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Abstract
The first substantive chapter (II) addresses the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS, 
with reference to sub-Saharan Africa. The framework is designed to capture some 
interactions between the formal and the informal sector, and -  reflecting open capital 
markets of many economies affected by HIV/AIDS -  to address the implications of 
capital mobility. Additionally, our study is the first academic study of the growth impact 
of scaling up antiretroviral treatment. Allowing for capital mobility, our analysis returns a 
stronger impact of HIV/AIDS on output and income per capita than the corresponding 
closed-economy models. The estimated impact on the informal sector is more 
pronounced than for the formal sector, reflecting a stronger impact of HIV/AIDS on 
savings rates. GDP per capita is lower in the scenario with comprehensive scaling-up of 
antiretroviral treatment, as rising costs of care and treatment affect savings rates.
Chapter III adapts a microeconomic framework with forward-looking agents to study 
the contributions of health, as well as income, to living standards, drawing on empirical 
work on the value o f statistical life. For leading industrialized countries, the contribution 
of health over long periods of time has been of similar magnitude as rising incomes, but 
the contribution of health has slowed down since about 1950. For developing countries, 
the slowdown occurred somewhat later. HIV/AIDS has resulted in steep declines in 
living standards in a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
Chapter IV focuses on the impact of capital-deepening arising from falling relative 
prices of ICT equipment. The estimated impact of ICT-related capital deepening on 
growth in developing countries is substantial (about 0.3 percentage points), although 
lower than comparable estimates for leading industrialized countries. Unlike in some 
industrialized countries, the impact of ICT-related capital deepening has not slowed down 
after 2000, owing to growing absorption of communications equipment.
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I. I n t r o d u c t io n
The studies included in this thesis contribute to the literature on economic growth in the 
context of economic development. Specifically, they address three areas.
Chapter II focuses on the impact o f  HIV/AIDS on economic growth. It provides a 
comprehensive survey of the academic literature on health and growth (Chapter II. 1), with 
particular emphasis on studies focusing on the impacts of HIV/AIDS, and an analysis of the 
macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS (Chapter II.2) that -  among other issues -  provides 
the first available analysis of the growth impacts of increased access to treatment. The 
chapter also discusses the role of assumptions regarding the extent of capital mobility, and -  
within the constraints of a 2-sector growth model -  points at some of the distributional 
implications of HIV/AIDS.
Chapter III deals with the roles o f  health and economic growth in economic development 
more generally. Unlike Chapter II (especially II. 1), which focuses on the impact of health on 
growth, Chapter III reviews the contributions of both to living standards. Chapter III. 1 lays 
the ground, with a review of the available academic literature. Chapter III.2 presents an 
analytical framework, and compares the properties of this framework with some of the 
approaches adopted in the literature. In addition to updating some earlier work on the 
contributions of rising income and growth to living standards over long periods of time in 
advanced industrialized countries, it addresses the contributions of improved health 
standards, as well as rising incomes, to living standards globally since 1950. It considers the 
adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS in a number of country (as the epidemic represents a health 
development that stands out in the post-1950 period as a reversal in otherwise positive 
developments in key health indicators over time and across countries).
Chapter IV addresses the growth impact of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs), with particular emphasis on developing countries. Most of the available literature, 
summarized in Chapter IV. 1, focuses on the United States and other OECD countries. An 
important constraint for the analysis of the economic impact of ICTs in developing countries 
is the lack of relevant national accounts data. Chapter IV.2 therefore discusses the 
availability of data, and describes the dataset constructed to analyse the impact of ICT.
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Chapter IV.3 presents a model designed to analyse the growth impacts of ICT-related capital 
deepening in developing countries (i.e., it draws on a relatively small set of macroeconomic 
variables), and presents estimates of the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening for these 
countries, as well as comparisons with middle- and high-income countries.
Chapter V concludes.
A. Health, HIV/AIDS, and Economic Growth
The body of work this chapter draws from and contributes to (see, for example, Haacker 
(2004, 2008a)) was motivated by the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and -  in particular -  in Southern Africa. The ongoing epidemic represents the most severe 
reversal in health standards recorded for a major region since 1950 (when the data we use 
start). In order to assess the macroeconomic and development prospects of countries 
significantly affected by HIV/AIDS, it is therefore necessary to understand the implications 
of HIV/AIDS in these countries.1
Chapter II. 1 sets the stage for our discussion, summarizing key indicators for the 
demographic impact o f HIV/AIDS, and discussing the relevant literature. As the economic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS derive from its impacts on health, the broader literature on the impacts 
of health on economic growth is also relevant. Our survey therefore sets out by reviewing the 
academic literature on health and growth. However, the health impact of HIV/AIDS does not 
simply represent a reversal of health gains achieved in the course of development, as the 
epidemic does have health impacts which, in important respects, differ from other health 
conditions.2 For this reason, and in light of the strong impact of HIV/AIDS on key health 
indicators in sub-Saharan Africa, many studies focus on the impact of HIV/AIDS on growth, 
and Chapter II.2 closes with a discussion of this literature.
1 An Appendix to Chapter II. 1, reprinted from Haacker (2008b), provides an introduction to the epidemiology 
and impact o f  HIV/AIDS, and provides a brief discussion o f  the international response to the epidemic.
2 For example, HIV/AIDS does have a strong impact on mortality among young adults, whereas many other 
health conditions affect primarily infants, young children and old people.
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Chapter II.2 provides an analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS on output and income per 
capita. The first part develops an analytical framework, designed to address two aspects of 
the impact of HIV/AIDS. First, the countries with the highest rates of HIV prevalence can 
arguably be characterized as dual economies, in which a formal sector coexists with an 
informal, largely agricultural, sector that provides the livelihood of a large share of the 
population, but generates an income per capita that is much lower than incomes in the formal 
sector. Second, in many studies of the impact of HIV/AIDS, an increase in the capital-labor 
ratio (tied to a slowdown in the rate of population growth) plays a major role in the economic 
assessment. However, most of the highly affected countries are characterized by a large 
degree of capital mobility, which means that the postulated increase in the capital-labor ratio 
may not materialize. Our analysis therefore contrasts the impacts of HIV/AIDS in an open- 
economy setting (with perfect capital mobility, at least for the formal sector) with a more 
conventional closed-economy setting. The second part of Chapter II.2 provides an 
assessment of the economic impact of HIV/AIDS, calibrating the model in line with the latest 
available evidence. One notable feature of our analysis is a discussion of the implications of 
increasing access to antiretroviral treatment, which has so far not been addressed in the 
academic literature.
B. Contribution of Health (and Income) to Living Standards
While the interactions between health and income are complex,3 improvements in both 
incomes and health have arguably played important roles in improving living standards. In 
Chapter III, we assess the contributions of improved health and incomes to rising living 
standards, treating both as outcomes of the development process, without attempting to 
identify fundamental causes of the improvements in either dimension.
Chapter III. 1 describes the heritage that our analysis draws from. The central concept is 
that of an agent with an intertemporal utility function, valuing income (because it enables
3 See Chapter II. 1 for a survey o f the literature on the impacts o f health on income. Deaton (2003,2006) 
provides more comprehensive discussions o f the interactions between health and income, also covering the role 
o f inequality.
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higher utility from consumption) and health (in the form of reduced mortality, as it increases 
the likelihood of experiencing anticipated utility streams in the future). The microeconomic 
branch of the literature we draw from expands on this concept, refining it -  for example -  by 
exploring the age-dependence of trade-offs between income and mortality risks or the 
interactions between the trade-offs between income and mortality risks on one hand and the 
shape of the utility function on the other hand. The empirical branch of this literature 
primarily links observed differences in wage rates to employment-specific mortality risks, in 
order to derive valuations of incremental mortality risks, which can be extrapolated to yield 
estimates of the “value of statistical life.”4 The macroeconomic branch of the literature draws 
on the microeconomic and empirical literature, applying estimates of the “value of statistical 
life” to assessing the contributions of rising life expectancy (or reduced mortality) and 
incomes to living standards.
Within this context, our own analysis (Chapter III.2) largely belongs to the 
macroeconomic branch of the literature. The first part of the paper develops the analytical 
framework and, based on a review of the available literature, motivates the functional form 
and the parameters adopted in our analysis. One area in which our analysis contributes to the 
literature on the methodological side concerns the analysis of discrete changes in life 
expectancy. The latter part of the paper investigates the contributipn of increased life 
expectancy to living standards in different contexts. We first discuss this in the context of the 
economic development of major industrialized countries, updating earlier work by Crafts
(1997). Second, we discuss the contributions of increasing life expectancy and economic 
growth to improvements in living standards globally since 1950. Third, noting the apparent 
declines in living standards in a number of countries since about 1990 which can be 
attributed to the impact of the evolving HIV epidemic, a section of Chapter III.2 provides a 
more substantial discussion of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on living standards.
4 For a comprehensive survey o f the available literature, see Viscusi and Aldy (2003), which also covers studies 
o f the value o f statistical life not based on labor market data. The principle that data on valuations o f  (quasi) 
incremental mortality risks convey information on valuations o f life was introduced by Schelling (1968).
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C. ICT Equipment Investment and Growth in Development
Our discussion sets out with an analysis of the academic literature on the growth impacts of 
advances in ICTs, most notably of ICT-related capital deepening associated with falling 
prices of ICT equipment (Chapter IV. 1). As limited availability of sufficiently disaggregated 
national accounts data acts as a constraint to comprehensive economic assessments of the 
economic impacts of advances in ICTs in developing countries, Chapter IV. 1 is devoted to a 
discussion of the data used in our analysis. Chapter IV.3 provides an assessment of the role 
of advances in ICTs in developing countries. One section focusing on the “steady-state” 
impact, that also provides comparisons with middle- and high-income countries, is 
complemented by an analysis of the growth impacts of ICTs through ICT-related capital 
deepening over time.
Most of the literature on the economic impacts of information technologies, and on the 
growth impacts of ICT-related capital-deepening which are the focus of our analysis, 
originates in the United States. Our survey of the literature (Chapter IV. 1) therefore sets out 
with a review of the literature relating to the United States, before discussing cross-country 
studies (largely relating to OECD and EU countries), including issues that are specific to 
country comparisons, such as the consistency of data across countries. While our primary 
interest is the impact of ICTs in developing countries, the discussion of the literature 
addressing this directly is brief, reflecting the small number of such studies. Chapter IV.3 
closes with a discussion of studies on the productivity effects of ICT-related capital- 
deepening on the sectoral level, which have refined the understanding of the impacts of ICTs 
in advanced economies, but -  owing to limited availability of data -  do not offer a template 
for our analysis geared towards the impacts of ICTs in developing countries.
One considerable constraint to the analysis of the economic impacts of ICTs, and -  in 
particular -  the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening is the lack of sufficiently detailed 
national accounts data in most developing countries. Chapter IV.2 is therefore devoted to a 
discussion of the available data, and to a documentation of the dataset constructed to support 
the subsequent analysis. The most important source of data for our purposes are trade data, 
exploiting that missing data on trade flows can frequently be proxied by the corresponding 
data from partner countries (see, for example, Feenstra and others, 2005). However, our
16
approach goes beyond the existing approaches, by accounting for bias that occurs when 
partner country data are substituted for missing countries. Another important type of data 
required for our analysis are data on prices of ICT equipment. In this regard, our price series 
are based on official price indices from the United States, as the national accounts data for 
the United States are arguably the most advanced in terms of measuring advances in ICTs, 
and as ICT equipment can be regarded as highly tradable (see Schreyer, 2002). However, 
regarding communications equipment, our analysis reflects recent advances not fully 
captured in the official price data for the United States (see, for example, Dorns (2005)).
Chapter IV.3 provides an assessment of the macroeconomic impact of advances in ICTs 
through capital deepening in developing countries, drawing on two building blocks. The first 
is the existing body of work on accounting for the sources of economic growth (particularly 
several studies by or associated with Dale Jorgenson). Regarding the economic impacts of 
advances in ICTs, two key features of this approach are (1) the recognition that falling prices 
of ICT equipment translate into high rates of growth of the stock of ICT equipment (at 
constant prices), and thus disproportionate contributions to economic growth, and (2) that the 
rates of return to different types of assets should be equal.5 This means, in the present 
context, that the gross rate of return of ICT-related assets, in equilibrium, is higher than for 
other assets, reflecting the rapid decline of relative prices of ICT equipment (similar to 
effects of high rates of physical depreciation, rather than economic obsolescence). The 
second building block is the dataset on ICT-related spending presented in Chapter IV.2.
Chapter IV.3 sets out with a presentation of the analytical framework, building on the 
work by Jorgenson and others but adapting it in light of the limited availability of data 
(notably for the labor market) for our countries of interest. This is followed by an analysis of 
the steady-state properties of the model, and of the impacts of productivity shocks (i.e., 
shocks to the relative prices of ICT equipment) over time, using perturbation techniques. The 
framework is used for an analysis of the impacts of falling prices of ICTs in steady state 
(including comparisons with high-income countries), and an assessment of the evolution of
5 See, for example, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) for an exposition. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) includes an 
updated discussion.
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the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening over time (1991-2006). We also provide a brief 
discussion of the growth implications of productivity gains in the production of ICT 
equipment, though this is not the focus of the chapter (as few developing countries feature an 
economically significant ICT-producing sector).
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II. 1. H e a l t h , HIV/AIDS a n d  G r o w t h : L it e r a t u r e  S u r v e y
A. Introduction
The ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic, owing to its severe impact in terms of health and 
increasing mortality, the social and demographic consequences, and the complexities of the 
response, is regarded as a threat to development in many low-income countries, most notably 
in sub-Saharan Africa where most countries with high HIV prevalence are located.6 The 
present chapter discusses the available economic literature regarding the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS on economic growth.
Below, we will proceed in three broad steps. First, we present some data describing the 
state of the epidemic and its demographic impacts. For sub-Saharan Africa, the region where 
HIV prevalence has been highest, we also review recent trends in economic growth and 
discuss whether or to what extent the impact of HIV/AIDS can explain those trends.
Second, the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS occur -  directly or indirectly -  through its 
impacts on health, i.e. increasing morbidity (i.e., decreasing state of health) among the 
population or increased mortality. For this reason, it makes sense to begin our discussion of 
the broader literature on the impacts of HIV/AIDS on economic growth with a summary of 
the literature on the effects of health on economic growth. However, the lessons from this 
literature do not necessarily translate directly into our more specific context, as the profile of 
morbidity and mortality associated with HIV/AIDS differs from that of many other diseases, 
and HIV/AIDS cannot simply be interpreted as reversal of previous health gains.7
6 The Appendix, from Haacker (2008), provides an overview o f  the epidemiology and impact o f  and the 
international response to HFV/AIDS. Haacker (2004a) is the most comprehensive discussion o f  macroeconomic 
effects o f HIV/AIDS so far.
7 A point also made by Acemoglu and Johnson (2006), who observe that “most o f  the diseases [their study 
focuses on] had the greatest impact on children (with the notable exception o f  tuberculosis), while HIV/AIDS 
affects individuals at the peak o f  their labor productivity . . .”
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Finally, we turn to the literature focusing directly on the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS. 
We first review the small set of empirical studies reviewing the impacts of HIV/AIDS on 
growth directly. Our discussion of applied studies based on macroeconomic models designed 
to capture the impacts of HIV/AIDS distinguishes three types of models: (1) studies adopting 
a growth-accounting framework inspired by the neoclassical growth model, (2) studies with a 
more elaborate sectoral structure (CGE models, also large-scale macroeconomic models 
developed for a different purpose but adapted to study the impacts of HIV/AIDS), and 
studies in which key variables reflect forward-looking behavior of economic agents.
A concluding section summarizes our findings and provides some pointers for future 
work.
B. HIV/AIDS and Growth -  Basic Data
To provide some context for our discussion, we summarize the most important data and 
estimates regarding the state of the global HIV/AIDS epidemic, and discuss the recent 
growth experience in some of the most affected countries. (The Appendix, taken from 
Haacker (2008), provides further background material.) Table 1 shows the latest available 
estimates of HIV prevalence for a number of countries with high HIV prevalence for the 
population of ages 15-49,8 as well as for selected countries with a high absolute number of 
people living with HIV/AIDS.
8 For a more extensive discussion o f how to interpret these population averages, see Haacker (2004b) or Epstein 
(2004).
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Table 1. The Demographic Im pact of HIV/AIDS in Selected Countries
HIV preva­
lence, ages 
15-49 
(Percent)
Crude 
death 
rate  (Per 
1,000)
Crude 
death  rate: 
Im pact of 
HIV/AIDS
Popu­
lation
growth
(Percent)
Population 
G row th: 
Im pact of 
HIV/AIDS
Life 
Expectancy 
a t Birth 
(Years)
Life Expectancy: 
Im pact of 
HIV/AIDS 
(Years)
2007 2000-05 2000-05 2000-05 2000-05 2000-05 2000-05
Botswana 23.9 16.3 10.6 1.2 -1.1 46.6 -20.4
Central African Republic 6.3 19.4 5.8 1.6 -0.6 43.3 -10.1
Democratic Republic of
Congo 1.2-1.5 19.3 1.8 2.9 -0.2 45.0 -3.0
Lesotho 23.2 17.7 9.4 1.0 -1.0 44.6 -19.3
Malawi 11.9 17.5 8.0 2.6 -0.8 45.0 -16.5
Mozambique 12.5 19.2 5.3 2.4 -0.5 44.0 -8.9
Namibia 15.3 12.9 7.5 1.4 -0.8 51.5 -16.8
Nigeria 3.1 17.5 1.4 2.5 -0.1 46.6 -2.4
South Africa 18.1 13.5 6.5 1.1 -0.7 53.4 -12.7
Swaziland 26.1 17.2 10.0 1.2 -1.1 43.9 -19.8
Tanzania 6.2 14.6 4.1 2.6 -0 .4 49.7 -8.6
Zambia 15.2 21.7 9.3 1.9 -0.9 39.2 -15.6
Zimbabwe 15.3 20.5 14.0 0.7 -1.4 40.0 -25.8
Memorandum item s:
Global Average 0.8 8.8 n.a. 1.24 n.a. 66.0 n.a.
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 15.7 n.a. 2.47 n.a. 48.8 n.a.
Source: UNAIDS (2008) for HIV prevalence, UN Population Division (2007a) for dem ographic indicators and estim ates of 
dem ographic impact of HIV/AIDS. The estim ates by UN Population Division (2007a) are  based on earlier estim ates of HIV 
prevalence (UNAIDS/WHO (2006)), which have subsequently  been revised substantially in som e cases (e.g ., Central African 
Republic, Swaziland, Zimbabwe). The estim ates of the impact of HIV/AIDS are based on the difference betw een the 
estim ates of actual dem ographic variables and a counterfactual "no AIDS" scenario included in UN Population Division 
(2007). The changes in dem ographic indicators shown are som ew hat lower than  the  gross im pact of HIV/AIDS, as som e 
people whose d eaths are attributed  to  HIV/AIDS would die for o ther reasons in the  no-AIDS scenario. For a detailed 
discussion of the assum ptions underlying the estim ates of the im pacts of HIV/AIDS, see UN Population Division (2007b).
There are several lessons that can be drawn from Table 1. First, the impact o f HIV/AIDS 
is extremely severe in the high-prevalence countries, where HIV/AIDS-related mortality 
accounts for the majority o f all deaths in 6 o f 10 countries. As illustrated in Figure 1, this 
increase in mortality appears even more pronounced when data disaggregated by age (or sex) 
are considered (Figure 1), with HIV/AIDS resulting in a manifold increase in mortality 
among the working-age population, most notably between ages 30 and 39.
Figure 1. Zam bia: HIV/AIDS and Mortality by Age and Sex 
2000-05
M d a n o A I D S  
Fem ale, no  A ID S 
M a la  including A ID S 
F e m a le  including A ID S
0.0  , , , , , , , , , , , ,
0 - 4  5 - 9  t)-W  B - B  20-24  25-29  30 - 34 35-39  40-44  45 -4 9  50 - 54 55-59
Age g ro u p
Source: Authors calculations, based on UN Population Division (2007a).
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Additionally, Table 1 summarizes estimates of the impact of HIV/AIDS on demographic 
variables which are frequently considered among determinants of economic growth, namely 
population growth and life expectancy.9 We see that estimated population growth declines 
substantially for the high-prevalence countries, by between 0.5 and 1.4 percentage points, 
dropping by about one-half for the 4 countries featuring the highest HIV prevalence rates. 
One of the most striking aspects of the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS is the steep drop in 
life expectancy experienced in many countries, averaging 17 years for the 10 countries with 
the highest HIV prevalence rates, and in some cases wiping out health gains made over half a 
century.
Compared with the steep declines in life expectancy and other health indicators, GDP 
growth has held up fairly well. Figure 2 illustrates trends in GDP growth from 1990 for the 
10 countries with the highest HIV prevalence rates at end-2005 (all in sub-Saharan Africa), 
as well as average GDP growth for sub-Saharan Africa. We do not see a dramatic decline in 
GDP growth in countries with high HIV prevalence, although the data suggest that growth in 
these 10 countries has decelerated somewhat relative to the average for sub-Saharan Africa.10
Regarding changes in GDP per capita, the picture is similar (Figure 3). This seems 
surprising at first sight, as one would expect that increasing mortality associated with 
HIV/AIDS would result in lower population growth, so that the slowdown in the growth of 
GDP per capita (if any) is less pronounced than the decline in GDP growth. However, many 
of the countries with high HIV prevalence are further advanced in the demographic
9 It is important to stress that the estimates o f the demographic impact o f HIV/AIDS shown in Table 1 are 
generated by demographic and epidemiological models using a range o f assumptions regarding the underlying 
demographics, and epidemiological and medical aspects o f HIV/AIDS. Any inferences regarding relationships 
between the data shown would primarily reflect features o f the underlying model. See Deaton (2006, p. 15 and 
Fig. 2) for a similar point regarding the pitfalls associated with the use o f generated demographic variables.
10 It is worth pointing out some special factors that resulted in various “outliers” in Figure 2. Growth in 
Swaziland is high in the early years shown because it benefited from foreign direct investment serving the 
South African market until the end o f apartheid, developments in Botswana are dominated by the diamond 
sector, and the collapse in economic growth in Zimbabwe in the later years shown is attributed by most 
observers to the adverse impact o f economic policies.
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transition, with higher life expectancies (before the arrival o f HIV/AIDS) and lower fertility 
rates than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. For this reason, the slowdown in population 
growth in the countries with high HIV prevalence is actually lower than the average for sub- 
Saharan Africa, and the decline in the growth rate o f real GDP per capita relative to the 
average for sub-Saharan Africa less pronounced, compared to the slowdown in real GDP 
growth.
Figure 2. Real GDP Growth in 10 Countries With High HIV Prevalence  
(Average annual growth in 5-year period ending in year indicated)
-7 “I   1 ,  T T T , T T T , T , ,------
1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: IMF, 2008._____________________________________________________
Figure 3. Real GDP Growth per Capita in 10 Countries W ith High HIV Prevalence  
~  (Average annual growth in 5-year period ending in year indicated)_________
- 7  -I I » T T T T ,  ,  T T ,  , ,  , r —
1990 1995 2000 2005
Source: IMF, 2008._____________________________________________________
as the fact that HIV/AIDS accounts for the most significant swings in life expectancy in 
sub-Saharan Africa in recent years allows us to complement our informal discussion about
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the growth experience of countries with HIV high prevalence with a closer look at the data. 
To this end, we create a dataset for 41 countries,11 including estimates of the growth of GDP 
per capita from IMF (2008) and estimates of life expectancy from UN Population Division 
(2007a) for the five-year periods ending in 1985, 1990,1995, 2000. Overall, the apparent 
impact of HIV/AIDS on growth of GDP per capita is weak. For the set of 41 countries, we 
obtain a significant link between the change in life expectancy and growth -  a drop in life 
expectancy of 6 years is associated with a decline in GDP growth by one percentage point. 
However, this correlation is largely accounted for by the 3 outliers identified in our 
discussion of Figs. (2) and (3), i.e., Botswana, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, which feature 
large swings in GDP growth arguably not related to the impact of HIV/AIDS. If these 
countries are excluded, the coefficients turn insignificant and -  once country dummies are 
included -  negative.
Table 2. GDP Growth and Life Expectancy
D ependent variable: Growth of Real GDP per Capita
Change in Life Expectancy 
Change in Log Life Expectancy
0.17***
(3.25)
0.17**
(2.49)
0.06*
(1 .77)
0 .06
(1 .60)
Time dum m ies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dum m ies included No Yes No Yes
N um ber of observations 205 205 205 205
R2 0.11 0.41 0.11 0.41
Change in Life Expectancy 
Change in Log Life Expectancy
0.08
(0 .59)
-0.05
(-0 .27)
0.03
(0 .44)
-0 .03
(-0 .34)
Time dum m ies included Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dum m ies included No Yes NO Yes
Num ber of observations 1 9 0 ' 190 190 190
R2 0.34 0.46 0.34 0.46
Source: Author's estim ates . One, 2, and 3 s ta rs  indicate es tim ated  coefficients significant on a 
10-, 5-, and 1-percent level of confidence. The second se t of regressions, based  on 190 
observations, excludes d ata  for Botsw ana, Swaziland, and Zim babw e.
11 The dataset consists o f the 44 countries subsumed under sub-Saharan Africa by the IMF, excluding Eritrea 
and Liberia (GDP data unavailable for at least part o f the period under consideration), and Seychelles (estimates 
o f  life expectancy unavailable).
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C. Health and Growth
As the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS occur, directly or indirectly, through its impacts on 
health, the literature on health and growth provides a useful background for our discussion of 
the macroeconomic effects of HIV/AIDS. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 
health impact of HIV/AIDS, affecting primarily working-age adults, with a long 
asymptomatic period followed by a relatively short period with high mortality (at least in the 
absence of treatment), is quite different from the health developments that motivated much of 
the literature on health and growth, and that lessons regarding the economic impact from 
general “health and growth” studies do not necessarily or directly translate into predictions 
regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on growth.
Our exposition of the literature on the impacts of health and growth proceeds in three 
steps. First, we discuss the impact of health or related demographic changes in a simple 
theoretical growth framework, identifying different channels through which health may 
affect growth. Second, we review some broad discussions of the theory and determinants of 
economic growth and consider the role of health in these frameworks. Third, we discuss a 
number of studies focusing on the impact of health on growth.
Health in the neoclassical growth framework
A useful workhorse for conceptualizing the impact of health on growth (and one frequently 
referred to in the relevant literature) is the framework developed by Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992), in short MRW, which augments the classical Solow growth model by allowing 
for accumulation of human as well as physical capital, with an aggregate production function 
of the form
Y ,= k : h ? (A ,E L ,ta- \  (1)
where 7, K, H , and L stand for aggregate output, the stock of physical capital, the stock of 
human capital, and the size of the labor force.12 One addition to the MRW framework we 
introduce is the introduction of an efficiency parameter E, which stands for the effectiveness
12 Sala-i-Martin (2005) also provides a discussion o f different impacts o f health on income or growth.
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of labor inputs, in addition to a productivity parameter A capturing technological progress 
(assumed to grow at rate g). Dividing through by effective units of labor AEL, the production 
function becomes
y ,= K h> , (2)
Y K Hwhere y, = -------, k, = -------, and h, = -------. The accumulation of k  and h is described by
' AEL ' AEL 1 AEL
k t = sky - ( n  + g + 8k)k , and (3)
ht =shy - ( n  + g + dh)h.  (4)
This means that the accumulation of physical capital (relative to effective units of labor) 
depends on investments (= savings, sk) in physical capital and a term that captures the
depreciation of physical capital bk and the dilution that occurs through growth n in the size
of the labor force L and technological progress (with A growing at rate g). The terms in the 
equation describing the accumulation of human capital are defined correspondingly.
One further extension to the MRW framework is embodied in Eqs. (3) and (4), as we 
allow the depreciation rates of physical capital ( 8k) and human capital ( bh) to differ.
Specifically, we think of bh as the mortality rate among the population, with the following
reasoning (abstracting, for a moment, from technological progress g). To maintain some 
capital-labor ratio, it is necessary to make investments to increase the capital stock by the 
same rate as the population growth rate n. However, human capital is embodied in people. To 
retain a constant level in h, it is therefore necessary to make investments shy  to bring new
entrants to the labor force “up to speed” with their peers. The rate at which new workers 
enter the labor force is equal to the (net) growth rate of the labor force n, plus the rate at 
which new entrants replace workers who died, 8h, which motivates our interpretation of the 
depreciation rate for human capital.
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To link key parameters of the growth model to health indicators, it makes sense to 
operate in terms of birth rates and mortality rates, rather than the rate of population growth 
(affected by births and deaths) and mortality. We therefore define the birth rate p and the 
mortality rate co. The parameters of the growth model are linked to these demographic/health 
variables as n = p -c o , and 8h -  co. Substituting for n and 8h, in Eqs. (3) and (4) yields
k t = ^ y - ( p - c o + g  + 6/t)A:, and (5)
h t =s hy - ( \ i  + g)h .  (6)
Solving Eqs. (2), (3), and (4) for the steady state level of output per efficiency unit yields
y t =
/  \  
Sk
1-a-p /  \
(n-w+g+gj U+sJ
l-a -0
(7)
Additionally, one could be interested in output per capita (Y/L), which -  along the steady- 
state growth path -  follows
\ L j
= AEy; = AE
p-co  + g  + 5
l-a-G
V + g.
1 -a-p
(8)
In the framework described by Eqs. (1) -  (6), changes in health can affect the steady-state 
level of output along numerous channels.
• An increase in mortality rates would increase GDP per capita through its impact on 
the accumulation of physical capital (Eq. (5)). As more people depart from the labor 
force, the capital/labor ratio increases.
• A decline in birth rates would raise GDP per capita through its impact on physical 
capital accumulation, as the existing capital stock is less diluted by new arrivals
(Eq. (5)). At the same time, it would become less expensive to sustain a given level of 
human capital; alternatively, for given investment rates in human capital, the steady 
state level of h would rise ((Eq. (6)).13
13 It is important not to equate birth rates with fertility rates (i.e., the average number o f  children a women 
bears). As birth rates are defined as the ratio o f births to population size, an increase in mortality can result in an
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• An increase in the (average) efficiency of labor E, as a result of a deteriorating health 
state among the population, would decrease Y/L.
• A decline in the investment rate in physical capital, to accommodate higher health 
expenditures or reflecting a deteriorating economic outlook, would result in a decline 
in the steady-state capital stock and output per capita.14
• A decline in the investment rate in human capital would result in a decline in h. In 
addition to the factors noted for physical capital, the decline in human capital could 
also reflect a more pessimistic outlook regarding the expected returns to human 
capital (which decline as expected mortality increases).
• Additionally, a decline in the health outlook may reduce the steady-state growth 
rate g, for example, if there is a feedback effect from human capital to the rate of 
technological progress.
Additionally, transitional effects may arise. In particular, a sudden increase in mortality rates 
or a one-off mortality shock associated with an epidemic may result in a temporary increase 
Yin —, as the denominator slows down or declines whereas Y only gradually adjusts towards 
L
the new equilibrium path.
Health in some general studies of economic growth
To gain a perspective on the role of health in the state of research on economic growth, it is 
useful to sample some broader studies of determinants of economic growth. Complementing 
our preceding discussion of different channels through which health may affect growth, this 
overview of the non-specific literature also provides pointers as to which aspects of health 
identified above are normally considered the most relevant ones.
Temple (1999), in a review of “the new growth evidence,” discusses health in the context 
of human capital, also making reference to the MRW framework. However, much of the 
discussion focuses on the role of education. While noting that “variables like life expectancy
increase in the birth rate if  it primarily affects people after child-bearing age. On the other hand, an epidemic 
would reduce birth rates if  behavioral changes, increased mortality, or lower health states among women o f  
child-bearing age results in a drop in the number o f pregnancies, or if  increased morbidity results in fewer 
successful pregnancies.
14 For simplicity, we focus on the direct effects do not discuss cross-effects between h and k.
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are often used in growth regressions,” he points out that “their role is never justified by a 
well-articulated theory.” A more recent discussion of the state of growth empirics, Bosworth 
and Collins (2003), largely equate human capital with educational attainment, but include life 
expectancy “as a measure of health.” Another health-related variable they capture is the rate 
of population growth.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997) do not discuss health explicitly in their discussion of the 
state of growth theory, but capture it in their empirical analysis of a cross section of 
countries, using “an empirical framework that relates the real per capita growth rate to [...] 
the stock of human capital in the forms of educational attainment and health,” proxied by life 
expectancy at birth (p. 421). They point out, however, that “it is likely that life expectancy 
has such a strong, positive relation with growth because it proxies for features other than 
health [...] [such as] better work habits and a higher level of skills. In addition to life 
expectancy, Barro and Sala-i-Martin include fertility rates in some regressions (see our 
discussion of the MRW framework, above), but do not motivate it explicitly. Another 
monograph from the same period, Aghion and Howitt’s Endogenous Growth Theory (1997), 
does not discuss the role of health explicitly. However, as they discuss a range of models in 
which agents optimize over their planning horizons, the discussion could be extended in a 
fairly straightforward manner to account for changes in mortality or life expectancy.
Among the more recent monographs, Weil (2004) discusses health as one of the forms of 
human capital (the other being education), in a similar way as Temple (1999) or Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1997). Similar to Weil’s more specific work (e.g., Weil (2007)), he discusses 
the impact of health on productivity. Additionally, he provides some discussion of the 
interactions of health and income (with higher income also “buying” better health, and of the 
links between climate, disease, and productivity. For Helpman (2004), health does not feature 
directly as a ingredient to the “mystery of economic growth,” as it is largely focusing on the 
determinants of growth among the most developed countries.
The edited volume by Aghion and Durlauf (2005) includes some thorough discussions of 
numerous aspects and strands of the theory of economic growth, although none of them
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focuses on the role of health.15 Durlauf, Johnson, and Temple (2005) focus on 
methodological aspects of growth empirics, and health does not feature in that discussion. 
However, they summarize the variables used in a large number of empirical studies. Life 
expectancy appears as the most common “health indicator” used in the literature, others 
include the prevalence of malaria and survival rates (i.e., the probability of reaching some 
agey, starting at age x). In addition, demographic (and health-related) variables such as 
dependency rates and fertility play a role in some studies. Caselli (2005), in his discussion of 
“accounting for cross-country income differences,” discusses the “health status of the labor 
force” as a component of human capital. He finds that “while the results with the adult 
mortality rate strongly imply that a correction for differences in health status is a first-order 
requirement in the measurement of human capital, those using birth weight are much less 
supportive.” In light of the shortcomings of the studies surveyed, he calls for further work 
“with more accurate indicators of health and more precisely calibrated parameters.” Another 
health-related variable discussed by Caselli (2005) is “experience,” i.e. the average level of 
work experience among the population, a variable that is influenced by demographic and 
health variables. Baneijee and Duflo (2005) focus on the direct impacts of health on 
productivity, quoting a number of micro-econometric studies linking the productivity of 
individuals to certain health characteristics.
Studies specifically addressing the impact of health on economic growth
The study of the impact of health on growth is complicated by an apparent interdependency 
between health and income. Notably, there is a broad literature focusing on the role of 
income in attaining good health.16 Additionally, the correlation between health and growth 
(or income) may reflect underlying factors that affect both health and growth (Deaton, 2006). 
With these caveats, we first turn to the empirical literature that aims to identify the links 
between health and economic outcomes, largely by focusing on microeconomic evidence.
We then discuss a number of studies on the links between health and growth that use an
15 One relevant chapter, Galor (2005), is discussed in the section on health and growth, below.
16 See Preston (1975) and Pritchett and Summers (1996) for important contributions, or Deaton (2003) for a 
recent review o f the literature.
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approach that can be broadly captured along the lines of our discussion of the neoclassical 
framework, above. A number of studies, summarized next, use a somewhat more 
sophisticated approach, with forward-looking agents whose behavior is affected by the 
(anticipated) state of health. Finally, we discuss some studies allowing for more complex 
interactions, between health, demographics, and development.
Many of the key issues regarding the link between health and economic outcomes are 
discussed in a comprehensive (now somewhat outdated) survey by Strauss and Thomas
(1998). They stress the complex linkage between health inputs and outputs, as “health varies 
over the life course and is the outcome of behavioral choices both during childhood and in 
later life.” Also, they stress that health is “fundamentally multidimensional,” and point at the 
challenges of measuring health, including the fact that the “measurement error is likely to be 
correlated with outcomes of interest like income” (a point also made by Deaton, 2006). One 
of the lessons from the empirical literature they survey is that health appears to have a larger 
return at low levels of health.
A more recent review (Thomas and Frankenberg, 2002) find that “carefully designed 
random assignment studies in the laboratory and field provide compelling evidence that 
nutritional deficiency -  particularly iron deficiency -  reduces work capacity and, in some 
cases, work output.” Further, they note that “observational studies suggest that general 
markers of nutritional status, such as height and body mass index (BMI), are significant 
predictors of economic success although their interpretation is confounded by the fact that 
they reflect influences from early childhood and family background.”
T. Paul Schultz (2005) points at similar issues to those discussed earlier by Strauss and 
Thomas, including the lack of “consensus among health specialists on how to conceptualize 
and measure health status at the individual level,” the problem of measurement error, and 
interdependencies between productivity or income and health which make it difficult to 
identify causal relationships,17 and the fact that health outcomes may depend on factors 
throughout an individual’s lifetime, and not just on contemporaneous ones.
17 Much o f  the article discusses the use o f instrumental-variable techniques to address this issue.
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Regarding quantitative studies on the links between health and growth, Bloom, Canning, 
and Sevilla (2004) is a good starting point, as their approach can be interpreted well in terms 
of our exposition of health in the neoclassical growth model, above. The core equation they 
estimate is
y  —  AK azPg<M+<MxP+<t’3exP2+(Ml (9)
where the e^s+^ exP+h exP1+W js an efficiency parameter or a measure of human capital that 
includes measures of educational attainment (years of schooling, s), health (life 
expectancy, h), and “experience” of the workforce, which is motivated as a measure of skill 
but depends directly on the health state of the population (one reason to include it is to 
control for a potential indirect effect of health on productivity). They suggest that “a one-year 
improvement in a population’s life expectancy contributes to an increase of 4 percent in 
output.”18 Cole and Neumayer (2006) also focus on productivity rather than growth. Rather 
than using summary measures of health, they focus on specific aspects of health (malaria 
incidence, prevalence of malnutrition, and the share of the population with access to safe 
water).
Bhargava and others (2001) focus on the link between growth and the adult survival rate 
(i.e., the probability of surviving to age 60 after reaching age 15), which arguably is a better 
measure of health as it relates to productivity as it excludes child mortality. They find a 
positive effect of adult survival rates on GDP growth in low-income countries, while the 
impact appeared to be negligible for higher-income countries.19
One recent study of the links between health and growth (or development) is Lorentzen 
McMillan, and Wacziarg (2005), who look in some more detail at channels through which 
health may affect growth, especially investment, human capital accumulation, and fertility.
18 Additionally, Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2004) provide a survey o f 13 earlier growth accounting exercises. 
In that literature, an increase in life expectancy o f 5 years was associated with a growth rate that is between 0.0 
and 0.6 percentage points higher.
19 Similarly, Gyimah-Brempong and Wilson (2004) find that “the growth impact o f  health human capital 
decreases at relatively large endowments o f health stock.”
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They suggest that mortality is an important determinant in explaining growth (the 
coefficients cannot easily be interpreted, as three different measures of mortality are included 
in the regressions). Additionally, the authors suggest that adult mortality may affect fertility
9 ftrates, physical capital investment rates, and school enrolment.
Shastry and Weil (2003) and Weil (2007) follow a different approach to identify links 
between aggregate health measures and GDP per capita. The approach in Weil (2007), the 
more comprehensive of the two papers, involves transforming available estimates from 
microeconomic and historical studies on the link between height and labor productivity into 
estimates of more commonly used health indicators like adult survival rates.21 Weil finds that 
health differences account for about 10 percent of the cross-country variation in income.
Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) address the issue of interdependency of health outcomes 
and income by focusing on declines in mortality that can be attributed to the international 
epidemiological transition that began in the 1940s (i.e., changes in mortality that can be 
arguably attributed to medical innovations rather than economic factors). They find no 
evidence suggesting that the large exogenous increase in life expectancy led to a significant 
increase in per capita economic growth in the longer run. In the shorter run, the impact of 
reduced mortality appeared to be negative, as the population size expanded faster than GDP.
We have already made reference to some studies suggesting a link from health states to 
educational attainment (e.g., Miguel, 2005). A number of papers have developed a growth- 
theoretic framework focusing on the impact of changes in mortality on human capital 
accumulation and growth. The key channel from higher mortality to productivity in these 
models is the decline in the rate o f return on investments in human capital associated with 
higher mortality (this point is discussed in more detail in Haacker (2004b). Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Ryder, and Weil (2000) develop a model in which agent’s decisions to invest in human
20 Additionally, Lorentzen and others (2005) suggest that there may be a effect o f mortality on risk behavior, as 
measured by smoking rates or HIV prevalence.
21 A second set o f studies Weil (2007) considers regards the link between age at menarche (first menstrual 
period) and labor productivity.
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capital depend on the anticipated mortality. They suggest that the negative impact of 
increased mortality on schooling would double the elasticity of steady-state output with 
respect to changes in the mortality rate. Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) extends this approach in two 
directions, introducing endogenous fertility into the model and also allowing for endogenous 
mortality. She proposes that a decline in mortality results in a decline in demand for children 
and increases in investment in each child. Another study linking mortality, educational 
attainment, and fertility, along similar lines, is Soares (2005), although his paper is not 
primarily geared toward the growth implications. Blackburn and Cipriani (1998) also discuss 
the link between underlying mortality and growth in a model with endogenous fertility and 
mortality, featuring physical capital only. Van Zon and Muysken (2001, 2005) adopt an 
endogenous growth framework motivated by Lucas (1988); the key point from their analysis 
is that a shift in the health state of the population that necessitates higher health expenditures 
results in a shift of labor time to health care and a reduced consumption and growth.
Finally, we turn to a set of studies that feature more complex interactions between health, 
growth, and development. Many of these studies feature externalities and other economic 
interactions that can give rise to growth “take-offs,” but also development traps. Sala-i- 
Martin (2005) conveys much of the logic of this approach, arguing that (1) citizens of poor 
countries have little resources and incentives to improve the state of their health, and that 
poor health has “adverse effect on the growth potential of a country, [...] through the process 
of education and training, through the effects on other diseases, through the accumulation of 
physical capital, and through the efficiency of the economy.”
In several papers by Galor and Weil (1999, 2000) and Galor (2005), developing a 
“unified growth theory” describing the transition to the modem growth regime, an increase in 
returns to human capital, which results in increased investment in human capital (and, 
eventually, a decline in fertility) is one of the key factors enabling sustained growth. The 
state of health of the population, as it affects the returns to and the rate of investment in 
human capital, thus can affect the timing or the occurrence of a growth take-off, or the rate of 
growth. For example, Galor (2005) argues that “in light of the technologically-based rise in 
the demand for human capital in the second phase of the Industrial Revolution, however, the 
rise in the expected length of productive life has increased the potential rate of return to
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investments in children’s human capital, and thus re-enforced and complemented the 
inducement for investment in education and the associated reduction in fertility rates.”
One specific line of thinking about the interactions between health and growth is 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003), who postulate a link between disease 
environments during the period of European colonial expansion and economic and social 
institutions set up by the Europeans in the respective colonies, shaping the future course of 
economic development.
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D. HIV/AIDS and Growth
The adverse health impacts of HIV/AIDS have motivated a body of literature dealing 
specifically with the growth impacts of HIV/AIDS. The discussion of the links between 
health and growth already provides many pointers regarding the economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS, and indeed motivates much of the applied literature in this area. However, many 
of the findings of that literature do not necessarily translate directly to the study of the 
impacts of HIV/AIDS, as the health consequences of HIV/AIDS are different from those of 
many other health conditions which dominate the literature on health and growth.
One important difference between HIV/AIDS and other diseases regards the profile of 
HIV/AIDS-related mortality, which is concentrated among working-age adults, whereas the 
most significant other diseases affect primarily either children (especially of ages 0-5) and 
old people (also see Fig. 1). Many observers have expressed concerns that HIV/AIDS 
therefore could have an impact on production processes, as HIV/AIDS-related deaths 
disproportionally result in the loss of economically active people. More generally, the profile 
of mortality raises issues regarding the returns to human capital, as early mortality owing to 
HIV/AIDS means that the returns to investments in education decline.
The other key difference between HIV/AIDS and many other health conditions arises 
from the fact that HIV/AIDS is largely asymptomatic for many years, and that the 
progression to mortality, once the symptoms become apparent, is relatively fast. This 
distinguishes HIV/AIDS from many health conditions which are debilitating, but are not 
normally lethal. HIV/AIDS may therefore have a less pronounced impact on the efficiency of 
labor than is suggested by empirical studies linking productivity to summary health 
indicators.
Nevertheless, many of the issues addressed by the literature on health and growth are also 
relevant for the study of the impacts of HIV/AIDS. While there is a considerable number of 
studies focusing specifically on the impact of HIV/AIDS -  reflecting the perception of the
22 Owing to the increasing availability o f  ART in low-income countries, the character o f HIV/AIDS may shift 
more towards a chronic disease.
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catastrophic health impact of the epidemic in many countries, as well as the noted specifics 
of the impact of HIV/AIDS compared to general health conditions -  the approaches taken in 
this studies are therefore frequently drawing on the literature on health and growth.
To organize our discussion of the specific literature on HIV/AIDS and growth, we will 
distinguish four different aspects of that literature. First, we will discuss empirical studies of 
the impact of HIV/AIDS. Second, we will review studies adopting a growth-accounting 
framework inspired by the neoclassical growth model, similar to the one used to structure our 
discussion of the impact of health on growth and per-capita income, above. Third, we discuss 
a number of studies featuring a richer set of microeconomic underpinnings with forward 
looking agents, in which expectations regarding he economic and health impacts of 
HIV/AIDS may affect decisions on the accumulation of human capital or educational 
choices, or demographic variables like fertility rates. Finally, much of the literature on the 
economics of HIV/AIDS has been policy-oriented, and we take note of some studies which 
do not meet academic standards but nevertheless represent significant additions to the 
literature, as evident -  for example -  by quotations in later studies.
The empirical evidence regarding the effects of HIV/AIDS on economic growth is weak. 
One early study, Bloom and Mahal (1997), do not find any impact of HIV/AIDS on growth. 
However, from today’s perspective, the study suffers from serious shortcomings regarding 
the measurement of the key explanatory variable, the number of AIDS cases, which had been 
constructed by the authors from very preliminary data.23 Dixon and others (2001, 2002) 
provide some mixed evidence regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on growth, largely though
23 As Bloom and Mahal explain, “direct measures o f  the number o f  AIDS cases are not available for any 
country in our sample, with the exception o f  the United States.” Instead, they use estimates generated by an 
epidemiological model, and available data on HIV prevalence, largely from survey data at antenatal clinics. 
From today’s perspective, the latter would be regarded as a very unreliable indicator o f  national HIV 
prevalence, and the uncertainties are compounded by the use o f an epidemiological model to generate estimates 
o f  the number o f AIDS cases. Also, their sample -  extending through 1992 -  precedes the period in which 
HIV/AIDS-related mortality took o ff in many countries.
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the impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy,24 while the evidence regarding the link from life 
expectancy to growth is weaker. In a recent paper, Papageorgiou and Stoytcheva (2007) find 
a statistically significant but very small impact of the observed number of AIDS cases on 
GDP per worker (using numbers of reported AIDS cases from WHO/UN AIDS 
epidemiological fact sheets,25 not generated data as in Bloom and Mahal (1997)). One issue 
that is not addressed by the studies summarized is the potential role of outliers in the sample, 
which could be an important issue in light of the large shifts in economic growth rates in 
three of the countries with very high (possibly the highest) HIV prevalence rates arguably not 
related to HIV/AIDS, as discussed above.
While the evidence regarding the impacts of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita is very weak, 
some studies point at impacts of HIV/AIDS on workers’ productivity (see, e.g., Fox and 
others, 2005, or Morris, Burdge, and Cheevers (2001)). However, there is not sufficient 
evidence regarding the direct productivity effects across sectors at this time that would allow 
for drawing inferences regarding aggregate productivity effects.
The increasing recognition of HIV/AIDS as a serious development issue in the early 
1990s has motivated a “first wave” of studies analyzing the macroeconomic effects of 
HIV/AIDS. Two early studies apply a one-sector neoclassical growth model to assess the 
potential growth impacts of HIV/AIDS in Tanzania (Cuddington, 1993) and Malawi 
(Cuddington and Hancock, 1994). In addition to direct productivity effects (which could be 
interpreted as working time lost), labor productivity is assumed to depend on the age 
structure of the population, through an equation linking productivity of an individual worker 
to “experience.” Reflecting the uncertainty regarding the economic effects to HIV/AIDS, the 
two studies map a range of assumed changes in productivity and savings (to accommodate
24 This finding is not surprising, as the estimates o f life expectancy used by Dixon and others, from the World 
Bank’s World Development indicators, are based on estimates o f  HIV prevalence
25 One drawback o f  this approach is the possibility that the extent to which AIDS cases are reported may differ 
across countries or over time, and that this error is correlated with economic variables, e.g. when the coverage 
o f  surveillance is limited in poorer countries, or if countries with higher prevalence rates collect more extensive 
data.
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higher medical and related expenditures) into estimates of the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
growth. Cuddington, Hancock, and Rogers (1994) point at the possibility of multiple 
equilibria, as HIV/AIDS-related expenditures are proportionally larger (relative to GDP per 
capita) at lower levels of income, but note that multiple steady states do not occur for 
plausible parameter values.
Cuddington (1993b) and Cuddington and Hancock (1995) extend the analysis to a dual 
economy model with some labor market imperfection. While Cuddington (1993b) observes 
that labor market reforms may offset the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS, Cuddington and 
Hancock (1995) point at the positive partial impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita that 
arises if workers are drawn from the informal to the formal sector (to replace workers lost to 
HIV/AIDS), which in their model offset other adverse partial impacts, so that the overall 
impact is relatively small. Over (1992) extends the “dual economy” model by also allowing 
for different types of labor inputs, and uses this framework to discuss implications of the 
“socio-economic gradient” of the epidemic (here, the distribution of HIV/AIDS across 
classes of skills) for the macroeconomic impact.
Among the more recent study also adopting models similar to the neo-classical
frameworks just described are Macfarlan and Squerri (2001), Haacker (2002a, 2002b).
Macfarlan and Squerri, using a model building on Cuddington and Hancock (1995), project a
slowdown in non-mining GDP growth in Botswana of up to 4 percentage points by 2010,
about the same magnitude a their projected slowdown in the size of the working-age
population. One factor that they point at (though not model explicitly) is the role of natural
resource endowments (a large proportion of GDP in Botswana is accounted for by mining). If
this is included in the analysis, GDP per capita (in Botswana or countries with a similar
26economic structure) could accelerate substantially as population growth slows down.
Haacker (2002a) discusses two features of the models discussed above (and of some 
studies using a more complex macroeconomic model (e.g., Arndt and Lewis (2000), Bureau
26 The situation in Botswana is discussed in more detail, though using a less elaborate economic model, in 
BIDPA (2000).
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of Economic Research (2001), or ING Barings (2000), which are discussed further below). 
First, an important feature of these models is that the adverse direct impact of HIV/AIDS is 
mitigated by an increase in the capital-labor ratio. Haacker (2002a) suggests that this implies 
changes in the rate o f return to capital which are implausible, given that many of the 
economies in question feature highly open capital markets and depend on foreign direct 
investment. The second aspect of many of the studies referred to that Haacker (2002a) 
investigates are effects on average GDP per capita which occur if a higher share of the 
population is absorbed by the formal sector, and he discusses the assumptions implicit in 
such scenarios.
A somewhat different strand of modeling originates with Kambou, Devarajan, and Over 
(1992), who apply a CGE model to studying the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS. 
Models in this tradition apply a more sophisticated sectoral structure, allowing for 
differential effects of HIV/AIDS across sectors or regions. However, owing to the envelope 
theorem, the features of CGE models tend to be similar to models based on aggregate 
macroeconomic variables.
The model employed by Kambou, Devarajan, and Over (1992) distinguishes 11 sectors 
which differ with respect to the intensity of inputs of rural labor, urban unskilled labor, and 
skilled labor, with a share of skilled labor that ranges from zero percent (food crops) to 
28 percent (public services). In the absence of a clear pattern of HIV prevalence across skill 
categories, Kambou, Devarajan, and Over analyze equiproportionate shocks to the labor 
force, as well as shocks to the respective skill categories. The economy appears most 
vulnerable to shocks to the supply of skilled labor, as this factor is disproportionally used in 
sectors accounting for a relatively large share of GDP.
Arndt and Lewis (2001) and Arndt (2006) follow similar approaches, with slightly 
differentiated economic structures and adding various modeling components. Notably, Arndt 
and Lewis (2001) include more detailed assumptions regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
spending patterns, whereas Arndt (2006) is designed in order to allow for policy 
interventions to offset an adverse impact of HIV/AIDS on access to education. Both studies
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find a large impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP growth. This finding, however, is largely based on
27the fact that both studies assume a strong impact of AIDS incidence on TFP growth.
The CGE models also provide a backdrop for a group of policy-oriented studies, adapting 
larger macroeconom(etr)ic models developed for a different purpose to account for the 
economic effects of HIV/AIDS. The notable representatives of this class of models are ING 
Barings South African Research (2000), Laubscher and others (2001), and Ellis and others 
(2006),28 all focusing on the South African economy. Regarding the sectoral composition of 
the economy, the structure of the models (and, consequently, the findings) are similar to the 
CGE models discussed above. There are three (at least comparative) advantages arising from 
the fact that these studies embed the analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS in a model designed 
to conduct comprehensive policy analyses and projections for the South African economy.
(1) Frequently, assumptions regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS can usually be easily mapped 
into model parameters, and (2) as the model generates projections around a fairly 
comprehensive macroeconomic baseline scenario, it is possible to derive inferences 
regarding impact of HIV/AIDS on key macroeconomic variables that the more analytical 
studies do not capture. The obvious disadvantage of using large-scale macromodels is that 
frequently it is difficult to interpret the findings in terms of the role that various dimensions 
of the impact of HIV/AIDS are playing, as details of the model have not been published or 
feature complex macroeconomic interdependencies.
Notable features of ING Barings South African Research (2000) include discussions of 
the impacts of HIV/AIDS on various segments of the labor market, on domestic savings, and 
on inflation. The impact on GDP growth is moderate (a decline of 0.3-0.4 percent), as the 
slowdown in population growth is more pronounced, this implies a notable increase in GDP 
per capita. Regarding the impacts of HIV/AIDS on productivity, the study assumes that an
27 Arndt (2006) assumes that an AIDS incidence rate o f 1 percent translates into a slowdown in productivity 
growth o f 1 percentage point. Arndt and Lewis (2001) apply a non-linear specification, whereby an AIDS death 
rate o f 1 percent slows down productivity growth by 23 percent (not percentage points).
28 Ellis and others (2006), by the same authors as Laubscher and others (2001), largely represents and update o f  
the earlier study.
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AIDS incidence rate of 1 percent translates into a decline in the level of productivity of 
1 percent. In Laubscher and others (2001) and Ellis and others (2006), the projected impact 
of HIV/AIDS on GDP growth is somewhat more pronounced (0.3-0.6 percent), although 
GDP per capita still comes out higher than in a “no-AIDS” counterfactual scenario; the more 
negative outcome likely reflects the fact that BER (2001, 2006) assume a link between AIDS 
incidence and TFP growth (similar to Arndt and Lewis, 2000). One unique aspect of Ellis 
and others (2006) is the discussion of the potential macroeconomic impacts of improved 
access to antiretroviral treatment,29 suggesting that an ART program with a coverage rate of 
50 percent could reduce the impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP by 17 percent (not percentage 
points) be 2020, with a projected change in the GDP growth rate of minus 0.38 percentage 
points with ART rather than minus 0.46 percentage points without.
The models discussed so far have focused on the macroeconomic consequences of 
HIV/AIDS which arise through the immediate impacts of HIV/AIDS on key macroeconomic 
variables (or microeconomic variables, such as health status of people living with HIV/AIDS, 
interpreted from a macro perspective), such as declines in endowments of human capital, 
disruptions to production processes, or a shift in spending from consumption and investment 
to health expenditure to cover the costs of care and treatment.
From about 2002, a group of studies have explored more complex and indirect effects of 
HIV/AIDS which arise when economic agents adjust their behavior in response to the 
macroeconomic and disease context. This shift in the literature has been motivated by the 
theoretical literature on economic growth, which emphasizes the role of agents basing their 
decisions on expectations regarding their economic outlook, and frequently by some 
discomfort regarding the small impacts of HIV/AIDS suggested by the earlier studies, which 
contrasts with a more general perception of HIV/AIDS as a serious challenge for economic 
development, arising from the severe health consequences of the epidemic.
29 An earlier study discussing the macroeconomic repercussions o f ART is Masha (2004), adopting a less 
elaborate macroeconomic model.
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Among these studies, Robalino, Voetberg, and Picazo (2002) argue that increased 
mortality will result in a decline in the savings rate and investment that exceeds any direct 
effects arising from higher health expenditures. In Corrigan, Glomm, and Mendez (2005), 
HIV/AIDS also reduces investments in education, as higher mortality risk means that parents 
are less likely to benefit in old age from investments in their children.
The studies by Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach (2004, 2006) and Bell, Bruhns, and 
Gersbach (2006) cover similar ground, but are built around a more elaborate model of 
generation of human capital which focuses on the transmission of knowledge from parents to 
children. While the present authors also allow for an effect of expected mortality (reducing 
the expected return to human capital) on education decisions as in the more aggregate 
models, the most significant impacts of HIV/AIDS in these models arise as early mortality 
disrupts the transmission of knowledge between generations. As orphans tend to receive 
relatively low education (and as the authors allow for little upward mobility), the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS accumulate from generation to generation and can become very large.
A related group of studies focuses on the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on fertility. 
Young (2005, 2007) focuses on two effects of HIV/AIDS, namely the adverse impact on the 
human capital accumulation of children, and the reduction in fertility that arises through a 
reduction in unprotected sex and as HIV/AIDS results in an increase in the of scarcity of 
labor (as the capital/labor ratio rises) and thus in the value of women’s time. Young (2005) 
argues that the fertility effect, primarily through reduced population growth, translates into 
increased GDP per capita. Young (2007) complements this line of reasoning with a study that 
focuses more on an cross-country econometric analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
fertility and other variables, with findings largely in line with his earlier study. However, the 
findings of both papers have been put into question by Kalemli-Ozcan (2008).31’32 Unlike
30 Another study, frequently quoted but yet unpublished, that highlights the impacts o f HIV/AIDS on 
investments in physical capital and education is Ferreira and Pessoa (2003).
31 Kalemli-Ozcan suggests that the findings o f  Young (2005) largely arise from the large weight in his sample 
o f periods before 1990 in which HIV/AIDS was insignificant (and is assumed zero), whereas his findings are 
reversed if  only post-1990 data are included. On Young (2007), she points out that the coefficients o f
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Young, she finds a positive relationship between fertility and HIV prevalence, which she 
interprets along the lines of Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) or Soares (2005), which are discussed 
above.
E. Conclusions and Outlook
There are (at least) three broad lessons we can take from our discussion of the literature on 
health and growth more generally and the more specific literature of HIV/AIDS and growth. 
First, the impacts of HIV/AIDS on economic growth at present appear much smaller than 
what would be suggested by some of the empirical literature on health and growth. This 
could point at shortcomings in the literature on health and growth more generally, or reflect 
that health and mortality impacts of HIV/aUDS differ from those associated with many other 
diseases. Second, there is very wide uncertainty regarding the economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS over the next decades, notably because the full impact of HIV/AIDS on education 
or the accumulation of human capital will only become apparent over time. Third, the 
findings regarding the (small) macroeconomic effects of HIV/AIDS contrast some 
microeconomic studies which show a significant impact on affected households; to 
understand the economic impact of HIV/AIDS, it is necessary to reconcile these findings.
Many empirical studies on determinants of economic growth use life expectancy as a 
proxy for the state of population health, which is considered as one of the constituents of 
human capital. However, for HIV/AIDS, with a very specific health impact, the association 
between life expectancy and an underlying state of health relevant with regard to economic 
growth presumably is different from the pattern observed in the historical data, a point that is 
also made by some of the studies discussed above (e.g., Acemoglu and Johnson, 2006).
HIV/AIDS in the fertility regressions become insignificant once the clustering o f individual observations is 
taken into account.
32 One issue that both Young and Kalemli-Ozcan are not addressing explicitly, but that may affect their 
findings, is the fact that some o f the countries highly affected by HIV/AIDS already were in a more advanced 
stage o f demographic transition than most countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
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Notably, it is frequently assumed, implicitly or explicitly, that the impact of HIV/AIDS 
would be particularly severe because it primarily affects young adults.
Against this background, the apparent absence of a steep decline in GDP growth in 
countries with high HIV prevalence rates, and declines in life expectancy exceeding 10 years 
in many cases, is puzzling. For the literature on health and growth, it underlines that life 
expectancy -  even though it fairly robustly “explains” some of the historical variation in 
growth in empirical studies -  may not be a good proxy for underlying health conditions 
relevant for economic growth, and that the findings of the empirical literature have little 
predictive power regarding the economic effects of new types of diseases (if this is indeed 
what it measures, rather than reflecting unobserved variables affecting both health and 
growth).33
While few observers would contest that the impacts of HIV/AIDS on economic growth 
(at least growth of GDP per capita) are modest, there is strong disagreement regarding the 
longer-term impacts of the epidemic, with some observers proposing that “economic collapse 
is a very real danger” in a high-prevalence country (Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach, 2006), at 
least in the absence of policy interventions, while Young (2005) suggests that “the AIDS 
epidemic [,..] enhances the future per capita consumption possibilities [...].” In light of the 
very serious health and demographic disruptions caused by HIV/AIDS, gaining an improved 
understanding of the potential impacts in the longer term is important. To this end, it would 
be necessary to develop or refine models in line with the evidence on the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS (and, if  applicable, health conditions and mortality not related to HIV/AIDS) on 
the microeconomic level, for example, regarding the impact on orphans or education 
decisions.
The evidence regarding the (modest) impacts of HIV/AIDS on macroeconomic 
aggregates contrast with microeconomic evidence that shows a serious impact of HIV/AIDS 
on affected individuals, households, or communities. Consequently, indicators of the average
33 More generally, the disease environment, both in developed and in developing countries, has changed 
dramatically over the 20th century. See, for example, Acemoglu and Johnson (2006) or Deaton (2006) for 
elaborations on this point.
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impact of HIV/AIDS (such as GDP per capita) are incomplete and potentially misleading 
indicators of the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS. Notably, HIV/AIDS can affect 
development indicators such as poverty rates, access to education, or gender imbalances. 
Further, to the extent that vulnerability to HIV/AIDS and the ability to cope with the impact 
is correlated with the socio-economic status or other characteristics (e.g., location) of an 
individual or household, HIV/AIDS can exacerbate existing inequities. These factors, in turn, 
can have repercussions for the impacts of HIV/AIDS on aggregate variables like GDP per 
capita (e.g., through changes in access to education). To capture the economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS more fully, it is therefore necessary to improve the understanding of such 
microeconomic effects, their relevance from a broad development perspective, and the 
macroeconomic repercussions.34
Finally, one shortcoming of the literature that is worth noting is a scarcity of studies that 
acknowledge that the health impact of HIV/AIDS in endogenous, especially in the context of 
increased availability of ART in developing countries. To some extent, this reflects the fact 
that most of the body of existing literature was written or at least conceived before scaling-up 
of ART took off.35 Improving the understanding of the determinants and impacts of scaling 
up is also a necessity for assessing the distributional impacts, as inequities in access to 
treatment potentially add a dimension to the differential impacts of HIV/AIDS across the 
population.
34 See, for example, Haacker (2004b) or Nattrass (2003), for discussions o f these and related points.
35 Among more recent studies, BER (2006), Masha (2004), and Young (2007) discuss economic aspects o f  
scaling up o f ART.
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G. List of Acronyms
ART Antiretroviral treatment
BTW Botswana
CAR Central African Republic
CGE computable general equilibrium
GFATM Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria
HIV/AIDS refers to the human immunodeficiency virus and the associated acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome
LSO Lesotho
MOZ Mozambique
MWI Malawi
NMB Namibia
RSA South Africa
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SWZ Swaziland
TFP total factor productivity
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
ZMB Zambia
ZWE Zimbabwe
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H. Appendix: HIV/AIDS -  Epidemiology, Impact, and International Response
HIV/AIDS refers to the human immunodeficiency virus and the associated acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome, which were first recognized as a global health issue in the 
early 1980s. In 2006, about 40 million people globally were living with HIV/AIDS, including 
25 million in sub-Saharan Africa, and the epidemic claimed almost 3 million lives in that 
year. The international response has involved a rapid scaling-up of aid and an expansion of 
prevention and treatment programs, as well as the establishment of two specialized 
international agencies to deal with the epidemic—the Joint United Nations Program on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
(GFATM).
Epidemiology and Demographics
The most important modes of transmission of HIV are sexual contact with an infected 
person, sharing needles for injected drug use, mother-to-child transmission before or during 
birth or through breast-feeding, and transfusions of infected blood or blood clotting factors. 
HIV/AIDS is largely asymptomatic during the first years after infection. Over time, 
HIV/AIDS progressively damages the immune system, resulting in increased susceptibility to 
opportunistic infections (e.g., pneumonia, tuberculosis, and certain types of cancer) and, 
eventually, death. Antiretroviral treatment suppresses the virus and slows down the 
progression of the disease.
The region most affected by HIV/AIDS is sub-Saharan Africa; however, the high HIV 
prevalence rate of about 6 percent for the region masks very substantial differences in HIV 
prevalence across countries, ranging from less than 1 percent (e.g., in Senegal) to more than 
20 percent in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe (all data on HIV prevalence 
relate to the population ages 15-49, at end-2005). Although HIV prevalence appears to have 
stabilized in sub-Saharan Africa since around 2001, it has been spreading rapidly in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.
36 Reprinted from Haacker, Markus, 2008, “HIV/AIDS,” Princeton Encyclopedia o f the World Economy 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).
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Development Impact
From an economic development perspective, the most direct impact of HIV/AIDS is the 
increase in mortality and consequent decline in life expectancy associated with it. For some 
of the most affected countries, it is estimated that HIV/AIDS has reduced life expectancy by 
more than 20 years. Development indexes such as the United Nations Development 
Program’s Human Development Index, which combines measures of income, education, and 
health, suggest that HIV/AIDS has been the most significant single factor to adversely affect 
development in recent decades. Another consequence of the increase in mortality among 
young adults associated with HIV/AIDS is an increase in orphan rates, which are estimated 
to have reached 20 percent of the young population in some of the countries most affected by 
the epidemic.
The evidence regarding the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS is less clear. In light of 
the slowdown of the growth of the working-age population, there is a consensus that growth 
of gross domestic product (GDP) also slows as a consequence of HIV/AIDS. Studies 
applying a neoclassical growth model typically find that HIV/AIDS reduces GDP per capita 
through declining productivity and a fall in capital per worker that occurs as health-related 
spending lowers the national saving and investment rates. These effects are at least partly 
offset by the impact of increased mortality on the capital/labor ratio (mortality decreases the 
denominator, causing an increase in the overall ratio). The latter effect, however, partly 
dissipates if investment flows are sensitive to changes in the rate of return to capital.
On the microeconomic level, HIV/AIDS is associated with income losses (as household 
members become too sick to work and as working time is devoted to caregiving) and with 
increased health-related expenditures. Microeconomic data, largely from sub-Saharan Africa, 
therefore suggest an adverse impact of HIV/AIDS on incomes, consumption, and wealth of 
affected households. This is most pronounced during illness or around the time of death; 
households appear to partly recover later on. To understand the impact of HIV/AIDS on 
poverty or inequality, it is necessary to take a broader perspective, also covering households 
that may gain financially as they benefit from income opportunities associated with deaths in 
other households, most obviously when household members fill HIV/AIDS-related
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vacancies. Overall, the sparse evidence suggests that an increased volatility in incomes 
associated with higher mortality translates into an increase in poverty.
International Response
On a global level, recognition of the health, humanitarian, and development challenges posed 
by HIV/AIDS has translated into an unprecedented effort to contain the epidemic and expand 
access to treatment. Important steps of the international response were the establishment of 
UNAIDS and the GFATM, and the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS (2004). In financial terms, the scale of the international response to HIV/AIDS 
has expanded very rapidly: Consistent estimates for HIV/AIDS-related spending are 
available for low- and middle-income countries only; for these, spending has increased from 
about U.S. $300 million in 1996 to about U.S. $9 billion in 2006, of which about U.S. $6 
billion were financed by external aid. The most important funding agencies are the GFATM 
and the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.
National responses to HIV/AIDS depend on the state of the epidemic in a country. To 
various extents programs emphasize public prevention measures in schools and work places, 
prevention and awareness measures targeted at high-risk groups, strengthening the health 
care system, improvements in care for people living with HIV/AIDS, measures to mitigate 
the social impacts (including support for orphans), and programs to expand access to 
treatment.
The most effective prevention measures are those targeted at groups at high risk of 
contracting and passing on the virus, including promotion of condom use among sex workers 
and provision of sterile needles to injecting drug users. Those measures, together with the 
perceived impact of the epidemic, have been credited with increasing awareness and 
reducing risky behavior. Social attitudes, particularly toward men who have sex with men, or 
the illegal nature of some of the risky behavior such as injecting drug use, can complicate the 
implementation of prevention programs, however.
In the most affected countries in Southern Africa, the epidemic is generalized, and 
prevention efforts are geared toward raising awareness and reducing risk behavior across the 
population, especially among young adults, through the education system, media and
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advertising campaigns, and public endorsements by leading politicians. Although HIV 
prevalence has risen to double-digit levels in numerous countries in spite o f these efforts, in
2005-6 many of the most affected countries reported increasing HIV awareness and 
somewhat falling prevalence rates among young adults.
The most significant development in the early years of the 21st century regarding the 
response to HIV/AIDS was the decline in the costs of antiretroviral treatment. In many 
developing countries, certain forms of antiretroviral treatment were available in 2007 at costs 
of around U.S. $300 annually, down from about U.S. $10,000 in 2000. This development 
reflected voluntary agreements with drug companies, often under the threat of compulsory 
licensing to a local producer, and the fact that only a certain range of antiretroviral drugs was 
available at these low prices, which allowed for some market segmentation between 
industrialized and developing countries.
Falling prices of drugs and strong international financial support have contributed to a 
rapid expansion in access to treatment. UNAIDS reports that the number of people receiving 
antiretroviral treatment in low- and middle-income countries increased from 400,000 to 1.3 
million between 2003 and 2005 (corresponding to a coverage rate of about 20 percent), with 
sub-Saharan Africa accounting for the bulk of the increase.
Continued spread of the disease and the longer survival of those already infected make 
the management of an increasing number of people requiring treatment the principal 
challenge in addressing the epidemic in the near future. Additional challenges include 
extending the gains made to countries with weaker public health systems, where progress in 
expanding access to treatment has been less pronounced so far, and managing the fiscal 
challenges and long-term commitments associated with the expansion in these health 
programs.
UNAIDS and the Global Fund
The perception of HIV/AIDS as a threat to global health, beyond the capacity and expertise 
of any single international organization, resulted in the establishment of a unique institution, 
UNAIDS, in 1994. UNAIDS coordinates the HIV/AIDS-related activities of its cosponsoring 
organizations, which are 10 (initially 6) organizations under the UN system. Although a
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relatively small organization on an international scale (its annual operational budget 
amounted to about U.S. $58 million in 2006-7), it is also financing part of the activities of its 
cosponsors on HIV/AIDS, as well as interagency activities (U.S. $42 million annually in
2006-7). Moreover, cosponsors include all of their HIV/AIDS-related activities in 
UNAIDS’s Unified Workplan, which brings the total of HIV/AIDS-related spending 
coordinated by UNAIDS to about U.S. $1.3 billion annually for 2006-7, about one-sixth of 
global spending on HIV/AIDS. Additionally, UNAIDS is a key provider of public 
information on the epidemic, including the annual Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, 
which is the most important regular publication on HIV/AIDS.
The GFATM is primarily a fimding agency. It receives about 95 percent of its funding 
from government sources. Grants typically underwrite comprehensive country programs, 
which are coordinated nationally, for several years. Between 2002 and end-2006, the 
GFATM disbursed U.S. $3.3 billion, of which U.S. $1.35 billion was disbursed in 2006. Of 
the accumulated grant portfolio, HIV/AIDS accounts for the lion’s share (56 percent), 
followed by malaria (27 percent) and tuberculosis (15 percent). Although public institutions 
play the most important role as implementing agencies (accounting for about half of 
GFATM-supported funding), many of the national responses are implemented by 
nongovernmental organizations (about a quarter of funding) or by faith-based and academic 
organizations. Reflecting the burden of disease of HIV/AIDS in the region, sub-Saharan 
Africa accounts more than half of GFATM funding.
Further Reading
Many key references are updated periodically and available online. Useful web sites are the 
ones of UNAIDS (www.unaids.org), including the annual Report on the Global AIDS 
Epidemic; the GFATM (www.theglobalfund.org); and the Global AIDS Program of the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/gap/). The World 
Bank’s website also includes much useful material, accessible from 
http://www.worldbank.org/aids. Other references include:
Beck, Eduard J., Nicholas Mays, Alan W. Whiteside, and Jose M. Zuniga (eds.), 2006, The
HIV Pandemic—Local and Global Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
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Canning, David, 2006, “The Economics of HIV/AIDS in Low-Income Countries: The Case 
for Prevention,” Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 121-42.
Haacker, Markus, (ed.), 2004, The Macroeconomics o f  HIV/AIDS, (Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund). Available online at 
http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/aids/eng/index.htm.
Jamison, Dean T., Richard G. Feachem, Malegapuru W. Makgoba, Eduard R. Bos, Florence 
K. Baingana, Karen J. Hofman, and Khama O. Rogo (eds.), 2006, Disease and Mortality 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Washington, DC: World Bank).
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II.2. M o d e l in g  t h e  M a c r o e c o n o m ic  C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  HIV/AIDS
A. Introduction
The ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic has had a significant health and demographic impact in 
many countries, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, and in some countries has reversed 
achievements in health standards attained over many decades. These developments have 
motivated a number of studies addressing the macroeconomic consequences of HIV/AIDS.
In light of the fact that many of the highly affected countries have moderate levels of GDP 
per capita, much of this literature departs from the broader literature on links between health 
and growth by introducing some aspects associated with macroeconomic studies in the 
context of economic development, notably a dual-economy structure.
The present study contributes to the literature in three areas. On the methodological side, 
it focuses on an incongruence between the closed-economy property of models commonly 
applied to the study of the economic consequences of HIV/AIDS,37 and the economies of 
many of the countries highly affected by HIV/AIDS, which are characterized by a large 
degree of capital mobility and a prominent role'of foreign direct investment. This apparent 
incongruence is problematic, as the closed-economy assumption is central to one of the most 
important channels identified in the literature, namely that the decline in population growth 
associated with HIV/AIDS results in an increase in the capital-output ratio. Additional 
contributions from a methodological perspective are a discussion of the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS on income per capita (in addition to output per capita), which is a consequence of 
our focus on an economy characterized by capital mobility, and a more explicit discussion of 
differences in the impact of HIV/AIDS between the formal and the informal sector than that 
provided by most studies of the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS.
37 The few studies known to the author which explicitly address the potential impact o f  reversals in investment 
flows are Haacker (2002a) and Haacker (2002b). One recent applied study (Ellis, Laubscher, and Smit (2006)) 
raises the issue in the discussion o f their findings, but does not incorporate it explicitly in their analysis.
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Second, our study summarizes the latest available evidence regarding different aspects of 
the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS, and calibrates quantitative estimates of the 
impacts of HIV/AIDS on key macroeconomic variables. Structural parameters were chosen 
in order to capture some of the characteristics of countries with high rates of HIV prevalence, 
and our analysis uses an HIV prevalence rate among the population of ages 15-49 of 20 
percent (a level attained by some of the highly affected countries) as a benchmark.
The third area in which our study contributes to the literature regards the economic 
implications of increased access to antiretroviral treatment. In light of the very substantial 
scaling-up of antiretroviral treatment that has take place in low- and middle-income countries 
in recent years (reaching an average coverage rate of 30 percent at end-2007, according to 
WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF (2008), the implications of this development for the 
macroeconomic consequences of HIV/AIDS have become relevant. However, the academic 
literature has so far not reflected this recent development, and the present study is the first to 
fill this gap.38 Specifically, we discuss the impacts of antiretroviral treatment on population 
growth, savings, and labor productivity, and draw inferences on the macroeconomic 
implications.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section II discusses the impact of HIV/AIDS in the 
closed economy. Much of the section focuses on modeling the macroeconomic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS in a dual economy, characterized by a formal sector with relatively high intensity 
of capital and skilled labor, and an informal sector that employs the majority of the 
population, largely drawing on unskilled labor, and generating a much lower level of output 
per capita than the formal sector. Section III develops the model under the assumption of 
perfect capital mobility, tying the return to capital to the world interest rate, and 
differentiating between the impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita and on income per capita 
(i.e., GDP per capita, plus net investment income from abroad). Section IV calibrates the
38 Two applied country-level studies (Jefferis, Siphambe, and Kinghom (2006) for Botswana, and Ellis, 
Laubscher, and Smit (2006) for South Africa) included some discussion o f  the impact o f  antiretroviral 
treatment. These studies, however, were primarily geared towards a policy audience, and provided limited 
information regarding the structure o f the model employed and the assumptions regarding the impact o f  
antiretroviral treatment.
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model(s), synthesizing the latest evidence on the impacts of HIV/AIDS on various economic, 
health-related, and demographic variables, and discussing the estimates of the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS under the different modeling strategies. Section V provides a discussion of the 
consequences of increased access to antiretroviral treatment. Section VI concludes.
B. Impact of HIV/AIDS: Closed Economy
With very few exceptions (see Haacker (2002a, 2002b)), the available studies of the 
macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS adopt a closed-economy framework, which therefore 
serves as a point of departure and reference for our discussion. Within this class of models, 
our framework is designed to capture the implications of two characteristics of models that 
have been applied to studying the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS.
First, the available studies differ regarding the extent of sectoral disaggregation of the 
models adopted, including one-sector frameworks, models with two sectors intended to 
capture the “dual economy” structure of many economies highly affected by HIV/AIDS, and 
CGE models with a large number of sectors. Our analysis focuses on a two-sector model, 
which shares key features with the CGE models (reallocation of labor across sectors), but is 
nevertheless analytically tractable in an explicit framework. A brief discussion of a one- 
sector framework serves as a “springboard,” to introduce some key aspects of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS, but also to elucidate some features of the two-sector model by means of 
comparison.
Second, we follow common practice by distinguishing two different types of labor, 
skilled and unskilled. This distinction complements the adoption of the two-sector 
framework, with one sector (the formal sector) relying more on skilled labor.
The One-Sector Neoclassical Growth Model
As the features of the neoclassical one-sector model are well known, we just briefly 
summarize the key equations. The aggregate production function takes the form
Y = AK*(eHp HL )\e uPuL ) \ (1)
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where a+p+y=l; p H stands for the proportion of highly-skilled agents in the working 
population L; p v (=1 - p H) stands for the proportion of unskilled agents; eH and ev are 
efficiency parameters for each group; Y, A , and K  represent output, total factor productivity, 
and capital, respectively.39 The capital stock evolves according to
K  = s Y - 8 K ; (2)
the savings rate s may comprise domestic savings, as well as (net) foreign direct investment. 
The supply of labor grows at rate w.40 Transforming the model into per capita terms and 
solving for the steady state capital stock (k *) and output level (y*) yields
k* =
i
P+r _L JL _!_ / o -2- - i-
(e///7//)P+Y(^ ;? l/)p+Y and / = A P+Y  ----  (eHPff)M (euPu)M  • (3)
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In this context, the HIV/AIDS epidemic may affect the steady-state level of income per 
capita through its impact on total factor productivity, capital accumulation, the growth rate of 
the labor force, and the efficiency of labor.41 Specifically,
• The savings rate s may decline as expenditures are reallocated to cover the costs of 
care and treatment, either on the household level or through public expenditures, 
resulting in a decline in output per capita.
• However, a decline in the population growth rate n would result in an increase in the 
capital-labor ratio, this would have a positive impact on output per capita.
39 Without loss o f  generality, one o f the parameters A, eH or ev  could be normalized to equal 1. However, it is 
convenient to “over-specify” the model in terms o f the productivity parameters as various hypotheses or 
estimates regarding the impact o f HTV/AIDS can best be related to either o f  the three parameters.
40 Throughout the paper, we assume that skilled and unskilled labor grow at the same rate n.
41 Our analysis does not capture changes in labor force participation rates, which arise if  relatives care for sick 
family members (other than making allowances for the financial costs o f  care and treatment).
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• Total factor productivity^ may decline, reflecting disruptions to economic activity as 
a result of increased morbidity and mortality.
• The efficiency of the different types of labor ( eH, eL ) may decline, for various
reasons. Productivity may decline owing to increased morbidity of people living with 
HIV/AIDS, and these effects may differ by type of labor. Increased mortality may 
have an impact of the efficiency of labor if a larger share of working time needs to be 
devoted to training, for example if a training program of a certain duration is “spread” 
over a reduced expected working time. Additionally, the changed composition of the 
working-age population may have an effect if work experience affects productivity.
• The composition of the labor force (captured by the parameters p H , p L) may
change, if HIV prevalence of HIV/AIDS-related mortality differ across population 
groups.
The Dual Economy
The one-sector neoclassical growth model assumes full employment and the absence of 
distortions in the labor market. Applied to the study of HIV/AIDS in a low-income country 
with a large informal sector and/or underemployment, this model may, therefore, yield 
misleading results. In particular, some analysts have suggested that workers in the formal 
sector who die from AIDS will be replaced by previously unemployed or under-employed 
workers, thereby reducing unemployment and raising per capita income.42 Several studies 
therefore add an informal sector, characterized by low capital intensity and a high share of 
unskilled workers.43
To study how the structure of the economy, particularly labor mobility between sectors, 
affects the impact of an epidemic such as HIV/AIDS, we apply a two-sector model, featuring
42 For example, Cuddington and Hancock (1994) suggests that “per capita output might actually rise as workers 
involved in low-productivity activities fill the vacancies created by AIDS in the more productive formal sector.”
43 These include Over (1992), Cuddington (1993b), Cuddington and Hancock (1994), Haacker (2002b). The 
reasoning is also applied in CGE models like those o f Laubscher and others (2001) and Ellis and others (2006).
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a formal sector that uses capital, skilled labor, and unskilled labor, and an informal sector that 
draws on capital and unskilled labor only, and is less capital-intensive than the formal 
sector.44 We further assume that the parameter describing the efficiency of unskilled labor 
(parameter ew above) is the same for the formal and the informal sector, and that capital 
accumulation in the informal sector is limited to savings generated within the sector. As 
unskilled agents may now work in the formal and informal sector, labor market clearing 
requires that Ly = Ly^+Lyj .
To allow for labor market imperfections, or non-market activities not included in 
measured output, a parameter X defines a wedge between wages for unskilled workers in the 
formal and the informal sectors,45 which means that
w*v f  = Xwy ., with X > 1. (4)
Under these circumstances, informal sector output takes the form
I ' M V t e / W ' *  (5)
with a,. + y, = 1. The steady state output per capita and the (unskilled) equilibrium wage rate 
for the informal sector are given by
(6)\ o  + n )
and w* . =yi(Aiy i - ^ — Y‘ eu . (7)
\ o  + n
For the formal sector, aggregate output takes the form
44 The assumption that the informal sector does not use skilled labor does not fundamentally affect our results, 
provided that the share o f  skilled worker is higher in the formal sector, but it does simplify the formal analysis 
significantly.
45 Note that, for X = 1, the model encompasses the case o f  perfect mobility o f  unskilled labor.
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Yf = A f K a/ ( e HL j ' { e uLuJ ' , (8)
with a f  + + y, = 1. The formal sector is assumed to be more capital intensive than the
informal sector, implying that a f  > a t or, equivalently, y(. > + yf . The amount of
unskilled labor used in the formal sector is endogenous in the dual-economy model and 
depends on the unskilled wage rate (see Eq. (4)). Using Eq. (7) and Eq. (4) (with 
dYf  / dLy f  = Wytf = Xw*v .) to substitute for eyLy f  in Eq. (8), we obtain
y  — j af +h  l f  - A f y , ( 4 )
r, f
I f
S: U /
8 + n
-y
(X/ +P/
K ? * '
h
af +h (9)
In equilibrium, the capital stock grows at the same rate (n) as skilled and unskilled labor. 
Defining y f  = Yf  !{eHLH) and k f  = K f  /(eHLH) , and using the fact that in steady state
sf y f  = (8 + n)k f , the steady state level of capital per efficiency unit of skilled labor for the 
formal sector is
-  A hk f  = Ajr
and the steady state level of formal sector output is equal to
]
S' 1
2±
Y,
-v
h
( s \  sf
7/ U  + nJ l 5 + «J
ar+h
h
Y - A hI f  f y  M ) h r ] Y,
(  S \
y r ^ 8  +  « > l 5 + " J
-y
eH^H
(10)
( 1 1 )
To obtain the steady state level of total output, it is necessary to determine the allocation 
of unskilled labor between the formal and the informal sectors. The formal sector wage for an 
unskilled worker with efficiency ev is equal to f  = yf Yf  /Lu j  . Using Eqs. (4), (7), and
(11), it follows that
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eU^U,f — (Af )^f
Yf
~(Pr +Vr) 
Pf
Si ]
Yi (  s A
U  + nJ U  + nJ
6hLh » (12)
provided that Eq. (12) does return a solution with ey l^  f <eJJL u . Depending on the
structural parameters, comer solutions may arise as the formal sector expands (e.g., if the 
availability of skilled labor increases) to the point that the marginal product of labor in the 
formal sector exceeds Xvfy f for 1^ f = Ly . As we apply the model in a dual-economy
context (and this will be reflected in any calibrations of the model further below), we will not 
entertain the case of a comer solution further.
Below, we will find it convenient to refer to the share of unskilled labor that is employed 
in the formal sector, which we denote as p and which is defined, by straightforward 
transformation of Eq. (12), as
P = euLf
^Yi(Aj)1
Yf
S:
5 + n
-(Pr+Tf)
Pf
|Pf eHLH
.S + n J  euLu
(13)
As reallocations of unskilled labor between sectors may be an important aspect of the 
economy’s response to a shock, it is useful to relate formal sector output to the amount of 
unskilled labor employed in the formal sector. Using Eq. (4), (7), (11) and (12), we obtain an 
equation decribing output in the informal sector as a multiple of the income of unskilled 
labor in the informal sector, with
Y/ 5 + n
Y' e t — ^ wuj r
Y/
(14)
As the inputs or incomes of unskilled labor in the respective sector provide a numeraire, 
it is possible to arrive at a parsimonious representation of total output as a multiple of total 
input of unskilled labor (Lu = Lu f + Ly ), using Eqs. (6), (7), and (14).
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Y  = „  X 1 k(1 -p )— + p — w L  =M  U
1— + f \  r p
_Y / j f
w LUl u (15)
Noting that p and wu are endogenous variables, the rate of change of Y in response to 
some shock can be summarized as
A
d Y _ \ y f  y i)
Y ~  1 '
— v
y,
x_ _ i
1 17 y>)
dp  , dw* | dL,j 
P wu, Lu
(16)
One important property of our model is the fact that a reallocation of labor to the formal 
sector (an increase in p ) results in an increase in output per capita.46 This would not be the 
case in a model with perfect capital and labor markets, as incremental reallocations of factors 
between the sectors would not have an impact on output owing to the envelop theorem. The 
two properties of our model that introduce such first-order effects from incremental 
reallocations of factors are the parameter X , i.e. the assumption that incomes of unskilled 
labor in the formal and informal sectors may differ, and the lack of capital mobility between 
the formal and the informal sector, as a result of which the marginal products of capita may 
differ between the sectors.
dp d w .Using Eq. (7) and (13) to substitute for —  and — — in Eq. (16), the response of output
o w .r ui
to a change in endowments, the economic environment, or productivity parameters can be 
summarized as
46 This is the case in Eq. (16) provided that — - — is positive. A sufficient condition for this (for X > 1) is that
y, y,
y , , the share o f unskilled labor in the informal sector, exceeds y f , the share o f unskilled labor in the formal
sector. Equivalently, the combined shares o f capital and skilled labor in the formal sector need to exceed the 
share o f  capital in the informal sector.
Eq. (17), together with Eq. (13), can be used to analyze the responsiveness of output to 
shocks.
• A proportional decrease in the supply of skilled and unskilled labor (LH and La) 
would leave the allocation of unskilled labor ( p ) and output per capita unchanged. 
However, if  the decrease is more pronounced for skilled (or unskilled) labor, then p 
and output per capita would decline (or increase).
• Similarly, a proportional decrease in the efficiency of skilled labor eH and unskilled 
labor would leave the allocation of unskilled labor ( p ) unchanged, and result in a 
proportional decline in output.
• For the formal sector, a decrease in Af  and sf  would result in a decline in output per
capita, whereas a decline in n would result in an increase, as in the closed economy 
model.
• Importantly, output per capita appears more responsive to changes in the parameters 
Af , sf , and n than the closed-economy model suggest, as positive or negative
shocks to the formal sector are reinforced by movements of unskilled labor into or out 
of the formal sector.
• On the other hand, the impacts on output per capita of shocks to the informal sector 
are ambiguous. While a positive shock to the informal sector (an increase in Af  or
sf , or a decline in n)  raises output in the informal sector, this will also result in a
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reallocation of unskilled labor to the informal sector, which by itself would reduce 
output.
C. The Open Economy
Virtually all available studies apply a closed-economy model to study the macroeconomic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS.47 In a neoclassical framework, the closed-economy assumption has 
very significant implications for the properties of the model regarding the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS, as much of the immediate impacts of HIV/AIDS on output are offset by an 
increase in the capital-labor ratio. This, however, implies a decline in the rate of return to 
capital.
In light of this, excluding the potential impacts of HIV/AIDS on inbound or outbound 
capital flows is problematic for many economies severely affected by HIV/AIDS, as these 
are characterized by a large degree of capital mobility.48 We are therefore complementing our 
earlier analysis, in the tradition of the main body of literature on the economic impact of 
HIV/AIDS as it adopts a closed-economy framework, with an analysis of the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS in an economy characterized by perfect capital mobility. Specifically, we assume 
that the returns to capital are tied to the yields of some alternative foreign asset; this means 
that
—  = r * .49 (18)
dK
47 The exception are two working papers and related publications by the author o f the present study, see 
Haacker (2002a, 2002b).
48 As evident from the absence o f significant restrictions on capital transfers, substantial presence of 
multinational companies in the economy, and -  in some cases -  listings o f  key domestic companies on 
international stock markets.
49 Many applications also include a risk premium. While a large epidemic like HIV/AIDS could conceivably 
results in an increase n uncertainty regarding economic outturns over the investment horizon, and result in an 
increase in the risk premium, we find no basis for quantifying any such effects and do not include them in our 
analysis.
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Additionally, adopting an open-economy framework implies that we need to distinguish 
between output and income (i.e., output plus net income from an economy’s net foreign 
investment position). As before, we first illustrate the impacts of HIV/AIDS in a one-sector 
model, and then adapt the two-sector model introduced above to allow for capital mobility.
The One-Sector Model
Again, the basic features of the model are well-known, and we focus on the behavior of the 
model in the particular context of a health shock. Key variables are defined above (see 
discussion of Eqs. (1), (2), and (18). As the steady-state capital-output ratio is implicitly 
defined by Eq. (18), the steady-state level of output becomes
In some regards, the response of the economy to shocks is very similar between the open-
in total factor productivity A or the parameters related to the composition or efficiency of 
labor ( eH, p Hi ev , p v ) are the same.
The key difference between the steady-state equations described by Eq. (19) and (20) and 
those described by Eq. (3) is the absence of terms relating to the savings rate and the 
population growth rate. This reflects the fact that any excess of savings over the amounts of 
investments that can be absorbed in the domestic economy at interest rate r * is transferred 
abroad, or -  if the economy is a net importer of capital -  that the inflows of capital adjust so 
that the rate of return in the domestic economy stays in line with the returns of alternative 
assets abroad.
a
Pf a  V +Y YA ^ ( e Hp Hr - ' ( e up ur - ' , (19)
with
(20)
economy and the closed-economy model, as the elasticities of output with respect to changes
This is an important point as changes in the capital-output ratio driven by a slowdown in 
population growth (including the effects o f higher mortality), which by themselves have a
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positive impact on output per capita, tend to partially offset or even reverse the negative 
impacts of HIV/AIDS through other channels in many assessments of the economic impacts 
of HIV/AIDS (which apply closed-economy frameworks). This means that closed-economy 
models, when applied to economies characterized by a high degree of capital mobility (as is 
arguably the case for many economies in sub-Saharan Africa, and especially Southern 
Africa), may underestimate the impacts of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita.
While output per capita is a key indicator of the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS, in the
context of an open economy it makes sense to differentiate between income and output, as
savings invested abroad generate revenues, while capital income from inward foreign direct
investment or portfolio investment does not accrue to residents. We therefore introduce
income per capita as an additional indicator of the impacts of HIV/AIDS. Denoted z, income
per capita equals the share of skilled (P)and unskilled (y) labor in output, plus the income
from savings invested at interest rate r* (either in the domestic economy, or abroad), which
*
T* Sin steady state is equal t o  (in percent of steady-state output).
5 + n
o r  sP + Y + 7 —5 + n
a i a( \ —  i P yn \ B + y ----  ----  ----
^  A ^ ( e Hp H) ^ ( e uPl, ) ^ .  (21)
r )While per capita output y  does not respond to changes in s or n, per capita income z 
does.50 Regarding the magnitude of the changes, we compare the elasticities of steady-state 
output y  and of income per capita z with respect to a change in the savings rate (the 
comparison regarding changes in the population growth rate is analogous).
The elasticity of income per capita with respect to changes in the savings rate is given by
50 This result points to some implications o f the HIV/AIDS epidemic with respect to the distribution o f  wealth. 
While income for those who do not save (presumably, agents with lower income) goes down, the accumulation 
o f wealth per capita for those who do save may increase. However, given the simplistic structure o f the model 
used here, these conclusions are largely speculative.
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dz* r s
~ t  =  & + n ■ (22)
-  P + Y + — ^ K 1 5 +n
Using Eq. (3) and (22), we find that the impact of a change in the savings rate on output 
per capita in the closed-economy model is stronger than the impact on income per capita in 
the closed economy model if
r s
a  > 6~+n
B + y n r s  ^ 1 P +y +
5 + 77
or, equivalently, a — — > r s . (23)
P + y - a  5 + n
Eq. (23) is satisfied provided that r*s/(d + n), which stands for steady-state interest 
income from capital invested at home and abroad, is not too large relative to a ,51 the share of 
capital in domestic output, i.e. provided that the economy’s net foreign assets are not too 
large. Very similar findings apply to the elasticities of output and income with respect to 
changes in the population growth rate, which is n / (5 + n) times the elasticity with respect to 
the savings rate.
The implication of this regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS is that a channel that offsets or 
even overcompensates for various negative impacts of HIV/AIDS in many studies of the 
macroeconomic effects of HIV/AIDS applying a closed-economy model, the positive impact 
of a decline in the population growth rate on GDP per capita, is not present in the open- 
economy model as far as GDP per capita is concerned, and is much weaker as far as income 
per capita is concerned.
51 This is a sufficient condition derived from the weaker necessary condition spelled out in Eq. (23). Notably,
*
Y S
the elasticities are not the same f o r  = a  (in which case the economy’s net foreign investment position is
5 + n
equal to zero, and z  = y ), as the rate o f  return to capital responds differently to changes in the stock o f  capital 
in the different settings.
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These findings also touch on two aspects of the macroeconomic consequences which are 
marginal to the present study, which is primarily concerned with methodological aspects of 
modeling the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS, but relevant in many policy contexts. 
One are the implications of HIV/AIDS for the accumulation of foreign debt. An economy 
with a high level of foreign debt, other things equal, is characterized by a low net foreign 
investment position (and a low level of r*s /(5 + n) ). The (positive) impact of a slowdown in 
population growth on steady-state income per capita is therefore weakened, meaning that 
HIV/AIDS has a more negative macroeconomic impact. More intuitively, this result reflects 
that it is more difficult to serve a certain amount of debt when the economy slows down.
Second, applying the same argument within countries, our findings point at some 
distributional effects of HIV/AIDS. If the impact o f HIV/AIDS on incomes per capita is 
related to wealth (relative to income), and savings rates are correlated to income, then the 
proportional impact of HIV/AIDS on incomes per capita (assuming that other dimensions of 
the impacts are equal) is less for population groups with higher incomes.
The Dual Economy
As in the discussion of the closed economy, we maintain the assumption that the capital . 
market is segmented within the economy, and that capital accumulation in the informal sector 
is limited to savings generated within the sector. The formal sector, however, is fully 
integrated in the international capital market.
For the informal sector, the analysis made above for the closed economy still applies, and 
the steady-state levels of output and the wage are given by Eq. (6) and (7), reprinted here for 
convenience:
y. —
'  ei/ V i >  and wu j = y M Y ‘ s‘ 1U  + nJ U  + nJ
52 See Haacker (2004a) for a more comprehensive and explicit discussion o f the impacts o f HIV/AIDS on the 
sustainability o f public debt, in line with the findings from the present analysis.
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Using the fact that dYf  / dK = r*, dYf  / dLy j  = wUtf = Xw*Uti, and Eq. (7) for the steady 
state level of t , the steady state level of output for the formal sector can be written as
Yf =(Af f>
ai i
a f h Xy,(4)"
S‘ \*r I f
~lL
h
eH^H (24)
The allocation of unskilled labor to the formal sector is then determined by
-(P /+Y/)
e L, - ( A  ^  e L
ar f  1 \
a f h s> 1Y(*r >- U + « J
)
(25)
and therefore the share of unskilled workers employed in the formal sector is equal to:
- (P /+ Y /)
a
f  j_
^ • ( 4 ) Y<
Y/
Sl li
U + « J
J
P/
eH^H
et/A/
(26)
Substituting unskilled labor for skilled labor in Eq. (24), using Eq. (25), gives output in 
the formal sector as a multiple (the wage rate of unskilled labor in the informal sector, 
multiplied by the parameter X, and divided by the share of unskilled labor in the formal 
sector) of the efficiency units of unskilled labor employed in the formal sector, i.e.,
*> =
XYi( 4  y
Y / 5 + n
y‘ e L ik jf  = — i!L e U L U f
I f
(27)
Eqs. (6) and (27), together with Eq. (26) which defined the endogenous share of unskilled 
labor employed in the formal sector, provide a equation that allows us to describe output in 
terms of the share of unskilled labor in the formal sector, the wage rate of unskilled labor (in 
the informal sector), and the supply of unskilled labor.
The percentage change in output is obtained as the suitably weighted sum of the 
percentage changes in the share of unskilled labor in the formal sector, the wage rate of 
unskilled labor, and the supply of unskilled labor.
dY _ \ j f  Y. )
Y i '
—  +
Yi
X 1
I V  y , j
d P  ! d w u! ! d L u  
P  W ul k j
(29)
do d w .Substituting for —  (using Eq. 26) and for — — (using Eq. 7) and rearranging yields an
P
equation that describes the variation in Y as a function of the rates of change of the variables 
of interest in our analysis of the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS, namely (in order of 
appearance) Af , e H, L H, e u , L u , A, , s , , and n .
dY_
Y
*2l_ i
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Y f
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(30)
For the dual economy, income can be presented in terms of the structural parameters of 
the model in a similar way as output in Eq. (28). However, owing to our assumption that 
capital is perfectly mobile for the formal sector, but not for the informal sector, income 
depends on the share of the formal sector in the economy’s output, which is endogenous. 
While the share of the formal sector in output can easily be obtained in terms of the structural 
parameters of the model, using Eqs. (6), (26), and (27), this yields an unwieldy term. 
However, it turns out that we can gain useful insights into the response of income or income
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per capita to shocks without explicitly solving for the share of the formal sector in output. 
Income per capita can be represented as
z = 1 + a
r *r s, Y
5 + n
- a , y (31)
where a  represents the share of the formal sector in output. Differentiating through Eq. (31) 
yields
r *r s t
dz _ d y  
z y
5 + n
— a .
d<j
1 + a
/  *r s.
+  ■
r s f
5 + n
5 + n
- a , 1 + a
f  *r s 4
5 + n
- a ,
f  dsj n d n '
 ^ sf  5 + n n
(32)
We can draw the following conclusions from Eq. (32).53 For the special case in which net
fincome from abroad is equal to zero, - —— = a f , and Eq. (32) reduces to
r s j
5 + n
dz _ d y C T -
r sf  
5 + n
1 + a f -CLf 
\ 5+ n  j
dsf  n dn 
y S f  5 + n n
i.e., income is more responsive to shocks to the savings rate in the formal sector and the 
population growth rate than output is,54 and as responsive as output for any other shocks.
53 Throughout our argument, we assume that 1 + ct 
parameters plausible in a macroeconomic setting.
f  *r s,
5 + n
- a , > 0 , a sound assumption for the range o f
54 This argument implies that > 0 and —  < 0 , which can be established in a straightforward way fromdy
ds dn
Eq. (24).
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Further, we see that income is more responsive to changes in the savings rate for the 
formal sector, as Eq. (32) reduces to
dz _ d y  
z y
CT
5 + h ds.
1 + or
f  *r s t
8 + «
- a ,
in this special case.55 For any shocks not involving sf  or n , the response of income to
shocks depends on the shock to output, whether net income from abroad is positive or 
negative, and whether the shock results in an increase or decrease in the share of the formal 
sector in output.
This argument uses th a t = 0 for the dual economy model.
dsj
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D. Calibrating the Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS
In order to arrive at quantitative estimates for the macroeconomic impact of HIV/AIDS, and 
to understand the implications of different modeling strategies considered in the present 
study, we construct an example that eflects macroeconomic features of some of countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa highly affected by HIV/AIDS. Below, we summarize key 
macroeconomic properties of the economy. The underlying parameters are provided in 
Table 1. We then calibrate the impact of HIV/AIDS on key parameters of the model, and 
discuss the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS under the different modeling strategies 
discussed above.
Key Properties o f Model
GDP per capita (before incorporating the impact of HIV/AIDS is set at US$1,000 (in 2005 
prices), or about $2,000 at PPP US$.56 The informal sector accounts for one-third of GDP, 
but provides for the livelihoods of two-thirds of the population (i.e., GDP per capita for the 
informal sector is US$500).57 We assume that dependency ratios in the formal and informal 
sector are the same, and equal to 100 percent (i.e., there is one dependent old or young 
person for each working person).58 The share of skilled labor in the working population is set 
equal to 20 percent.
56 Average GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa was about $900 in 2007 (in 2005 prices), according to data 
from IMF (2008) and United Nations Population Division (2007), and about $1,900 at PPP exchange rates. 
Choosing a somewhat higher value makes sense, as many countries with high HIV prevalence have a level o f  
GDP per capita that is higher than the regional average.
57 The rule that the informal sector accounts for one-third o f GDP, but provides for two-thirds o f  the population, 
is partly motivated by shares for the agricultural sector in some countries with high HIV prevalence (which, 
however, also includes some formal-sector activities). An additional consideration was that average incomes in 
the informal sector should be consistent with a share o f the population below certain poverty lines that is 
somewhat lower as compared to those reported by Chen and Ravallion (2008) for sub-Saharan Africa.
58 For examples o f  dependency rates in countries with high HIV prevalence, and a discussion o f  the impacts o f  
HIV/AIDS, see Haacker (2004b) and Epstein (2004).
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Annual income of each working person (including an imputation for capital services) in 
the informal sector, including an imputation for capital services is US$1,000 (to be shared 
with one dependent on average). Assuming a share of capita for the informal sector of 20 
percent, the wage rate in the informal sector (or income minus an imputation for capital 
services) comes out at US$800. GDP per capita (accruing to capital and labor) in the formal 
sector is equal to US$2000, or US$4,000 for each working person (assuming again a 
dependency ratio of 100 percent). The share of capital in the formal sector is equal to 40 
percent; in addition to the 20 percent of the working population classified as skilled, 13.3 
percent of the working population are employed in the formal sector as unskilled workers.59 
Assuming a premium of 25 percent between salaries of unskilled workers in the formal sector 
over the informal sector implies an annual wage of US$1,000 for unskilled workers in the 
formal sector. The average wage rate of skilled workers in the formal sector is equal to 
US$3,333.
Regarding the one-sector model, parameters are set in line with the outcomes for the 
dual-economy model described above. Notably, income per capita for unskilled workers is 
set at US$833, the average of unskilled wage rates for the informal and the formal sector in 
the dual-economy model. For the study of the open-economy, we focus on a setting in which 
the net foreign asset position of the economy is equal to zero.
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the economy. On the top, we provide some 
parameters which are common across sectors, or do not pertain to any specific sector. The 
middle part o f Table 1 describes the dual-economy model, providing the values of parameters 
for the informal and formal sectors, as well as some “common parameters” pertaining to the 
economy overall, and summarizes key macroeconomic variables returned by the model. The 
lower part of Table 1 documents the parameters for the one-sector model (calibrated to match 
key aggregate features and outcomes of the dual-economy model).
59 The study by Senhadji (2000), which we use elsewhere to motivate the choice o f the parameter determinating 
the share o f  capital, is not very helpful here, with estimates o f the share o f  capital for the group o f  countries o f  
primary interest (those with high HIV prevalence rates) ranging from 0.25 (Tanzania) to 0.82 (Zimbabwe).
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Table 1. Sum m ary of Key P aram eters
■ Common P aram eters 
5  8 percen t 
n 2 percen t
L J L
Dependency ratio
0.2 
100 percen t
Dual Economy Model
Inform al Sector Key O utcom es
4  251 .19  1 GDP per capita $1,000
st 10 percen t GDP per w orker $2 ,000
a ,  0 .2 V h * $1 ,000
o 00 L « J / L 0 .67
1 w  .K,l $800
Yf / (Lh + LuJ) $4 ,000
Formal S ector 0.13
Af  155.43 1 W»J $1 ,000
Sj 20 percen t w*./ $3 ,333
af  0.4 II 20 p e r c e n t2
ino
y, o .i Com m on p aram e te rs
1 X 1.25
i
O ne-Sector Model 3 Key O utcom es 3
A 246 .6  1 GDP per capita $1,000
^ 16.7 percen t GDP per w orker $2,000
a  0 .33 $833
p  0.33 w>, $3,333
Y 0 .33
Source: Author's calculations and assum ptions, a s  explained in tex t.
1 In 2005 U.S. dollars.
2 G ross ra te  of return to  capital, i.e., m arginal product of capital ne t of 
depreciation rate .
3 P aram eters and ou tcom es not shown for the  o n e-sec to r m odel a re  the  sam e 
as  th o se  shown for the  dual-econom y model.
Impact o f  HIV/AIDS on Key Parameters
The most important determinant of the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS is arguably the 
scale of the epidemic. Our scenario is motivated by the economic situation in Southern 
Africa, where some of the countries with the highest HIV prevalence rates are located (this 
was already reflected in the choices of parameters for the macroeconomic model). In line
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with the most recent estimates of the state of the global HIV epidemic,60 we use an HIV 
prevalence rate of 20 percent as a point of reference.
Regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on population growth, we follow the demographic 
estimates published by the United Nations Population Division (2007), showing a decline in 
population growth rates of around one percentage point for countries with HIV prevalence in 
the neighborhood of 20 percent (i.e., population growth, in our scenario, declines from 
2 percent annually to 1 percent annually.
An important determinant of the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS is the extent to 
which HIV prevalence and mortality differs across population groups. For example, HIV 
prevalence might differ by race, sex, social context, or wealth. This could introduce 
differences in the impacts of HIV/AIDS across types of labor and (in the dual economy 
model) across sectors. In this regard, some studies for South Africa (e.g., Ellis, Laubscher, 
and Smit (2006), or Laubscher, Visagie, Smit (2001)) assume that HIV prevalence is higher 
for unskilled workers, in line with the evidence on the socioeconomic gradient of the 
epidemic in that country. For other countries, however, the available evidence suggest that 
HIV prevalence is more or less even across population groups. Mather and others (2004), 
synthesizing studies from five countries (Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, and 
Zambia), find that HIV prevalence does not seem to be correlated with income or education. 
On this basis, our estimates are based on the assumption that HIV prevalence and mortality is 
even across sectors and types of labor.
Regarding the impacts of HIV/AIDS, we follow a common approach and link the impact 
of HIV/AIDS to HIV/AIDS-related mortality, rather than HIV prevalence. This makes sense 
as HIV is asymptomatic during for many years. It is therefore common practice to calibrate 
the impacts of HIV/AIDS backwards from estimates of the impacts on mortality, and to use
60 See UNAIDS, 2008, and Table 1 in Chapter II. 1.
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available estimates on increased mortality also as a scale factor in assessing the aggregate 
costs of increased morbidity.61
While we assume that mortality is even across sectors and types of labor, it does differ by 
age, and for some purposes it is important to distinguish between mortality among the 
working-age population and mortality for the population overall. Based on data from 
countries with high prevalence rates, we will assume an increase in mortality rates for the 
overall population of 0.8 percentage points, and for the working-age population of 3.0 
percentage points.62
Regarding shifts in expenditure patterns related to HIV/AIDS, it makes sense to 
distinguish between public expenditures and private expenditures. For public expenditures, it 
is important to take into account that most HIV/AIDS-related expenditures in middle- and 
low-income countries are financed by external grants (see UNAIDS, 2008). We do not 
consider the macroeconomic effects of such externally-financed expenditures,63 but focus on 
the implications of domestically-financed expenditures for national savings.
Using data from UNAIDS (2008) and IMF (2008), we find that domestically financed 
HIV/AIDS-related public spending amounted to around one percent of GDP in some 
countries with very high HIV prevalence.64 However, it is necessary to “translate” these
61 This practice becomes increasingly difficult as demographic estimates start to reflect the impacts o f  
antiretroviral treatment across countries. For the period our demographic estimates relate to (2000-05), 
however, this is still a minor issue.
62 For an illustration o f the underlying impact o f HIV/AIDS on mortality by sex and age, see Figure 1 in 
Chapter 2.1 which provides an example for Zambia (where mortality is estimated to have increased by just 
under 0.8 percentage points for the overall population, and 3.4 percentage points for the population o f  ages 
15-59).
63 For a more substantial discussion on the ramifications o f rapid scaling-up o f  external aid, see Adam and 
Bevan (2006), Bourguignon and Sundberg (2006), Haacker (2008, discussing explicitly the scaling-up o f  aid in 
the context o f HIV/AIDS), and Heller (2005).
64 For example, we find levels o f domestically financed HIV/AIDS-related public spending o f  1.3 percent o f  
GDP (2006) and 1.9 percent o f GDP (2007) for Botswana, 0.7 percent o f  GDP (Swaziland, 2006), 0.2 percent
increases in spending in changes in public savings and investments, which is a somewhat 
speculative exercise as there is no counterfactual available and the availability of more 
disaggregated data is limited. We will assume that national savings and investment decline 
by one-third of an assumed increase in domestically financed HIV/AIDS-related public 
expenditures of one percent of GDP, i.e. by 0.33 percent of GDP.65 For the dual economy 
model, we will apply this decline to each sector, even though the savings rate in the informal 
economy is considered lower (implying that public investment plays a proportionally higher 
role in the informal sector).66
Regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on private savings and investment, an awkward 
aspect of the literature is that the available estimates are based on microeconomic studies of 
the impact of HIV/AIDS on the household level. Translating these estimates into a 
macroeconomic impact is not be straightforward, as they may not capture aspects o f private 
savings and investment not directly entering statistics on household income and expenditure, 
such as corporate investment financed from retained earning, which are relevant on the 
macroeconomic level. “Scaling up” microeconomic estimates, relative to household income,
o f  GDP (Mozambique, 2005 and 2006), 0.7 percent o f GDP (2005) and 1.0 percent o f  GDP (2007) for Namibia, 
and 0.3 percent o f GDP for Lesotho (2006).
65 For example, if  capital expenditure accounts for one-third o f  the budget, then our assumption would imply 
that additional expenditures would be financed without additional borrowing, crowding out investment and 
current expenditures proportionally. We abstract from capital expenditures included in HIV/AIDS-related 
spending, as much o f these health-related expenditures are difficult to interpret in the context o f  our present 
model.
66 While many o f the impacts o f  HIV/AIDS can be considered proportional to HIV prevalence or HIV/AIDS- 
related mortality, this may not be the case for domestically financed HIV/AIDS-related public spending, as for 
lower-prevalence countries spending on HIV prevention (not tied to prevalence) may play a more pronounced 
role, and as the extent o f  external aid may differ. Another important point to note is the fact that the mix 
between external and domestic financing differs strongly according to income level. Whereas we focus on 
countries close to dividing line o f low- and middle- income countries (according to World Bank, 2008), 
countries in the lower tier o f  low-income countries may shower a higher degree o f  external financing, and a 
lower level o f domestically financed HIV/AIDS-related public spending, relative to GDP, than the countries 
considered here.
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to the macroeconomic level may therefore result in exaggerated estimates of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS. The other drawback of household studies, for the purpose of drawing inferences 
regarding macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS, is that these studies may capture impacts 
which reflect redistribution between households, and net out from a macroeconomic 
perspective. For example, if an individual needs to give up an employment (losing income) 
for HIV/AIDS-related reasons, and another individual fills the position (gaining income), we 
may see impacts on the balance sheet of the household affected by HIV/AIDS, although the 
macroeconomic impacts (in this regard) cancel out.
For this reason, we focus on household expenditures rather than incomes. Even when 
treatment is provided free of charge through public health services or other organizations, 
households have to incur the costs of caring for sick dependents and of accessing health care. 
Naidu and Harris (2006) summarize a number of studies finding that households affected by 
HIV/AIDS increase their health expenditures, while reducing other expense,categories. The 
magnitude of these reallocations can be substantial -  Steinberg and others (2002) find that 
households affected by HIV/AIDS spend about one-third o f their income on health care, 
compared with a national average of 4 percent, whereas other categories of expenditures are 
cut, most notably clothing and electricity. Rosen and others (2007) study the costs of 
accessing treatment at South African health facilities, finding that the costs of health visits 
(such as transportation costs and fees) amounted to about US$ 100 per year. Additionally, 
patients were spending considerable amounts on non-prescription drugs, special foods, and 
other HIV/AIDS- or health-related expenditures.67
Overall, we assume that patients spend $300 per year on care and treatment (30 percent 
of GDP per capita), and that these expenses are incurred for two years before death. This 
means that treatment-related private expenditures can be approximated as multiple of 
mortality rates and GDP per capita. With an assumed increase in HIV/AIDS-related mortality 
of 0.8 percentage points, we therefore calibrate the private costs of treatment at 0.5 percent of 
GDP. Regarding the breakdown between the formal and the informal sector, we assume that 
the nominal costs are the same across sectors, which implies that the costs are 60 percent of
67 Based on 6 visits per year to a health facility, at a cost o f 120 rand per visit.
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income per capita (not per worker) in the informal sector, and 15 percent in the formal sector. 
With similar rates of HIV prevalence in the informal and the formal sector, this translates 
into additional expenditures of 1 percent of output per capita in the informal sector, and 0.25 
percent of output per capita in the formal sector.
It remains to be determined how much of this is financed out of savings. The available 
literature does show some crowding of other expenditures lines. However, this takes place in 
the context of declining income, which arguably partly reflects distributional shifts (meaning 
that some of the reduced spending could be offset by higher spending in other households). 
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence that households affected by HIV/AIDS run 
down their assets. Additionally, households affected by illness (and death, see below) 
frequently receive support from other households (so that savings could decline in these 
households, as well).
In the absence of more substantial evidence of the impacts of the costs of treatment and 
care on private savings on the macroeconomic level, we will assume that one-half of the 
costs are financed by reduced savings, which means that the partial negative impact on the 
aggregate savings rate is 0.25 percentage points, reflecting a decline of 0.5 percentage points 
in the informal sector, and a decline of 0.125 percentage points in the formal sector.
The other important part of HIV/AIDS-related expenditure is the cost of funerals. 
Steinberg and others (2002) suggest that funeral expenses are, on average, equivalent to four 
months’ salary. Booysen and others report costs corresponding to 3.4 monthly incomes. 
Naidu and Harris (2006), in a comprehensive survey of the literature, point at numerous 
studies with similar findings (although not all results can easily be related to household 
income). Collins and Leibbrandt (2007), in a study focusing on poor households, find that 
funeral costs accounted for about 7 times monthly incomes.
68 See, for example, Lundberg, Over, and Mujinja (2000), or World Bank (1999), the latter pointing out that in a 
sample from the Kagera region in Tanzania, the median amount received by household within six months o f  the 
death was twice that received during the year before the death, and twice that received by households that did 
not suffer a death.
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On this basis, we will assume that funeral expenses are equivalent to about the level of an 
annual average income (3 times average monthly household income for an average 
household size of 4 corresponds to one year’s average income for one person), and that one- 
half of this is financed out of savings (which may include savings of friends and families 
contributing to the costs of funerals). With an increase in mortality of 0.8 percentage points, 
this means that the savings rate declines by 0.4 percentage points.
We are now in a position to calibrate the impacts of HIV/AIDS on savings rates. Public 
savings are reduced by 0.33 percent of GDP, which we assume to be spread proportionally 
(with output) across sector, i.e., savings rates decline by 0.33 percentage points both in the 
formal and the informal sector. The costs of care and treatment contribute 0.25 percentage 
points on aggregate to the decline (0.5 percentage points for the informal sector, 0.125 
percentage points for the formal sector), and funeral expenses contribute 0.4 percentage 
points to the decline. Overall, our assumptions translate into a decline in aggregate savings of 
0.98 percentage points, reflecting a decline in the savings rate of about 1.23 percentage 
points in the informal sector, and 0.86 percentage points for the formal sector.
Regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS on productivity, there are two different types of 
evidence -  data on the productivity of people affected by HIV/AIDS while working and data 
on absenteeism (and, partially overlapping with the latter, increased vacancies related to 
higher job attrition).69
Some studies of the impact of HIV/AIDS on the company level point to substantial 
declines in the productivity of workers in the late stages of the disease. According to Fox and 
others (2004), tea pickers on an estate in Kenya who retired or died from AIDS-related 
causes earned 16 percent less in their penultimate year at work, and 17.7 percent less in the 
final year. Similarly, Morris, Burdge, and Cheevers (2001) report that about 10 percent o f a 
sick employee’s working time was lost in the two years before the worker retired in a large 
South African sugar mill. Comparable estimates are not available for “white-collar” jobs, 
where productivity is more difficult to measure.
69 The discussion on the impacts o f HIV/AIDS on productivity partially draws on Haacker (2004a, 2004b).
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Some studies o f the financial costs of HIV/AIDS on the company level suggest that the 
impact can be substantial. Rosen and others (2004) estimate that the costs for several South 
African companies ranged from 0.4 to 6.0 percent of the wage bill, with HIV prevalence 
among employees ranging from 8 percent to 25 percent. Aventin and Huard (2000) estimate 
the costs of HIV/AIDS to companies at 0.8 to 1.3 percent of the wage bill, with an HIV 
incidence among employees of 1.1 percent to 1.9 percent. These studies, however, include 
costs we capture elsewhere (funeral costs, domestic health spending).
The other source of information on the productivity impacts of HIV/AIDS draws on data 
on HIV/AIDS-related disruptions to the work processes, notably through increased 
absenteeism. Government of Malawi and UNDP (2002) and Grassly and others (2003) both 
report evidence consistent with an increase in absenteeism for medical reasons of about 2 
percent of working hours (scaled from the original estimates to correspond with an HIV 
prevalence rate of about 20 percent, see Haacker (2004a) for details). However, these 
estimates are based on an increase in the number of AIDS cases of 2 percent of the working 
population, whereas the estimated by United Nations Population Division (2007) suggest that 
3 percent would be more appropriate, which would translate into an increase in absenteeism 
of 3 percent of working hours for medical reasons. Another cause of absenteeism is 
attendance at the funerals of those who have died of AIDS. Haacker (2004a) estimates that 
this factor may account for an increase in absenteeism of 0.7 percentage points.
For some sectors, notably the public sector, increased utilization of sick leave may be a 
factor. Haacker (2004b), based on provisions for sick leave for public servants in Swaziland 
and Zambia, suggests that “for a country where 2 percent of public servants drop out of the 
service for HIV/AIDS-related reasons, about 1 to 1.5 percent of all public servants may be on 
sick leave at a given time as a consequence.” However, these examples cannot be 
generalized, as provisions for sick leave differ across sectors (and countries); notably, public 
servants may enjoy more generous sick leave provisions than employees in the private formal 
sector or in the informal sector.
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One major area of potential sources of impacts of HIV/AIDS on productivity and growth 
is the accumulation of human capital.70 Birdsall and Hamoudi (2004), in an empirical paper, 
argue that life expectancy affects access to education, measured by schooling years across 
countries. Haacker (2004b) provides a thorough discussion of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on 
the costs of training. Various studies (BIDPA (2000), various papers by Cuddington) 
postulate an impact of HIV/AIDS on productivity through losses in experience, motivated by 
Mincerian wage regressions.
We do not include these effects in our analysis, as they cannot be interpreted in a 
straightforward way within the parameters of our model, owing to the long time lags 
involved, and as the empirical evidence regarding the specific impacts of HIV/AIDS in this 
area is very weak (owing to the different epidemiological and economic context, findings on 
health and life expectancy in general do not necessarily carry over to the impact of 
HIV/AIDS).
Based on these pieces of evidence, we will adopt the following assumptions regarding the 
impacts of HIV/AIDS on productivity. As the impacts we have described relate to the 
productivity or efficiency of labor in the first place, we assume that the parameters A , A, and 
Aj remain unchanged. For the efficiency of labor on the job (parameters e H and e v  ), the
studies we draw on suggest that the productivity of workers declines by 10 percent or more in 
the final 2 years of lives. With a mortality rate of 3 percent among the working population, 
this would be consistent with a decline in productivity of 0.6 percentage points. Increased 
absenteeism, owing to medical reasons or funeral attendance, accounts for a decline in labor 
productivity of 3.7 percent according to our reckoning. Allowing for some double-counting, 
we will assume that the efficiency of labor declines by 4 percent (somewhat lower than the 
sum of the two effects we have identified). As our data do not provide a basis for
70 These implications o f  the disease on human capital, and thus labor productivity and growth, are highlighted in 
other analytical studies on the economic impacts o f HIV/AIDS highlight the, including Bell, Devarajan and 
Gersbach (2004, 2006), predicting a severe contraction in the level o f economic activity in South Africa over 
the next decades. Young (2004) also allows for a negative impact o f  HIV/AIDS on the accumulation o f  human 
capital, but argues that other effects dominate.
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differentiating between sectors or types o f labor, and we assume that HIV prevalence is the 
same across population groups, we assume that the change in the respective efficiency 
parameters is the same.
Macroeconomic Impact o f HIV/AIDS: Findings
We are now in a position to summarize our findings on the macroeconomic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS. In this regard, Table 2 summarizes the impact of HIV/AIDS on the level of 
output and income, applying the different modeling strategies discussed above, and breaking 
down the impact by source (changes in savings, the population growth rate, and labor 
productivity. As our model involves two types of labor, and (as far as the dual-economy 
version is concerned) allows for shifts between sectors, our findings could also point to some 
distributional aspects of HIV/AIDS. Table 3 therefore summarizes some indicators in this 
direction, notably the changes in wage rates for skilled and unskilled labor.
Table 2. The Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS 
__________________ (In percent)__________________
Total impact Impact of decline in ...
Population 
Savings rate 1 growth rate 1
Labor 
productivity 1
One-Sector Model 
Closed Economy
Output (=Income) per Capita -1.3 -3.0 5.9 -4.0
Open Economy
Output per Capita -4.0 0.0 0.0 -4.0
Income per Capita -3.8 -1.9 2.1 ^ .0
Dual-Economy Model 
Closed Economy
Output (=Income) per Capita -1.3 -3.0 6.0 -4.0
Labor allocation2 1.0 0.1 0.9 0.0
Open Economy
Output per Capita -4.2 -0.9 0.8 -4.0
Income per Capita -2.5 -2.1 3.7 -4.0
Labor allocation2 0.1 0.7 -0.5 0.0
Sources: Author's calculations.
1 The table shows the impacts of changes in the savings rate (parameters s, s* and St, respectively), population 
growth rate (parameter ri) and labor productivity (parameters ey and en, with A, Ah and A  assumed unchanged).
The "partial" impacts may not add up to the total impact owing to rounding errors and cross-effects.
2 Change in share of unskilled workers working in the formal sector (in percent of the total number of unskilled 
workers).
For the closed economy, our findings for the one-sector replicate the pattern proposed by 
many other studies (see our discussion of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on economic growth in 
Chapter 2.1). The direct impact of HIV/AIDS on productivity are exacerbated by the impacts
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of a decline in national savings on the capital-labor ratio and thus output per capita.
However, much of these negative impacts are reversed by the positive impacts of a 
slowdown in population growth on the capital-labor ratio, almost offsetting the adverse 
impacts through the other two channels, so that the overall effect of HIV/AIDS on GDP per 
capita comes out rather small (minus 1.3 percent). The findings for the dual-economy model 
are very similar, but we note that the adjustment involves a reallocation of labor to the formal 
sector (reflecting our assumption that the decline in the savings rate in the formal sector is 
less pronounced).
Our estimates of the impact of HIV/AIDS in the open economy are very different from 
those for the closed economy. The impact on output per capita is stronger (a decline of about 
4 percent both in the one-sector and dual-economy version of the model). In the open 
economy, however, it is also important to consider the change in the country’s net investment 
position. As deteriorating investment opportunities in the domestic economy result in an 
outflow of capital, the balance of income in the economy’s current account improves and the 
decline in income per capita is less pronounced than the decline in output per capital. For the 
dual-economy model, this effect is more pronounced, this reflects the incongruence in our 
model designs between the one-sector and dual economy model, while the former does not 
differentiate between different types of capital, we assume that only capital generated in the 
formal sector (where the savings rate declines less than in the economy overall) is mobile.
The presence of different types o f labor also means that HIV/AIDS could have some 
implications for the distribution of income. In our model, which operates on high level of 
aggregation, these would take the form of different impacts on the wage rates of skilled an 
unskilled labor, respectively.71 Table 3 shows that the impacts of HIV/AIDS on wages are 
uniform across types of labor in the one-sector model.72 However, the impact of HIV/AIDS 
is more pronounced for unskilled labor than for skilled labor in the dual economy model,
71 In a more general model, it may also be possible to track distributional implications o f  a change in the rate of 
return to capital.
72 This reflects the constant-factor-shares property o f the aggregate production function, coupled with our 
assumption that the declines o f labor productivity are uniform across types o f  labor.
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owing to our assumption that savings rates decline less in the formal sector -  the formal 
sector thus contracts less than the informal sector, also resulting in a reallocation of unskilled 
labor to the formal sector, which has a first-order impact on the wages of skilled labor, but a 
second-order impact on the wages of unskilled labor.
Table 3. The Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS: Distributional Aspects
Share of formal 
sector (Change in 
Percentage points)
Interest rate 
(Change in 
Percentage points)
Skilled wage 
(Change in 
percent)
Unskilled wage 
(Change in 
percent)
One-Sector Model
Closed Economy n.a. -1.1 -1.3 -1.3
Open Economy n.a. 0.0 1 -4.0 -4.0
Dual-Economy Model
Closed Economy 1.5 -1.2 1.0 -4.6
Open Economy 0.2 0.0 1 -3.9 -4.6
Sources: Author's calculations.
1 For the dual-economy model, the interest rate for the formal sector is shown.
£ . Impact of Antiretroviral Treatment
Access to antiretroviral treatment has increased dramatically in low- and middle-income 
countries in recent years., WHO, UNAIDS and UNICEF (2008) estimate that 3 million 
people in need of antiretroviral therapy were receiving it as of end-2007, corresponding to a 
coverage rate of 30 percent, and comparing to a number receiving treatment of 2 million just 
one year earlier, and only 400,000 at end-2003.
The actual and potential economic impact of antiretroviral treatment has so far not been 
covered in the academic literature dealing with the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS, partly 
because the available studies precede the increase in access to treatment.74 Among the 
applied studies, only Jefferis, Siphambe, and Kinghom (2006) and Ellis, Laubscher, and Smit 
(2006) include an explicit discussion of the impacts of treatment. Their study, however, does
73 The latter effect mitigates the impacts o f HIV/AIDS on the wages o f unskilled labor, but also contributes to 
reversing some o f  the decline in the wage o f skilled labor.
74 However, some studies may implicitly include some assumptions regarding the impact o f  treatment, if  the 
demographic studies they are based on incorporate some assumptions in this direction.
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not provide a full documentation of some key assumptions regarding the impact of 
HIV/AIDS (and by implication, antiretroviral treatment) and of important features o f the 
model.
Assumptions on impact o f antiretroviral treatment
For our estimates of the macroeconomic consequences of increased access to antiretroviral 
treatment, which employ models geared towards the analysis of long-run changes in GDP per 
capita, we would need some reasonable projections of the scale access to treatment could 
attain over the next years. The treatment coverage rate we adopt is 100 percent, i.e., 100 
percent of people whose illness has progressed to the point where they would require 
treatment receive it. This may be a benchmark difficult to achieve literally (it would require 
that all people living with HIV/AIDS are diagnosed in time, seek treatment, and are able to 
access appropriate health services); however, for our region of interest, with relatively high 
treatment coverage rates, it provides a useful point of reference.
The health and demographic consequences of increased access to treatment have been 
discussed in some detail in United Nations Population Program (2007), and Over (2004, 
2008) provides thorough discussions of the implications from a public health perspective. In 
the context of our discussion, the principal effects of increased access to antiretroviral 
treatment are three-fold -  first, mortality related to HIV/AIDS declines, second, some of the 
decline in birth rates associated with HIV/AIDS is reversed, and third, the number of people 
living with HIV/AIDS, and in particular the number of people receiving treatment, increases. 
In terms of the parameters of our model, we would expect to see the following impacts of 
increased access to treatment:
(1) A partial reversal in the decline in the population growth rate, as mortality declines 
and the decline in birth rates associated with HIV/AIDS is mitigated;
(2) a partial reversal of the declines in labor productivity, owing to lower mortality and 
morbidity among workers;
(3) changes in the savings rate, reflecting lower average expenses on funerals, but higher 
spending on care and treatment.
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To understand the magnitude of these effects, it is first necessary to determine the impact 
of treatment on mortality and birth rates. In our analysis of the macroeconomic impact of 
HIV/AIDS (largely excluding the impact of treatment), we assumed a decline in the rate of 
population growth of 1.0 percent, reflecting an increase in mortality of 0.8 percent and, by 
implication, a decline in the birth rate of 0.2 percent.
Antiretroviral treatment substantially increases the life span of people receiving it, but it 
prevents few HIV/AIDS-related deaths. Based on Lopez and others (2006), and the 
documentation accompanying United Nations Population Division (2007), we assume that 
treatment reduces the loss in life expectancy of a person living with HIV/AIDS in low- and 
middle- income countries from 36 years to 28 years. Assessing the implications for mortality 
rates is not straightforward, as HIV/AIDS-related deaths are mainly delayed rather than 
prevented. However, the reduction in mortality owing to treatment is related to the gain in 
life expectancy from it. As about one-quarter of the loss in life-years is averted by treatment, 
we assume that the increase in mortality owing to HIV/AIDS is reduced by one-quarter, i.e., 
from 0.8 percentage points to 0.6 percentage points.75 For the potential impact of treatment 
on birth rates, we assume that treatment reverses the decline in birth rates from 0.2 percent to 
0.1 percent. Proportionally, this is a larger reversal than the one in mortality rates, reflecting 
that the increase in life expectancy has a more than proportional effect on the time women 
living with HIV/AIDS survive during child-bearing age, and that treatment also increases the 
probability of successful pregnancies. Overall, we thus assume that treatment reverses the 
decline in the population growth rate by 0.3 percentage points (from minus 1.0 percentage 
points to minus 0.7 percentage points).
To assess the impact of increased access to treatment on labor productivity, we need to 
establish the impact of treatment on the mortality among the working-age population, 
recalling that, at 3.0 percentage points, the impact on mortality for this age group (ages 15-59)
75 For mortality rates that are uniform over time, life expectancy is equal to the inverse o f the mortality rate. Our 
approximation linearizes the link between life expectancy and mortality, and does not take fully into account 
complications arising from mortality rates that differ over time and from the composition o f  the population 
reflected in population averages o f mortality rates.
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is much more pronounced than for the overall population (0.8 percentage points). Using the 
same approximation as above, we assume that the reversal in the increase in mortality is 
proportional to the reversal in the loss in life expectancy, which would mean that mortality 
declines by only 2.3 percent.76 Correspondingly, we assume that the decline in productivity 
amounts to only 3 percent, rather than 4 percent.
Regarding the implications of increased access to treatment on the savings rate, there are 
two effects going in opposite directions. As HIV/AIDS-related mortality declines (from 0.8 
percentage points to 0.6 percentage points, so does the impact of funeral expenses on the 
savings rate (from 0.4 percentage points to 0.3 percentage points).
Our estimates o f the impact of HIV/AIDS on private savings were motivated by the costs 
of care of treatment, assumed to occur over an average of 2 years. Antiretroviral treatment 
extends life-time by 8 years, and during this time costs of treatment are incurred. On the 
other hand, the costs of care can be expected to decline, as the state of health of the people 
receiving treatment improves. We therefore assume that the costs of care and treatment 
increase three-fold (whereas a simple scaling-up based on higher survival times would 
suggest a five-fold increase). This would mean that the negative impact of the private costs of 
care and treatment on the aggregate savings rate rises to 0.75 percentage points (from 0.25 
percentage points, reflecting a decline of 1.5 percentage points in the informal sector, and a 
decline of 0.375 percentage points in the formal sector.
The remaining component of the impact of HIV/AIDS on national savings is the impact 
on government savings, which we set at 0.33 percent of GDP. In light of the prominent role 
of external grants in financing HIV/AIDS-related expenditures, especially regarding health
76 Doing this, we do not take into account complications that arise as (1) a number o f  young people living with 
HIV/AIDS who would have died before reaching age 15 survive beyond this age (and increase mortality among 
the working-age population), and (2) for a number o f relatively old people, death is postponed until after they 
exit the working-age population. Both effects play a relatively small role, as HIV prevalence among people 
under age 15 is low, and as the old cohorts in the working-age population carry account for a small share in the 
working-age population, and as mortality in the latter age group is lower than for the working-age population 
overall.
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expenditures, scaling up -  for our projections -  domestically financed government 
expenditures proportionally with the number of people receiving treatment would probably 
exaggerate the impact of scaling-up of treatment. It is also worth noting that the reported data 
on HIV/AIDS-related spending already include some costs associated with provision of 
antiretroviral therapy, although on much low levels than suggested by our scaling-up 
scenario. However, the expansion in health services associated with a substantial scaling-up, 
and required overheads, would most probably also require an increase in domestic 
expenditures. In light of the dominant role of external finance, a well-founded estimate is 
impossible. As a “memorandum item,” and in light of the considerable expansion in public 
health services, we assume that a comprehensive scaling-up doubles the decline in public 
savings associated with HIV/AIDS, from 0.33 percent of GDP to 0.67 percent of GDP.
The overall impacts of HIV/AIDS on savings rates in a scenario involving comprehensive 
access to antiretroviral treatment, through the three channels described, thus add up to 1.72 
percentage points, ranging from 2.47 percentage points in the informal sector to 1.34 
percentage points in the formal sector.
Tables 4 and 5 summarizes our findings on the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS in 
a setting with comprehensive access to antiretroviral treatment. Remarkably, for most 
scenarios (the one exception is the open-economy one-sector model), the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS are more pronounced in the scenario with comprehensive access to treatment, 
even though the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS on health indicators are lower. The 
deterioration is most pronounced for the open economy, were output per capita declines by 
an additional 3 percentage points (both for the one-sector model and the dual-economy 
model. The decline in the savings rate accounts for a decline of about 2 percent, the reduced 
slowdown in the rate of population growth contributes another 2 percent, while these 
negative effects on output per capita are partly offset by the dampened impact o f HIV/AIDS 
on productivity (reflecting lower mortality rates).
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Table 4. Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS -  Comprehensive Access to Treatment 
___________________________________ (In percent)___________________________________
Total impact Impact of decline in ...
Population 
Savings rate 1 growth rate 1
Labor 
productivity 1
One-Sector Model 
Closed Economy
Output (=Income) per Capita -4.1 -5.0 4.0 -3.0
Open Economy
Output per Capita -3.0 0.0 0.0 -3.0
Income per Capita 
Dual-Economy Model
-4.4 -3.3 1.8 -3.0
Closed Economy
Output (=Income) per Capita -4.2 -5.2 4.1 -3.0
Labor allocation2 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.0
Open Economy
Output per Capita -4.4 -1.9 0.5 -3.0
Income per Capita -4.3 -3.7 2.5 -3.0
Labor allocation2 1.1 1.5 -0.4 0.0
Sources: Author's calculations.
1 The table shows the impacts of changes in the savings rate (parameters s, s* and Sn respectively), population growth 
rate (parameter n) and labor productivity (parameters eu and eH, with A, Ah and ^ assum ed  unchanged). The "partial" 
impacts may not add up to the total impact owing to rounding errors and cross-effects.
2 Change in share of unskilled workers working in the formal sector (in percent of the total number of unskilled workers). 
For the open-economy model, the changes in per-capita output and income associated
with the scaling-up of antiretroviral treatment are less pronounced. In the one-sector model, 
savings rates and population growth rates have no impact on output per capita, and the 
decline in output per capita is equal to the change in labor productivity. However, the decline 
in income per capita becomes more pronounced in a setting with comprehensive access to 
treatment, as the decline in the savings rate and the reduced impact on the population growth 
rate affects the rate of accumulation of assets.
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Table 5. Distributional Aspects -  Comprehensive Access to Treatment
Share of formal 
sector (Change in 
Percentaqe points)
Interest rate 1 
(Change in 
Percentaqe points)
Skilled wage 
(Change in 
percent)
Unskilled wage 
(Change in 
percent)
One-Sector Model
Closed Economy n.a. 0.5 -4.1 -4.1
Open Economy n.a. 0.0 -3.0 -3.0
Dual-Economy Model
Closed Economy 1.7 -0.1 -1.7 -8.0
Open Economy 1.7 0.0 2.0 -8.0
Sources: Author's calculations.
1 For the dual-economy model, the interest rate for the formal sector is shown.
For the dual-economy model, the scenario with comprehensive access to treatment also is 
characterized by a deterioration of incomes in the informal sector (and for unskilled labor 
more generally), reflecting the asymmetric impacts of the costs of treatment between the 
informal and the formal sector (as the costs of care and access to treatment account for a 
larger share of income in the informal sector). As a result, the wage rate for unskilled labor 
declines by 8 percent, whereas wages of skilled labor decline by only 1.7 percent in the 
closed-economy setting. For the dual (open) economy, the decline in wages for unskilled 
labor, and a reallocation of unskilled labor to the formal sector, result in an increase in the 
wages of skilled labor of 2 percent (while the wages of unskilled labor decline by 8 percent, 
as in the closed-economy setting).
F. Conclusions
Our findings can be grouped along four themes. First, in line with previous studies, we find 
that the size of the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS so far is not of the same order of 
magnitude as the impacts on health and mortality. Our analysis suggests that the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS, so far, are consistent with a decline in the steady-state level of output per capita 
of between one and four percent. Considering that the adjustment to steady-state takes times, 
and that the impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality has evolved gradually, the implications of our 
steady-state calculations for the rate of growth of GDP per capita are small -  a few tenths of 
a percentage point.
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Second, our findings relate to concerns about distributional impacts of HIV/AIDS, 
notably regarding a disproportional impact of HV/AIDS on low-income groups. In our 
framework, the disproportional costs of care and treatment for low-income groups translate 
into a decline in savings rates, which results in a decline in output per capita in the informal 
sector. However, it can be argued that the most important aspect o f the distributional impacts 
of HIV/AIDS occur on the household level,77 and our approach focusing on aggregate 
macroeconomic variables offers few insights in this direction.
Third, our findings highlight the critical role that the “closed-economy” assumption plays 
in many studies of the impacts of HIV/AIDS, where an increase in the capital-labor ratio 
offsets much of the otherwise negative impacts of HIV/AIDS on output per capita. This point 
is also relevant for considerations regarding the long-term impacts of HIV/AIDS, including 
possible effects on education choices, human capital, or fertility. With gradual adjustment in 
capital flows, our open-economy model is particularly relevant for the long-run analysis; 
studies of the long-run effects of HIV/AIDS relying on an increase in the returns to labor 
associated with an increase in the capital-labor ratio may therefore be built on shaky 
premises.
Fourth, our findings suggest that increased access to antiretroviral treatment does not or 
will not mitigate the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita. While mitigating 
some of the direct effects (e.g., those associated with increased mortality), the economic 
burden associated with the costs of treatment and care increases, resulting in a somewhat 
higher decline in GDP per capita. Notably, in our analysis the implications of the increased 
costs of accessing care and treatment are more pronounced for the informal sector, 
suggesting an adverse impact on the distribution of income.
77 See Haacker (2008, 2004b).
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I I I . l .  H e a l t h , L if e  E x p e c t a n c y , W e l f a r e  (L it e r a t u r e  S u r v e y )
A. Introduction
Higher incomes are associated with better health, over time or across countries. Over time, 
improvements in incomes tend to be accompanied by increases in life expectancy and other 
key indicators of public health. Across countries, life expectancy increases steeply with 
income (Preston (1975), Deaton (2003)), especially for low-income countries; the “Preston 
curve” flattens but keeps increasing for higher-income countries.
However, the interactions between health, economic development, living standards, and 
other economic variables are complex and manifold. While higher incomes can “buy” better 
health services, improved public health also contributes to productivity, income, and 
economic growth (see our discussion in Chapter 2.1). From an economic development 
perspective, health is regarded as an objective and constituent aspect of “well-being,” as well 
as a means to achieving development outcomes, with improved health outcomes enabling 
agents to pursue gainful activities, thereby contributing to the attainment of development 
objectives in various areas (Sen, 1999).
Our discussion focuses the contributions of health from a specific angle, drawing on the 
microeconomic theory of consumption, in which consumers maximize the utility derived 
from consumption over their planning (life) horizons. In this setting, agents generally value 
declines in mortality and improvements in life expectancy, as they can attain a higher life­
time utility (especially if the increases in life expectancy and improvements in health are 
associated with an increase in the productive period in agents’ lives). Rather than assessing 
the impacts of health on income, or vice versa, we thus evaluate development outcomes in 
income or health, irrespective of any interdependencies that may exist between income and 
health.
Drawing on the literature on the “value of statistical life,” which provides empirical 
estimates of valuations of mortality risks, the framework of the intertemporally maximizing 
consumer can be used to assess the contributions of increased life expectancy to living 
standards (i.e., the expected utility over an agent’s life). To this end, the literature generally
I l l
uses income (proxied by GDP per capita) as a meter, adapting the microeconomic framework 
to obtain estimates of the value of improved life expectancy relative to changes in income. 
This approach, in different forms, has been used in numerous studies, for example to adjust 
GDP growth with a contribution of increased life expectancy (e.g., Crafts (1997, 2007), and 
Nordhaus (2003)) or adding an allowance for increased “health capital” to the level of GDP 
(Murphy and Topel, 2006).
Against this background, our study is structured in 4 main sections. We set out with a 
discussion of health from a macroeconomic or economic development perspective 
(Section 2).78 While focusing on a subset of this literature subsequently, the purpose of the 
section is to place this specific area of the literature in a broader context, and to define the 
contributions to the broader literature of our studies of primary interest, as well as their 
limitations, more clearly.
Regarding the literature applying the microeconomic framework of the intertemporally 
maximizing consumer to studying the contributions of improved life expectancy to living 
standards, many papers provide methodological innovations, as well as concrete estimates of 
the contributions of increased life expectancy. Nevertheless, we find it useful for expository 
purposes to initially focus on the methodological aspects of the literature (Section 3).
Section 4 surveys the empirical literature estimating the “value of statistical life,” as well 
as some approaches used to calibrate the parameters of the utility function (which are related 
to the value of statistical life) in studies estimating the contributions of increased life 
expectancy to living standards.
Section 5 discusses a number of studies which apply the microeconomic framework of 
the intertemporally maximizing consumer and estimates of individuals’ valuations of 
mortality risk or the “value of statistical life” to study the impacts of changes in life 
expectancy on living standards in different contexts. Much of this literature addresses 
increases in life expectancy and income in industrialized countries, largely in specific
78 References on the linkages between health and economic growth are cursory, as these are discussed in some 
detail elsewhere in this volume (see Chapter 2.1).
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countries, with periods of coverage that could go back as far as 1900, or 1870 in some cases. 
A second area of interest is the small literature that extends the approach to a large number of 
countries, to allow for cross-country comparisons or, in one notable paper (Becker and 
others, 2005), to study the evolution of world inequality, allowing for the contribution of 
increasing life expectancies across countries. One specific area in which the approach we 
focus on has been applied usefully is the study of the impacts of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
which represents the most serious example of an event reversing gains in life expectancies in 
individual countries or regions for a sustained period of time.
Section 6 concludes.
B. Health and Welfare -  A Macroeconomic Perspective79
While our discussion in subsequent sections focuses on specific aspects of the contribution of 
improved health on living standards, the present section provides some broader context.
From a broad economic development perspective, for example in the framework developed 
by Sen (1999), improved health would be regarded as a constituent aspect of development 
and a development objective in its own right. At the same time, improved health contributes 
to the attainment o f other development objectives, including income (most directly, as 
healthy people are more productive) and education. The view of health as a constituent 
aspect of development, and a key instrument in attaining improved material living standards 
is also reflected in catalogues of development objectives such as the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with 3 of the 9 MDGs directly referring to public 
health issues.80
More specifically regarding the linkages between income and health, Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health, Working Group I (2002), which provides a comprehensive
79 The section on “Health and Welfare -  A Macroeconomic Perspective” partly draws on Haacker, Markus, 
2008a, “Health and Globalization,” in: Reinert, Kenneth A., Ramkishen S. Rajan, Lewis Davis, And Amy Glass 
(eds.), 2008, Princeton Encyclopedia o f the World Economy (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press).
80 See Haacker (2008b) for further reading. The relevant MDGs are MDG 4 (“Reduce child mortality”), MDG 5 
(“Improve Maternal Health”), and MDG 6 (“Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Other Diseases”).
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review of the academic literature on the links between income, health, and poverty, focuses 
on four macroeconomic aspects of health.81 (1) A successful demographic transition from 
high to low fertility depends in large part on improvement in health. (2) Healthier workers 
are physically and mentally more energetic and robust, and thus more productive. A healthy 
environment is also conducive to children’s education. (3) Across the world ill health 
disproportionally afflicts poor people. At the same time, as the main asset o f the poor, their 
body, is left without insurance, ill health imposes a higher level of risk on the poor than on 
people with more assets. (4) The report points at income inequality as key determinant of 
mortality in higher-income countries, with income inequality indicating the quality of social 
arrangements, stress, and mortality.
The linkages between income or GDP per capita on one hand, and health on the other 
hand, have been explored by numerous authors with a more narrow macroeconomic focus. 
Early influential studies include Pritchett and Summers (1996) and Pritchett (1997), which 
highlight the positive correlation between income and life expectancy. Recent studies by 
Deaton (2003, 2006) and Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) generally propose more 
complex interactions between income, health, and other economic variables. Deaton (2003) 
focuses on links between inequality and health. While finding that income inequality 
becomes relatively more important as a cause of death at higher income levels, the evidence 
does not support an independent role for income inequality as a major determinant of 
population health. Instead, inequality appears to affect health as it is associated with poverty.
Deaton (2006) and Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006) offer a more complex view 
of the relationship between health and income. Deaton (2006) suggests that “health 
improvements in poor countries are not primarily driven by income, nor even by 
improvements in health knowledge and technology. Knowledge has certainly been important 
in the long run. But over periods as long as decades, it is the social factors that make for 
effective delivery of health that are vital, particularly levels of education, and the
81 The following list largely quotes from Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, Working Group I 
(2002). However, it draws a few key sentences from and thus edits a longer discussion, our summary should 
therefore not be interpreted as a literal quote.
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development of population health as a political priority, which itself depends on better 
education and on the widespread idea that better health is both a possibility and a right.”
Relatedly, Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), analyzing the determinants and 
correlates of mortality, find that “over the broad sweep of history, improvements in health 
and income are both the consequence of new ideas and new technology, and one might or 
might not cause the other. Between rich and poor countries, health comes from institutional 
ability and political willingness to implement known technologies, neither of which is an 
automatic consequence of rising incomes. Within countries, the lower earnings of people 
who are sick explain much of the correlation between income and health, rather than a causal 
relationship from higher income to better health.”
In addition to the role of health as a determinant of GDP per capita (discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2.1), and the interactions between health and GDP per capita, the 
recognition of health as a key development outcome has motivated the construction of 
development indicators that incorporate measures of the state of public health, in addition to 
income (and, in some cases, other variables).
The best-known of these indicators is the Human Development Index (HDI) developed 
by the United Nations Development Program. It combines indices representing the state of 
public health (based on life expectancy), educational attainment (based on literacy rates and 
enrolment rates), and income per capita.
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) adopt a more informal approach, analyzing and 
comparing long-term trends across countries over long periods (1820-1992). They find that 
global income inequality has increased throughout the period under consideration, although 
at a slower pace in the period following World War II. While most inequality was due to 
differences between countries in the early 19th century, most differences were accounted for
82 A good survey o f  different approaches is included in Crafts (2007).
83 For the latest version, see United Nations Development Program (2007). For a thorough discussion o f  
underlying methodology, see United Nations Development Program (1993)
115
by cross-country differences in later periods. Meanwhile, inequality in longevity increased 
during the 19th century, but the increase was (more than) reversed between 1920 and 1970.84
Composite indices like the HDI, or “parallel” analyses like the one in Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002), reflect a recognition of the state of health as a central determinant or 
component of economic development. The literature that we discuss further below differs 
from these approaches in two (related) regards. First, the assessments of the contribution of 
health to economic living standards, based on a framework with intertemporally maximizing 
agents, is motivated by microeconomic evidence regarding individual’s valuations of reduced 
mortality or improved life expectancy, drawing on the literature on the “value o f statistical 
life” and other microeconomic studies.85 Second, attaching a value to improvements in life 
expectancy enables researchers to use income as a common meter for improvements in living 
standards, calibrating, for example, “corrected” or “adjusted” growth figures, measuring 
gains in living standards by “full income,” including an imputation for increased life 
expectancy, or estimating the (stock) value of increases in life expectancy, and attributing a 
value to the outcomes of medical research (as in Murphy and Topel (2003b, 2006)).
While -  in terms of social valuations of increases in life expectancy -  assessments based 
on microeconomic evidence may offer some advantages,86 it is important to stress what this 
type of analysis can and cannot achieve. If one accepts a specific utility function as 
representative of individuals’ preferences, the framework provides valuations of 
improvements in income per capita and in life expectancy using a common meter (usually 
projecting health improvements into equivalent income changes). However, it provides
84 Inequality in income appears to have reached a trough in 1980, according to Fig. (3) in Bourguignon and 
Morrison (2002), this is not discussed explicitly in their study.
85 See Section IV for a more extensive discussion.
86 As discussed in more detail further below, translating the microeconomic evidence into the context o f  
macroeconomic evaluations is not unproblematic, as the microeconomic data across countries is scarce, as the 
context o f  the surveys and the individuals sampled may not be representative o f the economy as a whole, and as 
assessments across countries or over longer time periods are afflicted by problems associated with out-of- 
sample projection.
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valuations of the contributions of health to improved living standards only in a reduced form, 
or in terms of final outcomes of income per capita and life expectancy, and bypasses the 
issues raised in the discussions of the interdependencies of income, health, and other 
economic variables outlined above.
C. Microeconomic Context
The body of theoretical literature we draw from starts with Schelling (1968), which is 
frequently quoted as an influential source in the subsequent literature, and which establishes 
three principles which characterize the literature on the value of statistical life. First, while ’ 
establishing valuations of life or actual death is difficult, such issues can usually be 
approached based on incremental mortality risks (and decision-making problems typically 
relate to the latter). Second, inferences regarding valuations of life can be made based on 
“market evidence of what people will pay to avoid their own death” (i.e., reduce the 
probability of a fatality). Third, Schelling conjectures that such valuations would exceed the 
value of the expected income over an agent’s remaining life. Additionally, Schelling points 
out potential frictions between individual valuations of life (depending on an agent’s wealth) 
and social preferences (using a hospital as an example).
The approach sketched by Schelling has been formalized by several authors, adopting 
frameworks in which agents are endowed with an explicit set of preferences over time and 
states of nature, and in which valuations of mortality risks are “evaluated [...] by reference to 
what each member of the community is willing to pay or to receive for the estimated change 
of risk” (Mishan, 1971). Mishan also introduces the links between the valuation of life the 
Hicksian “compensating variation” in income, and spells out the links of this approach to 
valuing life to the concept of Pareto optimality). Jones-Lee (1974) contributes a more refined 
“analysis of compensating variations for changes in the probability of an individual’s own 
fatal accident,” using a framework with two states of nature (“life” and “death”). The 1976 
book by Jones-Lee on “The Value of Life -  An Economic Analysis” provides a thorough 
discussion of some earlier literature not covered here, and provides an extensive discussion 
of “the value of changes in safety and longevity” against the background to the theory of 
choice under uncertainty. The book also links the theory to the practice of life insurance, and
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provides some discussion of an experimental approach to estimating valuations of life. Jones- 
Lee (1994) provides an accessible introduction to issues regarding “the economics of safety 
and physical risk.”
Arthur’s “Economics of Risks to Life” (1981) analyzes valuations of mortality risks in 
the context of agents’ expected life horizon, focusing on the “willingness to pay” for 
reductions in mortality risk. A subtle difference between Arthur’s approach and the earlier 
ones is that the valuation of risks to life in his paper are based on an equivalent, rather than a 
compensating, variation in income. The key contribution of Arthur’s study, however, is an 
explicit link between remaining life expectancy and the valuation of life, as “a life lost at a 
younger age forfeits more than one at an older age.”
Rosen (1981) links valuations of life of occupational health risks, and provides an 
expository model in which wage differentials are related to employment-specific mortality 
risks. At the time, few studies of valuations of life implicit in wage differentials were 
available, but the contribution is significant as it established the principle o f which much of 
the subsequent literature on the “value of statistical life” builds (see our discussion further 
below). Rosen (1988) provides a more explicit framework, emphasizing age-dependent 
variations in the value of life (as in Arthur, 1981), and explicitly linking the valuation of life 
to certain properties or parameters of agents’ preferences (compare our discussion of direct 
vs. indirect estimates of the value of statistical life, further below). Rosen (1986) formalizes 
the links between employment-based mortality risks and the value of life in an integrated 
framework in which employment opportunities are characterized as bundles of different 
types of attributes, including associated incomes and health risks.
Usher (1973, 1980) provided a macroeconomic perspective to the literature on the value 
of statistical life, relating income growth and advances in life expectancy to obtain estimates 
of a “growth rate of income inclusive of an imputation for increased life expectancy.” Usher 
(1973), the more extensive of the two studies, also provides estimates of the contribution of 
life expectancy in 5 countries (while Usher (1980) focuses on Canada only), and discusses 
some of the properties of valuations of life in a life-cycle context (including age- 
dependency).
118
D. Studies of the Value of Statistical Life
There are two distinct approaches to estimating the “value of statistical life,” i.e., the 
valuation of life implied by observed economic valuations of incremental changes in 
mortality risks. One method is closely aligned with the definition of the value of statistical 
life, and draws on empirical studies relating differences in wage data or other economic data 
to observed differences in mortality across a sample. The other approach involves drawing on 
evidence on the structure of agents’ preferences. To see how the two approaches are related, 
we employ a simplified version of the life-cycle model of consumption, with
U =  \e~l“u(c)dt = ^ S l ,  (1)
o »
where c represents the level of consumption (assumed to be constant over time) p stands for 
the mortality rate (also assumed to be constant, which means that life expectancy is equal to 
1 / p ). The presentation of preferences in Eq. (1) also implies an assumption that the rate of 
time preference, which is not essential for the present exercise, is equal to zero. 
Differentiating through and dividing by U gives
dU  _ d \ i ^ u \ c ) 'c d c  p j
U p u{c) c
The equivalent variation in the level of consumption that would leave U unchanged, in 
response to a change in p, is
dc
c u= u
r  U \ c ) ' c^  
u(c)
-1
(3)
V-
A version of Eq. (3) is commonly used in empirical studies of the value of statistical life, 
usually in the form
dy -  a , d\x + other var tables + error terms, (4)
where the estimated coefficient a , , corresponding to u '(c) • c
V 1
— in the above expository
w(c)
framework, represents the value of statistical life. Our simple framework also suggests that
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the value of statistical life also changes with the level of income, mortality, or life expectancy 
(1 / jLt), which needs to be taken into account when adapting parameters from regressions as 
in Eq. (4) to different settings, or applying the framework in settings where the level of 
income or life expectancy may differ over time or across units of analysis (individuals, 
groups, countries, etc.).
Eq. (3). As
The alternative approach for calibrating the value of statistical life also departs from 
u '(c) ’ c ^---------  , the elasticity of the utility function with respect to the level of
u(c) J
consumption, is closely related to the shape of the utility function, and can be represented in 
terms of key parameters of specifications of utility functions commonly used in 
macroeconomic or microeconomic analysis, it is also possible to derive estimates of the value 
of statistical life from that literature. (Another closely related economic variable is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, - , estimates of which could also be
c ■ u \c )
utilized to determine parameters of the utility function and thus the value of statistical life.) 
Direct Estimates o f the Value o f Statistical Life
As our primary interest is the study of the value of statistical life across countries or over 
time, we focus on the literature building on estimates from individual studies and analyzing 
the variations in estimates of the value of statistical life across studies (i.e., over time and 
across countries). The most comprehensive of such “meta” studies is Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003), on which we will focus below, following an earlier study by Viscusi (1993); another 
study that is sometimes used to motivate estimates of the value of statistical life across 
countries is Miller (2000). Bowland and Beghin (2001) is notable for our purposes, in light of 
their objective of deriving estimates for the value of statistical life for developing countries 
from a sample that is dominated by industrialized countries. Liu, Hammitt, and Liu (1997), in
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addition to estimating the value of statistical life based on data from Taiwan, also provide 
some cross-country analysis.87
The study by Miller (2000) is noteworthy as it represented, at the time, the most serious 
effort aimed at studying the determinants of the value of statistical life across countries, 
including low-income countries. To this end, the empirical analysis in Miller (2000) focuses 
on GDP per capita or GNP per capita as a determinant of the value of statistical life; 
additionally, he conducts sensitivity checks regarding the over-representation of certain 
countries, most notably the United States, in the sample. For various specifications, his 
estimates of the elasticity of the value of statistical life range from 0.95 to 0.96 for GDP per 
capita, 0.85 to 0.95 for GNP per capita, and 0.89 for PPP-adjusted GDP per capita. For a 
simpler specification, based on country averages for the value of statistical life rather than 
individual observations, the estimated elasticities with respect to GNP per capita range from 
0.92 to 1.0, and imply a value of statistical life of about 136.7 times GNP per capita (see 
Crafts and Haacker (2004); the estimate is based on regression (4) from Miller (2000).
Bowland and Beghin (2001, and the 1998 working paper version which provides a more 
extensive documentation of some of the econometric specifications) discuss some of the 
problems in drawing inferences from available studies of the value of statistical life (largely 
from industrialized countries -  Bowland and Beghin (1998, 2001) adopt the dataset from 
Viscusi (1993). Specifically, they focus on explanatory variables (such as income, indicators 
for human capital, and estimates of demographic characteristics) which are available for a 
wide set of developing countries, and apply some weighting techniques to analyze the 
sensitivity of their findings to outliers. Their preferred specifications return estimates of the 
elasticity of the value of statistical life of 1.52, 1.66, and 2.27.
Our discussion uses Viscusi and Aldy as a focal point, not only because it includes the 
latest and most comprehensive discussion of available studies to date, but also because it
87 We do not provide a further discussion o f the findings from the cross-country analysis in Liu, Hammitt, and 
Liu (1997), as the presentation and discussion is very brief (11 lines) and serves primarily as a brief “sanity 
check” o f  the authors’ findings from studying the Taiwanese data.
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discusses and re-estimates some of the models in Miller (2000) and Bowland and Beghin
(2001) using the larger set of observations covered by their survey.88
The study by Viscusi and Aldy covers 30 studies of compensating wage differentials for
QQ
mortality risk from the U.S. labor market, and 21 studies from other labor markets. Of the 
latter studies, the bulk regards industrialized countries, while 7 cover emerging or developing 
economies (including 3 successive studies by the same author, using the same dataset from 
India). The earliest studies for the U.S. date back to the mid-70s, and only 10 were published 
in 1990 or later, while most studies of non-U.S. economies (17) were published after 1990.
The heavy reliance on U.S. studies, especially for the years before 1990, is problematic 
when these studies are used to draw inference regarding the value of statistical life across 
countries or over time. A key variable in this regard is the level of income or GDP per capita; 
finding a stable relationship between the estimated value of statistical life and income would 
inspire some measure of confidence in applying the estimates obtained from analyzing the 
estimates of the value of statistical life from country-level studies.
Using their expanded sample of country-level studies, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) update 
the earlier analyses by Liu, Hammitt, and Liu (1997), Miller (2000), and Bowland and 
Beghin (2001), finding elasticities of the value of statistical life (estimate from original 
studies in parentheses) with respect to income of 0.53 (0.51) for the model used in Liu and 
others (1997), 0.53 (0.89) for Miller (2000), and 0.61 (1.66) for Bowland and Beghin (2001).
The similarities of the estimates produced by Viscusi and Aldy (2003), across 
specifications, suggest that the composition of the sample may play a key role in explaining
88 Another “meta study” o f  variations in the value o f statistical life across studies covered by Aldy and Viscusi 
(2003) that we do not discuss here is Mrozek and Taylor (2001) and largely focuses on the U.S. economy, and 
which applies a specification that cannot not be extended to a large set o f countries, owing to limited data 
availability.
89 Additionally, Aldy and Viscusi (2003) survey studies o f the value o f  statistical life using other methods 
(property values and health risks, risk-reducing expenditures), and studies addressing wage differentials 
associated with injury risk.
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the differences between the estimates by Viscusi and Aldy and the original studies, while the 
value of statistical life, in Viscusi and Aldy (2003), appears to be fairly robust across 
specifications. The large weight of observations from the U.S. alone in Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003) does not appear to be the primary reason for the differences between their study and 
the earlier ones, as Liu and others (1997) and Miller (2000) show similar imbalances, and as 
Miller (2000) produces similar estimates for the elasticity of the value of statistical life with 
respect to income in regressions based on the country averages of the estimated value of 
statistical life.90
More recently, Becker and Elias (2007) revisited the estimates produced by Viscusi and 
Aldy (2003). Becker and Elias (2007) emphasize the role of outliers in the sample used by 
Viscusi and Aldy, notably the estimated values of statistical life from 3 studies from India, 
which are very high relative to the sample average of income levels, - the average level of 
income in the three studies from India included by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) is US$778, while 
the estimates of the value of statistical life range from US$1.0 million to US$4.1 million, 
corresponding to between 1285 and 5270 times the level of income, i.e., about 10 to 40 times 
the level produced by most other studies. Moreover, these outliers have a large effect on the 
estimated elasticities as India is an outlier in the sample used by Viscusi and Aldy in terms of 
GDP per capita. Becker and Elias (2007) therefore re-estimate the elasticities produced by 
Viscusi and Aldy excluding the estimates from India, and obtain elasticities in the vicinity of 
unity.
Another test regarding the plausibility of estimates of the value of statistical life across 
countries is whether the estimates make sense when applied to countries at either end of the 
distribution of income across countries. To this end, we use the U.S., with an estimated GNI 
per capita of about $45,850 in 2007, as a benchmark for high-income countries and an 
average low-income country, with GDP per capita estimated at about $1,441 (in current US$, 
at PPP exchange rates, see World Bank (2007). [Note: For drafting purposes, this section 
actually used GNI. Need to update numbers.] As a benchmark for the value of statistical life
90 Bowland and Beghin (2001) do not provide a straightforward documentation o f  their sample, and therefore 
does not allow for similar comparisons.
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for the U.S., we use a value of US$ 5.5 million (corresponding to 120 times GDP per capita), 
based on the latest estimates of the value of statistical life adopted by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).91 An income elasticity o f the value of statistical life of 0.53 (the 
lower of the values estimated by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) would translate into a value of 
statistical life of US$0.98 million, or 677 times GDP per capita.92 At a value of statistical life 
as high as this (in relative terms, 5.5 times the level for the U.S.), public health would 
probably become the dominant domestic policy issue, and it can be argued that the evidence 
from low-income countries does not support such a premium in the relative value of public 
health. Conversely, an income elasticity of the value of statistical life of 1.66, as in Bowland 
and Beghin (2001), would translate into an estimated value of statistical life of US$17,600, 
corresponding to about 12 times GDP per capita. This is implausible as the (annualized) 
value of statistical life is below the level of income.93,94
Indirect Estimates Based on Parameters o f Utility Function
The second approach to determining the value of statistical life that is used in the literature 
builds on macroeconomic or microeconomic empirical studies evaluating the shape of the 
utility function (or studies pursuing a different objective, but with implications for the shape
91 See Borenstein, 2008.
92 Note that the actual or estimated value o f  statistical life, depending on the context, would also depend on the 
level o f  life expectancy. Our comparison focuses on the role o f income and abstracts from the level o f life 
expectancy.
93 Published estimates o f  the value o f  statistical life are typically based on samples dominated by working-age 
people, and a remaining life expectancy o f  40 years for that group is a good approximation. A value of  
statistical life o f  12 times GDP per capita, for a remaining life expectancy o f 40 years, would only correspond to 
a small fraction o f  expected income over the remaining life span, whereas most individual studies return a value 
of statistical life that considerably exceeds the expected income over the remaining life span.
94 The studies by Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005), and Philipson and Soares (2005), discussed further 
below, make even more radical assumptions, assuming that the value o f  statistical life turns negative (i.e., that 
death is preferred to life) for some o f  the poorest low-income countries.
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of the utility function). The most influential paper adopting this approach is Murphy and 
Topel (2006), building on earlier work by the authors Murphy and Topel (e.g., 2003b). They 
adopt the utility function (somewhat adapted for our purposes)
where a  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and c0 is the consumption level below
which the utility flow from consumption would turn negative. Regarding a , Murphy and 
Topel (2006) motivate their parameter choices based on the econometric evidence surveyed 
by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999), who -  according to Murphy and Topel (2006)95 
-  “conclude that a  is ‘a bit’ larger than 1.0,”96 although the preferred value adopted by 
Murphy and Topel is 0.8. Regarding the value of c0, Murphy and Topel argue that this could 
differ across countries or over time, setting c0 at 10 percent of GDP per capita for each 
period they consider. Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005), and Philipson and Soares (2005) 
motivated by Murphy and Topel (2003), adopt a similar approach to parameterizing the value 
of statistical life. The key difference to the approach take by Murphy and Topel (2006) is that 
Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005), and Philipson and Soares (2005), do not allow for 
differences in the parameter c0 over time or across countries. As a consequence, they
postulate that agents with an annual income c0 of less than US$353 (in 1990 US$, PPP- 
adjusted) are assumed to derive negative utility from their consumption, implying that a very 
substantial proportion of the population of low-income countries their study focuses on 
would be better off dead. This, however, is problematic for a study focusing on sub-Saharan 
Africa, where a significant share of the population lives on incomes at or below that level -  
Chen and Ravallion (2008), in a study at least implicitly endorsed by the World Bank, 
estimate that close to 40 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa live at incomes
95 In our reading, Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) is ambiguous on this point.
96 Another conclusion emphasized by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) is that “the elasticity o f  
intertemporal substitution as determined from consumption is usually poorly determined.”
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below $1 a day in 2005 US$, PPP-adjusted, roughly corresponding to the level at which the 
utility from being alive turns negative according to Philipson and Soares (2005).
An earlier study that provides a thorough microeconomic foundation of the estimates of 
the value of statistical life is Rosen (1988). However, while building estimates of the 
valuation of life from an explicit microeconomic framework, he uses an estimate of the value 
of statistical life from an earlier study (Thaler and Rosen, 1975). This is used to calculate 
values for key parameters (including the elasticity of the utility function with respect to 
consumption) under different assumptions regarding discount rates. For example, he obtains 
an elasticity of 0.36 for a discount rate of 8 percent. Nevertheless, the framework spelled out 
by Roses (1988) could also be used to “reverse-engineer” estimates of the value of statistical 
life from the microeconomic parameters of the framework, and the paper has been an 
influential point of reference for later work.
E. Applied Studies97
In recent years, there has been a number of studies applying the literature on the value of 
statistical life to assess the contributions of improved health (i.e., longer life expectancy) to 
living standards.98 Among factors motivating this research are the observation that the 
increase in material living standards over the 20th century has coincided with a very 
substantial drop in mortality rates or, equivalently, an increase in life expectancy, the fact 
that the evolution of the pattern of income across countries is different from trends in the 
pattern of mortality rates across countries, the high costs of health services in the United 
States, and the appalling declines in life expectancy associated with the HIV epidemic, 
notably in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
97 While the classification is not always clear-cut, we group studies in this section which are primarily geared 
towards calibrating the contributions o f health to living standards in a country or a set o f countries, and which 
largely refer to prior work to motivate the functional form and key parameters adopted.
98 Some o f these studies were already referred to earlier as they also provide contributions regarding the 
underlying theory or estimating the value o f  statistical life.
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Among the most influential contributions to the literature is the work of Murphy and 
Topel (2003b, 2006), which is concerned with “the economics of improving health and the 
returns to medical research” (Murphy and Topel, 2003a), primarily with regard to the United 
States." In the tradition of studies like Arthur (1988) and Rosen (1988, 1994), Murphy and 
Topel (2006) use a framework in which remaining lifetime expected utility of an individual 
of age a is characterized by
(2)
a a
where Ht represents an individual’s state of health at age t, 100 current utility u depends on 
consumption ct and leisure lt, the probability St o f surviving through age t, and the discount 
rate p. To estimate the value of a life year, Murphy and Topel adopt a specific functional 
form for the role of consumption in current utility, with
where a  is the elasticity of substitution and is assumed constant.101 Using an estimate of 0.8 
for a  and $6,000 for z0 (the annual consumption level below which utility u turns negative), 
Murphy and Topel obtain a value of a life year at age 50 of $373,000, and a value of 
statistical life that peaks at about US$7 million around age 30, declining to about 
US$5 million by age 50, and US$2 million by age 70. Using this framework, Murphy and
99 Our discussion focuses on Murphy and Topel (2006), which largely supersedes the earlier publications.
100 As Murphy and Topel focus on the role o f  the survival function St, the health state plays a marginal state in 
their analysis and is not discussed below.
101 This presentation o f utility as a function o f  consumption implies as assumption that the elasticity o f  
substitution between consumption and leisure in u(c,l) is constant.
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Topel estimate the economic gains from reductions in mortality between 1970 and 2000 at 
US$64 trillion for the 2000 U.S. population.102
Murphy and Topel also provide estimates of the value of improved life expectancy 
relative to GDP over time, adopting a somewhat different approach, scaling the parameter z0 
m proportion with GDP. Arguing that improvements in life expectancy should be 
interpreted as an increase in health capital, they add the increases in the “stock” of health 
capital to the level of GDP. For the first half of the 20th century, the value of the 
improvements in life expectancy amount to between 70 percent of GDP and 90 percent of 
GDP. For the second half of the 20th century, the role of improvements in health is much less 
pronounced, accounting for 25 percent of GDP to 30 percent o f GDP in most decades.
Table 1. GDP and Increases in Health Capital, 1900-2000 (Murphy and Topel, 2006) 
______________________________ (2004 U.S. dollars)______________________________
1900-10 1 9 10-20 19 2 0 -3 0 1 9 3 0 -4 0 1940-50
GDP 6,011 7,239 7,703 7,578 13,592
Increase  in health  capital 4 ,987 2,754 5,513 6,062 12,314
(In percen t of GDP) 83.0 38.0 71.6 80 .0 90.6
Total • 10,998 9,993 13,216 13,640 25,912
1950-60 1 9 60-70 1 9 70-80 19 80-90 1990-2000
GDP 15,856 20,343 25,342 28,381 32,057
In crease  in health  capital 4 ,951 2,381 12,839 7,305 8,240
(In percen t of total) 31.2 11.7 50.7 25.7 25.7
Total 20 ,807 22,724 38,181 35,686 40,297
Source: Murphy and Topel, 2006.
An earlier influential study discussing the value of health improvements in the United 
States (Cutler and Richardson, 1997) points to three relevant factors -  “an increase in the 
length of the typical life, a greater prevalence of disease during that life, and an improvement 
in the mental and physical aspects of health conditional on disease.” Using an estimate of the 
value of a life year of US$ 100,000 in 1990 U.S. dollars, assumed to be constant over time, 
Cutler and Richardson estimate that the value of extended life expectancy amounted to 
between US$ 55,000 (at age 0) and USS 108,000 (at age 65) over the 1950-70 period, and
102 Interestingly, but beyond the scope o f  the current discussion, Murphy and Topel also discuss gains in life 
expectancy in the context o f  health expenditures, and potential gains from medical progress in certain categories 
o f diseases.
103 See Murphy and Topel, 2006, p. 891.
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between US$ 77,000 (at age 0) and US$ 159,000 (at age 65) over the 1950-70 period, 
whereas the contributions of changes in the (health) quality of life were modest.104 Burstrom, 
Johannesson, and Diderichsen (2003), in a study on Sweden between 1980/81 and 1996/97, 
adopt the benchmark value of $100,000 per life year from Cutler and Richardson. They find 
similar gains, and also point out that the gains in life expectancy over these years have been 
more pronounced for males than for females.
A different line of the literature focuses on the contribution of improved health to living 
standards, relative to or in addition to GDP growth. The literature on the value of statistical 
life has been adapted early to analyze the evolution of “full income” (i.e., GDP plus an 
allowance to account for the improved level of population health), notably by Usher (1973, 
1980). Usher (1973), using a specification where u(c) = cp, provides estimates for the 
growth rate of GNP, including “an imputation for life expectancy increases,” for five 
countries (Ceylon, Chile, France, Japan, and Taiwan), for different periods. For different 
choices of parameters,105 he finds that the contribution of increased life expectancy exceeded 
that of GNP growth for Ceylon (1946-63), and almost attained the same level as GNP 
growth in Chile (1931-65). The weights of increases in life expectancy were more moderate 
in the more advanced economies, accounting for only about 0.6 percentage points in France 
(1911-64). Usher (1980) updates the earlier paper and extends the analysis to 10 countries, 
(different periods), focusing on Canada, and also providing less extensive estimates for 
Chile, Costa Rica, France, Mauritius, Japan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United 
States. The contributions of increased life expectancy to the “growth rate of GNP inclusive of 
an imputation for increased life expectancy” appear lowest for the most advanced economies, 
at about 0.6-0.7 percentage points for the United States (1930-1974), and 0.8-1.0 percentage
104 See also Cutler and Richardson (1998) for a concise summary o f their main findings from the 1997 study. 
Cutler and Richardson (1999), which largely draws on the authors’ earlier 1997 study in terms o f  analytical 
content, provide a more extensive discussion o f  health expenditure and health policy issues.
105 Usher (1973) explores does not settle on specific parameters, but applies values for the elasticity p ranging 
from 0.25 to 0.45, and values for the discount rate ranging from 1 percent to 5 percent.
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points for France (1911-1972), but generally exceed 1 percentage point for the other 
countries, ranging to up to 2 percentage points for Sri Lanka (1946-1968).
Crafts (1997) adopts an approach similar to Usher’s, calibrating the rate of growth of 
“GDP, adjusted for mortality” as a weighted sum of the rate of growth of GDP and the rate of 
growth of life expectancy. Principal contributions of Crafts (1997) include the discussion of 
adjustments to GDP as measure of living standards to account for changing life expectancy 
against the background of some alternative indicators, such as UNDP’s Human Development 
Index. Additionally, Crafts adds a long-term perspective, focusing on a sample of 
industrialized countries for which estimates of GDP and other data are available from the 
1870s.106 He estimates the unweighted mean of the contribution of reduced mortality to the 
annual growth of “GDP/head, adjusted for mortality,” at 0.5 percentage points for 1870—
1913, at 0.8 percentage points for 1913-1950, at 0.4 percentage points for 1950-1973, and at
0.5 percentage points for 1973-1992.
Subsequent work by Nordhaus (2003, following up on and updating a 2002 working 
paper version) and Crafts (2005, partly based on a 2001 working paper) follows a somewhat 
different approach, attaching a certain value (which may change in line with the level of GDP 
per capita) to an increase in life expectancy or a reduction in mortality (similar to the 
approach taken by Cutler and Richardson, 1997, which is referred to in Nordhaus’s study). 
Nordhaus (2003) addresses the impact of improved life expectancy on economic welfare in 
the United States over the period 1900-1995. He estimates that the contribution of increased 
life expectancy or, similarly, reduced mortality, to improving living standards was of a 
similar magnitude as consumption growth.
Crafts (2005, and, similarly, but covering broader ground, 2007), with reference to 
Nordhaus’s work, applies a similar analysis to the growth of living standards in the United 
Kingdom over the years 1870-2001, finding that “greater longevity was a major contributor 
to the growth of living standards during the twentieth century.” One refinement that Crafts 
(2005) adds to the analysis is an adjustment for the age structure of the population, taking
106 The GDP data were obtained from Maddison (1995).
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account of the fact that increases in (remaining) life expectancy differ by age. Overall, Crafts 
estimates that the contribution of reduced mortality to living standards considerably exceeded 
the contributions from increased income between 1870 and 1950 (by up to a factor 2), and 
that they were of similar magnitude as the contributions from increased income between 
1950 and 2001.
As discussed above, Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) adopt a specification similar to 
the one proposed by Murphy and Topel (2003b, 2006). Based on the observation that 
increasing incomes have been associated with increased live expectancy, they discuss the
107implications of changes in life expectancy for the evolution of cross-country inequality. 
Similar to Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), they find that trends in inequality across 
countries evolved differently regarding income and health -  “incorporating longevity gains 
changes traditional results; countries starting with lower income tended to grow faster than 
countries starting with higher income. [They] estimate an average yearly growth in ‘full 
income’ o f 4.1 percent for the poorest 50 percent of countries in 1960, of which 1.7 
percentage points are due to health, as opposed to a growth of 2.6 percent for the richest 50 
percent of countries, of which only 0.4 percentage points are due to health” (Becker, 
Philipson, and Soares (2005), p. 277).
The experience of severe declines in life expectancy in many countries associated with 
the evolving HIV/AIDS epidemic has motivated several studies assessing the losses in living 
standards caused by the increased mortality. The earlist of these studies is Jamison, Sachs, 
and Wang (2001), a background study for the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health. 
With reference to the “mortality” approach used (by an early version of) Nordhaus (2003), 
and a value o f statistical life assumed at 100 times GDP per capita, the welfare losses from 
increased mortality are calculated as the change in adult mortality (in percent), multiplied by 
the share of adults in the population and the factor 100. Jamison, Sachs, and Wang estimate 
that living standards in sub-Saharan Africa declined by 2.6 percent annually in 1990-2000,
107 Philipson and Soares (2002) provide a more informal discussion o f  similar issues. See Deaton (2003, 2006) 
for background and further references, and Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) for a less formal discussion o f  the 
contribution o f  incomes and health to changes in inequality across countries.
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broken down in an annual rate of GDP growth of -0.9 percent, and a contribution of 
increasing mortality o f-1.7 percent. For some countries with high HIV prevalence, they 
estimate the rate of decline in living standards owing to increased mortality at between 
minus 5 and minus 8 percent annually in 1985-2000.
Crafts and Haacker (2003, 2004) use an expected utility framework, and derive a link 
between the percentage change in life expectancy and the equivalent loss in GDP per capita, 
and use this framework to calculate the welfare losses in 7 countries. They find that 
HIV/AIDS results in a welfare loss of about 90 percent in the worst affected countries. 
However, even for countries with fairly low HIV prevalence rates the welfare losses can be 
substantial -  for Vietnam, with an estimated HIV prevalence rate of 0.4 percent, Crafts and 
Haacker estimate a welfare loss of 2.9 percent. Usefully, Crafts and Haacker also provide a 
discussion of issues regarding the application of studies of the value of statistical life (largely 
from developed countries) to developing countries with much lower levels of GDP per 
capita.
Philipson and Soares (2005) also spell out an explicit expected-utility framework. To 
evaluate the impacts of changing life expectancy, they adopt the specification and parameters 
from Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), which in turn are based on empirical work on the 
U.S. economy. Notably, the utility framework assumes that individuals with an annual 
income of $353 in 1996 PPP U.S. dollars would be indifferent between being alive or dead, 
and individuals with an income below that level would be better off dead (unless they expect 
that their income will rise in the near future, making expected lifetime utility positive). Using 
GDP per capita (and thus averaging income across populations, thus mitigating the apparent 
problem) to calculate the welfare losses, they find that HIV/AIDS is welfare-improving 
(because it shortens miserable lives) in one country (Democratic Republic of Congo), more 
generally, Philipson and Soares propose that the social value of AIDS eradication (i.e., the 
compensating variation), relative to GDP, is considerably lower in low-income countries than 
in middle-income countries included in the sample (after controlling for HIV prevalence).
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F. Conclusions
Against the background of the literature on the role of improvements in health standards in 
increasing living standards, this survey discusses attempts to expand indicators of material 
living standards such as the level or the rate of growth of GDP per capita with indicators for 
public health, notably life expectancy. At the same time, the applied studies discussed in this 
survey change the perspective from a focus on current income or consumption flows to a 
forward-looking approach assessing the value of a consumption stream over an agent’s 
expected life-cycle.
The principal point of departure from the studies discussed here is the heterogeneity of 
methods adopted to implement estimates of the value of statistical life in assessments of the 
level of or progress in living standards. Some of this heterogeneity reflects the different 
purposes the analytical frameworks adopted in different studies are designed for. For 
example, a study dealing with the benefits of improvements in health standards in a particular 
country at some point in time would not have to be designed with considerations regarding 
comparability across countries or consistency over time in mind.
However, differences in methodologies also extend to studies covering long periods of 
time (such as the studies covering gains in living standards over periods as long as a century) 
involve cross-sections of heterogeneous countries (from low-income to high-income 
countries), or cover periods characterized by extreme changes in the indicators for public 
health (such as the dramatic drops in life expectancy experienced in some countries severely 
affected by HIV/AIDS).
A study evaluating the existing approaches against an explicit analytical framework could 
therefore contribute to identifying best practices in analyzing the contributions of improved 
health standards to living standards across countries and over time, and clarify discrepancies 
between existing studies. Notably, we would expect additional insights regarding cross­
country studies covering countries with vastly different levels of GDP per capita, and studies 
addressing the impacts of catastrophic health events, where the implications of the noted 
methodological differences are most pronounced.
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III .2 . C o n t r ib u t io n  o f  In c r e a s e d  L if e  E x p e c t a n c y  t o  L iv in g  S t a n d a r d s
A. Introduction
The present study assesses the role of changes in life expectancy in various episodes of 
economic development, notably the increases in life expectancy that have accompanied 
increases in material living standards in (today’s) major industrialized countries, and the 
declines in living standards that can be associated with a major epidemic (HIV/AIDS).
The analysis builds on a body of literature that draws on the microeconomic theory of 
consumption to assess the contributions of improved health, in addition to rising incomes, to 
living standards.108 The approach is based on the concept of an intertemporal utility function, 
which describes lifetime utility as the utility streams derived from consumption at future 
dates, discounted by a factor that reflects the rate of time preference and survival 
probabilities to the respective dates, e.g.
oo
U = fS ,e-*u(c,)d t, (1)
0
where St represents the survival probability through time t, £is the discount rate, and u(cj 
represents the utility flow derived from ct, the consumption stream at time t. In this setting, 
economic growth affects (life-time) living standards U as it enables an upward shift in the 
trajectory of consumption levels ct over an individual’s time horizon. At the same time, 
individuals value an increase in survival probabilities as this enhances the value, in terms of 
life-time utility U, of a given consumption trajectory (additionally, a change in the trajectory 
of St may also result in a reallocation of consumption over time).
The framework outlined here has been applied by numerous researchers to estimate the 
contribution of improved health to changes in living standards, most notably to analyze the 
sources of improvements in living standards over longer periods of time. More recently, 
HIV/AIDS -  which has resulted in pronounced declines in life expectancy in a number of
108 See Chapter 3.1 for a comprehensive discussion o f the relevant literature.
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countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa -  has motivated several studies addressing the 
implications of the resulting increase in mortality on living standards.
These studies commonly use GDP and GDP growth as yardsticks for changes in living 
standards. The contribution of changes in life expectancy is then calibrated also using GDP 
as a meter, either as a change in living standards that is equivalent to a change in GDP 
growth that would result in the same change in living standards U, or as the increment to 
GDP growth that would compensate for a change in life expectancy, leaving U unchanged.
A key challenge in using the framework sketched here for an analysis of the contribution 
of changes in mortality rates to living standards is the choice of an appropriate functional 
form and parameters of the intertemporal utility function. Most available studies draw on 
estimates of the “value of statistical life,” based on empirical studies that relate wage 
differentials to differences in employment-related mortality risk. Translating such wage 
differentials into assumptions regarding the general population, however, is difficult, as the 
wage differentials relate to a non-representative subset of the population.109 Moreover, most 
studies of the “value of statistical life” relate to a few industrialized countries for relatively 
recent years, attempt to evaluate the contributions of improved life expectancy to living 
standards over long periods of time (e.g., from 1870) or for a large set of countries, including 
low-income countries, therefore amount to out-of-sample-projection, implying large margins 
of error.
Our analysis below sets out with an outline of earlier studies (Section 2), highlighting 
areas in which our study contributes to the body of literature. Section 3 introduces our 
theoretical framework, and motivates our choice of parameters for the intertemporal utility 
function (and thus the weight of increases in life expectancy, relative to income gains, in 
improving living standards). Section 4 discusses the contribution of increased life expectancy 
in 17 industrialized countries in 1870-2006, and for a larger group of 136 countries for the 
1950-2006 period. Section 5 analyzes the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS across countries.
109 Chapter 3.1 provides a more substantial discussion o f the methodology.
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(The assumptions underlying the demographic estimates used in our analysis of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS are summarized in an appendix.) Section 6 concludes.
B. Background
Our analysis builds on various strands of the economic literature, notably the theoretical 
contributions deriving individual or welfare implications of changes in health variables from 
utility functions of forward-looking (representative) consumers, and applied work that draws 
on the theoretical contributions to analyze the value of medical research, the contributions of 
increased life expectancy, alongside with growth of GDP per capita, to rising living 
standards, and -  more recently -  studies addressing the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS, which 
has slowed down or resulted in reversals in gains in live expectancy in many countries.
Methodologically, our study builds on an analytical framework that goes back to 
Schelling (1968), an informal analysis that is credited in much of the later work for 
established the principle that inferences regarding valuations of life can be made based on 
incremental changes in mortality risks, and the amounts individuals are prepared to pay or 
forfeit to avoid such risks. This concept has been formalized in microeconomic papers by 
Mishan (1971), Jones-Lee (1974), and Arthur (1981), using a framework in which lifetime 
utility derives from the expected utility of future consumption streams, discounted and 
weighted by survival probabilities.
This approach has subsequently been adapted to a macroeconomic context, and been used 
to assess the contributions of increased life expectancy (as well as GDP or GNI per capita) to 
the growth of living standards. The earliest contributions in this direction were those by 
Usher (1973, 1980), the recent contributions most relevant in our context include Nordhaus 
(2003), Crafts (2007, 2005, and 1997), dealing with the role of increasing life expectancy 
during industrial development), and Murphy and Topel (2006). Bourguignon and Morrison
(2002) and Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) have addressed aspects of the contribution 
of improved health to living standards in the post-WWII period across a broader set of 
countries, building on the dataset compiled by Maddison (2004, 1995). A spin-off from this 
literature has been motivated by the experience of increased mortality owing to HIV/AIDS in
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many countries, the most comprehensive studies in this direction are Crafts and Haacker 
(2003, 2004) and Philipson and Soares (2005).
A related strand of literature that the macroeconomic studies of the contribution of 
increased life expectancy to living standards draws on and partly overlaps with are studies 
analyzing variations in the valuation of changes in mortality risks (and hence the “value of 
statistical life”) across countries, over time, or for different income levels, which is a 
necessary ingredient of studies analyzing the contributions of increased life expectancy over 
time and across countries. There are two different approaches to assessing variations in the 
value of statistical life in relation to other economic variables (notably GDP or income per 
capita). As the value of statistical life, as we discuss further below, is related to properties of 
the utility function, some studies draw on micro-econometric studies on properties of the 
utility function; a notable recent example of a study adopting this approach is Murphy and 
Topel (2006); Usher (1973, 1980), without the benefit of the later micro-econometric work, 
also took a related approach. The other approach focuses on the findings from employment- 
based individual studies, and involves analyzing the differences in such estimates of the 
value of statistical life in relation to a set of explanatory variables. Notable studies following 
this approach include Miller (2000) and Viscusi and Aldy (2003), which also includes the 
most comprehensive survey of the literature so far.
Against this background, our analysis adds to the existing literature in several areas. 
Methodologically, our analysis builds on an explicit microeconomic framework with 
forward-looking consumers. From this framework we derive a reduced form that allows us to 
estimate the contributions of increasing life expectancy to living standards in a 
straightforward manner. Additionally, we derive a method to assess the implications of large 
changes in life expectancy (relevant, e.g., for comparisons over long time intervals, or the 
analysis of catastrophic health events significantly reducing life expectancy) which, we 
argue, represents an improvement to much of the applied literature.
From this platform, we revisit two branches of the applied literature. First, we build on 
studies addressing the contribution of increased life expectancy to living standards in the 
context of industrial development, such as Nordhaus (2003) and Crafts (2007, 2005, and
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1997). Notably, we build on and update the work by Crafts (1997), reviewing the 
contribution of increasing life expectancy to living standards for a group of 17 industrialized 
countries from 1870, and discuss the contributions of improved health to living standards on 
a global scale since 1950, focusing on the contributions of health to the growth of living 
standards (unlike Bourguignon and Morrison (2002), and Becker, Philipson, and Soares 
(2005), who place more emphasis on the evolution of inequalities in living standards across 
countries).
The second strand of applied literature we contribute to is the literature on the economic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS, building, most directly, on the work by Crafts and Haacker (2003, 
2004), and benefiting from our analytical framework that facilitates the analysis of impacts of 
large changes in life expectancy. One aspect that distinguishes our analysis from earlier 
studies is an explicit analysis of the implications of access to antiretroviral treatment, 
reflecting the increase in access to treatment experienced in many countries severely afflicted 
by HIV/AIDS in recent years.
C. Theoretical Framework and Choice of Parameters
The discussion of our analytical framework proceeds in four steps. First, we discuss the role 
of changes in mortality and life expectancy in a fairly general framework in which expected 
life time utility is determined by the utility flows derived from consumption in future periods, 
weighted by a discount rate and applicable survival probabilities. Second, we introduce a 
specific functional form, and discuss the relation between key parameters of our model and 
the value of statistical life. Third, we draw on the empirical literature estimating the value of 
statistical life, as well as other approaches, to populate the parameters of the model. Fourth, 
we discuss some properties of the model regarding the analysis of the implications of discrete 
changes in life expectancy (while most of our analysis uses differential techniques).
Basic Theoretical Framework
We analyze the link between living standards and life expectancy or mortality from a 
straightforward microeconomic model of consumption, in which an individual values 
consumption and life expectancy according to the lifetime utility function
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00 -J(p+Mi,v)*
^ [k } ,{ ^ } ,P ,- s ]=  ]u{ct)e 1 dt, (2)
s
where {c,} denotes the individual’s consumption stream over time, s stands for the 
individual’s initial age, (p ,1} is the set of time-varying mortality rates of an individual with 
initial age s at time t, with t e  [s,oo), and p gives the discount rate. The function «(...) has 
the usual properties, with w'(...) > 0 and w "(...) < 0.
The individual’s budget constraint is
i i i
oo 00 ~ jrvdv 00 ~ jrvdv
jc te 1 d t = j y te 1 dt= jy*e s d t , (3)
s s s
where y t stands for the individual’s income at time t, rt is the real interest rate at time t, and
y  is the constant income stream that yields the same present discounted value as the
(possibly time-varying) income stream {yt} . Let {c*} be the consumption stream that 
maximizes (2), subject to (3), and V = f/[{c*}, ,} ,p ,s] . The solution to the optimization
dVproblem implies a link between V andy*, say, — j- =  X , derived from the Lagrange
dy
multiplier associated with the lifetime budget constraint. The incremental change in y  that 
would have the same effect on V as an incremental change in the mortality pattern {p^,} then 
is equal to
„  _  1  °°f  L  - J ( p + h , . v ) *
d y = — )u{ct)\d\xsvd v e ' dt.  (4)
s s
However, in the framework outlined above, (incremental) changes in the pattern of 
mortality, }, result in (incremental) changes in the pattern of consumption, {c*} .Whereas
the envelope theorem implies that the impact of these incremental changes of {c*} is second
order around the maximum, this does not apply to discrete changes. Moreover, in our context 
data do not normally arrive in a form assumed in Eq. (4), as data on mortality are usually
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lumped by cohort or age group or arrive in the form of summary indicators like life 
expectancy. Similarly, we are dealing with summary indicators of income like GDP or GNI 
per capita, rather than data on individuals’ income flows over time. For these reasons, we are 
going to simplify the model in various directions, in order to obtain a better match between 
the data at our disposal and key variables of the model, and to obtain a more straightforward 
link between changes in mortality and equivalent variations in income than the one presented 
in Eq. (4).
Specifically, we assume that lifetime utility can be represented in terms of permanent 
income, i.e. we present utility in terms of a consumption stream that is equal to permanent 
income and constant over time. This means that utility V can be represented in the form
/
“ -J(P+^ .v)rfv
= ' d t , (5)
s
where the first term on the right-hand side represents the utility flow. The integral in Eq. (5) 
represents life expectancy (discounted by the rate of time preference, and equal to actual life 
expectancy in the special case of p = 0), which we will denote as LE. Eq. (5) can therefore 
be rearranged as
v  ( {Vs*) » / » P» ■s ) = u (y*  ) L E ( fas*
i
00 - J ( P + H » , v ) *
with LE( ,}, p, s) = fe  * d t ,
S
i.e., lifetime utility is represented as the utility flow from permanent income (or the 
consumption level consistent with it), multiplied by (discounted) life expectancy.
Specifically, we will use GDP per capita as the measure of choice for income in various 
applications further below, which implies the assumption that consumption moves in line 
with GDP per capita, at least over the long periods which are the focus of our analysis.
(6)
(7)
147
Functional Form
The second type of restrictions we impose regards the structure of preferences. A functional 
form that will turn out convenient in terms of identifying the value of statistical life based on 
model parameters (and model parameters based on empirical evidence on the value of 
statistical life) is the one adopted by Murphy and Topel (2006), which is also sufficiently 
general to encompass different specifications adopted in studies by Crafts and Haacker 
(2003, 2004), Philipson and Soares (2005), and Crafts (1997). In this framework, the utility 
flow from consumption is determined by
i - I  i - l
St O  ^  St O
<C)=  ri" > ( 8 )
1 - -
<j
where c0 presents a level of extreme poverty below which the utility flow from consumption
c becomes negative, and a  = —u ^c-  , the elasticity of substitution, is assumed constant. For
cu "(c)
reasons that will become apparent further below, we transform the utility function, using
ji i
u(c) = c i - c j ,  (9)
which, apart from a linear transformation, is identical to the Murphy and Topel (2006)
specification, with y = a
CT — 1
The objective of our analysis is the analysis of changes in health standards, specifically 
mortality rates and life expectancy, on living standards, i.e., the expected value of lifetime 
utility, and to be able to express the gains or costs associated with changes in mortality 
patterns and life expectancy in terms of equivalent changes in income. To this end, we 
substitute for u(y*) in Eq. (6) from Eq. (9), and differentiate, obtaining
1 -» (  1 1  ^dV = - ( y * ) y LEdy * + (,y * y - y ,
y
d L E . (10)
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The variation in income that is equivalent to a change in life expectancy is obtained as the 
minus one times the variation that would leave lifetime utility V unchanged (i.e., the 
compensating variation), following an incremental change in life expectancy. Setting dV  
equal to zero in Eq. (10), and solving for dy*, first yields the compensating variation in 
income as
i i
dy
y  *
cy * y  - y l  dLE 
1F^=° (yl!)y
= —y - r -° _  • ( i i )
The equivalent variation is then obtained by simply reversing the sign, i.e.
dy
y  *
( y * Y - y l  dLE 
(.y*), L E
= y -  - , ■ (12)
In Eq. (12), the multiplier that determines the percentage change in income equivalent to 
some percentage change in life expectancy consists of two parts -  the parameter y and a
term that depends on the level of income relative to income level y Q. Specifically, for large
levels of y  * (relative to y Q), or very low levels of y0, the multiplier approaches y , whereas
it declines to zero (or below zero) as y  * approaches (or falls below) y0.
It remains to show how the parameters in our specification relate to the value of statistical 
life. The concept of the value of statistical life builds on the idea that expenditures, wage 
differentials, or similar costs or compensations that compensate for or avoid differences in 
mortality risks bear information regarding the valuation of life. The best researched aspect of 
the value of statistical life, and also the version that relates most directly to our subject, is the 
link between differences in income and associated differences in employment-based 
mortality risk. Concretely, if a mortality risk of one-tenth of a percent over a year is 
associated with a 15 percent premium in terms of annual income, then the value of statistical 
life would be equal to 150 times (15 percent, divided by one-tenth of a percent) annual 
income.
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Rather than dealing with mortality as a trajectory of time-variant mortality rates (as in 
Eqs. (2) -  (7)), we simplify the analysis by representing such trajectories by an average 
mortality rate that is time-invariant over an infinite time horizon). “Average mortality” is 
then related to life expectancy as
LE=  \e~'udt = - ,  
o H
(13)
i.e., the average mortality rate is equal to the inverse of life expectancy. Substituting for life 
expectancy in Eq. (11) gives the compensating variation in income as
dy* ( y * Y  - y ]  d\x 
= 7  i---------
y
O'*)
(14)
dy* -
( y * ) Y  _  y Y
y - / ° - L E -y *
( y * r
d\x (15)
From Eq. (15) and the definition of the value of statistical life as the incremental change 
in income that compensates for an incremental change in mortality, denoted below as VSL, it 
follows that
I
( y * y  _  y Y
VSL = y - — — -j — LE - y * , (16)
< j * y
i.e., the value of statistical life is equal to the product of a term reflecting the shape of the 
utility function and expected lifetime income LE ■ y * .  Starting from estimates of the value of 
statistical life, and making allowances for the sample levels of income and remaining life 
expectancy, it is therefore possible to draw inferences regarding the structure of preferences.
Choice o f Parameters
For our purposes, the principal challenge in finding an appropriate functional form and 
parameters arises from the fact that we wish to apply our analysis to the study of changes in
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life expectancy over long periods of time (back to 1870 or 1950, depending on the context) 
and a large number of countries, including low-income countries, whereas the empirical 
evidence on the value of statistical life is heavily geared towards high-income countries and 
largely confined to the last few decades. Thus, in drawing on the available evidence, we 
encounter problems similar to those associated with out-of-sample projections in an 
econometric context.
One important contribution to the literature is Murphy and Topel (2006), whose 
specification we adapted above in Eq. (9) as it encompasses those of many other studies, 
reprinted here (with y  * and y 0 substituted for the respective consumption levels).
 ^ ji
u(y*) = (y*y  - y l . (17)
It is convenient to distinguish two considerations, in line with the key parameters in 
Eq. (17) -  the parameter y that can be described as a scale parameter for the value of 
statistical life, and the parameter yQ that determines how the value of statistical life changes 
with income (bounded upwards by y for large values of y*, relative to y 0).
One prior consideration we need to take into account is the fact that we will be analyzing 
trends across countries characterized by large differences in GDP per capita (in excess of a 
factor 20), and trends over time periods in which incomes in the countries under 
consideration has changed dramatically (for the 17 countries covered in Appendix Table 2, 
GDP per capita has increased by a factor of 11.7 between 1870 and 2006, and for Japan it has 
increased by a factor close to 30). This would mean that an elasticity of the value of 
statistical life far from one would be problematic, as it would translate into radically different 
trade-offs between health and income in developing countries vs. leading industrialized 
countries, or for industrialized countries over time. For example, an elasticity of the value of 
statistical life with respect to income of 0.5 would mean that the value of statistical life, in 
relation to income, is 4.7 times higher in a country with an income level of $1,000, as 
compared to a country with an income level of 20,000.
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Murphy and Topel (2006) choose a very low level for y 0 (10 percent of “normal”
income). Importantly, for Murphy and Topel, the “critical” value depends on the economic 
and social context; for their analysis of the contributions of improved health standards to 
living standards over time they therefore scale it in line with GDP per capita, so that the 
value of statistical life, de facto, is proportional to GDP per capita in their long-term analysis. 
Other analyses (the early work by Usher (1973, 1980), Crafts (1997), and Crafts and Haacker 
(2003, 2004)) specify the value of statistical life as proportional to income, which would 
correspond to setting y0 equal to zero in Eq. (17).
One outlier regarding the analysis of the contribution of improved life expectancy to 
living standards is the work by Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) and Philipson and 
Soares (2005). With reference to Murphy and Topel, they adopt a utility function as 
described in Eq. (17), but do not allow for changes in this parameter depending on the 
economic context, setting it at US$353 at 1996 prices and purchasing power parity. This is 
problematic for the study of low-income countries (to which their analysis extends), as a 
considerable proportion of inhabitants of these countries -  in their view -  do not derive 
utility from consumption, or derive negative utility and would be better off dead. To illustrate 
the scale of this problem, we draw on estimates by Chen and Ravallion (2008) of the number 
of people living below US$1 per day (i.e., US$ 365 per year) at 2005 prices and purchasing 
power parity, roughly corresponding to the threshold proposed by Becker, Philipson and 
Soares (2005) and Philipson and Soares (2005). According to Chen and Ravallion (2008), 16 
percent of the population of the developing world was living below the US$1 threshold in 
2005, notably in Africa and South Asia, where 39 percent and 24 percent of the population 
were living at or below US$1 per day. For 1981, Chen and Ravallion estimate the proportion 
of people living below US$1 per day at 42 percent (an issue for the study by Becker, 
Philipson, and Soares (2005), which considers a period going back to 1950).
Regarding the empirical evidence, setting the parameter y0 equal to zero is equivalent
(within the constraints of the Murphy and Topel framework) to postulating that the elasticity 
of the value of statistical life with respect to income is equal to 1, i.e., the value of statistical 
life is proportional to income. Various analyses of estimates of the value of statistical life
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returned estimates of the elasticity of the value of statistical life with respect to income 
around one (Miller, 2000), at about one-half (Liu and others, 1997), or close to 1.7 (Bowland 
and Beghin, 2001). Viscusi and Aldy, re-estimating the earlier work by these other authors 
based on an expanded sample and offering an alternative specification, estimate the elasticity 
of the value of statistical life with respect to income at between 0.5 and 0.6. However, Becker 
and Elias (2007) point at three observations from India (by the same author) proposing values 
of the statistical life which are outliers, with estimates of the value of statistical life, in 
relation to income, which are between 10 and 40 times higher than those of most other 
studies. With these observations are excluded, Becker and Elias estimate the elasticity of the 
value of statistical life with respect to income at 1.15.
Overall, we find the data situation regarding the elasticity of the value of statistical life 
with respect to income very weak. In light of prior considerations (a value of the elasticity far 
from one would result in radically different tradeoffs between health variables and income in 
low-income and high-income countries), and the fact that a value of the elasticity of one is 
well within the range of the available estimates of the elasticity, we adopt a value of one for 
the elasticity of the value of statistical life with respect to income, implying a value of the 
parameter y 0 of zero. In terms of the functional form adopted, our analysis thus is closest to 
that of Usher (1973, 1980), Crafts (1997), Crafts and Haacker (2004), and Murphy and Topel 
(2006, in light of their approach of scaling the parameter y 0 in line with average income per 
capita).
One advantage of the functional form we adopt (with y Q = 0 ) is that it yields a very 
tractable representation o f the contribution of increases in GDP per capita (or income) and 
life expectancy to living standards. With y Q = 0 , Eqs. (6) and (17) yield
I
V = (y* y  L E . (18)
As we would like to express the contribution of increasing (or falling) life expectancy to 
living standards using GDP per capita as a meter, it is convenient to apply a monotonous
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transformation to Eq. (18). By raising both sides of Eq. (18) to the power of y , we obtain a 
measure V = Vy of living standards that is linear in ( /* ) , i.e.,
V -  (y* )LEy. (19)
The contributions of growth of income and of life expectancy to living standards can then 
be represented as
(20)V y  LE
i.e., the rate of growth of living standards is equal to the rate of growth of income, plus the 
growth rate of life expectancy, weighted by parameter y .
Regarding the parameter y , there are two approaches for choosing appropriate values. 
One approach draws on the literature on the value of statistical life, the other on macro- or 
micro-econometric evidence regarding the parameters of the utility function. For the 
approach that draws of the empirical literature estimating the value of statistical life, we first 
note that -  owing to our choice of a value of zero for the parameter y Q -  Eqs. (15) and (16) 
reduce to
from Eq. (15), implying that
or, equivalently,
dy* = yLE - y  * d\x (21)
VSL = yL E -y* , (22)
VSL
y = t ^ — ; •  {23)LE- y*
i.e., the parameter y  can be calibrated from an estimate of the value of statistical life, divided 
by income and the remaining life expectancy for the sample on which the estimate of the 
value of statistical life is based. Alternatively, if an estimate of the value of statistical life is
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specified as a percentage of income, the parameter y can be calibrated by dividing this by 
remaining life expectancy.
Nordhaus (2003) adopts a value of statistical life of US$3 million, based on 1990 income 
and prices, based on the value of statistical life used in policy evaluations by different U.S. 
government agencies. As this number is an average applied across the U.S. population, the 
appropriate scale variable is GDP per capita; and the value adopted by Nordhaus (2003) 
corresponds to 129.3 times GDP per capita.110 To derive model parameters, Nordhaus uses 
working men at age 40 as a benchmark, pointing out that most empirical studies of the value 
of statistical life are based on working-age men, and approximates the remaining life 
expectancy for men of age 40 at an additional 40 years,111 which would imply a value of the 
parameter y  of 3.23.112
As the study by Nordhaus has been influential (in the final or previous working paper 
versions), we offer some variations on his estimates. Using more precise estimates of 
remaining life expectancy for males at age 40 (35.09 years, according to NCHS (1997)) 
would result in a estimate of the parameter y  of 3.68. More fundamentally, it can be argued 
that life expectancy of males at age 40 is not the correct reference point for interpreting the 
value of statistical life adopted by Nordhaus, as it is derived from a value adopted by U.S. 
agencies for policy evaluations, and is not directly obtained from labor market data. 
Therefore, the average remaining life expectancy for the U.S. population (total, including 
non-males) may be a more appropriate measure of remaining life expectancy. Merging data 
from United States Bureau of Census (1992) and NCHS (1997), we obtain an average life 
expectancy of 43.8 years in 1990, which would translate into a value for the parameter y  of 
3.00.
110 Author’s calculation, based on a value for U.S. GDP per capita o f  $23,208 from IMF (2008).
111 More precisely, he uses an average mortality rate o f 0.025, the remaining life expectancy is obtained as the 
inverse o f this number.
112 Author’s calculation, as Nordhaus uses a different specification.
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While the estimates by Nordhaus could be outdated by now (being based on 1990 data), 
the basic framework described in Eqs. (22) and (23) provides a straightforward tool to obtain 
estimates of the parameter y  based on estimates of the value of statistical life applied by U.S. 
government agencies more recently. For example, the U.S. Environmental protection Agency 
currently adopts a value of statistical life of US$ 6.9 million for policy analyses113 which 
relates to a level of GDP per capita of US$ 43,541 (IMF, 2008) and an average remaining life 
expectancy of about 44 years.114 The value of statistical life thus corresponds to 158 times 
GDP per capita. Dividing by average remaining life expectancy yields an estimate of the 
parameter y  of 3.60.
While the value of statistical life (and corresponding parameters) for the United States is 
an important point of reference, as much of the empirical literature is based on U.S. data, our 
primary interest is the evidence on the value of statistical life across countries. The primary 
resource in this regard is the study by Viscusi and Aldy (2003), who compile estimates of the 
value of statistical life from across the world, already discussed above and in chapter 3.1. Of 
the studies compiled by Viscusi and Aldy, we focus on 28 studies for the United States and 
22 studies from other countries for which sufficient summary data are available for our 
purposes. One of the features of the data is the notable dispersion in estimates for the value of 
statistical life from non-U.S. studies, ranging from 37 times average income (for the 
underlying sample) to 5270 times average sample income. One way of addressing this wide 
dispersion in the data, adopted by Becker and Elias (2007), is the elimination of obvious 
outliers. In light of the apparent role of outliers, we focus on the median value of statistical 
life, in relation to the average sample income. For those studies where Viscusi and Aldy 
report a range for the value of statistical life, we adopt the midpoint of that range.
1,3 The value o f statistical life applied by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is not officially 
released. The number o f  U.S. 6.9 million was reported by Associated Press based on recent cost-benefit 
analyses conducted by the EPA. See Borenstein, 2008.
114 The remaining life expectancy was calculated by the author based on projections o f the U.S. population by 
age for 2008 from United States Bureau o f Census, Population Division (2008) and estimates o f  life expectancy 
by age for the 2005-2010 period from United Nations Population Division (2007b). The latter have not been 
adjusted, as 2008 is close to the midpoint o f the 2005-2010 period.
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For the United States, the median value of statistical life among the studies compiled by 
Viscusi and Aldy is 234 times sample income for the respective studies, for other countries, 
is 287 times sample income, and for the combined dataset, the median value of statistical life 
is 257 times sample income. Finding an appropriate value for the remaining life expectancy 
for the Viscusi/Aldy (2003) dataset is difficult, as the estimates of the value of statistical life 
relate to different years (and countries). If a value of remaining life expectancy of around 40 
is assumed, then a value of statistical life of 257 times sample income would imply a 
parameter y  of about 6.4.
An alternative source of evidence on the value of statistical life are empirical studies 
targeting parameters of the utility function in econometric studies, either on a microeconomic 
or macroeconomic level. One notable study following this approach is Murphy and Topel 
(2006), drawing on a study by a Browning, Hansen, and Heckman (1999) which concludes 
that the elasticity of substitution is “a bit” larger than 1 (see our discussion of the 
parameter <7 in Eq. (8)). This would be consistent with estimates of the value of statistical 
life as those suggested by the discussion above. However, Murphy and Topel (2006) also 
point at evidence from macro-econometric studies suggesting a lower level of <J, which 
cannot easily be reconciled with our framework with y Q = 0, but is less problematic in 
Murphy and Topel’s framework.115
Overall, we will base our estimates below on a value of the parameter y  of 3.6, as 
suggested by the U.S. data for 2008. Three considerations were relevant for this choice.
(1) The estimate is based on consistent data and fairly detailed data on life expectancy 
(whereas we need to make guesses regarding life expectancy in the Viscusi and Aldy (2003) 
dataset), (2) the apparent heterogeneity of the available empirical studies of the value of 
statistical life across countries, and (3) a certain bias towards the established -  our choice o f a 
value of 3.6 for the parameter y  is not far off from those adopted in earlier studies.
115 On the other hand, the discrepancies between the macroeconometric studies referred to by Browning, 
Hansen, and Heckman (1999), and Murphy and Topel, and the microeconometric evidence on the value o f  
statistical life may point at some anomalies o f utility functions where death is concerned, which may not 
adequately be captured in our framework.
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Analyzing Discrete Changes in Life Expectancy
As the above framework is specified in terms of incremental changes while most applications 
are based on data describing discrete (and sometimes large) changes in the underling 
variables, it is useful to show explicitly under which circumstances the framework based on 
incremental changes dy * and dLE may be applied to discrete data, without introducing 
significant bias.
Using the utility function specified in Eq. (18), the incremental change in lifetime utility 
owing to changes is given by Eq. (20). For discrete changes, we note that
AV
V
1 +
A /
*
y
i + ALE
LE
- 1.
By Taylor expansion, the term involving LE can be represented as
1 +
ALE
LE
1 M E  ,= l + y - —  + y (y - l)
LE
ALE
LE
+ higher order terms,
so that discrete changes can be approximated by
(24)
(25)
AV Ay ALE
- = -  =  - V  +  y --------V y  LE
(26)
provided that the cross term , and the higher-order terms involving are small.
y  LE LE
In many cases covered by the literature, adopting Eq. (13) to analyze discrete changes in 
GDP per capita and in life expectancy would therefore be appropriate. For larger changes in 
GDP per capita, it would be possible to calculate the changes in living standards explicitly as 
the change in the value of V -  (y*)LEy, although it would then not be possible to clearly 
attribute the overall change to either (y*) or L E .
One important application of our approach regards settings in which the principal area of 
interest are the implications for living standards of certain health events or interventions, for 
example the benefits of a health investment under consideration or -  an area which we will
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discuss in some detail below -  the welfare implications of increased mortality owing to a 
major epidemic like HIV/AIDS. In these cases, our framework yields a simple way of 
deriving the welfare costs exactly (conditional on our framework and parameters applied) as
AV
V y =const.
1 +
ALE
LE
- 1. (27)
One important advantage of the approach to estimating the contributions of changes in 
GDP per capita and life expectancy summarized in Eqs. (26) and (27) is the robustness, when 
applied over large changes in GDP per capita or life expectancy, to linearized models which 
are sometimes applied in the literature (e.g., Nordhaus (2003), Crafts (2001), Cutler and 
Richardson (1999)). The variation in income that is equivalent to a change in mortality or life 
expectancy is
dy* = - yy d\i
dy* = yy*
LE
dLE
(28)
(29)
Consider that a specific value is adopted for an increment in mortality or an addition life 
year. This may work well for small changes. The problem with the linearized approach that is 
apparent from Eq. (28) and (29) is that the terms inside the squared brackets do not remain 
constant as life expectancy (and income) change. A linearized approach that assumes 
constancy of the terms inside the square brackets in Eqs. (28) and (29) is therefore likely to 
produce biased estimates.
D. Contribution of Increased Life Expectancy to Living Standards
The model described above provides a framework for analyzing the contributions of 
increasing life expectancy to living standards over time and across countries, and several 
studies have used similar approaches to this end. The study that is, in terms of scope and 
methodology, closest to the framework adopted in the present paper, is Crafts (1997), which 
applies a reduced form similar to Eq. (20) to “adjust” growth rates of GDP per capita for
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changes in mortality, covering 16 countries for the years 1870-1992,116 Other notable studies 
covering long periods of time are Nordhaus (2003), covering the years 1990-95 for the 
United States, attributing a monetary value to a life year gained (or, in an alternative 
approach, to an increment in mortality), and Crafts (2005, 2007), which applies an approach 
similar to Nordhaus’s to the United Kingdom for the years 1870-2001. Another important 
study is Becker and others (2005), covering a larger number of countries (96), but a much 
shorter period (1960-2000), focusing primarily at the role of health improvements in the 
evolution of world inequality.
Table 1 reports our findings regarding the implications of growth in GDP per capita and 
in life expectancy for living standards for a set of 17 countries, based on source data 
summarized in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. It largely builds on (and partly replicates) the 
analysis by Crafts (1997), extending the final period to 2006 and increasing the country 
coverage by one.117 The only substantial difference from the earlier analysis regards the 
weight of changes in life expectancy, which has been updated in line with more recent 
empirical evidence (see our discussion above).
The estimates summarized in Table 1 illustrate the crucial role of both increases in GDP 
per capita and in life expectancy in increasing living standards since 1870. Over the entire 
period, the contributions of growth in GDP per capita (at 1.8 percentage points) and life 
expectancy (at 1.9 percentage points) were roughly even.118 Over time, however, the relative 
contributions of growth in GDP per capita and in life expectancy, respectively, have changed. 
Until about 1950, the most important source of improvements in living standards were 
improvements in longevity, especially over the years 1913-1950, where it contributed 3
1,6 Crafts (1997) also considers the impact o f  changes in hours worked (imputing a value o f leisure), an issue 
that is beyond the scope o f the present study.
117 The summary tables in Crafts (1997) exclude Spain, as they also cover the role o f changes in working hours, 
data on which were unavailable for that country.
1,8 Calculated based on the unweighted averages for the levels o f  GDP per capita and life expectancy, 
respectively, as shown in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.
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percentage points to an annual rate of growth of living standards of 4 percent.119 The relative 
roles of GDP growth and improvements in public health in raising standards were reversed in 
the second half o f the 20th century, when improvements in life expectancy slowed down, 
while GDP growth accelerated, notably between 1950 and 1973.
119 For a discussion o f innovations in public health from a macroeconomic perspective, see Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2007).
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Table 1. Contributions of GDP per Capita and Life Expectancy to Living Standards, 17 Countries, 1870-2006
1870-1913 1913--1950
GDP per Life Life Living GDP per Life Life Living
capita Expectancy Expectancy standards capita Expectancy Expectancy standards
(Contribution (Contribution
(Rate of (Rate of to growth in (Rate of (Rate of (Rate of to growth in (Rate of
growth) growth) living growth) growth) growth) living growth)
standards) standards)
Australia 1.1 0.5 1.8 2.8 1.0 0.4 1.6 2.6
Austria 1.5 0.7 2.5 3.9 0.2 1.2 4.4 4.6
Belgium 1.1 0.5 1.8 2.9 0.7 0.8 3.1 3.8
Canada 2.3 0.5 1.8 4.1 1.3 0.7 2.7 4.1
Denmark 1.6 0.6 2.0 3.6 1.6 0.6 2.1 3.6
Finland 1.4 0.5 2.0 3.5 1.9 1.0 3.6 5.5
France 1.5 0.4 1.6 3.0 1.1 0.8 2.8 3.9
Germany 1.6 0.7 2.6 4.2 0.2 0.9 3.2 3.4
Italy 1.3 1.2 4.5 5.8 0.8 0.9 3.3 4.2
Japan 1.5 0.4 1.6 3.0 0.9 1.0 3.7 4.5
Netherlands 0.9 0.9 3.1 4.0 1.1 0.7 2.5 3.6
Nonway 1.3 0.3 1.3 2.6 2.1 0.7 2.4 4.5
Spain 1.2 0.5 1.8 3.1 0.2 1.2 4.2 4.4
Sweden 1.5 0.5 1.9 3.3 2.1 0.6 2.3 4.4
Switzerland 1.7 0.6 2.1 3.7 2.1 0.8 2.8 4.9
United Kingdom 1.0 0.6 2.2 3.2 0.9 0.7 2.6 3.5
United States 1.8 0.4 1.4 3.2 1.6 0.8 2.9 4.5
Average 1.4 0.6 2.1 3.5 1.2 0.8 3.0 4.1
1950-1973 1973--2006
GDP per Life Life Living GDP per Life Life Living
capita Expectancy Expectancy standards capita Expectancy Expectancy standards
(Contribution (Contribution
(Rate of (Rate of to growth in (Rate of (Rate of (Rate of to growth in (Rate of
growth) growth) living growth) growth) growth) living growth)
standards) standards)
Australia 2.4 0.1 0.5 2.9 1.9 0.4 1.4 3.2
Austria 4.9 0.3 1.1 6.1 2.0 0.4 1.4 3.4
Belgium 3.5 0.2 0.9 4.4 1.9 0.3 1.2 3.1
Canada 2.8 0.2 0.9 3.7 1.7 0.3 1.1 2.8
Denmark 3.1 0.2 0.6 3.7 1.8 0.2 0.7 2.4
Finland 4.3 0.3 1.0 5.3 2.3 0.3 1.3 3.6
France 4.0 0.4 1.4 5.4 1.6 0.3 1.2 2.8
Germany 5.0 0.2 0.7 5.7 1.5 0.3 1.3 2.8
Italy 4.9 0.4 1.4 6.4 1.8 0.4 1.3 3.1
Japan 8.1 0.6 2.2 10.2 2.1 0.4 1.3 • 3.4
Netherlands 3.5 0.1 0.4 3.9 1.7 0.2 0.8 2.5
Nonway 3.2 0.1 0.4 3.6 2.7 0.2 0.9 3.5
Spain 5.6 0.6 2.1 7.7 2.4 0.3 1.1 3.6
Sweden 3.1 0.2 0.6 3.7 1.7 0.2 0.9 2.5
Switzerland 3.1 0.3 1.0 4.1 0.7 0.3 1.1 1.8
United Kingdom 2.4 0.2 0.6 3.1 1.9 0.3 1.1 3.0
United States 2.5 0.1 0.5 3.0 1.9 0.3 1.0 2.8
Average 3.9 0.3 1.0 4.9 1.9 0.3 1.1 3.0
Source: Author's calculations. For data sources, see  Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Averages are unweighted.
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One notable feature of the trends in GDP growth across countries is the role of conflict- 
related disruptions. Among the notable outliers among the trends described in Table 1 are 
low rates in GDP growth in the 1913-1950 period for Austria and Germany, presumably 
owing to economic disruptions related to World War II. Another notable outlier is the period 
of rapid growth in Japan between 1950 and 1973, when GDP per capita grew six-fold, or at a 
yearly rate of just over 8 percent. Meanwhile, the growth of life expectancy does not show 
outliers of a similar magnitude as those observed for growth rates GDP per capita, which 
may reflect the prominent role of cross-country diffusion of health innovations.120
A principal limitation of the analysis of long-term trends going back as far as 1870 is that 
macroeconomic and health data are available for only a handful o f countries, largely leading 
industrialized countries (or leading industrializing countries, where the beginning of the 
sample period is concerned), partly because many countries (re)gained independence only in 
the second half of the 20th century. The “group of 17” countries discussed here therefore is a 
fairly small and homogeneous set of countries. The analysis of long-term trends for the small 
group of 17 countries can therefore usefully be complemented with an analysis of trends 
income and health trends since 1950, where data are available for a much larger group of 
countries.121
To this end, Figure 1 summarizes trends in life expectancy and GDP per capita for major 
world regions from 1950 to 2005 (for life expectancy) or 2001 (for GDP per capita). (As the 
emphasis of the present study is on the contribution of improving health standards to living 
standards, the presentation focuses on life expectancy). Regarding the evolution of life 
expectancy, Figure 1.1 shows a pattern of steady increases over the entire period and for all 
regions, with two exceptions. Most significantly, life expectancy in Africa, which had barely 
kept up with the global average in 1950-1990, has slowed down and actually declined
120 For a more extensive discussion o f convergence and divergence o f health and income indicators, see Deaton 
(2006).
121 Regarding GDP per capita, data series for most developing countries in Maddison (2004) start in 1950. 
Regarding life expectancy, the World Population Prospects database (see United Nations Population Division, 
2007b) includes demographic estimates starting with the 1950-55 period.
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somewhat during 1990-2005 (while the global average o f life expectancy increased by about 
2 years).122 The other notable exception is the “bump” in the trajectory o f life expectancy for 
Europe in 1990-95.
Figure 1. Life Expectancy and GDP per Capita, Major World Regions, 1950-2005
Figure 1. Life Expectancy at Birth, by Period and World Region 
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Similar to life expectancy, GDP per capita has increased throughout the post-1950 period 
as far as the global average is concerned. On the global scale, it is important to note that the 
increases in GDP per capita were more pronounced than the increases in life expectancy -  
while the former increased by a factor o f almost 3 (from US$ 2,111 to US$ 6,049, at PPP and 
in 1990 prices), life expectancy increased by 44 percent, from 46 years to 66 years. For our 
purposes, the most significant deviations from trends in the global average occur among 
regions with relatively low levels o f GDP per capita, including the sharp decline in GDP per 
capita o f about one-third in Eastern Europe between 1989 and 1996, the relatively high rates
Western
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Source: Maddbn (2004).
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Southern Europe
122 Life expectancy in Africa attained a peak at about 51.9 years around 1990, and declined to 51.6 years for the 
2000-05  period, while the global average increased from about 64 years to 66 years.
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of growth in Asia, especially after 1973, and the persistence of the stagnation in Africa since 
about 1980 (with a moderate rebound in recent years).
Regarding the declines in life expectancy observed in Africa and Europe, Figure 1.3 
illustrates the role of the ongoing HIV/AIDS epidemic, showing that the declines in life 
expectancy were most pronounced in countries with high HIV prevalence, while life 
expectancy stagnated overall in the sub-Saharan countries with HIV prevalence of up to 
5 percent at end-2005.123 Meanwhile, North Africa (with very low rates of HIV prevalence, 
and also much higher levels of life expectancy at the outset) experienced substantial 
increases in life expectancy. Figure 1.4 breaks down trends in life expectancy by subregion in 
Europe. Notably, the “bump” in life expectancy in Europe observed earlier can be attributed 
to a decline in life expectancy concurrent with the economic contraction in the early 1990s. 
Perhaps more significant are the longer-term discrepancies between Eastern and Southern 
Europe -  while life expectancies in Eastern and Southern Europe were on a similar level and 
appeared to catch up with other European regions between 1950 and 1965, life expectancy 
stagnated in Eastern Europe since 1965, fluctuating at about the same level for the next 25 
years (while life expectancy increased by 7 years in Southern Europe), followed by the noted 
decline in the early 1990s.
The substantial increases in life expectancy and GDP per capita across countries in the 
post-1950 period, as well as the apparent differences across regions and over time, suggest 
that the framework developed above could also gainfully be applied in this context. Based on 
the data summarized in Figure 1 and discussed above, we therefore construct estimates of the 
contributions of growth of GDP per capita and life expectancy to living standards. For recent 
years (through 2006), though, we extend the data on GDP per capita from Maddison (2004), 
which extend to 2001 only, by applying the estimated growth rates of real GDP per capita
123 The demographic estimates in United Nations Population Program (2007) are based on estimated HIV 
prevalence rate in UNAIDS (2006). While the latter estimates have subsequently been revised for a number o f  
countries, we use UNAIDS (2006) estimates o f HIV prevalence in order to interpret the demographic estimates 
in United Nations Population Program (2007).
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from World Bank (2008). Similarly, we use estimates of life expectancy in 2006 from World 
Bank (2008).124
Estimates of the contribution of growth of GDP per capita and life expectancy, 
respectively, to living standards are summarized in Table 2, showing population-weighted 
averages by major world region, as well as estimates for a group of large countries (by 
population size), and four smaller countries with high rates of HIV prevalence. In light of our 
previous discussion, we distinguish North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and show 
estimates for Eastern Europe separately.
Regarding global trends, the findings from our comprehensive sample are quite different 
from those presented earlier for a sample dominated by major industrialized economies. 
Improvements in life expectancy played a major part in rising living standards in the 
1950-73 period, contributing 4.6 percentage points to an overall growth rate of 7.4 percent. 
However, the contribution of increased life expectancy declines in subsequent periods (to 2.4 
percentage points in 1973-90, and 1.3 percentage points in 1990-2006). This pattern would 
be consistent with a delayed dissemination of major health innovations in developing 
countries, which had already resulted in major increases in life expectancy in leading 
economies before 1950 (the impact of which on the rate of growth of life expectancy had 
tapered off post-1950 in these economies), but still resulted in pronounced improvements in 
developing countries between 1950 and 1973.125
124 Merging the dataset from United Nations Population Division (2007) and World Bank (2008) creates a 
problem regarding the consistency o f estimates between the two databases. For almost all countries and periods, 
data from United Nations Population Division (2007) and World Bank (2008) are very close, with differences 
o f  less than three months (as the UN data are averaged over 5-year periods, while the World Bank reports 
estimates for specific years, usually in two- or three-year intervals, some discrepancies would arise even if  the 
underlying estimates were identical). However, for a few Eastern European countries, the estimated levels o f  
life expectancy differ by 2 or 3 years between the UN and the World Bank data. For the final period under 
consideration (1990-2006), we therefore use the growth rate o f life expectancy from World Bank (2008) for 
that period.
125 For context, see Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) and Deaton (2006).
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Meanwhile, the contribution of growth of GDP per capita, just above 2.5 percentage 
points in 1950-90, accelerated to 3.8 percentage points between 1990 and 2006. Much of the 
acceleration in growth can be attributed to an acceleration in growth in Asia, notably in 
China and India (which dominate the population-weighted average for Asia, and also carry 
considerable weight on the global scale). Regarding the (correlation of GDP growth and 
growth in life expectancy, we note that periods of strong growth in individual countries -  
e.g., China (1973-90 and 1990-2006, India (1990-2006), Vietnam (1990-2006), or 
Botswana (1973-1990) -  were not characterized by high rates of growth of life expectancy, 
suggesting that there is no simple causal relationship, going either way, between GDP per 
capita and life expectancy.126
126 This point is further elaborated by Deaton (2003, also providing a comprehensive discussion o f relevant 
literature) and Deaton (2006).
Table 2. Contributions of GDP per Capita and Life Expectancy to Living Standards. Selected Countries and Regions, 1950-2006_______
___________________ 1950-1973_________________________________ 1973-1990___________________________________________1990-2006
GDP per Life
capita Expectancy Life Expectancy
(Rate of 
growth)
Living
standards
(Rate of 
growth)
(Contribution to 
growth in living 
standards)
(Rate of 
growth)
GDP per Life Living GDP per Life Living
capita Expectancy Life Expectancy standards capita Expectancy Life Expectancy standards
(Rate of (Rate of < ° ° ^ u t i° n to  (RMOf (Rateo( (Rateof ( C W M M  (RaKof
grown) growh) 9rostand'anJ")n9 9roWh) SRQWh) gro.Ui) g °  g o r th )
Bangladesh -0.4 0.9 3.5 3.1 1.5 1.1 4.0 5.5 3.3 0.9 3.3 6.6
Brazil 3.7 0.8 2.9 6.6 1.4 0.6 2.3 3.7 1.3 0.5 1.7 3.1
China,P.R.: Mainland 2.9 2.2 8.2 11.0 4.8 0.4 1.6 6.4 7.1 0.3 1.0 8.1
India 1.4 1.5 5.6 7.0 2.5 0.9 3.5 6.0 4.5 0.5 1.9 6.4
Indonesia 2.6 1.4 5.0 7.6 3.1 1.3 4.8 7.9 2.8 0.6 2.2 5.0
Mexico 3.2 1.0 3.8 7.0 1.4 0.7 2.7 4.0 1.5 0.3 1.1 2.5
Nigeria 2.7 0.8 3.0 5.7 -1.0 0.6 2.1 1.1 1.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.9
Pakistan 1.7 0.9 3.3 5.0 3.1 0.8 3.0 6.1 2.4 0.6 2.1 4.5
Philippines 2.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 0.7 0.7 2.6 3.3 1.5 0.5 1.8 3.3
Russia n.a. 0.3 1.2 n.a. 1.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 -1.2
South Africa 2.2 0.9 3.3 5.5 -0.3 0.8 2.9 2.6 1.4 -1.2 -4.3 -2.9
Vietnam 1.0 1.1 4.0 5.1 1.3 1.5 5.7 7.0 5.7 0.5 1.9 7.7
Botswana 5.2 0.8 3.0 8.2 6.3 0.7 2.6 9.0 3.4 -1.4 -5.1 -1.7
Namibia 2.1 1.3 4.7 6.8 -0.4 0.8 2.9 2.5 2.0 -0.9 -3.4 -1.4
Swaziland 5.1 0.9 3.3 8.4 0.4 0.9 3.5 3.9 0.8 -1.9 -7.0 -6.2
Zambia 2.1 0.9 3.2 5.3 -1.5 -0.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.1 -0.8 -3.1 -3.2
North Africa 1.7 1.0 3.8 5.5 3.0 1.1 4.2 7.2 1.7 0.7 2.4 4.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.8 0.9 3.4 5.2 -0.8 0.6 2.1 1.3 1.2 0.0 -0.1 1.1
Latin America and Caribbean 2.9 0.9 3.3 6.2 1.0 0.7 2.5 3.5 1.5 0.4 1.5 3.0
North America 2.5 0.2 0.7 3.2 1.9 0.3 1.1 3.0 1.7 0.2 0.8 2.5
Asia 2.6 1.7 6.1 8.7 3.4 0.7 2.7 6.1 5.0 0.4 1.6 6.5
Eastern Europe n.a. 0.5 2.0 n.a. 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.9
Europe, excluding Eastern Europe 4.3 0.3 1.3 5.6 2.1 0.3 1.2 3.3 1.6 0.3 1.1 2.6
World, excluding Eastern Europe 2.8 1.3 4.6 7.4 2.6 0.7 2.4 5.0 3.8 0.4 1.3 5.1
Sources: Author's estimates and calculations, as described in text, based on data from Maddison (2004) and United Nations Population Division (2007). Regional averages are weighted by population size. 
For aggregation purposes, former member states of the USSR are assigned to Eastern Europe. Aggregates exclude former Yugoslavia and successor states. To ensure comparability between periods, the 
global average does exclude Eastern Europe, where estimates of GDP growth are unavailable for the 1950-73 period. A full set of country-level estimates is available in Appendix Table 3
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The country-level estimates also allow us to interpret developments in regions or 
countries where life expectancy evolved notably differently from global trends. For Eastern 
Europe, we see that improvements in life expectancy played a very limited role, with a 
contribution to the growth of living standards of 0.3 percentage points in 1973-1990 and 0.1 
percentage points in 1990-2006, and life expectancy actually declined in key economies in 
the region (Russia and Ukraine, see Appendix Table 3) both in 1973-1990 and in 1990-2006.
The other significant adverse health event identified above is the impact on life 
expectancy of the evolving HIV epidemic, notably in sub-Saharan Africa, which results in a 
stagnation in average life expectancy in the region in 1990-2006 (a decline of 0.3 percent, or 
0.02 percent annually). However, in line with the wide discrepancies in HIV prevalence in 
the region,127 the impact of HIV/AIDS is also very uneven, and the average masks very 
serious declines in life expectancy in some countries, while life expectancy increased in 
others. For the 5 countries with high HIV prevalence included in Table 2, the increases in 
mortality and associated declines in life expectancy were of a magnitude to wipe out any 
increases in living standards owing to increased GDP per capita, and in two cases (South 
Africa and Swaziland), the impact of declining life expectancy was enough to wipe out any 
improvements in living standards achieved since 1973.
E. Im pact of HIV/AIDS
The economic and development impact of HIV/AIDS has received considerable attention, 
not only because of the serious impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality, life expectancy, and other 
health indicators, but also because the impact of the epidemic has been most pronounced in 
countries with a relatively low level of economic development, thus frustrating or reversing 
efforts to improve living standards in these countries, and because the impacts of HIV/AIDS 
within countries are generally more pronounced for population groups which are also 
economically vulnerable.
127 According to UNAIDS (2006), which includes the estimates o f HIV prevalence underlying the demographic 
estimates used here, HIV prevalence among the population o f ages 15-49 in sub-Saharan Africa ranged from 
less than 1 percent to 33 percent at end-2005.
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With these considerations in mind, we expand our analysis of the impact of HIV/AIDS 
on living standards in two directions. First, in order to assess the impact of HIV/AIDS, it is 
necessary to base the analysis on a well-defined counterfactual, i.e., a scenario that excludes 
the impact of HIV/AIDS. Our analysis is therefore based on the data and estimates compiled 
by the United Nations Population Division (2007b), which includes a counterfactual 
“No-AIDS” scenario. Second, we complement the analysis of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on 
the rate of growth of living standards with an assessment of its overall (i.e., accumulated) 
welfare effects, obtaining estimates of the welfare costs of HIV/AIDS in relation to the level 
of GDP per capita.
Context
The analysis builds on or relates to several earlier studies of the “welfare effects of 
HIV/AIDS,” such as Jamison, Sachs, and Wang (2001), Crafts and Haacker (2003, 2004), 
and Philippson and Soares (2005). As the study of the impact of HIV/AIDS involves the 
analysis of extreme changes in life expectancy, it also represents a robustness test of the 
different approaches used to analyzes the implications for living standards of changes in 
mortality or life expectancy.
Jamison, Sachs, and Wang (2001) adopt a linearized approach similar to Nordhaus 
(2003). As pointed out in the presentation of our analytical framework, this linearized 
approach -  while representing a convenient reduced form that is useful in some 
circumstances -  can yield biased estimates if applied over periods involving large changes in 
life expectancy (as the theoretical analysis suggests that a log-linear specification is more 
appropriate). In case of HIV/AIDS, the magnitude of the observed declines in life expectancy 
means that the cost of HIV/AIDS, as measured by an “equivalent variation” in income, may 
exceed total income in countries with very high rates of HIV prevalence. Adopting a log- 
linear specification, as our study, and similar to the Crafts and Haacker (2003, 2004), yields a 
similarly convenient reduced form that avoids the shortcomings of the linear(ized) approach 
adopted by Nordhaus (2003) or Jamison, Sachs, and Wang (2001).
The key difference to the work by Philippson and Soares (2005) regards the specification 
of the utility function. As observed earlier, Philippson and Soares (2005) adopt a
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specification in which the value of statistical life declines with the level of income, turning
negative for very low levels of income (US$353 at 1996 prices and purchasing power parity).
As noted earlier, we find that this specification is unsuitable for the study of the economic
impacts of HIV/AIDS. Not only is it inconsistent with evidence on well-being from
developing countries (see, for example, Deaton (2007), it also means that increased mortality
would not have an adverse impact on well-being for a large proportion of the population in
many countries with high HIV prevalence. As argued above, the poverty line of $1 in 2005
prices from Chen and Ravallion is a fairly good approximation of the threshold below which
the utility flow from being alive turns negative in the study by Philippson and Soares (2005).
This would mean that for 39 percent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa (as of 2005), the
welfare impact of HIV/AIDS would be neutral or positive as it shortens the disutility from
being alive, which is an unacceptable proposition for empirical (Deaton, 2007) and ethical 
128reasons.
One “strategic” choice we make at the outset regards the weighting of welfare losses by 
age and population groups. We measure the impact of HIV/AIDS on living standards through 
its impact on life expectancy at birth. Some of the theoretical and applied literature (e.g., 
Arthur (1981), Rosen (1988), Cutler and Richardson (1998, 1999), and Murphy and Topel 
(2006)) emphasizes the age-dependence of the value of statistical life -  the shorter the 
remaining life span, the lower the utility derived from it. Some researchers (e.g., Crafts and 
Haacker (2004), or Philippson and Soares (2005)) therefore base their estimates of the 
impacts of HIV/AIDS on living standards on suitably weighted population averages, with 
Crafts and Haacker (2004) applying a one-man-one-vote principle, assigning the same weight 
to each individual, and Philippson and Soares (2005) deriving the weights from the 
remaining lifetime utility.
In the present study, while recognizing the value of the alternative approaches, we focus 
on life expectancy at birth (as Jamison, Sachs, and Wang (2001), alternative estimates in 
Crafts and Haacker (2004), and much of the literature analyzing long-term changes in living
128 On the ethical dimension, see the literature on the concept o f “life unworthy o f life,” for example Glass 
(1997) or Binding and Hoche (1920).
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standards, such as Nordhaus (2006)), based on three considerations.129 First, the age 
structures across the countries we analyze differ considerably, notably reflecting differences 
in birth and population growth rates. Differences across countries in the estimated impact of 
HIV/AIDS, weighted by the size of population age-cohorts, therefore reflect both health and 
demographic variables, and are difficult to interpret. Second, the quality of demographic data 
in many of the countries of interest is weak, and the estimates at our disposal are generated 
from generic demographic models fitted to the limited data available for the respective 
countries. The use of indirectly generated demographic variables thus compounds the 
complexities of interpreting the differences in (estimated) age structures across countries.130 
Third, HIV/AIDS-related mortality, by thinning out the cohorts in which the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS are most pronounced, mitigates the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS (weighted by 
the size of age-cohorts) on living standards over time, adding another layer of complexity to 
the interpretation of estimates of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on living standards, weighted by 
the size of age-cohorts.
On a technical level, focusing on life expectancy at birth thus normalizes the estimates of 
the impacts of HIV/AIDS on living standards with respect to the three elements just 
described.131 In terms of analytical substance, our analysis provides a “cleaner” measure of 
the implications of the health impacts of HIV/AIDS, over the life span of a representative 
individual.
One remaining problem that is particularly relevant for the analysis of the economic and 
development impacts of HIV/AIDS, as it primarily regards low- and middle-income 
countries, is the “extrapolation” issue discussed earlier. As there is very little direct evidence
129 Additionally, we take note o f  the complexities o f deriving appropriate weights, an issues that we cannot 
adequately discuss within the scope o f the present study.
130 For a discussion o f  the pitfalls o f  using generated demographic variables in economic analysis, in a 
somewhat different context, see Deaton (2006).
131 An alternative approach, with similar advantages (and disadvantages) as our analysis based on changes in 
life expectancy at birth, involves using life expectancy at a certain age (e.g. 15) as a benchmark. See Crafts and 
Haacker (2004) for an example.
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on the value of statistical life in low-and middle-income countries, our analysis, regarding the 
weight of changes in life expectancy in living standards, amounts to out-of-sample 
projections, i.e., it is subject to large margins of error.
Estimates o f the Impact o f HIV/AIDS Across Countries
Our estimates of the adverse impacts on living standards of reduced life expectancy owing.to 
HIV/AIDS are based on demographic estimates, including a counterfactual “no-AIDS” 
scenario, obtained from United Nations Population Division (2007b). These estimates are 
based on a complex demographic model explicitly incorporating the impact of HIV/AIDS. 
Underlying assumptions regarding the impact of HIV/AIDS are presented in the Appendix; 
the estimates incorporate the latest available information regarding the impact of and access 
to antiretroviral treatment, this is important as improved access to antiretroviral treatment can 
make a significant impact on HIV/AIDS-related mortality.
To illustrate the implications of benchmarking trends in life expectancy against a 
counterfactual scenario, rather than just measuring actual declines in life expectancy,
Figure 2 illustrates the estimates of trends in life expectancy (actual and according to the “no- 
AIDS” scenario) for Tanzania (with an HIV prevalence rate among the population of ages 
15—49 of 6.5 percent as of end-2005) and South Africa (with an HIV prevalence rate of 18.8 
percent), according to UNAIDS (2006).132 Clearly, an analysis based on changes in actual 
life expectancy, rather than changes relative to a no-AIDS scenario, would severely 
underestimate the impact of the epidemic, especially for countries with relatively low HIV 
prevalence.
132 Estimates o f  HIV prevalence were updated in UN AIDS (2008). For Tanzania and South Africa, the earlier 
estimates o f HIV prevalence (see UNAIDS, 2006) underlying the estimates in United Nations Population 
Division (2007b) are very close to the updated ones.
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Table 3 summarizes our estimates o f the impacts o f increased mortality owing to 
HIV/AIDS on living standards.133 For sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy at birth declines 
by 7 years relative to a no-AIDS scenario, from 55.6 to 48.8 years, translating into a loss in 
living standards equivalent to 38 percent o f GDP. For some o f the countries with very high 
HIV prevalence, the losses are much more pronounced, exceeding 70 percent for Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
These losses may appear extreme at first sight. It is important, however, to recognize that 
the underlying changes in mortality and life expectancy are extremely large, as well. For 
many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS has reduced life expectancy to the vicinity 
o f levels which were common in 1950 (or falling below them in Botswana, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe).134 An analogy from a different context may also be helpful to illustrate the
133 For each region, Table 3 shows a mix o f  countries with relatively high HIV prevalence and countries with 
large populations. China and India, which would “qualify” based on population size, are not covered, the former 
because o f  limited data and very low estimated HIV prevalence, the latter because ongoing substantial revisions 
in the estimates o f  the number and composition o f people living with HIV/AIDS in India imply that the 
estimates by United Nations Population Division are now obsolete. For a discussion o f  estimates o f  the 
dmeographic impact o f  HIV/AIDS and its implications in India and other Asian countries, see Haacker (2008).
134 United Nations Population Division (2007) estimates that life expectancy at birth in 1950-55 was 37.6 years 
in sub-Saharan Africa, and 44.7 years in Southern Africa.
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magnitude of the losses in life expectancy experienced in Africa -  the declines experienced 
in some severely afflicted countries, from life expectancies above 60 years to life 
expectancies in the vicinity of 40 years, corresponds to the (reversal of) the gains 
experienced by some of the industrialized countries discussed earlier between 1870 and 
1950, or the (reversal of) the gains experienced in these countries between 1913 and 2006 in 
relative terms.135
Table 3. Impact of HIV/AIDS on Living Standards (Levels), Selected Countries
Country HIV Prevalence
...3 ---------- ----------------------------------------------- -
Life Expectancy Welfare Loss
(In percent of 
population, age 
15-49, end-2005)1
(In Years, (In Years, 
without AIDS, actual, 
2000-05) 2000-05)
(Level change 
by 2000-05, in 
percent of GDP
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.2 (6.1) 55.6 48.8 -38.3
Botswana 24.9 (24.1) 67.1 46.6 -73.8
DRC n.a. (n.a.) 48.0 45.0 -21.4
Ethiopia 2.1 (n.a.) 53.2 50.7 -16.0
Kenya 7.1 (6.1)2 60.5 51.0 -46.7
Lesotho 23.4 (23.2) 63.9 44.6 -73.4
Malawi 12.3 (14.1) 61.5 45.0 -68.3
Mozambique 12.2 (16.1) 52.9 44.0 -49.3
Namibia 15.3 (19.6) 68.3 51.5 -64.6
Nigeria 3.2 (3.9) 49.0 46.6 -16.6
South Africa 18.2 (18.8) 66.1 53.4 -54.5
Swaziland 26.4 (33.4) 63.6 43.9 -74.6
Tanzania 6.4 (6.5) 58.3 49.7 -44.5
Zambia 15.0 (17.0) 54.8 39.2 -70.9
Zimbabwe 19.0 (20.1) 65.7 40.0 -84.0
Thailand 1.4 (1.4) 70.9 68.6 -11.7
Myanmar 0.8 (1.3) 61.4 59.9 -8.9
Russia 1.1 (1.1) 64 9 64.8 -0.5
Ukraine 1.5 (1.4) 68.1 67.6 -2.6
Brazil 0.6 (0.5) 71.5 71.0 -2.3
Haiti 2.2 (3.8) 64.2 58.1 -30.7
Honduras 0.7 (1.5) 71.0 68.6 -11.9
1 Estimates of HIV prevalence shown first are from UNAIDS (2008), estimates from UNAIDS (2006), 
on which the estimates of life expectancy are based, are shown in brackets.
2 For Kenya, UNAIDS (2008) does not offer a point estimate. The number shown is the midpoint of 
the upper- and lower-range estimates (6.1 percent and 8.1 percent, respectively).
Source: UNAIDS (2008, 2006), United Nations Population Division (2007), and author's estimates.
135 The unweighted averages o f life expectancy for the set o f 17 industrialized countries covered in Appendix 
Table 2 are 40.1 years (1870), 51.0 years (1913), 68.3 years (1950), and 80.1 years (2006). A reversal o f  the 
gains between 1870 and 1950 would imply a decline in life expectancy o f  28 years or 41 percent, a reversal o f 
the gains between 1913 and 2006 would imply a decline o f  29 years or 36 percent.
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Table 3 also illustrates that the consequences of HIV/AIDS for living standards are by no 
means negligible for the countries with relatively low HIV prevalence rates. For example, in 
Ethiopia, with an estimates HIV prevalence rate of about 2 percent, a loss in life expectancy 
of 2.5 years translates in to a welfare loss equivalent to 16 percent of GDP, and for Thailand 
(HIV prevalence: 1.4 percent), life expectancy declines by 2.3 years, corresponding to a loss 
in living standards equivalent to 12 percent of GDP.
Impact on Growth Rates
The preceding section analyzes the size of the impact o f HIV/AIDS on living standards. As 
the impact of HIV/AIDS evolves over time, this perspective can usefully be complemented 
by an analysis of the contribution of HIV/AIDS to changes in living standards over time, 
notably in relation to the growth rate of GDP per capita. To this end, Table 3 summarizes the 
estimates of the contributions of growth of GDP per capita and life expectancy to living 
standards over the period 1990-2005, in which the impact of HIV/AIDS on mortality 
escalated in many countries.
For sub-Saharan Africa overall, HIV/AIDS has been a drag on the growth rate of living 
standards. While GDP per capita increased at a modest rate of 0.6 percent, life expectancy 
declined modestly, so that the living standards improved only at a rate of 0.4 percent 
annually. However, the apparently modest masks two development going in opposite 
directions -  considerable improvements in public health which made a substantial positive 
contribution to living standards , but which got more than offset by the adverse impact of 
HIV/AIDS.
For sub-Saharan countries featuring high prevalence rates (disproportionally represented 
in Table 3), the period of 1990-2005 appears as one of declining living standards, with 
HIV/AIDS more than offsetting gains in GDP (or, in some countries, exacerbating a decline 
owing to negative growth of GDP per capita). In the two Asian countries covered, the role of 
improvements in life expectancy (with or without the impact of HIV/AIDS) was limited 
compared to the contributions of fairly high rates of growth of GDP per capita. In Russia and 
Ukraine, declining life expectancy exacerbated the decline in GDP, but HIV/AIDS played a 
minor role in this. Interestingly, Brazil shows a positive “contribution” to the growth of life
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expectancy from HIV/AIDS, which reflects early and comprehensive health sector response 
and near complete access to antiretroviral treatment, which have reduced HIV/AIDS-related 
mortality in Brazil between 1990 and 2005.136
Table 4. Impact of HIV/AIDS on the Growth of Living Standards, Selected Countries
Country
Growth of 
GDP per 
capita
Growth in Life 
Expectancy
Of which: 
HIV/ AIDS
Growth in 
Living 
Standards
Of which: 
HIV/ AIDS
(In percent, (In percent, (In percent, (In percent, (In percent,
annual annual annual annual annual
average, average, average, average, average,
1990-2005) 1990-2005) 1990-2005) 1990-2005) 1990-2005)
SSA 0.6 -0.05 -0.6 0.4 -2.2
Botswana 3.9 -1.7 -2.0 -2.5 -7.2
DRC -5.3 -0.1 -0.2 -5.7 -0.7
Ethiopia 1.1 0.6 -0.2 3.3 -0.9
Kenya -0.4 -0.8 -0.9 -3.3 -3.1
Lesotho 1.9 -1.9 -2.5 -5.3 -9.3
Malawi 0.3 -0.2 -1.8 -0.6 -6.6
Mozambique 3.2 -0.1 -1.5 3.0 -5.5
Namibia 2.0 -1.1 -1.8 -2.0 -6.5
Nigeria 1.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.7 -1.3
South Africa 0.6 -1.2 -1.7 -3.8 -6.1
Swaziland 0.3 -2.2 -2.8 -7.8 -10.2
Tanzania 1.3 0.01 -0.8 1.3 -2.8
Zambia -0.3 -1.1 -1.5 -4.5 -5.6
Zimbabwe -2.7 -2.5 -2.6 -12.0 -9.7
Thailand 3.6 0.3 -0.1 4.7 -0.5
Myanmar 6.2 0.2 -0.2 7.1 -0.6
Russia -2.4 -0.2 -0.03 -3.3 -0.1
Ukraine -0.4 -0.2 -0.1 -1.0 -0.3
Brazil 1.1 0.5 0.02 3.0 0.1
Haiti -2.8 0.6 -0.4 -0.6 -1.4
Honduras 1.1 0.4 -0.1 2.5 -0.4
Source: Authors estimates, based on data from World Bank (2008) and United Nations Population 
Division (2007b). Data may not add up across columns due to rounding. For life expectancy, growth 
rates are based on "point estimates" for 1990 and 2005 approximated as averages for the surrounding 
periods (1985-90 and 1990-95 for 1990, and 2000-05 and 2005-10 for 2005) from United Nations 
Population Division (2007b). The impact of HIV/AIDS on growth rates of life expectancy is calculated as 
the difference in growth rates between the estimates of actual life expectancy and the "no AIDS" 
counterfactual scenario from United Nations Population Division (2007b).
136 On access to antiretroviral treatment in Brazil and other countries, see WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF 
(2008).
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Implications o f Access to Antiretroviral Treatment
One important extension of the analysis of the impacts of HIV/AIDS summarized in Table 3 
is an assessment of the potential of increased access to antiretroviral treatment to mitigate 
these impacts. These are already partly reflected in the estimates of life expectancy shown in 
Table 3, although the impact presumably is rather small as access to antiretroviral treatment 
in developing countries substantially accelerated only towards the end of the 2000-2005 
period (see WHO and UNAIDS (2006), and WHO, UNAIDS, and UNICEF (2008)).
While a lull analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, as we do not have estimates of the
impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy identifying the impact of antiretroviral treatment, we
can nevertheless provide a numerical example based on the assumptions regarding the impact
of antiretroviral treatment used in United Nations Population Division (2007), which are
summarized in the Appendix. Overall, we assume that antiretroviral treatment extends the
life expectancy of an individual living with HIV/AIDS by 8 years.137 In a country with an
HIV prevalence rate of 15 percent, it is a reasonable approximation that 30 percent of a new
1cohort will become infected over their life span. Assuming a coverage rate of antiretroviral 
treatment of 80 percent, once required, life expectancy for 24 percent of a new cohort 
increases by 8 years, i.e., life expectancy at birth increases by about 2 years. This is a 
relatively small reversal compared to the losses in life expectancy reported in Table 3, which 
shows declines in life expectancy, at similar HIV prevalence rates as the 15 percent assumed 
for the numerical example, of between 9 years (Mozambique) and 16 years (Malawi).
A different way of calculating the impact of comprehensive access to antiretroviral 
treatment on life expectancy is based on available burden of disease indicators. Lopez and 
others (2006), in an authoritative study supported by the World Bank and the WHO, estimate
137 This is obtained based on an estimated increase in the average lifespean o f 7.5 years for adults (accounting 
for about 90 percent o f  people living with HIV/AIDS) and between 5.5 and 18 years for children.
138 The share o f  people expected to become infected over their life span is much higher than the commonly 
quoted HIV prevalence rate for the population o f ages 15-49, as the latter does not include infected children 
who die before adulthood, adult members o f  a cohort who have already died, and adults who statistically can be 
expected to become infected in the future.
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that an HIV/AIDS-related death on average cost 36 life years. Access to antiretroviral 
treatment reduces the expected loss in life years for an individual to 28 years; assuming a 
coverage rate of 80 percent, the average expected loss in life years per person infected would 
fall by 6.4 years to just under 30 years.
Motivated by the latter example, we assess the potential reversal in the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on living standards associated with comprehensive access to antiretroviral 
treatment for selected countries covered in Table 3, assuming that comprehensive treatment 
reduces the decline in life expectancy by 18 percent (6.4 years of saved life years, divided by 
36 years without antiretroviral treatment).139
Table 5. Potential Impact of Antiretroviral Treatment
Actual Comprehensive Treatment Difference 
"Treatment" vs. 
"Actual"1
Gains from 
Treatment1Loss in... Loss in...
Life Living Life Living Living Living
Country Expectancy Standards Expectancy Standards Standards Standards
(Percent of (Percent of (Percent of (Percent of
(Years) GDP) (Years) GDP) GDP) GDP)
Sub-Saharan Africa -6.8 -38.3 -5.6 -32.5 5.9 9.5
Lesotho -19.3 -73.4 -15.9 -65.1 8.3 31.4
Malawi -16.5 -68.3 -13.6 -60.0 8.3 26.2
Mozambique -8.9 -49.3 -7.3 -42.2 7.1 13.9
Namibia -16.8 -64.6 -13.8 -56.4 8.2 23.0
Nigeria -2.4 -16.6 -1.9 -13.8 2.8 3.3
South Africa -12.7 -54.5 -10.5 -47.0 7.5 16.5
Swaziland -19.8 -74.6 -16.3 -66.2 8.3 32.8
Tanzania -8.6 -44.5 -7.1 -38.0 6.6 11.8
Zambia -15.6 -70.9 -12.8 -62.6 8.3 28.6
Zimbabwe -25.8. -84.0 -21.2 -76.1 7.9 49.0
1 "Difference Treatment vs. Actual'" is expressed in terms of the costs of HIV/AIDS (relative to a counterfactual with no 
AIDS). "Gains from Treatment" are defined relative to the reduced level of living standards in the absence of treatment, and 
are derived as 100 times "Difference Treatment vs. Actual/" divided by (100 minus the percentage loss in living standards 
from "actual" scenario).
Source: United Nations Population Division (2007), and author's estimates. Table 5 does not provide estimates for Botswana, 
as our estimates of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy for otswana, much more than for other countries in the 
region, already include an impact of antiretroviral treatment
139 One caveat regarding our analysis regards the role o f antiretroviral treatment in the estimates o f  actual life 
expectancy in 2000-05 on which our illustrative scenario is based does already incorporate some small impact 
of antiretroviral treatment, and the “comprehensive treatment” scenario may therefore include some double­
counting. However, these sources in bias in the respective scenarios cancel out in our measures o f  the potential 
impact o f  antiretroviral treatment, which is based on the difference between the two scenarios.
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Table 5 shows that the benefits from comprehensive access to treatment are substantial. 
For Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole, comprehensive treatment mitigates the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on living standards by 5.9 percentage points, which translates into a gain from 
treatment of 9.5 percent of GDP. For many countries with high HIV prevalence, the gains 
that can be achieved with comprehensive access to treatment exceed 20 or even 30 percent of 
GDP, and reach close to 50 percent of GDP in one case.
The bad news is that the costs of HIV/AIDS remain very substantial, even in a 
comprehensive treatment scenario. A welfare improvement equivalent to 50 percent of GDP 
is fantastic, but not so much if it raises living standards by 50 percent from a level at which it 
is depressed by 84 percent owing to a massive increase in mortality, to a level at which living 
standards are reduced by “only” 76 percent.
In addition to an assessment of the welfare gains associated with comprehensive access to 
antiretroviral treatment (which we find to be large, but -  at the same time -  small relative to 
the overall welfare costs of the impact of HIV/AIDS) thus also provides insight regarding the 
roles of prevention programs. Returning to our example of a country with an HIV prevalence 
rate o f 15 percent, in which 30 percent of a new cohort can be expected to become infected 
over their life span, we see that HIV/AIDS may reduce life expectancy by 10.8 years 
(assuming that an HIV/AIDS-related death costs 36 life years, as estimated by Lopez and 
others (2006). Comprehensive access to treatment, with a coverage rate of 80 percent, 
mitigates the loss in life expectancy to 8.9 years (if antiretroviral treatment extends life 
expectancy by an average 8 years). The same gain be achieved by a program that succeeds in 
preventing 18 percent of new infections, reducing the probability of becoming infected from 
30 percent to just under 25 percent.
F. Conclusions
The present paper covers some methodological ground regarding measuring the contributions 
of increased life expectancy to living standards, based on the literature on the value of 
statistical life and its macroeconomic interpretations, and discusses the contribution of 
increased life expectancy to living standards in three different contexts.
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Methodologically, we build an explicit framework that -  we argue -  has certain 
advantages compared to other recent studies, as it provides a reduced form well-suited for 
analyzing periods characterized by substantial changes in life expectancy. One objective of 
our analysis is a meaningful analysis of changes in life expectancy on a global scale, 
including in low-income countries, and we address some shortcomings in the existing 
literature in this direction as well.
Regarding the contributions to living standards of increased life expectancy over a long 
period of economic development in 17 of toady’s leading industrialized economies, we find 
that the contributions of increased incomes and improved health to living standards were 
roughly even over the 1870-2006 period. The relative importance of increasing income and 
improved health, however, have shifted after 1950. While improvements in living standards 
were primarily driven by improved health before 1950, growing GDP per capita accounted 
for most of the improvements since then. Further, improvements in health showed less 
volatility and appeared to follow a common trend across countries, suggesting that the factors 
driving health improvements are different from factors driving GDP growth, and that there is 
no simple relationship between GDP per capita and health attainments.
Based on a larger sample of 136 countries from 1950, we find that improvements in life 
expectancy played a major part in rising living standards in the 1950-73 period, but the 
contribution of increased life expectancy declines in subsequent periods. This pattern would 
be consistent with a delayed dissemination of health innovations which already had a major 
impact in the leading industrialized countries between 1913 and 1950. The most recent 
acceleration in the growth of GDP per capita globally (1990-2006) can be attributed to an 
acceleration in growth in Asia, notably in China and India. Regarding the (correlation of 
GDP growth and growth in life expectancy, we find that periods of strong growth in 
individual countries were not characterized by high rates of growth of life expectancy, 
reinforcing our earlier point that suggesting that there is no simple causal relationship, going 
either way, between GDP per capita and life expectancy.
The analysis of the adverse impact of HIV/AIDS -  which already showed as an 
extraordinary health development in our analysis of global trends -  suggests that living
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standards have fallen in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with losses in life expectancy 
more than offsetting any gains in GDP per capita, and that the average losses to living 
standards in sub-Saharan Africa may be as high as 38 percent o f GDP. One feature of our 
analysis that is new relative to earlier work is a discussion of the implications of improved 
access to treatment and of HIV prevention for the impact of HIV/AIDS. We find that 
improved access to treatment (an assumed coverage rate of 80 percent) does mitigate the 
adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS, but only at a rate that would correspond to a successful 
prevention of 18 percent of new infections.
We see the principal shortcomings of the approach adopted in the present study in two 
areas. First, our measure of the contributions of increased income and increased life 
expectancy is based entirely on outputs of the development process and of other (e.g. health) 
factors. The perspective is thus one of accounting for changes in living standards, without 
addressing factors driving the changes in income or life expectancy. To obtain a fuller 
accounting of the role of increased income or higher life expectancy to living standards, it 
would therefore be necessary to gain a better understanding of the interactions between 
income ad health, and of factors that may be driving both. The limited evidence in this 
direction that we present in the present study suggests that this would be a complex exercise.
Second, while the approach taken in the present study has clear advantages compared to 
other approaches addressing ht e contribution of health to living standards, as it is based on 
an explicit microeconomic framework, the weak evidence regarding the underlying estimates 
of the value of statistical life is a matter of concern for our purposes. Notably, most of the 
empirical literature is based on data from industrialized countries and a few middle-income 
countries. Adapting such estimates to a global scale, as we do, therefore corresponds to out- 
of-sample projection, implying that the margin of error of our estimates is large.
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H. Appendix. Assumptions Regarding Demographic Impact of HIV/AIDS
Owing to limited availability of data, and the rapidly evolving situation regarding the 
availability of antiretroviral treatment, estimating the impacts o f HIV/AIDS on mortality and 
other demographic variables is complex and subject to considerable uncertainties. The 
estimates by the United Nations Population Division (2007b) that our analysis draws from 
are based on the latest recommendations by the UN AIDS Reference Group on Estimates, 
Modelling and Projections, and are in turn used by UNAIDS in their publications. Below, we 
summarize some of the key assumptions underlying the estimates, especially regarding the 
availability and impact of treatment, as documented in United Nations Population Division 
(2007a).
The estimates by the United Nations Population Division (2007b) that we are using draws 
on country-level data on HIV prevalence which are used to determine parameters of a model 
describing the dynamics of the epidemic in the respective countries so far. In addition to to 
the parameters describing the scale and the dynamics of the epidemic, a key determinant of 
HIV/AIDS-related mortality is the coverage of various forms of treatment. Based on data 
from WHO and UNAIDS (2006), the proportion of adults receiving treatment averages 25 
percent for the countries for which United Nations Population Division (2007b) provides 
estimates of the demographic impact of HIV/AIDS, and ranges from 0 percent to 100 
percent. Antiretroviral treatment extends the mean survival time from 2 years to 9.5 years 
after the initiation of treatment, which is assumed to occur at the time the full symptoms of 
AIDS develop.
A second important demographic effect of antiretroviral treatment is a reduction in a 
number of children bom HV-positive, as treatment substantially reduces the probability of 
mother-to-child transmission of the virus (to around 1 percent). For infected children (in 
utero or through breast-feeding), the average survival time with treatment is assumed to be 
19.5 years, which compares to 1.3 years for children infected in utero, and 14 years for 
children infected through breast-feeding. Coverage rates of pediatric treatment average 9 per 
cent in 2005 but vary between 0 and 99 per cent among the 62 countries covered by the 
United Nations Population Division.
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Appendix Table 1. GDP per Capita, 17 Countries, 1870-2006  
(constant 2005 international dollars, at purchasing power parity)
1870
w /
1913 1950 1973 2006
Australia 4,732 7,455 10,714 18,616 34,450
Austria 3,014 5,608 5,997 18,180 34,936
Belgium 3,894 6,104 7,902 17,605 32,507
Canada 2,478 6,504 10,664 20,239 35,580
Denmark 2,773 5,415 9,610 19,302 34,590
Finland 1,563 2,894 5,832 15,198 32,002
France 2,628 4,883 7,387 18,377 31,005
Germany 2,945 5,841 6,214 19,160 31,324
Italy 2,211 3,779 5,163 15,678 28,156
Japan 1,019 1,917 2,655 15,805 30,961
Netherlands 4,283 6,290 9,317 20,326 35,431
Nonway 2,595 4,531 9,898 20,375 48,532
Spain 1,974 3,362 3,580 12,528 27,765
Sweden 2,362 4,401 9,580 19,180 33,137
Switzerland 3,273 6,641 14,111 28,341 36,046
United Kingdom 4,564 7,039 9,927 17,202 32,066
United States 3,402 7,377 13,306 23,226 42,610
Average 2,924 5,296 8,344 18,785 34.182
Sources: World Bank (2008) for 2006, authors calculations, based on Maddison (2004) and 
World Bank (2006) for earlier years
Appendix Table 2. Life Expectancy at Birth, 17 Countries, 1870-2006
1870 1913 1950 1973 2006
Australia 48.0 59.1 69.6 71.7 81.0
Austria 31.7 42.2 65.7 70.5 79.8
Belgium 40.0 49.6 67.5 71.4 79.5
Canada 42.6 52.5 69.1 73.1 80.4
Denmark 45.5 57.7 71.0 73.6 78.1
Finland 36.5 46.2 66.3 70.7 79.2
France 42.0 50.4 66.5 72.4 80.6
Germany 36.2 49.0 67.5 70.6 79.1
Italy 28.0 47.2 66.0 72.1 81.1
Japan 37.0 44.4 64.0 73.3 82.3
Netherlands 38.9 56.1 72.1 74.0 79.7
Norway 49.3 57.2 72.7 74.4 80.3
Spain 33.7 41.8 63.9 72.9 80.8
Sweden 45.8 57.0 71.8 74.7 80.8
Switzerland 41.0 52.2 69.2 73.8 81.5
United Kingdom 41.3 53.4 69.2 72.0 79.1
United States 44.0 51.6 69.0 71.3 77.8
Average (unweighted) 40.1 51.0 68.3 72.5 80.1
Sources: Crafts (1997) for 1870-1973, World Bank (2008) for 2006.
Appendix Table 3. Contributions of GDP per Capita and Life Expectancy to Living Standards, 136 Countries, 1950-2006__________
__________________1950-1973________________________   1973-1990________________________________  1990-2006
GDP per 
capita
Life
Expectancy Life Expectancy
Living
standards
GDP per 
capita
Life Living 
Expectancy Life Expectancy standards
GDP per 
capita
Life Living 
Expectancy Life Expectancy standarc
(Rate of 
growth)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Contribution to 
growth in living 
standards)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Contribution to 
growth in living 
standards)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Rate of 
growth)
(Contribution to 
growth in living 
standards)
(Rate o 
growth]
Albania 3.6 1.0 3.8 7.4 0.5 0.3 1.3 1.8 2.1 0.4 1.3 3.4
Alqeria 2.4 1.2 4.4 6.8 1.3 1.2 4.4 5.7 0.8 0.4 1.6 2.4
Anqola 2.3 1.2 4.3 6.7 -4.0 0.4 1.3 -2.7 2.3 0.3 1.1 3.4
Arqentina 2.1 0.4 1.3 3.4 -1.2 0.4 1.3 0.1 2.6 0.3 1.0 3.6
Armenia n.a. 0.6 2.2 n.a. -0.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.8 2.4 0.3 1.0 3.4
Australia 2.4 0.2 0.6 3.0 1.7 0.4 1.5 3.2 2.1 0.3 1.1 3.2
Austria 4.9 0.4 1.3 6.2 2.4 0.4 1.5 3.9 1.5 0.3 1.2 2.7
Azerbaiian, Rep. of n.a. 0.6 2.3 n.a. 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.7 0.1 0.5 2.2
Banqladesh -0.4 0.9 3.5 3.1 1.5 1.1 4.0 5.5 3.3 0.9 3.3 6.6
Belarus n.a. 0.4 1.5 n.a. 1.9 -0.1 -0.3 1.6 2.3 -0.2 -0.7 1.6
Belqium 3.5 0.2 0.9 4.4 2.1 0.3 1.3 3.3 1.7 0.3 1.0 2.7
Benin -0.1 1.0 3.8 3.7 0.5 0.7 2.7 3.1 1.1 0.3 1.2 2.3
Bolivia 0.9 0.7 2.7 3.6 -0.4 1.3 4.9 4.5 1.5 0.6 2.2 3.6
Botswana 5.2 0.8 3.0 8.2 6.3 0.7 2.6 9.0 3.4 -1.4 -5.1 -1.7
Brazil 3.7 0.8 2.9 6.6 1.4 0.6 2.3 3.7 1.3 0.5 1.7 3.1
Bulqaria 5.2 0.5 1.9 7.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.4 2.0 0.1 0.3 2.3
Burkina Faso 1.6 1.6 5.7 7.3 0.5 0.8 2.9 3.5 1.9 0.2 0.8 2.7
Burundi 1.9 0.6 2.2 4.1 1.6 0.3 1.2 2.8 -1.8 0.4 1.4 -0.4
Cambodia 2.0 0.1 0.4 2.4 0.5 1.8 6.7 7.2 3.9 0.4 1.5 5.5
Cameroon 1.8 1.0 3.7 5.5 1.2 0.9 3.3 4.5 -0.1 -0.5 -1.8 -1.8
Canada 2.8 0.3 1.1 3.9 1.8 0.3 1.2 3.1 1.6 0.2 0.8 2.4
Cape Verde 0.7 0.9 3.1 3.9 5.1 0.7 2.8 7.9 3.4 0.5 1.8 5.2
Central African Rep. 0.4 1.0 3.8 4.1 -1.0 0.8 3.0 2.0 -1.2 -0.7 -2.5 -3.7
Chad -0.4 0.9 3.3 2.9 -0.2 0.7 2.6 2.4 3.0 -0.1 -0.4 2.6
Chile 1.3 0.7 2.7 4.0 1.4 0.9 3.1 4.5 3.9 0.4 1.3 5.2
China.P.R.: Mainland 2.9 2.2 8.2 11.0 4.8 0.4 1.6 6.4 7.1 0.3 1.0 8.1
China,P.R.:Honq Konq 5.2 0.8 3.1 8.3 5.5 0.4 1.4 6.9 2.8 0.3 1.2 3.9
Colombia 2.1 1.0 3.6 5.8 1.9 0.6 2.2 4.1 1.2 0.4 1.3 2.5
Comoros 2.0 0.9 3.4 5.4 -1.5 0.8 3.1 1.6 -1.1 0.7 2.7 1.6
Conqo, Republic of 2.2 1.3 4.9 7.1 0.7 0.2 0.8 1.5 0.3 -0.2 -0.8 -0.5
Costa Rica 3.5 0.9 3.2 6.6 0.6 0.6 2.2 2.8 2.7 0.2 0.8 3.5
C6te d'Ivoire 2.6 1.0 3.8 6.5 -1.9 0.4 1.5 -0.4 -0.8 -0.6 -2.2 -3.0
Croatia n.a. 0.6 2.4 n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.7 n.a. 1.0 0.3 1.1 2.1
Czech Republic n.a. 0.2 0.8 n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.6 n.a. 1.7 0.4 1.5 3.2
Denmark 3.1 0.2 0.7 3.7 1.7 0.1 0.4 2.1 1.9 0.3 0.9 2.8
Diibouti 1.7 1.2 4.5 6.1 -2.4 0.8 3.0 0.6 -1.2 0.4 1.4 0.3
Dominican Republic 3.0 1.3 4.8 7.8 1.2 0.7 2.6 3.9 3.5 0.3 1.2 4.7
Ecuador 2.5 1.0 3.6 6.1 1.0 0.9 3.3 4.3 1.1 0.5 1.8 2.9
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Eqypt 1.5 1.0 3.7 5.2 4.0 1.1 4.1 8.1 1.8 0.8 2.9 4.7
El Salvador 2.0 1.3 4.7 6.6 -0.6 0.6 2.4 1.8 2.0 0.5 1.9 3.8
Equatorial Guinea 3.0 0.8 3.0 6.0 2.3 0.8 3.0 5.3 16.6 0.5 1.9 18.5
Estonia n.a. 0.4 1.4 n.a. 1.3 -0.1 -0.4 0.9 3.2 0.3 0.9 4.2
Finland 4.3 0.3 1.2 5.4 2.5 0.4 1.3 3.8 2.1 0.3 1.2 3.3
France 4.0 0.4 1.5 5.6 1.9 0.3 1.3 3.2 1.3 0.3 1.1 2.3
Gabon 3.8 1.4 5.1 8.9 -2.4 1.3 4.8 2.4 -1.4 -0.4 -1.5 -2.9
Gambia, The 2.2 1.2 4.5 6.7 -0.8 1.7 6.2 5.4 0.5 0.8 3.1 3.6
Georqia n.a. 0.6 2.2 n.a. 1.4 0.2 0.7 2.2 -2.5 0.0 0.1 -2.4
Germany 5.0 0.3 0.9 5.9 1.7 0.4 1.3 3.0 1.3 0.3 1.1 2.4
Ghana 1.0 0.7 2.7 3.6 -1.6 0.7 2.8 1.2 2.3 0.3 1.1 3.4
Greece 6.2 0.5 1.7 7.9 1.6 0.4 1.3 2.9 2.6 0.2 0.7 3.3
Guatemala 1.9 1.2 4.6 6.4 -0.4 0.9 3.1 2.8 0.8 0.7 2.4 3.3
Guinea 2.0 0.7 2.7 4.7 0.6 1.1 4.2 4.7 1.0 0.9 3.5 4.4
Guinea-Bissau 5.0 0.6 2.1 7.1 -0.6 0.9 3.2 2.6 -1.9 0.5 1.8 0.0
Haiti -0.2 1.2 4.5 4.4 0.2 0.7 2.7 2.8 -2.2 0.6 2.2 0.0
Honduras 1.0 1.3 4.7 5.6 0.8 1.1 4.2 5.0 1.0 0.3 1.3 2.3
Hunqary 3.6 0.4 1.6 5.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.9 2.3 0.3 1.1 3.4
India 1.4 1.5 5.6 7.0 2.5 0.9 3.5 6.0 4.5 0.5 VO 6.4
Indonesia 2.6 1.4 5.0 7.6 3.1 1.3 4.8 7.9 2.8 0.6 2.2 5.0
Iran, I.R. of 5.1 1.0 3.8 9.0 -2.6 0.9 3.3 0.7 3.5 0.5 1.9 5.4
Ireland 3.0 0.3 1.2 4.2 3.2 0.3 1.1 4.3 5.3 0.4 1.4 6.7
Israel 5.5 0.5 1.7 7.2 1.8 0.4 1.4 3.1 1.6 0.3 0.9 2.6
Italy 4.9 0.4 1.6 6.6 2.5 0.4 1.4 3.9 1.0 0.3 1.2 2.1
Jamaica 5.1 0.8 3.0 8.1 -0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1 0.4
Japan 8.1 0.7 2.5 10.6 3.0 0.4 1.6 4.6 1.1 0.3 0.9 2.0
Jordan 1.6 1.4 5.0 6.6 2.8 1.0 3.7 6.4 1.6 0.4 1.5 3.0
Kazakhstan n.a. 0.7 2.5 n.a. -0.2 0.3 1.1 0.9 1.2 -0.2 -0.7 0.5
Kenya 1.7 1.2 4.4 6.1 0.7 0.6 2.2 3.0 0.0 -0.6 -2.3 -2.3
Korea 5.8 1.4 5.1 11.0 6.8 0.7 2.7 9.5 4.7 0.6 2.1 6.8
Kyrqyz Republic n.a. 0.7 2.7 n.a. -0.2 0.5 1.7 1.5 -2.0 -0.1 -0.2 -2.2
Lao People's Dem.Rep 1.0 0.5 1.9 2.9 1.1 0.9 3.3 4.4 3.2 0.9 3.4 6.6
Latvia n.a. 0.3 1.1 n.a. 1.4 -0.1 -0.4 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.5 1.5
Lebanon 1.1 0.8 2.9 4.0 -2.8 0.3 1.0 -1.8 4.2 0.2 0.9 5.2
Lesotho 3.4 0.8 3.1 6.5 2.7 0.9 3.5 6.2 3.2 -1.8 -6.7 -3.5
Liberia 1.4 0.5 1.9 3.3 -2.0 0.1 0.4 -1.6 -3.1 0.3 1.2 -1.9
Libya 9.3 1.1 3.9 13.2 -4.4 1.5 5.4 0.9 -1.5 0.5 1.8 0.3
Lithuania n.a. 0.5 1.8 n.a. 0.8 0.0 -0.2 0.6 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1
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Macedonia, FYR n.a. 1.0 3.8 n.a. n.a. 0.3 1.2 n.a. -0.5 0.2 0.8 0.3
Madagascar 0.8 1.0 3.7 4.5 -2.1 0.7 2.7 0.6 -0.8 0.8 3.1 2.3
Malawi 2.5 0.7 2.6 5.1 -0.1 0.9 3.2 3.1 1.4 -0.1 -0.4 1.0
Malaysia 2.2 1.3 4.9 7.0 4.2 0.6 2.3 6.5 3.7 0.3 1.1 4.9
Mali 1.1 0.9 3.2 4.2 1.4 1.0 3.7 5.1 1.4 0.7 2.6 4.0
Mauritania 3.2 0.9 3.3 6.5 -0.3 1.0 3.6 3.3 1.6 0.6 2.2 3.8
Mauritius 1.7 1.1 3.9 5.6 4.0 0.6 2.1 6.0 3.8 0.3 1.1 5.0
Mexico 3.2 1.0 3.8 7.0 1.4 0.7 2.7 4.0 1.5 0.3 1.1 2.5
Moldova n.a. 0.5 1.9 n.a. 0.8 0.2 0.9 1.7 -3.8 0.1 0.4 -3.4
Monqolia 3.0 1.2 4.5 7.5 2.6 0.7 2.7 5.3 0.5 0.4 1.5 2.0
Morocco 0.7 1.1 3.9 4.5 2.5 1.1 4.2 6.7 1.6 0.6 2.1 3.7
Mozambique 2.2 1.3 . 4.7 6.9 -3.0 0.5 1.7 -1.3 4.0 -0.2 -0.6 3.4
Namibia 2.1 1.3 4.7 6.8 -0.4 0.8 2.9 2.5 2.0 -0.9 -3.4 -1.4
Nepal 1.0 1.0 3.6 4.6 1.5 1.2 4.5 6.1 1.8 0.9 3.3 5.0
Netherlands 3.5 0.1 0.5 3.9 1.6 0.2 0.9 2.5 1.8 0.2 0.8 2.5
New Zealand 1.7 0.1 0.5 2.2 0.7 0.3 1.1 1.7 1.4 0.3 1.3 2.7
Nicaraqua 2.6 1.3 4.9 7.5 -4.0 0.9 3.2 -0.8 1.1 0.7 2.5 3.6
Niqer -0.4 0.4 1.5 1.1 -1.6 0.7 2.7 1.1 -0.4 1.1 4.2 3.8
Niqeria 2.7 0.8 3.0 5.7 -1.0 0.6 2.1 1.1 1.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.9
Norway 3.2 0.1 0.4 3.6 3.0 0.2 0.7 3.7 2.4 0.3 1.0 3.4
Pakistan 1.7 0.9 3.3 5.0 3.1 0.8 3.0 6.1 2.4 0.6 2.1 4.5
Panama 3.5 0.9 3.4 6.9 0.3 0.5 1.8 2.1 2.8 0.2 0.9 3.6
Paraquay 1.1 0.2 0.9 2.0 2.9 0.2 0.6 3.5 -0.3 0.3 1.1 0.8
Peru 2.5 1.2 4.3 6.8 -1.7 1.0 3.6 1.9 2.7 0.5 1.7 4.4
Philippines 2.7 1.0 3.6 6.3 0.7 0.7 2.6 3.3 1.5 0.5 1.8 3.3
Poland 3.5 0.7 2.6 6.0 -0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 3.7 0.3 1.3 5.0
Portuqal 5.4 0.7 2.5 8.0 2.5 0.5 1.9 4.4 1.7 0.4 1.3 3.1
Romania 4.8 0.6 2.3 7.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.2 0.7 2.1
Russia n.a. 0.3 1.2 n.a. 1.0 -0.1 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -1.1 -1.2
Rwanda 1.0 0.5 2.0 3.0 1.5 -1.6 -5.9 -4.5 0.8 2.1 7.9 8.7
Saudi Arabia 7.2 1.5 5.6 12.8 -1.1 1.3 4.9 3.8 -0.1 0.4 1.4 1.3
Seneqal 0.2 1.0 3.8 4.0 0.2 1.3 4.8 5.0 1.0 0.5 1.9 2.9
Sierra Leone 2.2 0.8 2.9 5.1 -0.3 0.6 2.2 1.9 -3.9 0.5 1.7 -2.1
Sinqapore 4.4 0.7 2.6 7.0 5.3 0.4 1.6 6.8 3.8 0.4 1.6 5.3
Slovak Republic n.a. 0.4 1.6 n.a. n.a. 0.1 0.5 n.a. 2.0 0.3 1.0 2.9
Slovenia n.a. 0.3 1.2 n.a. n.a. 0.3 0.9 n.a. 2.4 0.3 1.3 3.7
South Africa 2.2 0.9 3.3 5.5 -0.3 0.8 2.9 2.6 1.4 -1.2 -4.3 -2.9
Spain 5.6 0.7 2.4 8.0 2.7 0.3 1.2 3.9 2.2 0.3 1.1 3.3
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Sri Lanka 0.8 0.6 2.2 3.0 2.9 0.4 1.5 4.4 3.8 0.3 1.1 4.9
Sudan -0.2 0.8 2.9 2.6 -0.3 0.9 3.4 3.1 3.7 0.6 2.1 5.7
Swaziland 5.1 0.9 3.3 8.4 0.4 0.9 3.5 3.9 0.8 -1.9 -7.0 -6.2
Sweden 3.1 0.2 0.7 3.8 1.6 0.2 0.9 2.5 1.7 0.2 0.9 2.6
Switzerland 3.1 0.3 1.2 4.3 1.0 0.3 1.1 2.1 0.5 0.3 1.2 1.6
Syrian Arab Republic 2.2 1.1 4.1 6.4 2.1 1.0 3.8 5.8 2.2 0.5 1.7 3.9
Taiikistan n.a. 0.7 2.5 n.a. -1.9 0.2 0.9 -0.9 -4.0 0.3 1.0 -2.9
Tanzania 1.4 0.7 2.7 4.1 -0.5 0.4 1.5 1.0 1.2 0.1 0.4 1.6
Thailand 3.7 0.9 3.2 6.9 5.5 0.6 2.1 7.6 3.6 0.3 1.0 4.6
Toqo 2.7 1.3 4.7 7.4 -1.9 0.9 3.1 1.2 -1.6 0.1 0.2 -1.4
Trinidad and Tobaqo 3.8 0.5 2.0 5.8 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.6 5.8 0.0 -0.1 5.7
Tunisia 3.0 1.1 4.1 7.1 2.4 1.2 4.5 7.0 3.3 0.3 1.0 4.3
Turkey 3.4 1.4 5.0 8.3 2.7 0.7 2.7 5.4 2.5 0.5 1.7 4.2
Uqanda 0.9 1.2 4.5 5.4 -2.0 -0.1 -0.4 -2.4 2.7 0.1 0.3 3.1
Ukraine n.a. 0.3 1.1 n.a. 1.2 -0.1 -0.2 1.0 -1.9 -0.2 -0.7 -2.5
United Kinqdom 2.4 0.2 0,7 3.2 1.9 0.3 1.1 2.9 2.0 0.2 0.9 2.9
United States 2.5 0.2 0.7 3.1 2.0 0.3 1.0 3.0 1.7 0.2 0.7 2.5
Uruquay 0.3 0.2 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.3 1.1 2.7 1.9 0.2 • 0.9 2.8
Uzbekistan n.a. 0.7 2.4 n.a. -1.1 0.3 1.0 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3
Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 1.5 0.9 3.3 4.8 -1.4 0.4 1.6 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.9 1.7
Vietnam 1.0 1.1 4.0 5.1 1.3 1.5 5.7 7.0 5.7 0.5 1.9 7.7
Zambia 2.1 0.9 3.2 5.3 -1.5 -0.2 -0.7 -2.3 -0.1 -0.8 -3.1 -3.2
Source: Author's calculations, based on World Bank (2008), United Nations Population Division (2007b), and Maddison (2004).
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IV. 1. M a c r o e c o n o m ic  I m p a c t  o f  IC T -R e l a t e d  C a p it a l  D e e p e n in g  -  L it e r a t u r e
S u r v e y
A. Introduction
The present chapter reviews the available literature on the impact of ICT-related capital 
deepening on productivity and economic growth. Regarding our objective, the analysis of the 
economic role of ICT-related capital deepening in developing countries, the purpose of the 
present chapter is to provide some methodological context for our own analysis. However, 
most of the available studies on the economic impact of ICT-related capital deepening deal 
with the United States or other OECD countries,140 reflecting the weight of these countries in 
the world economy or the global markets for ICT equipment, but also limited availability of 
data which complicate an analysis of ICT-related capital deepening in developing
141countries.
The literature on the economic impacts of technological advances in ICTs on productivity 
or growth broadly distinguishes three channels through which such technological progress 
affects economic growth:
Productivity gains in the production of ICT equipment. In most countries, the share of the 
ICT-producing sector in GDP is small.142 However, with very high rates of productivity 
growth in the ICT-producing sector, the sector can account for a disproportionate share of 
overall productivity growth.
140 Baily (2001) provides a good introduction to many o f the issues discussed below.
141 Chapter IV.2 provides an extensive discussion o f issues regarding the measurement o f  ICT-related capital 
deepening in developing countries, and documents construction o f our dataset, largely from trade data.
142 In 2001-05, production o f  “office, accounting, and computing machinery” (ISIC Rev. 3 category 3000), 
which is dominated by IT equipment, exceeded 1 percent o f GDP for only 9 countries globally, including, with 
Japan, only one G7 economy (source: author’s calculations, based on UNIDO (2007) and IMF (2008).
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Capital deepening associated with falling prices of ICT equipment. The relative prices of 
ICT-related equipment decline as technological progress in the ICT sector translates into 
lower prices of ICT equipment (or improved capabilities of such equipment at a given price), 
resulting in an increase in the capital-labor ratio (at constant prices) and therefore an increase 
in labor productivity and growth.
Broader productivity gains owing to transformations in the economy enabled by 
improvements in ICTs, through advances in production processes or transformations in the 
global pattern of production enabled by ICT s.
Most of the literature on the economic impacts of ICTs focuses on the first two effects, 
because they can be captured, at least conceptually, in national accounts data. The third 
channel, which relates to the character of ICTs as “general purpose technologies,” is more 
difficult to capture as it relates to “complementary advances” which may not directly be 
related to the intensity of ICT adoption. Furthermore, there may be lags between the “time to 
sow” and the “time to reap” which conventional growth accounting exercises would not 
capture.143
Against this background, this chapter is organized as follows:
In Section II, our discussion of the literature on the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs sets 
out with a discussion of the body of work focusing on the recent growth experience in the 
United States, the country for which the impacts of ICTs have been studied most extensively, 
and which has been a starting point or point of reference for much of the literature on the 
economic impacts of ICTs in Europe or the OECD.
143 The terminology in the present paragraph draws from Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998. Some o f the early 
work on the economic repercussions o f  “general purpose technologies” was motivated by technological 
advances in semiconductors (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995); and some o f the early contributions on the 
economic impacts o f ICTs emphasized their capabilities to generate efficiency gains across the economy and 
transform production processes (e.g., David (1990) on computers (and electricity), and Litan and Rivlin (2001) 
on the internet). More recently. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2005) provide a thorough comparative discussion o f  
electricity and IT as general purpose technologies.
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Section III discusses the available literature on the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs 
across countries (most of which focuses on OECD or European countries). Apart from 
expanding the geographical coverage of our discussion, this literature adds two dimensions to 
the study of the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs. It provides an opportunity to analyze 
differences in the adoption or the impact of ICTs across countries, and potential factors that 
may cause such differences. Also, it is necessary to address the implications of differences in 
national statistical systems for a cross-country analysis. The section concludes with a 
discussion of the few studies on the growth impacts of ICTs with a coverage that 
substantially extends beyond the OECD.
Although, owing to lack of data, this is an issue that is not immediately relevant for our 
analysis, Section IV discusses the additional insights that can be gained from an analysis of 
the impacts of ICTs on the industry or company level. The variations in the adoption of ICTs 
across sectors also enable a more refined econometric analysis of the economic impacts of 
ICTs, which also contributes to refining the understanding of trends in aggregate productivity 
indicators.
Section V concludes and discusses the relevance of the literature focusing on the United 
States and other OECD countries for the study of ICT-related capital deepening in 
developing countries.
B. Literature on ICTs and Economic Growth in the United States
One remarkable feature of the literature on the links between ICTs and growth in the United 
States is that it is dominated by two groups of authors, one being Oliner and Sichel, and the 
other Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh. Both of these groups (sometimes with additional co-authors, 
including the occasional overlap) have authored numerous papers, although some of these 
papers simply update the authors’ earlier estimates.
Oliner and Sichel (1994), compared with their later work, provides a more informal 
discussion of the contributions of computers, or of broader measures of ICT inputs including 
communications equipment and software, to output growth. From today’s perspective, an 
interesting feature is the discussion of measurement issues, which is more explicit than in the
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authors’ later work. Oliner and Sichel (2000) presents the authors’ fully developed 
framework, attributing changes in labor productivity in nonfarm business to IT-related capital 
deepening (as relative prices of hardware, software, and communications equipment fall), the 
contribution of other capital, increases in labor hours and quality, and MFP, and attributing 
part of MFP growth to the production of computers and semiconductors. They find that IT- 
related capital deepening accounted for about half of the acceleration of labor productivity 
growth between 1974—90 and 1996-99, and for more than half of the increase in MFP. Oliner 
and Sichel (2003), apart from updating their earlier estimates, provide a growth-accounting 
model that is used to conduct a forward-looking calibration of growth and its determinants 
along a steady-state growth path.
Two contributions by Gordon (2000, 2003) draw on the estimates by Oliner and Sichel. 
The earlier paper, using estimates from Oliner and Sichel (2000), focuses on the acceleration 
in MFP observed in the second half of the 1990s. Making an adjustment for changes in MFP 
owing to cyclical factors, he argues that the magnitude of the structural acceleration in MFP 
outside the IT-producing sector between 1995 an 1999 has been negligible. The later paper 
was written in the context of the experience of the early 2000s, when IT investment declined 
but productivity increased. In this regard, Gordon discusses the role of “intangible capital 
that is complementary to computer hardware and software,” and provides some illustrative 
rough estimates of the implications of accounting for intangible capital for estimates of the 
impacts of ICT-related capital deepening on productivity. The key point is that investments 
in organizational changes and restructured production processes not captured in the national 
accounts slow down recorded productivity at the time IT investments occur, but result in an 
increase in recorded productivity reflecting the returns to this intangible capital.
To illustrate the lessons from the work of Oliner and Sichel, Table 1 reproduces (in a 
slightly modified form) their latest estimates, included in Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007). 
Table 1 shows an acceleration in labor productivity of about one percent between 1973-95 
and 1995-2000, associated with an increasing role of ICT-related capital deepening and 
productivity growth in the ICT-producing sector (other capital deepening and MFP growth in 
non-ICT sectors roughly cancel out). The picture changes for the 2000-06 period, as labor
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productivity growth accelerates further, while the role of ICT capital and ICT production 
decline.
Table 1. Contributions to Growth in U.S. Labor Productivity, 1973-2006
1973-1995 1995-2000 2000-2006
Growth of labor productivity in th e  nonfarm  business 1.47 2.51 2.86sec to r (percen t a year)
Contributions from (percen tage  points)
Capital deepening 0 .76 1.11 0.85
IT capital 0 .46 1.09 0.61
C om puter hardw are 0 .25 0.60 0.28
Softw are 0 .13 0.34 0.20
C om m unications equipm ent 0 .07 0.15 0.14
O ther tangible capital 0 .30 0.02 0.24
Im provem ents in labor quality 0.27 0.26 0.34
Growth of MFP 0.44 1.14 1.67
Of which: IT-producing secto rs 0 .28 0 .75 0.51
Sem iconductors 0 .09 0 .45 0.23
Com puter hardw are 0.12 0 .19 0.10
Softw are 0 .04 0.08 0.13
C om m unications equipm ent 0 .04 0 .04 0.05
Source: A dapted from  Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh, 2007.
Similar to Gordon (2003), Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007) point at the role of intangible 
capital. Drawing on empirical work on the impacts of ICTs on the sectoral or establishment 
level (discussed further below), and recent work on measuring intangible capital (e.g., 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, 2006), Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh extend the analysis for the 
effects of such intangible capital, which also requires some modifications to their framework, 
e.g., by adjusting factor shares. They find that inclusion of intangible capital does not change 
the basic lessons regarding the central role of ICTs in the acceleration of productivity after 
1995. However, inclusion of intangibles implies that “the fastest gains in labor productivity 
occurred during 1995-2000, with some step-down after 2000,” correspondingly, the increase 
in MFP growth after 2000 (as shown in Table 1) is mitigated.
The work by Jorgenson and others extend the framework for analyzing productivity 
changes that goes back to Jorgenson and Griliches to study the impact of ICTs on 
growth.144,145 A key aspect of ICT equipment in this context is the rapid rate of price declines
144 For early expositions o f  the underlying analytical framework, see Griliches and Jorgenson (1966, 1967).
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observed for such assets, which has two consequences. (1) In comparing old and new 
equipment (e.g., to measure aggregate capital stocks), it is important to take into account the 
differences in the purchasing prices of equipment over time. (2) The user costs of ICT 
equipment, a proxy for the marginal product, importantly include the rate of decline in the 
price of ICT equipment, in addition to rate of return to capital and the rate of physical 
depreciation.146
A key features that distinguishes the work by Jorgenson and others from the work by 
Oliner and Sichel is the coverage of output and inputs. Jorgenson and others include services 
from durable consumption goods in output, treating spending on such products in a way that 
is “exactly parallel to that of capital goods” (Jorgenson and Stiroh, 1999). The measure of 
output thus is wider than the one applied by Oliner and Sichel (nonfarm business sector), 
probably as Jorgenson’s work is geared towards identifying the contributions of ICTs to 
growth, while Oliner and Sichel focus more on productivity. One corollary from the wider 
measure of output covered by Jorgenson and others is the inclusion of ICT-related durable 
goods among inputs, similar to capital services.
The first contribution by Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999) in a general-interest economics 
journal provides a concise outline of the methodology and estimates of the impact of 
computer outputs and inputs to economic growth through 1996.147 Jorgenson and Stiroh 
provide a more substantial analysis, extending the analysis to communications equipment and 
software, and documenting in some detail the construction of the estimated series for capital 
stocks and capital services. The focus of Jorgenson (2001) is wider, dealing with the role of 
information technology in the U.S. economy. While the discussion of the growth impacts of 
ICTs is similar to previous work by Jorgenson and Stiroh, Jorgenson (2001) places more
145 Oliner and Sichel also draw on this framework. As the studies by Jorgenson and others includes more 
explicit discussions and references, we discuss these methodological aspects o f the literature on ICTs and 
growth here.
146 These points are discussed in more detail in Jorgenson (1996).
147 This follows the first publication by Jorgenson and Stiroh (1996) on “Computers and Growth” in Economics 
o f  Innovation and New Technology.
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weight on stocktaking of developments in the ICT sector (including a review of issues 
regarding measuring price changes of ICT products) since the late 1950, and discussing 
implications for economic research. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003) update the earlier 
estimates, and provide a more accessible presentation of “capital quality,” i.e., capital 
services derived from a given capital stock. Jorgenson (2005a) and, similarly, Jorgenson, Ho, 
and Stiroh (2005),148 represent a fuller development of the approach by Jorgenson (2001) 
towards addressing the economic role of ICTs, and also include a discussion of the growth 
impacts of ICTs in the G7 economies.
Table 2 illustrates the latest estimates by Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008).149 The 
presentation is similar to the one in Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007, see Table 1), which 
facilitates comparisons. Unlike Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (which focus on the nonfarm 
business sector), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) find that the growth rate of labor 
productivity has peaked in 1995-2000. However, the key reasons behind these differences 
are not related to ICTs, our primary areas of interest, the contributions of which are similar 
between the studies. Most significantly, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh show a smoother 
trajectory of other tangible capital, and a more moderate acceleration of total factor 
productivity in the non-IT sector.
148 Much o f the emphasis o f Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) is on industry-level developments. These aspects 
will be discussed below.
149 The title o f  the paper (“A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence”) is somewhat o f  
a misnomer, as the bulk o f the paper is concerned with growth projections, which we do not discuss here.
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Table 2. Sources of U.S. Output and Productivity Growth, 1973-2006
1973-1 9 9 5  1995-2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 6
A verage labor productivity (percen t a year) 1.49 2 .70 2.50
Contributions from  (percen tage  points):
Capital deepening 0.85 1.51 1.26
Inform ation technology 0.40 1.01 0 .58
Non-inform ation technology 0.45 0 .49 0 .69
Labor quality 0.25 0 .19 0.31
Total facto r productivity 0.39 1.00 0 .92
Inform ation technology 0.25 0 .58 0 .38
N on-information technology 0.14 0.42 0 .54
Source: Adapted from Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, 2008.
One notable addition to the literature is provided by Nordhaus (2002). Among other points he 
makes, he provides an analysis of the impact of ICTs on “well-measured” output, which does 
not produce substantially different results, and augments the analysis by allowing for 
productivity effects of shifts in the composition of output.
C. Lessons from Cross-Country Studies
The study of the impacts of ICTs across countries adds additional challenges to the analysis, 
related to differences in national statistics, such as the availability of data on ICT-related 
production of expenditures, or differences in price indices applied to ICT-related categories. 
Additionally, variations in ICT penetration or the estimated impact of ICTs across countries 
motivate analyses of potential determinants of these cross-country differences.
Regarding ICT-related data in national accounts, Colecchia and Schreyer (2002) provide 
a snapshot of the availability of data across countries. For nine OECD countries, they 
document differences in the coverage of current-price investment series, which sometimes 
have to be augmented by OECD estimates to allow for cross-country comparisons. The lack 
of sufficiently detailed national accounts data, beyond key OECD economies, is also one of 
the reasons why most studies focus on a relatively small set of countries. One alternative 
source of data that is sometimes used is industry data on sales of ICT products, such as
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WITSA’s Digital Planet database or Global Insight’s Global IT  Navigator database, covering 
70 countries.150
Probably the more significant issue regarding cross-country comparisons are differences 
in price series, a crucial item as the rate of technological progress in the ICT sector is usually 
measured by the rate of price decline of the respective goods. The internationally recognized 
best practice for measuring prices of ICT goods are hedonic indices that account for changes 
in the quality of ICT products.151 However, the methods applied in generating price indices 
for ICT products across countries differ widely (Colecchia and Schreyer, 2002). The most 
common approaches to address this problem for cross-country studies is the use o f a 
“harmonized” indices (Schreyer, 2002), which are based on the difference in U.S. data 
between the price index of IT equipment and the overall price index for equipment, assuming 
that the difference between prices of IT equipment and equipment overall evolves in the 
same fashion across countries. The alternative that is sometimes used involves adjusting U.S. 
price indices for exchange rate changes.152
A substantial share of the work on the growth impacts of ICTs in the G7 countries, 
Europe, or the OECD has been conducted at or commissioned by the OECD. Van Ark 
(2001), distinguishes between ICT-producing manufacturing and service industries, intensive 
ICT-using manufacturing and service industries, and other sectors. He finds that productivity 
growth differentials between the United States and most European countries are partly 
explained by a larger and more productive ICT-producing sector in the United States, but 
also by bigger productivity contributions from ICT-using industries and services in the 
United States. Pilat and Wolfl (2004) cover a wider set of countries, focusing on ICT- 
producing manufacturing and services, as well as ICT-using services. They find that the
150 The WITS A database now is produced by Global Insight; the latest version (Digital Planet 2008) now covers 
80 countries.
151 See Schreyer (2002), Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society (2005), and Grimm and others 
(2005).
152 For a discussion o f the use o f “harmonized” indices vs. the use o f U.S. indices adjusted for exchange rates, 
see also van Ark (2002).
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contributions of the ICT-manufacturing sector are modest for most OECD countries 
(exceptions are Finland, Ireland, and Korea), and point at a strong pick-up in productivity 
growth in ICT-using services in the United States and Australia in the second half of the 
1990s. Ahmad, Schreyer, and Wolfl (2004), a companion paper to Pilat and Wolfl (2004), 
concentrate on the role of ICT-related capital deepening, estimating that the impact on 
growth roughly doubled between 1990-95 and 1995-2001 (with some variation between 
countries), and that it amounted to between 0.3 percentage points for France and 0.8 
percentage points for the United States in the latter period. However, the authors stress that 
the measurement issues described above continue to make cross-country comparisons 
difficult.
Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) -  also of the OECD, but in an academic journal -  
document the contribution of ICT to capital input across countries. Their discussion of the 
contribution of ICTs to productivity growth is less formal, relying largely on a comparison of 
increases in MFP growth across countries. Salvatore (2003) also assumes that “growth of 
multifactor productivity (mfp) can be used as a rough measure of the contribution of the New 
Economy to the growth of the nation,” but does not provide a more explicit analysis of the 
links between ICT adoption and MFP growth. The study by Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark-
(2007) is based on input and output data on the industry level, distinguishing 26 industries 
and covering 7 advanced economies. They find that “differential growth performance is most 
strongly related to differences in TFP growth,” whereas the pattern regarding ICT capital 
deepening was similar across countries, accelerating between 1995 and 2000, but slowing 
down subsequently. An industry decomposition points at slower productivity growth in 
business services in continental Europe as a reason for differences in productivity growth 
across countries.153
Jorgenson (2003, 2005b, also adapted in Jorgenson (2005a) and Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh (2005)) extends the framework developed for the United States by himself and his 
collaborators to the G7 economies. As the various published versions are virtually identical,
153 Additionally, Inklaar, Timmer, and van Ark (2007) provide a discussion o f differences in productivity levels 
across countries.
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our discussion is based on Jorgenson (2005a) only. One point Jorgenson stresses is the 
distinction between capital stocks and capital quality, i.e. the flow of services obtained from 
a unit of capital (also discussed above). The growth contribution of ICT capital in the United 
States between 1980 and 2006 increased more than twice as fast as the stock of capital, as the 
increase was concentrated in IT hardware and software, commodities characterized by high 
marginal products (i.e., high rates of price decline and, in case of IT hardware, physical 
depreciation). The UK enjoy the highest rates of IT-related productivity growth over the 
1995-2001 period (1.5 percentage points per year), more than half of which occurs in IT 
production. The productivity gains for the US and Japan are somewhat lower overall (1.4 and
1.3 percentage points per year), two-thirds of which are accounted for by IT capital 
deepening. Canada shows relatively low IT-related productivity gains (1.0 percent annually) 
-  while the impact of IT-related capital deepening is among the highest, it features very little 
IT production.
Oulton (2002) focuses on differences in productivity growth between the UK and the 
United States and the role of ICTs. He finds that the role of ICT-related capital deepening 
increased gradually between 1989-94 and 1994-98, but attained a level of only about half of 
the estimates presented by Oliner and Sichel (2000) for the U.S. economy.154 However, TFP 
declined in the UK, while it increased in the United States.
Timmer and van Ark (2005) and -  most recently -  van Ark, O ’Mahoney, and Timmer
(2008) discuss productivity differentials between the European Union (actually, 10 EU 
countries) and the United States.155 The latter paper identifies 4 determinants of labor 
productivity -  (a) labor composition, (b) ICT capital, (c) non-ICT capital, and (d) MFP - , 
defining the impact of the knowledge economy as the sum of items (a), (b), and (d). Overall, 
van Ark, O’Mahoney, and Timmer (2008) find that labor productivity growth has declined
154 The point estimates are 0.24 percentage points per year for the UK, and 0.45 percentage points per year for 
the US. The time periods in Oliner and Sichel (2000) are one year later than those in Oulton (2002), which may 
affect the observed differences.
155 The latter paper updates the analysis o f contributors to labor productivity through 2004 (from 2001) and 
augments the analysis by accounting for changes in the composition o f  labor.
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by 0.9 percentage points in the European Union between 1980-1995 and 1995-2004, 
whereas it has increased by 1.5 percentage points in the United States over the same periods 
(Table 3). In their analysis, the contribution of ICT capital has been lower and accelerated 
more slowly. However, the biggest factor underlying the divergent trends in labor 
productivity are the trends in MFP growth, which declined in Europe but increased in the 
United States. The analysis summarized in Table 1 is complemented by a discussion of 
contributions to growth in labor productivity (but not MFP) by sector; while a larger share of 
ICT production in the United States plays the role, most of the difference in labor 
productivity growth between the European Union and the United States arises from slower 
growth in the service sector.
Table 3. Growth of Labor Productivity in the Market Economy, EU and U.S., 1980-2004
European Union United S ta tes
1980-1995 1995-2004 1980-1995 1995-2004
Labor productivity grow th (percen t a year) 
Contributions from (percen tage  points):
2.4 1.5 1.5 3.0
Labor com position 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Capital serv ices per hour 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.3
ICT capital 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.8
Non-ICT capital 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.4
Multifactor productivity 0.9 0.3 0.5 1.4
Source: A dapted from  van Ark, O 'M ahoney, and Tim m er, 2008.
Daveri (2002) takes a somewhat different approach than the studies discussed so far. 
Rater than using national accounts data, his estimates are based on WITS A ’s Digital Planet 
database. As a consequence, his paper covers some EU countries frequently left out because 
of issues with national accounts data. Second, he appears to use U.S. price indices adjusted 
for exchange rates rather than harmonized indices. He suggests that the pattern of ICT 
adoption in Europe has been uneven in 1998-2001, with a group of countries partially 
catching up with the United States, and a group of “slow adopters” continuing to lag behind. 
However, he does not find a strong impact of ICT adoption on labor productivity overall.
While most studies -  owing to limited availability of sufficiently disaggregated national . 
accounts data -  focus on a limited number of advanced economies, a few studies have 
attempted to make full use of available cross-country databases. One of the first of these
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studies, Bayoumi and Haacker (2002),156 assess the impacts of ICT production on GDP 
growth using a dataset comprising 32 countries, including some developing countries, from 
Reed Electronics Research (2001), as well as data from WITSA’s Digital Planet database. 
They find that the growth effects from IT production are substantial for a few countries 
(exceeding 1 percentage points for 5 countries), but they only account for 0.1 percentage 
points or less in more than half of the countries covered. The analysis is complemented by an 
analysis of the impact of falling prices of ICT products on real domestic demand. Here the 
gains are much more even, and some of the countries with the highest gains barely produce 
ICT products (e.g., Australia, South Africa). Bayoumi and Haacker therefore find that 
productivity gains in ICT production are wiped out by deteriorating terms of trade for ICT 
products (as their prices decline), and the principal determinant of macroeconomic benefits 
from ICT production is absorption of ICT products.
Jorgenson and Vu (2005a, 2005b, 2007) build on earlier work by Jorgenson (2003,
2005b) on the G7 (discussed above), analyzing the contribution of ICT-related capital 
deepening to growth in the 110 countries covered by the Penn World Tables (Version 6.1).
To this end, they use data for 70 countries from WITSA’s Digital Planet database. For the 40 
countries not covered by the WITSA database, they construct proxies drawing on data from 
various sources, including the World Bank and the International Telecommunications Union 
(as documented in Jorgenson and Vu, 2005b). For 2000-04, Jorgenson and Vu (2007) 
attribute, out of global growth of 3.75 percent annually, 0.42 percentage points to ICT-related 
capital deepening. Across major regions, the contributions of ICT-related capital deepening 
range from 0.27 percentage points (28 countries in sub-Saharan Africa) to 0.47 percentage 
points for the G7 economies. Notably, the impact of ICT-related capital deepening increased 
in all regions relative to the G7, doubling (for the non-G7) from 0.14 percentage points in 
1989-95 to 0.27 percentage points in 2000-04 (while it increased from 0.39 percentage 
points to 0.47 percentage points in the G7, over the same periods).
156 Pohjola (2002) also draws on the WITSA dataset, providing an informal discussion o f  the role o f ICTs in * 
development, as well as an econometric analysis o f the impacts o f  ICT-related capital-deepening on growth, 
based on data for 40 countries, which yields inconclusive results.
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Haacker (2008) offers the widest coverage of developing countries so far. Unlike the 
studies by Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) and Jorgenson and Vu (2005a, 2005b, 2007), he 
builds a database using trade data from the Commodity Trade Statistics Database maintained 
by the United Nations Statistics Division. One drawback of the analysis is that it cannot 
capture absorption of domestically produced ICT equipment; for this reason, Haacker 
concentrates on countries with low ICT-related exports, which presumably do not produce 
ICT equipment (most low- and low-middle-income countries, but few high-middle and high- 
income countries). Overall, he estimates the growth impact of IT-related capital deepening at 
0.20 percentage points in 32 low-income countries, and 0.32 percentage points in 31 low- 
middle-income countries.
D. Additional Insights from Firm- or Industry-Level Studies
Although our discussion focuses on the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs, the literature on the 
impacts of ICTs on the industry or firm level is relevant for our purposes, because it adds 
insights regarding the form the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs take (this aspect already 
played a role in some of our preceding discussion, especially regarding the impacts of ICTs 
in Europe), and because industry data -  owing to variations in ICT adoption across industries 
-  enable more refined economic analyses of the impacts of ICTs, “casting a brighter light on 
the black box of production in the increasingly information technology-based economy” 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000).
Early important contributions to the study of the impacts of ICTs on productivity on the 
firm level are those by Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000, 2003) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and 
Hitt (2002), motivated by work on “general purpose technologies” (e.g., Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg, 1995). Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) takes stock of the evidence and evolving 
literature, pointing at links between productivity and the information technology stock across 
firms, and between IT adoption and organizational change at the firm level. Among the key 
challenges to identifying the impacts of ICTs are the timing of the impacts (evolving over 
time and larger when measured over longer time periods; see Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003) 
and the complementarities of ICTs with investments in intangible capital which are difficult 
to measure. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) point at complementarities between
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ICTs, skilled labor, and two measures of innovation (organizational change, and new 
products and services).
Another important contribution to the literature is the body of work by Stiroh (and 
collaborators).157 Stiroh (2002b) observes that ICT capital is correlated with an acceleration 
of labor productivity growth, but not of TFP growth. He also points at substantially different 
impacts of IT and communications equipment, and advises caution when using aggregate 
measures of ICT equipment. Stiroh (2002a) focuses on the timing of productivity gains, 
suggesting that industries investing heavily in ICT equipment in the 1980s and early 1990s 
experienced higher productivity growth after 1995. Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh
(2007), updating the more comprehensive study included in Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh 
(2005), find that productivity accelerated across industries after 1995, and that “the TFP 
boom of 1995-2000 was generated by the IT-producing industries, while IT-using industries, 
many of them in services, came to the fore in the aftermath of the dot-com crash of 2000.” 
However, in a recent empirical study, Stiroh and Botsch (2007), suggest that the link between 
IT-intensity and labor productivity has weakened after 2000. In this regard, Oliner, Sichel, 
and Stiroh (2007) propose that productivity increased in industries under pressure to 
restructure, while the impact of ICTs was less clear.
Basu and Femald (2008) focus on the role of ICTs as general-purpose technologies, 
pointing out that the acceleration in TFP growth after the mid-1990s (through 2004) was 
located primarily in ICT-using industries, and that TFP accelerations in the 2000s were 
positively correlated with previous ICT investments, which would be consistent with 
productivity gains, e.g. through organizational change, enabled by previous ICT investments. 
Earlier attempts by Basu, Femald, Oulton, and Srinivasan (2003) to explain U.S.-UK 
differences in productivity growth using a similar approach were less successful, although it 
is important to note that much of the mileage of the later paper comes from post-2000 data 
not available in the earlier study.
157 See Stiroh (2002a, 2002b), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005), Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels, and Stiroh (2007), 
Stiroh and Botsch (2007), and Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007).
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E. Lessons for Studying the Impacts of ICTs in Developing Countries
Much of the literature discussed in this chapter, focusing on the United States and other ECD 
countries, cannot easily be adapted to the analysis of the contributions of ICT-related capital 
deepening to productivity and economic growth, owing to data limitations. This applies, in 
particular, to the study of the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening on the industry level, 
most notably the econometric studies discussed in Section IV which have refined the 
understanding of the role of ICTs in economic growth in industrialized countries. Similarly, 
many of the studies prepared for the OECD discussed in Section III require data which are 
barely available beyond (a subset of) OECD countries, and cannot serve as a template for 
studying the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening in developing countries.
On the other hand, the basic approach, summarized in Section II and parts of Section III, 
provides a framework that could be applied to the study of macroeconomic impacts of ICT- 
related capital deepening in developing countries, as it can be applied bottom-up, i.e., it 
requires, at the minimum, sufficient data to identify the contributions of falling prices of 
ICTs to capital deepening, and -  suitably weighted -  to economic growth, but it does not 
require a comprehensive set of macroeconomic data. In Chapter IV.2 we therefore discuss 
the data situation in developing countries, with the objective of constructing a dataset 
covering as many countries as possible which could be used for an analysis of the 
macroeconomic role of ICTs in these countries.
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IV .2 . M e a s u r in g  A c c e s s  t o  IC T s  in  D e v e l o p in g  C o u n t r ie s
A. Introduction
Even for the most advanced industrialized countries, the study of the economic impact of or
determinants of access to ICTs is complicated by differences in statistical systems across 
• 1countries. For studies focusing on developing countries, the issues are, in many regards, 
more complex. First, national accounts data, on a level of disaggregation that would allow for 
identification of ICT-related spending, is generally not available. Second, in many 
developing countries, national data series are available for limited periods only, and the 
series may not be complete. Third, the quality of statistical data in developing countries is 
more diverse than among G7 or OECD countries.
As a first step towards an analysis of the contributions of ICTs to economic growth in 
developing ocuntries, notably through the production of ICT equipment and through ICT- 
related capital deepening, the present chapter discusses the available data and documents the 
construction of a comprehensive dataset on the production of and spending on ICT 
equipment in low- and middle-income countries.
Regarding the production of ICT equipment (Section 2), the most important source of 
data is the Industrial Statistics Database assembled by the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO).159 In some cases, however, the UNIDO data appear to 
be incomplete, and had to be complemented by data obtained from other sources.
Sections 3 and 4 address the measurement of spending on ICT equipment. In the absence 
of sufficiently disaggregated national accounts data, trade data are the most important source 
of information on spending on ICT equipment. Section 3 discusses the construction of a 
comprehensive trade dataset, covering most low- and middle-income countries, based on the 
ComTrade database prepared by the United Nations Statistics Division (2008). The most
158 See, for example, van Ark (2002), or Schreyer (2000,2002).
159 See UNIDO (2007, 2008).
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significant challenge to this arises from the fact that for many developing countries, there are 
no complete trade data series. In these cases, trade data need to be proxied from partner 
country data, which introduced a source of bias (associated wit trade between countries for 
which data are not reported through the ComTrade database), and Section 3 also documents 
how this problem has been addressed.
Section 4 discusses the construction of a dataset on spending on ICT equipment, largely 
based on the trade database described in Section 3. There are two main issues that need to be 
addressed here. First, for countries that do not produce ICT equipment, net imports of ICT 
equipment can be regarded as a good measure of the domestic absorption o f such 
commodities. However, trade data do not directly translate into spending data in the national 
accounts, as it is necessary to account for items such as transportation costs, indirect taxes, or 
retail mark-ups which are included in final expenditure data, such as investment, but not in 
international trade data. Second, for producers of ICT equipment, it is necessary to account 
for domestic production of ICT equipment, in addition to net imports (or exports) in order to 
estimate domestic spending on ICT equipment.
A crucial issue for the measurement of the impact of ICT production and ICT-related 
investment on economic growth is the measurement of changes in the prices of ICT 
equipment (Section 5), as the rate of price decline of such equipment serves as a measure of 
the rate of productivity gains in the sector. As in most studies of the economic impacts of 
ICTs across countries, our price series are based on national accounts data from the United 
States, although we take into account some recent literature refining the price indices applied 
to communications equipment.
Finally, Section 6 discusses any issues regarding the sources of or the construction of any 
other dataset used in this study.
B. Production of ICT Equipment
Data on the production of ICT equipment are important for an assessment of the economic 
impacts of ICTs in developing countries. First, the literature on the impacts of ICTs in the 
United States, Europe, or the OECD identifies productivity gains in the production of ICT
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equipment as one of the primary channels through which advances in ICTs affect growth. 
Second, as data on spending of ICT equipment are not directly available for most low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, our data on spending on ICT are based on commodity trade 
data, and -  in order to draw inferences from net imports regarding domestic spending -  it is 
necessary to account for domestic production.
The UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (UNIDO, 2007) provides data on industrial 
output and value added by ISIC category.160 The categories of interest are ISIC 3 (i.e., ISIC, 
Rev. 3) category 3000 (“manufacture of office, accounting, and computing machinery”) and 
the earlier ISIC 2 (i.e., ISIC, Rev. 2) category 3825 (with the same label) for IT equipment, 
and ISIC 3 category 30 (“manufacturing of radio, television, and communication equipment 
and apparatus”).161 For some countries, the data are available in ISIC 3 classification from 
the early 1990s; for most low- and middle-income countries the transition occurred in the late 
1990s. While the categories coincide by title, merging ISIC2 and ISIC 3 series is not a trivial 
exercise -  for countries where the series overlap, wide discrepancies may occur between the 
“matching” categories. While country coverage is wider than for Reed Electronics Research 
(2008), with 105 countries included in UNIDO (2007), including 4 low-income countries, 
there are no complete series for many of these countries. Also, the publication lag is 
relatively long (the median for the most current year for which data are available in the 2007
160 Another important source o f production data on the production o f  ICT equipment is the Yearbook of  
Electronics Data by Reed Electronics Research (2008). One o f the advantages o f  this source is that it provides 
breakdowns o f ICT spending fairly well delineated with commodity categories o f  interest (e.g., it differentiates 
computers from office equipment). Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) make good use o f this resource to estimate the 
growth contribution o f  the ICT-producing sector. However, for the present purposes, with a focus on developing 
countries, the country coverage is insufficient, with data as for only 2 low-income countries (India and 
Vietnam) and 6 low-middle-income countries (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine), out o f  
a total o f  54 countries.
161 ISIC 3 category 30 breaks down into 3 components on the 4-digit level, namely category 3210 (manufacture 
o f  electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components), 3220 (manufacture o f television and radio 
transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy), and 3230 (manufacture o f  television and 
radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated goods).
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edition is 2002), limiting the value for most of our analysis, which places a premium on the 
availability of recent data.
One drawback of the data included in UNIDO (2008) is the fact that a key commodity of 
interest, IT equipment, is available only included in the wider category “office, accounting, 
and computing machinery” (ISIC, Rev. 3, category 3000).162 To assess the magnitude of 
potential errors that can arise when drawing inferences regarding the role of production of IT 
equipment from the wider ISIC Rev. 3 category 3000, it is useful to look at trade data 
(discussed in more detail below), which are available on a more disaggregated level. We find 
that the share of IT equipment in global exports of “office machines and automatic data 
processing equipment” (SITC category 75) has risen fairly steadily from 72 percent in 1980 
to about 94 percent in 2003, and has remained at that level through 2006.163 For recent data, 
the wider category thus appears to be a reasonable approximation for IT equipment, but the 
discrepancies are substantial for earlier years, and comparisons over time would have to take 
into account the changing composition of “office, accounting, and computing machinery.”
While the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database may include the major producers of ICT 
equipment, the limited coverage of low-income countries (and, to a lesser extent, lower- 
middle-income countries) is problematic, as an output in some country that is very small as a 
percentage of the global market may represent as substantial proportion of GDP of a small 
low-income country. For this reason, we analyze trade data (from United Nations Statistics 
Division, 2008) in order to identify additional countries which may produce ICT equipment. 
In a first round, all countries where exports of IT equipment, communications, or integrated 
circuits exceeded 0.1 percent of GDP were identified. For most of the countries identified in 
the round, exports were much lower than imports in the respective category, or the level of 
exports was so low in absolute numbers to make it implausible that the country was a 
producer. In the end, the analysis of trade data pointed to three countries not covered by 
UNIDO (2007) that could be producers -  China, Thailand, and Tunisia. Additionally, trade
162 A point also made by Caselli and Coleman, 2001.
163 Based on data from United Nations Statistics Division, 2008. IT equipment is defined as SITC 2 categories 
752 and 7599, as explained in our discussion o f data on IT equipment trade.
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data suggest that Indonesia has become a net exporter of IT equipment since 1994, even 
though UNIDO (2007) shows trivial quantities of production of IT equipment. As two 
independent sources of data (trade data reported by Indonesia, and data reported by partner 
countries) contradict the UNIDO (2007) data, we also construct production data from trade 
data for Indonesia.
For these three countries, we construct an estimate for production of IT equipment using 
trade data and data on domestic spending on IT equipment (the three countries happen to be 
covered by Global Insight, 2006). To this end, it is necessary to take account o f some 
differences in the definitions and the coverage of the data between the trade and spending 
data. First, trade data do not include various costs to importers that would need to be applied 
to imports (cif, tariffs and taxes), and domestic spending in the national accounts would also 
include some retail and distribution margins. At the same time, the production data also 
include a share of office equipment and do not identify intermediate inputs of ICT equipment 
that may be included in the trade data.164
Probably for these reasons (even though the various effects do not work in the same 
direction), domestic spending on IT goods is normally higher than the sum of production and 
net imports for countries where the different types of data (spending, production, trade) are 
all available.165 In line with data for these countries, we apply a discount of 28 percent to 
spending data when estimating production data based on domestic spending and net imports. 
For communications equipment, it is not possible to estimate domestic production based on 
data on domestic spending, as Global Insight (2006) does not distinguish between 
communication equipment and related services.
Table 1 summarizes our data on production of ICT equipment (and related commodity 
flows) in low- and lower-middle-income countries for the period 2001-2004, including all
164 The role o f intermediate inputs is discussed in some more detail in our discussion o f  ICT-related spending.
165 Egypt, India, Iran, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. As net exports are much higher than 
domestic spending for China, Indonesia, and Thailand, the discount factor applied to domestic spending does 
not play a large role in our estimates.
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countries for which UNIDO (2007) data are available, plus the three countries for which we 
have constructed estimates of production of IT equipment (in case of Tunisia, the estimated 
amount is trivial). Production of IT equipment plays a significant role in only one low- 
income country (Vietnam), and in four lower-middle-income countries (China, Philippines, 
and Thailand, plus Macedonia where our data are inconsistent, showing significant 
production, but essentially zero exports). Similarly, there is only one low-income country 
(India) where production of communications equipment plays a significant role, and at least 
one lower-middle-income country (Indonesia). Especially China, a net exporter of 
communications equipment, would also fall in this category, but owing to lack of domestic 
spending data we cannot construct an estimate of domestic production. One point worth 
noting is the role of intermediate inputs, which is covered in Table 1 by net exports of 
integrated circuits. For two producers of IT equipment (Vietnam, China), our data show 
substantial net imports of integrated circuits, suggesting that production of IT equipment in 
these two countries may primarily take the form of assembly of imported components. 
Conversely, Philippines -  which is the country with the highest share of production of IT and 
office equipment in GDP in our sample -  is primarily a major exporter of integrated circuits.
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Table 1. Production of ICT Equipment in Low- and Lower-Middle Income Countries, 2001-2004 (Percent of GDP)
Country
Production of 
IT and office 
equipm ent
Production of 
Com m unications 
Equipm ent
Spending 
on IT 
Equipment
Net Exports:
IT
Equipm ent
Com m uni­
cations Equ.
In teg ra ted
Circuits
Low-income countries
India 0.2 1.0 0.8 -0 .3 -0 .4 -0.1
Kyrgyz Republic 0.1 0.2 n.a. -0 .3 -0 .6 0.0
Vietnam 0.9 0.0 n .a. 0.3 -0 .7 -0 .6
Lower-m iddle-incom e countries
Albania 0.3 0.0 n .a. -0 .3 -0 .9 -0.1
China,P.R.: M ainland1 3.0 n.a. 1.6 1.7 0.6 -1 .8
Egypt 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0 .2 -0 .3 0.0
Indonesia 1.2 1.8 0.4 0.9 0.4 0.1
Iran, I.R. of 0.1 0.8 0.2 -0 .2 -0 .3 0.0
Macedonia, FYR2 1.8 0.0 n.a. -0 .7 -1.1 -0.1
Moldova 0.1 0.0 n.a. -0 .7 -1.1 -0.1
Morocco 0.0 0.2 0.4 -0 .4 -0 .7 0.0
Philippines 4.2 0.0 0.8 4.1 -0 .7 13.2
Sri Lanka 0.3 0.1 0.7 -0.1 -0 .5 0.0
Thailand1 3.5 n.a. 0.7 2.9 -0.1 0.5
Tunisia1 0.0 n.a. 0.5 -0 .6 -0 .8 0.0
Ukraine 0.2 0.6 1.1 -0 .2 -0 .4 0.0
Source: A uthor's calculations. If not sta ted  otherw ise, production d ata  are obtained from UNIDO (2007), da ta  on spending on 
IT equipm ent a re  from  Global Insight (2006), and da ta  on net exports of ICT-related com m odities from  United Nations 
S tatistics Division (2008).
1 Data on production of IT equ ipm ent (in italics) for China, Indonesia, Thailand, and Tunisia a re  e s tim a te s  based  on da ta  on 
IT spending and n e t exports, as explained in text.
2 The estim ate  of the  m agnitude of IT production for Macedonia from UNIDO (2007) of 1.8 percen t of GDP seem s 
implausible, a s  th e  country does not export any appreciable quantities of IT equ ipm ent (gross exports were 0 .03  percen t of 
GDP in 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 4 ), and a s  es tim ated  production m inus net exports suggest an unusually high am oun t of dom estic 
spending on IT equipm ent.
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Tables 2 and 3, which provide annual data for the production of IT equipment and 
communications equipment, complement the “snapshot” across ICT products in Table 1. In 
only few cases were complete production data available from UNIDO (2007), and data which 
have been estimated by intrapolation or extrapolation are shown in italics. Countries were 
included in Tables 2 and 3 if production of IT equipment or of communications equipment 
attained at least 0.1 percent of GDP in consecutive years.
Similar to Table 1, estimates for two countries (China, Thailand) for which production 
data were not available from UNIDO (2007) were constructed based on data on net exports 
and domestic spending. To extend the available data for spending on IT equipment back to 
1992, Global Insight (2006) data were supplemented with WITSA (2001) data.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to construct similar estimates for China and Thailand 
for production of communications equipment, as the spending figures only identify total 
communications spending, and not the share of communications equipment.
For all other countries, the data are based production data from UNIDO (2007). As the 
UNIDO data also include non-IT office equipment, an adjustment needed to be made to 
obtain estimates of production of IT equipment only. To this end, the shares of IT equipment 
(SITC 2 categories 752 and 7599) in gross exports of IT and office equipment (SITC 2 
category 75) for each country were applied to scale the production figures.
As noted before, production data for Macedonia were inconsistent with trade data (both 
data reported by Macedonia and by partner countries), this finding also applies to the time 
series from 1990-2005. While production of IT and office equipment attained a level of 
about 4 percent of GDP in 1997-2000 according to UNIDO (2007), subsequently tapering 
off to a still substantial 1 percent of GDP, gross exports of these products did not exceed 0.02 
percent of GDP in any of these years according to United Nations Statistics Division (2008). 
For our estimates of the contributions of the production of IT equipment and ICT-related 
capital deepening to economic growth, we follow the trade data and assume that the level of 
production of IT equipment in Macedonia is zero.
Production of IT equipment did play a marginal role in low- or lower-middle income 
countries in 1990, but started to take off in three countries (China, Philippines, and Thailand)
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in the mid-1990s, rising to between 3.7 percent and 4.9 percent of GDP by 2005 (on a gross 
basis -  the contribution to GDP would be smaller on a value-added basis). Other notable 
countries include India (production around !4 percent of GDP throughout the 1990-2005) 
period and Sri Lanka where production peaked at 0.9 percent o f GDP 1999.
For communications equipment, production plays the most important role in Indonesia 
and India (our data exclude China) and, to a lesser extent, in Egypt, Iran, and Ukraine. On 
peculiar feature of the data is the fact that Philippines and Thailand, the two significant IT 
producers for which we have data on the production of communications equipment, started 
out with a large production of communications equipment, which tapered off as the 
IT-producing sector took off.
Table 2. Production of IT Equipment in Low- and Lower-Middle Income Countries, 1990-2005 (Percent of GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Low-income countries 
India
Kyrgyz Republic 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
Lower-middle-income countries 
Albania
China,P.R.: Mainland
Egypt
Indonesia
Iran , I.R. of
Macedonia, FYR1
Moldova
Morocco
Peru
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Ukraine
M em orandum  item s:
Share of IT production in 
ISIC Rev. 3 category  30002 
Macedonia, FYR: Production 
of IT and office equipm ent 
(UNIDO, 2007)
0.20 0.28 0.30 0.17
0.06 0 .05 0.14 0.17
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.26 0.26 0.32 0.20
0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
0.03 0.08 0.15 0.14
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.04 0.09 0.02 0.02
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.40
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.12
0.00 0.07 0.08 0.09
0.00 0.00 0.77 0.21
78.6 77.9 75.2 82.5
0.31 0.29 0.27 0.29
0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.41 0.52 0.64 0.83
0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06
0.23 0.32 0.42 0.46
0.06 0.03 0.05 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.05 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.19 0.17
0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.47 0.80 0.92 1.18
0.14 0.29 0.00 0.54
0.01 1.37 2.73 1.99
0.16 0.10 0.05 0.13
77.0 85.4 85.4 86.2
0.00 4.03
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.12 0.14 0.22 0.23
0.03 0.02 0.11 0.09
1.14 1.37 1.60 0.53
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.19 0.16 0.13 0.73
0.96 0.98 1.31 1.62
0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02
0.70 0.83 1.95 1.42
0.08 0.08 0.10 0.08
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.05 0.09 0.04 0.04
0.10 0.12 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3.77 4.21 4.37 4.53
0.52 0.94 0.53 0.31
1.25 2.26 3.28 3.89
0.07 0.11 0.23 0.18
87.2 86.4 88.5 86.4
4 .28 4 .00 3.89 3.59
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.20 0.24 0.24 0.24
0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02
0.66 0.99 1.04 1.04
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.10 0.12 0.17 0.17
2.20 3.39 4.33 4.70
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
1.29 0.92 1.14 1.01
0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.08 0.12 0.07 0.07
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.10 3.66 3.66 3.66
0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
3.31 3.21 3.20 3.90
0.21 0 .18 0.28 0.28
89.5 90.2 89.9 89.8
1.57 1.13 0.99
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01Macedonia, FYR: Exports ofIT Equipm ent__________________________________________________________ ___________________  _____________________________________
Source: Author's calculations, based on d ata  from UNIDO (2007), UN Statistics Division (2008), and IMF (2008), excep t for China (1 9 9 0 -2 0 0 5 ) and Thailand (2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 5 ), which 
a re  not covered by UNIDO (2007). For th e se  two countries, estim ates have been constructed based on data  on net exports from  UN S tatistics Division (2008), and spending data  
from  Global Insight (2006) and WITSA (2001).
1 For M acedonia, trad e  da ta  (both reported  by Macedonia and corresponding data  from partn er countries w ere inconsistent with production data  in UNIDO 2007). Our e s tim ates 
follow th e  trad e  d a ta , assum ing th a t  the level of production is equal to  zero. Source data  for production and trade are  show n under m em orandum  item s.
2 The assum ed sh a re  of IT equipm ent in production in ISIC Rev. 3 category 3000 (IT and office equipm ent) for each country is based  on the  sh a re  of IT equ ipm ent (SITC2 
categories 752 and 7599) in g ross exports in SITC category  75 (office m achines and autom atic da ta  processing equipm ent) for th a t country. For orientation purposes, we show 
th e  unw eighted averag e  of these  sh a res  (which w as also used to scale the  es tim ates for Peru, a s  no trade  data  w ere available for th a t country).
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Table 3. Production of Communications Equipment in Low- and Lower-Middle Income Countries, 1990-2005 (Percent of GDP)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Low-income countries
India 0 .80 0.84 0.99 0.83 1.05 1.02 0.90 1.11 1.04 1.00 0.98 0.82 1.18 1.06 1.06 1.06
Kyrgyz Republic 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0 .15 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.18
Vietnam 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.58 1.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zimbabwe 0.21 0.22 0.20 0 .16 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower-middle-income
countries
Albania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
China,P.R.: Mainland1 n .a. n .a . n .a. n .a. n .a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n .a. n.a. n.a. n .a. n .a. n.a.
Egypt 0 .16 0 .24 0 .34 0.31 0.28 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Indonesia 0.49 0.43 0.86 0.81 1.06 1.41 1.65 2.16 2.35 2.16 3.11 1.59 1.72 1.96 1.96 1.96
Iran , I.R. of 0.34 0 .34 0.34 0.35 0 .40 0.23 0 .39 0.65 0.89 1.26 1.65 1.47 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.39
Macedonia, FYR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Moldova 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.15
Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 .16 0.21 0.20 0.02 0.40 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.28
Peru 0.31 0 .28 0.42 0.24 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Philippines 3.07 3.92 4 .08 3.78 4.15 4 .87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sri Lanka 0 .07 0 .13 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Thailand 3.51 6 .62 5.87 5.13 2.62 3.51 4.41 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.54 0.49 0.51 0.66 0.66
Source: A uthor's calculations, based  on data  from  UNIDO (2007) and IMF (2008).
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C. Data on Trade in ICT Equipment
In the absence of national accounts data on ICT-related spending, and the limited coverage of 
other databases on ICT-related spending across developing countries, trade data are the 
principal source of data for constructing a dataset on absorption of ICT-related equipment in 
low- and lower-middle-income countries. In particular, as we argue above, most low- and 
lower-middle-income countries do not produce ICT-related equipment, which means that net 
imports of such equipment could be good measures of domestic spending. However, the 
availability of trade data from low-income countries is also limited, and time series of trade 
data often exhibit missing years. One approach that is some times used in the literature to 
address such missing values (or entire missing series) involves use of partner country trade 
data as proxies for data from countries for which no official statistics are available.
ICT-related commodities in trade statistics
A key choice we need to make at the outset is the classification of trade data on which our 
dataset is to be based. The classifications used in trade statistics are revised in irregular 
intervals, and most countries now report data in “HS 2002” or “HS 1998” format. We adopt 
the older “SITC 2” classification, because it captures the categories of IT equipment we are 
interested in fairly well, and allows us to construct a dataset that extends back to 1980. 
Adopting “SITC 2 does not involve loss of access to more current data (at least on the level 
of aggregation we use) -  more current classifications tend to be more refined than the 
predecessor, and can be (and routinely are in the UN COMTRADE database) mapped into 
older categories (while older categories are not generally upward-compatible).
Specifically, as measures of IT equipment, we focus on SITC 2 categories 752 (automatic 
data processing equipment) and 7599 (parts and accessories pertaining equipment in category 
752), corresponding to HS 2002 categories 8471 and 847330. For some purposes (the 
discussion of gains in the production of ICT-related equipment), we also look at SITC 2 
category 7764 (electronic microcircuits). The measure of communications equipment we 
adopt is SITC 2 category 764 (telecommunication equipment, parts and accessories).
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The inclusion of SITC 2 category 7599 among IT equipment requires some further 
elaboration, as analysts sometimes focus on SITC 2 category 752 only (see, for example, 
Caselli and Coleman, 2001a, 2001b). For our purposes, we seek a measure of IT-related 
equipment that matches the data from other sources on IT-related production and spending. 
However, if commodities in SITC 2 category 7599 are largely intermediate products, they 
should not be counted towards spending on IT equipment directly, as their value would be 
embodied in domestic production of IT equipment.
To gain some more insights regarding the relation between commodities in SITC 
categories 752 and 7599, Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of net exports of IT equipment in 
these categories across countries. For the vast majority of the countries in our sample, which 
do not produce IT equipment (or produce trivial quantities only), imports in SITC 2 category 
7599 clearly complement imports in SITC 2 category 752, and represent a significant share 
of IT-related expenditure. However, the breakdown between SITC 2 categories 752 and 7599 
differs considerably across countries. These differences cannot easily be explained by 
differences in the demand for IT equipment (computers, their constituent parts, and 
peripheral equipment are more or less used in fixed proportions). Alternative explanations 
are differences in classifications applied across countries (the dividing line between SITC 2 
categories 752 and 7599 is not exceedingly well-defined), or differences across countries on 
the retail level. If this reasoning is correct, then focusing on SITC 2 category 752 as measure 
of IT-related investment introduces a source of error and possibly bias.
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The second consideration regards the role o f intermediate products. As production figures 
we use for some purposes do not identify IT-related inputs, it is difficult to draw inferences 
from data sets that combine production and trade data (e.g., in order to estimate domestic 
absorption). This may be an issue for SITC category 7599 in some countries (e.g.,
Philippines report net exports of IT equipment in SITC 2 category 752 o f 5 percent o f GDP 
over the 2001-05 period, but net imports o f IT equipment in SITC 2 category 7599 o f  
1 percent o f GDP. However, the Philippines are an outlier among IT producers (although a 
large one), and IT producers trade large quantities of IT equipment between themselves, both 
in SITC 2 category 752 and in category 7599.
In light o f the observed patterns in trade flows, focusing on SITC 2 categories 752 and 
7599 as measure o f trade in IT-related equipment therefore seems to be the right choice, in 
light o f the noted similarities in trade flows in IT-related commodities in SITC 2 categories 
752 and 7599. Notably, we find little evidence suggesting that “arts and accessories” should 
be primarily classified as intermediates.
Availability o f  trade data
The availability o f  detailed trade data has improved substantially in recent years, especially 
through the COMTRADE database maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division
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(2008). Figure 2 illustrates the availability o f trade data (SITC 2 classification166) from the 
COMTRADE database. It shows that data availability for low- and middle-income countries 
has improved substantially over the last decades. Most notably, the availability o f data for 
low-income countries has increased dramatically around the m id-1990s (at least partly owing 
to improved access to ICTs in developing countries), from around 30 percent for which data 
are available to over 60 percent. However, data reporting for these countries appears to be 
subject to delays, as evident from the drop in the number o f countries for which data are 
available in the later years.
Figure 2. Availability of Trade Data by Country Group, 1980-2006  
(Percent of number of countries in group, unweighted)
L o w -in c o m e  c o u n tr ie s
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+ -  • - H ig h - in c o m e c o u n tr ie s  
 H ig h - in c o m e  c o u n tr ie s  (excl. 6 )
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S o u r c e s :  A u th o r ’s  c a lc u la t io n s ,  b a s e d  o n  UN C o m tra d e  d a ta b a s e .  "H ig h - in c o m e  c o u n tr ie s  (excl. 6 )” 
e x c lu d e s  6  sm a ll e c o n o m ie s  f o r  vtfiich t ra d e  d a ta  a re  re p o r te d  a s  part o f  t h e  s ta t i s t ic s  o f  th e  su rro u n d in g  
e c o n o m ie s .  C o u n tr ie s  a re  inclu d ed  in th e  d e n o m in a to r  f ro m  th e  firs t full c a le n d a r  y e a r a f te r  in d e p e n d e n c e .
An additional aspect o f data quality is the availability o f data over time, which is required 
to illustrate and analyze trends over time. However, the composition o f countries for which 
data are available changes over time. Especially for low-income countries, data series are 
frequently incomplete. Thus, while data for at least some year are available for almost all 
low-income countries (see discussion o f country classifications, below), focusing on 
countries for which complete data series are available would severely restrict the coverage 
for these countries.
One method researchers have attempted to get around breaks in trade data is the 
substitution o f partner country data for missing country observations. For example, one
166 Our choice o f  SITC 2 as the basis for our empirical analysis is explained further below.
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country’s imports correspond to the exports of all partner countries to that country. This 
principle has been applied by Feenstra and others (2005) to construct a data set of bilateral 
trade flows for 1962-2000, using a country import data where available, and substituting 
another country’s exports to that country if no data are reported from the former country.
However, the dataset constructed by Feenstra and others has several shortcomings 
regarding our purposes. Most substantially, it is based only on trade data from 72 countries 
accounting for 98 percent of overall world exports. For all other countries, it constructs trade 
flows based on the reported data from the 72 countries. For a study focusing on low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, it means that the bulk of the data are from partner countries, 
even if some data are available for the country of primary interest. Second, the data set 
constructed by Feenstra and others (2005) extend to 2000 only, whereas data are now 
available through 2006 for most countries (Figure 2). Third, we focus on a much narrower set 
of trade data than Feenstra and others, who are primarily concerned with consistency of 
broad aggregates of trade data, which gives us an opportunity to scrutinize the data of interest 
in more detail.
Constructing a comprehensive dataset on trade in ICT equipment
In terms of assembling a dataset for empirical analysis, there are essentially three options:
Using only observations from countries reporting trade data. This may work for cross- 
sectional analysis, but is awkward when comparing results for different years (as the 
coverage data sets would differ across years). Alternatively, the data may be used as an 
unbalanced panel, with all the problems this entails.
Using the observations from countries under consideration where available, and 
substituting the corresponding data from partner countries where data for a country under 
consideration are unavailable. However, inconsistencies in data across countries would 
translate into inconsistencies within the trade dataset generated in this way, and the quality of 
the data would be affected by any errors in the destination of exports in partner countries.
Using only partner country data. This approach, given the focus of the present study on 
low-income countries, would be similar to using the Feenstra (2005) dataset. Principal
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advantage of this approach are consistency across countries (other than for major exporters 
for IT equipment, which we are not concerned with here), and -  similarly -  the fact that it 
controls for idiosyncrasies in individual country’s statistical systems. The principal drawback 
is that it increases the scope for errors arising from incorrect records regarding the destination 
of exports or source of imports in partner country trade data.
In order to adopt the second or third approach, two criteria would have to be satisfied. 
First, data from reporting countries would have to capture a large proportion of global trade 
in ICT equipment.167 Second, trade data assembled from partner countries must be a good 
approximation for missing observations from non-reporting countries.
The issue o f completeness cannot be addressed directly, as trade flows between non­
reporting countries are, for our purposes, unobserved. However, it is possible to draw some 
indirect conclusions regarding the share of global trade in ICT equipment that we cannot 
observe, drawing on the extent to which reporters trade with reporters. To this end, Figure 3 
illustrates the magnitude of recorded trade flows in SITC 2 categories 752 (IT equipment) 
and 7599 (parts and accessories relating to category 752). For IT equipment (Figure 3.1, we 
find that reporting countries import usually import more than they export (the annual gap 
averages 8.2 percent of imports). Much of the gap can be attributed to a trade deficit in SITC 
2 category with non-reporting countries; if only trade between reporting countries is 
considered (Figure 3.2.2), imports still exceed exports, but the annual gap between imports 
and exports is reduced to 4.9 percent (which still represents a sizable error).
Figure 3.3 shows trade between reporting countries as a percentage of total trade in SITC 
2 category 752. One trend that appears is an increase in the share of exports to countries also 
reporting trade data, which can largely be attributed to an increase in the number of countries 
reporting trade data (compare Figure 2). Economically more significant is the fact that a 
substantial share of imports, peaking at 9.8 percent in 2000, is from non-reporting countries. 
The most important contributor to imports from non-reporting countries (accounting for
167 Feenstra (2005) provides a discussion o f this point regarding aggregate trade flows. As trade patterns for ICT 
equipment -  our primary object o f interest -  could be very different from aggregate trade flows, findings for 
aggregate trade flows do not necessarily carry over to trade flows in specific commodity categories.
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about half o f  the total) is the UN Comtrade region “Other Asia, nes,” most probably
168reflecting that Taiwan Province o f China is included in this region.
In some regards, trade in SITC category 7599 (Parts o f IT equipment) shows a similar 
picture, in particular regarding the role o f trade with non-reporters, which accounts for up to 
11.3 percent o f all imports by reporting countries, and a smaller proportion o f  exports, 
suggesting that non-reporters are net exporters in this category (Figure 3.6). However, unlike 
for SITC 2 category 752, most o f the discrepancies between reported exports and imports on 
the global level are not related to non-reporters, but to the fact that reporter report higher 
exports to each other than they report as imports from reporters (Figure 3.5), suggesting some 
inconsistencies between data across countries.
For communications equipment (Figure 3.7), the share o f trade between reporters is lower 
than for IT-related equipment in the early 1980, notably for exports o f IT equipment where 
reporters account for only about three-quarters o f exports to reporters in 1980. However, the 
share o f  reporters increases to about 90 percent by the mid-1990s and to about 95 percent in 
the later years covered by Figure 3.
Figure 3. Global Trade Flows in SITC 2 C ategories 752  and 7599
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168 For the early years covered by Figure 3, Brazil -  then a non-reporter -  also is an important source country 
for imports o f  IT equipment.
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The share of trade between reporting countries for SITC 2 Category 7764 (integrated 
circuits), however, shows a different pattern than those observed for ICT equipment. For 
exports of ICT equipment, the coverage of the data appears to be somewhat lower than for IT 
equipment at the start of the period under consideration, and remains flat afterwards. For 
imports of ICT equipment, the share of trade between reports starts at 92 percent, but is has 
fallen steeply since 1997 to only 80 percent in 2006.
Overall, the data summarized in Figure 3 suggest that the coverage of our data appears 
fairly complete, either bilaterally between reporters or partially as one of the parties of a trade 
transaction is a reporter. Under fairly general assumptions, the trade between non-reporters 
accounts for a very small proportion of global trade in IT products. According to our data, the 
share of trade between non-reporters would attain a non-trivial proportion only if non­
reporters highly disproportionally trade with each other.169
Nevertheless, the gaps in the data suggest several problems that may arise if partner 
country data are used to substitute for missing data from non-reporters. First, for non­
reporting countries, trade data proxied by aggregating the corresponding bilateral trade flows 
from partner countries are biased, as the proxies do not capture all trade flows. Second, if 
data from reporting and (proxied data for) non-reporting are merged in a dataset, (proxied) 
trade for non-reporters (and for groups containing a disproportionate share of non-reporters) 
will appear lower than for reporting countries; if the extent to which data are reported is 
correlated across countries, this can introduce bias in econometric inference. Third, as the 
number of reporting countries increases over time (and thus the extent to which partner 
country data capture the trade of non-reporting countries), the declining measurement error 
introduces artificial trends in the data. We will get back to these points further below.
169 A simple numerical example may illustrate this. Suppose that non-reporters account for 10 percent o f  world 
exports and 4 percent o f imports, import 10 percent o f  their imports from non-reporters, and that 4 percent o f  
their exports go to non-reporters (roughly in line with actual numbers for SITC 2 category 952, assuming that 
the trade patterns o f  non-reporters, regarding the shares o f non-reporters, is the same as for reporters. In this 
case, non-reported trade flows (where both partners are non-reporters) account for 0.4 percent (4 percent of
10 percent) o f global trade flows.
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In addition to the criterion of completeness of partner country data, which we just 
discussed, it is also necessary that there is a good correspondence between the corresponding 
bilateral trade flows across countries. This cannot be tested directly for the non-reporting 
countries (as we generally do not have the trade data for these countries). However, it is 
possible to analyze the extent to which data between reporting countries match. While a good 
match between reporting-country data is neither necessary nor sufficient for reporting- 
country data being a good proxy for the data of non-reporting countries, problems in 
matching data between reporting countries may signal problems in applying this approach to 
create proxies for non-reporting countries.
We therefore create proxies for imports and exports of commodities of interest (SITC 2 
categories 752, 7599, 764) for all reporting countries covered by our sample, by aggregating 
the trade flows to and from any reporting country by reporting trade partners. This yields a 
total of 2862 observations over the years 1980-2005. We then assess the quality of these 
proxies by using them to “predict” the actual trade flows reported by country i. Specifically, 
using m to note imports to country i from country j  reported by country i, and x.. exports to
countryy, reported by country i, we proxy country Vs imports m = m by partner
i . i* j
country’s exports in. = ^  x .., and country Vs exports x. = ^  x. by x  = ^  m . Below, we
j , j * i  i , i* j  j j * >
test the quality of m or x. as a proxy for m or x. by estimating the equation
log(m.) = a  + j3log(m.) + e. (or log(x.) = a  + /3log(x,) + e.), where we would like to see a
to be close to zero, p  to be close to 1, and the variance of the error term to be small.
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Table 4. Relation Between Reported Trade Data and Data Predicted From Partner Country Data
Dependent variable Constant
Predictor 
( mt or x .) F-test
m. (SITC 952) 
jc. (SITC 952) 
m. (SITC 9599) 
x, (SITC 9599) 
mt (SrTC 952+9599) 
x  (SITC 952+9599) 
m. (SITC 964)
* (SITC 964)
0.16*** 0.67***
(0.03) (0.09)
0.00 0.96***
(0.01) (0.03)
0.00*** 0.95***
(0.02) (0.09)
0.04*** j 04***
(0.01) (0.06)
0.12** 0.86***
(0.05) (0.01)
0.01 1.02***
(0.01) (0.03)
0.08*** 0.86***
(0.08) (0.12)
0.05*** 1.01***
(0.01) (0.06)
0.57 F(2,2862)=127.5***
0.91 F(2,2862)=3.7**
0.77 F(2,2862)=2.55*
0.78 F(2,2862)=29.5***
0.74 F(2,2862)=31.6***
0.92 F(2,2862)=3.6**
0.65 F(2,2862)=6.4***
0.69 F(2,2862)=27.0***
Based on import and export data from United Nations Statistics Division (2008), transformed in terms of percent 
of GDP using GDP data from IMF (2008). Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. The F- 
test relates to the joint hypothesis that a = 0 and p = \ .  1,2, and 3 stars indicate coefficients significant at the 
10-, 5-, and 1-percent level. For the F-tests, 1,2, and 3 stars indicates that the hypothesis is rejected at the 10-, 
5-, and 1-percent level.
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We find that there is a fairly good match between the reported data and the proxies 
created from trade data, with a median R2 of 0.73 (excluding the regressions for the 
composite of SITC 2 categories 952 and 9599). Most of the estimated coefficients are in the 
vicinity of the desired values of a  and f t  (but not the coefficients for imports in SITC 
category 952). Some of the inconsistencies observed earlier in the global data (see Figure 3.2 
and 3.5) also appear in the regressions, as reported global imports in SITC 2 category 952 
exceed exports, while exports exceed imports for SITC 2 category 9599 (which could result 
in estimates of (3 exceeding 1 for exports in SITC 2 category 7599 as dependent variable, and 
makes the estimated coefficients for imports in SITC 2 category 752 more puzzling). Overall, 
the estimated coefficients (positive estimates for a, and estimates of /3 that tend to be below 
1) are suggestive of errors in variables. The R2 of the regressions is consistently higher for 
exports. This may reflect that production is concentrated in few countries, and errors in 
export data for the producing countries may result in large errors in predicted imports for 
some importing countries, while imports are more diffuse and random errors would therefore 
average out.
We are now in a position to revisit the problem set at the outset of the present section, the 
choice between three approaches to constructing a trade dataset. The gold standard in terms 
of the quality of the underlying data, in light of the considerable errors that may occur when 
constructing proxies for non-reported trade flows from counterpart data, would involve using 
directly reported data only. This, however, is not feasible for a study focusing on low-and 
lower-middle-income countries as the availability of complete data series over longer periods
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of time is very limited, at least for low-income countries. According to Table 5, complete 
trade data series are available for between 0 and 7 low-income countries for the periods 
considered, and the number of countries with complete series corresponds to less than half of 
all lower-middle income countries for all but the most recent period (2000-05).
Table 5. Availability of Complete Trade Data Series by Income Group, 
______________Various Periods (Number of Countries)_______________
Period Low-incomeCountries
Lower-middle
Incom e
Countries
Upper-Middle
Incom e
C ountries
H igh-incom e
Countries
1980-2005 0 11 5 26
1980-2000 2 11 5 29
1 980-1990 3 13 6 30
1 990-2000 4 18 15 31
1990-2005 5 18 16 33
2 000-2 0 0 5 7 38 30 42
Source: A uthor's calculations, based on United Nations S tatistics Division, 2008.
Regarding the choice between the second of the three options outlined at the outset, 
which substitutes estimates constructed from partner country data only where and when 
directly reported trade data is unavailable, and the third option, which uses partner country 
data consistently even if directly reported data are available, this essentially involves 
accepting either of two evils, namely (i) inconsistencies in the dataset that arise when directly 
reported data and generated data are m ixed, and (ii) introducing additional errors that arise 
as through inconsistencies in recorded trade flows across countries.
We adopt the second of the three options, substituting estimates constructed from partner 
country data only where and when directly reported trade data is unavailable. There is no 
well-defined criterion underpinning this choice (none of the approaches is clearly superior). 
Instead, the choice reflects the considerable scope for errors that can arise when substituting 
partner country data for missing trade data for non-reporters (Table 4), and the fairly large 
number of low- and lower-middle-income countries for which reported trade data are 
available at least on an intermittent basis (Figure 2). Alternative arguments that would 
support the choice of the third option could point at the inconsistencies arising from mixing 
different types of data, and weaker statistical systems in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries which introduce another source of error that can be bypassed by using partner 
country data.
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Specifically,
• We use data as reported by countries of interest (low- and lower-middle-income 
countries) where available; and
• For non-reporting countries, we use proxies created by adding up the corresponding 
trade flows from reporting countries, but scale them to account for the share of non­
reporting countries in recorded trade flows (see Figures 3.2, 3.5, and 3.7).170
As the choice between the second and third approach was not based on unambiguous 
criteria, we also create an alternative dataset, using partner country data only, which will be 
used as a “sanity check” against our preferred approach on some regressions we conduct. As 
in our preferred dataset, we scale the proxies derived from partner country data in line with 
the share of non-reporting countries in recorded trade flows.
Scaling the proxies to account for the share of non-reporting countries removes trends in 
estimates constructed from partner country data that simply reflect an increase in the share of 
directly reported trade in global trade flows. However, our scaling method implies an 
assumption that for non-reporting countries the share of trade with reporters and non­
reporters, respectively, is the same as the corresponding shares for reporting countries. If this 
assumption is not satisfied (either overall, e.g., if non-reporting countries disproportionally 
trade with each other, or for individual countries with specific trade patterns), then mixing 
data constructed from partner country data and data directly reported introduces 
inconsistencies between data for different countries or over time for countries not 
consistently reporting data (where partner country data have to be used to fill gaps in data 
series).
170 A  numerical example is helpful. In 2005, 96.1 percent o f imports o f  reporting countries were from reporting 
countries. To construct estimates o f imports o f non-reporting countries, we add up reported exports to that 
country, and multiply this sum by a factor o f  1.041 (=100/96.1). This adjustment is exact if  the share o f  imports 
from reporters is the same for non-reporters as for reporters. However, the fact that reporters include most 
significant producers (except Taiwan Province o f China, which is not included directly in the UN Commodity 
Trade Database), and that producers trade disproportionally with each other, may imply that the adjustment 
factor does not fully remove the bias.
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It is worth noting that, while the errors-in-variable issues discussed earlier and our 
empirical analysis summarized in Table 4 suggest that there may be more efficient rules to 
derive estimates for trade flows from partner-country data, we do not adopt the empirical 
findings regarding the relation between trade data and data predicted from partner country 
data (summarized in Table 4) for deriving estimates of trade flows where directly reported 
data are available. This would be difficult and arbitrary, as by construction the dataset these 
findings are based on (trade between reporting countries) does not intersect with the set of 
countries (or specific periods for a country) for which no directly reported data are available. 
One way of improving on our estimates would involve exploiting the information from low- 
and lower-middle-income countries for which partial series are available. As this would be 
very complex, in light of the heterogeneity across countries in these groups in terms of the 
availability of data, it is beyond the scope of the current paper and we do not pursue this line 
of inquiry further.
Finally, a few words about differences between our dataset and those included or 
employed in other studies. An earlier dataset that has been used frequently in the literature is 
the one included by Feenstra and others (1997), drawing on the World Trade Database 
published by Statistics Canada (1995), covering over 150 countries. The approach taken by 
Statistics Canada (1995) that the relevant portion of Feenstra and others (1997) is based on is 
similar to the approach adopted in our paper, drawing on the UN COMTRADE Database 
using reporter country data where available and substituting partner country data otherwise, 
but making some adjustments to the data to reconcile published data on exports and imports. 
An important shortcoming for our purposes are the asymmetries between non-reporting and 
reporting countries regarding the coverage of trade in ICT-related equipment, which mean 
that imports of IT equipment for non-reporters are likely to be understated, introducing a 
source of bias in econometric inference as the fact that a country is a non-reporter is
171correlated with economic characteristics, and as the size of the bias evolves over time. This
171 The trade data summarized in Figure 3.2 suggests that the size o f this bias increases from 2 percent in 1980 
to about 8 percent in 1990.
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can have some implications for econometric studies, especially those drawing on a large 
number o f countries.172
Feenstra (2005) updates the earlier database, focusing (for 1984-2000) on data from 72 
countries reporting trade data more or less regularly. Between reporters, bilateral trade flows 
are reconciled by focusing on reported imports, for countries outside the group of 72 
preselected economies (or, presumably, missing observations within), partner country data 
are adopted. In addition to the bias introduced by the method adopted for merging directly 
reported data and data generated from (reporting) partner country data, the Feenstra (2005) 
has one considerable shortcoming that makes it difficult to use for our purposes. Bilateral 
trade flows on the SITC 2 4-digit level exclude any flows with a value of less than $100,000. 
As these omissions are more relevant for small and low-income countries, and therefore are 
correlated with economic characteristics of countries, they introduce a further source of bias 
to cross-country comparisons and econometric inference.
D. Spending on ICT Equipment
In light of the limited role of production of ICT-related equipment in low- and lower-middle- 
income countries, the most important direct impacts of technological advances in ICTs on 
economic growth occur through ICT-related capital deepening.173 However, national 
accounts data on ICT-related spending are generally unavailable for low- and lower-middle 
income countries, and it is necessary to construct data from other sources. Conceptually, 
domestic spending can be captured as the sum of domestic production and net imports of the 
relevant commodities. In our context, as production of ICT equipment plays no role in most
172 For example, Caselli and Coleman (2001) analyze the global diffusion o f  computers (SITC 2 category 952). 
In their study, at least 41 percent o f observations regarding Latin America, and 49 percent o f  observations for 
sub-Saharan Africa, are generated from partner country data. (These rates could be highly understated, as we 
identify reporting countries based on United Nations Statistics Division (2008) and do not capture trade data 
which are included in United Nations Statistics Division (2008) but had not been reported by 1995.)
173 Compare our discussion in chapter 4.1 and chapter 4.3, which distinguishes between productivity gains, in 
IT-producing sectors, capital deepening associated with falling prices o f ICT equipment, and gains in total 
factor productivity (which may or may not be associated with economic transformations associated with ICTs).
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low- and lower-middle income countries, the most important data source on domestic 
spending on ICT equipment therefore is net imports of the relevant commodities; while 
adjustments would have to be made for the few countries producing such commodities.174
Non-Producers o f ICT Equipment
For non-producers of ICT equipment, net exports of the relevant commodities (SITC 2 
categories 952 and 9599 for IT equipment, and category 964 for communications equipment) 
capture the domestic absorption of ICT equipment, and would be an adequate measure of 
ICT spending for the purpose of cross-country analyses of access to such equipment. 
However, as we are also interested in the contribution of ICT-related capital deepening to 
economic growth, we need data on ICT-related spending which are compatible with national 
accounts data, notably with investment data as a component of GDP by expenditure category.
These final expenditure data include components which are not included in trade data. 
First, the trade data we use are available on a fob (“free on board”) basis, and do not include 
insurance, freight, and related costs. Additionally, the importer bears the costs of customs 
clearance, and would be liable to pay import tariffs. Additionally, other indirect taxes may 
apply (value added tax, sales tax, and excise taxes), and final expenditure data would also 
include costs incurred on the retail level, in addition to any profit margins. For these reasons, 
expenditures on ICT-related equipment in the national accounts would be considerably 
higher that the costs of net imports.
In the absence of cross-country data on most of these costs (with the possible exception 
of import tariffs and taxes), one way of assessing the size of mark-ups involves comparing 
available expenditure data on ICT equipment for the countries of interest with the 
corresponding trade data. To this end, we consider data from the Global IT Navigator 
database (Global Insight, 2006), which provide expenditure data for 24 low- and lower- 
middle-income countries. Of these 24 countries, 10 countries had non-zero production of IT
174 See Caselli and Coleman (2001) for a discussion o f similar issues.
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equipment.175 For the remaining 14 countries,176 Figure 4 shows average levels o f spending 
on IT hardware and net imports o f IT equipment for 1999-2005 (the years covered by Global 
Insight, 2006), confirming that spending generally is much higher than recorded net imports, 
with 11 o f the 14 countries above the 45° line. On average, spending on IT hardware from 
Global Insight (2006) exceeds net imports o f IT equipment by 72 percent.177
Figure 4. IT-Related Spending and Net 
Imports, 14 Countries, 1999-2005 
(Percent of GDP)
1.8  -  
1.6  -  
1.4 
1.2
1.0 - 
0.8  - 
0.6 -  
0.4 
0.2 
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Source: Author's calculations, based on United Nations 
Statistics Division (2008), Global Insight (2006), and 
International Monetary Fund (2008).
To construct a dataset on ICT spending, we will proceed in two steps.
175 China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Ukraine, all showing 
production o f  IT equipment o f  at least 0.01 percent o f  GDP in any year between 1999 and 2005 in Table 2.
176 Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cameroon, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, Peru, 
Senegal, Tunisia, Zimbabwe.
177 When a least-squares criterion is applied, the mark-up ranges from 39 percent (when IT hardware spending 
is used as dependent variable) to 102 percent (when net imports are used as dependent variable).
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• We adopt data from Global Insight (2006) and WITS A (2001) on spending where 
ayailable (note that this applies to producers of IT equipment only).
• For other countries, we generate estimates of spending on IT equipment by applying a 
markup of 72 percent to net imports in SITC categories 752 and 7599, based on the 
sample averages for the countries captured in Figure [x].
• For spending on communications equipment, where domestic spending figures are 
unavailable, we apply the same mark-up of 72 percent to imports in SITC 2 category 
764.
Producers o f  IC T  Equipment
For producers of IT equipment, estimating spending data from trade and production data is 
more complex, owing to the higher gross trade volumes for these countries (reflecting both 
re-export trade and trade in intermediates, which introduces an additional source of 
measurement error.178 This is an issue especially for spending on communications equipment 
(where we do not have national spending figures), whereas we do have expenditure data for 
all countries which are large IT producers. Overall, we adopt the following approach(es) to 
estimating spending volumes for producers of ICT equipment:
• We adopt data from Global Insight (2006) and WITS A (2001) on spending on IT 
equipment where available.
178 To illustrate this point, we abstract, for the moment, from any markups that would have to be applied to 
production, trade, or spending to draw inferences across these categories. Define, for simplicity, production as 
the sum o f value added and importers o f  intermediates ( P  = VA + Ip ), spending as the sum o f production and
imports o f ICT equipment destined for spending ( S  = P - E  + I$), and net exports as exports minus imports o f  
ICT products used as intermediates and for final sales EN£T = E -  7S - I  . I f  the sum o f  spending and net 
exports is used as a proxy for spending, imports o f intermediates create a downward bias, as 
P  = S + Enet = P - I p , whereas using production minus net exports as a measure for spending results in an
upward bias, as S = P ~ E mT = S  + I  .
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• For spending on communications equipment, or spending on IT equipment for the 
countries where spending data are unavailable,179 we apply the same mark-up as for 
non-producers to net imports of IT equipment.
• We obtain estimates of ICT-related spending as the sum of the relevant net imports 
(plus markup) and of estimated production levels at face value. The zero markup 
applied to production data reflect two considerations. We apply a deduction of 20 
percent of the production value to account for intermediates, and apply a markup of 
20 percent to the production value to account for markups on any domestically 
produced ICT products absorbed domestically, and any markups that may apply to 
transform production values into fob export prices. The two markups go in different 
directions and happen to cancel out.
E. Prices of ICT Equipment
Adequately measuring prices of ICT equipment is a crucial issue in understanding the 
economic impacts of advances in ICTs, as the rate of technological progress embodied in 
ICTs (and, indirectly, the contribution of ICTs to economic growth) is generally measured by 
the rate at which prices of these commodities decline. Our discussion first covers issues 
regarding the measurement of prices of ICTs, focusing on data and literature from the United 
States. We then discuss issues regarding cross-country analyses of prices of ICT equipment, 
notably regarding the construction of price series which allow for an assessment of 
contributions of ICTs to growth across countries. Finally, we define and describe the price 
series for ICTs used elsewhere in this study, which are available from Table [x] at the end of 
this section.
Measuring Prices o f  IC T  Equipment
In case of certain well-defined commodities, technological progress can be measured based 
on the ratio between outputs and inputs, or declines in prices of the respective products
179 For 1999-2005, this applies to Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, and Vietnam. For 1990-1998, it applies to the 
same three countries, as well as Iran, Moldova, and Peru.
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(controlling for input prices). For ICT products, this is complicated by the fact that the 
technical specifications of ICT equipment change rapidly, so that (a) products (e.g. 
computers) are not comparable over time (as typical specifications change), and (b) weights 
within categories change rapidly (as outdated models disappear from the market and new 
ones become introduced).
As we are dealing with aggregated data, we are primarily concerned with the first 
• 180issue. In the context of national accounts, the most common approaches for addressing 
changes in the quality of commodities are either the application of matched-model indices 
(which are based on the evolution of the price of specific models over time) or the 
construction of “hedonic indices,” which “make use of a (...) relation between the prices of 
different varieties of a product, such as the various models of personal computers, and the 
quantities of characteristics in them” (Triplett, 2004).181
Hedonic price indices are widely regarded as the preferred method for constructing price 
indices for ICT products, owing to the rapid technological change in the sector and the 
evolving specifications of ICT products. Working Party on Indicators for the Information 
Society (2005) recommends the use of hedonic indices for ICT equipment, and U.S. National 
Income and Product Accounts and Producer Price Indices employ hedonic indices for key 
categories of IT equipment, although less so for communications equipment (see Grimm and 
others, 2005).
Figure 5 illustrates the declines in relative prices of key categories of production or 
spending for the United States. The series shown have been generated from the 
corresponding U.S. National Income and Product Accounts and producer price indices by 
dividing the series by the CPI, and then rescaling the series, setting the 1990 values equal to
180 To address the issue o f rapidly shifting weights among the components o f  an index, “chain-weighting” 
provides some remedy. See Whelan (2002) for a discussion.
181 The most comprehensive study discussing the application o f  hedonic indices and other price indices 
accounting for quality changes is Triplett (2004). Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society 
(2005) also provides a discussion o f key features o f hedonic indices, drawing on Triplett’s study. Aizcorbe and 
others (2003) also provide a thorough discussion o f differences between hedonic and matched-model indices.
248
100.182 Figure 5 shows rapid declines for computers and related equipment, for investment, 
durable consumption goods, and producer prices, with an average rate of decline (relative to 
the CPI) averaging between 13 percent per year (PPI) and 23 percent a year (consumption 
spending on IT equipment and software). The declines of prices in software (3.6 percent per 
year) and communications equipment (2.4 percent per year) are much less pronounced, 
although these rates still translate into a substantial overall decline in relative prices of 44 
percent and 33 percent, respectively, over the 1990-2006 period.
Figure 5. U.S. Price Indices for ICT Equipment 
(relative to CPI, 1990=100)
-100
PPI:Communication and 
related equipment
Investment: Software
PPI: Electro nic co mputers and 
co mputer equipment Investment: Computers and 
peripheral equipment
Consumption: Computers, 
peripherals, and software
1990 1995 2000 2005
Sources: A uthor's calculations, based  on  d a ta fro m  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2 0 0 8 ) fo r  investment and consum ption price indices (NiPA Tables 5.3.4 and 2 .3 .4 , respectively), and from  U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau o f Labor S tatistics (2 0 0 8 ) fo r producer p rice  indices.
The much lower rates of price declines for communications equipment are puzzling, 
considering that this sector has been characterized by very high rates of technological 
progress and a profound transformation. Dorns (2005), in a study that has been recognized 
(e.g., by Jorgenson, 2005) as a major improvement in measuring changes in prices of 
communications equipment, attributes the relatively slow pace in research on prices of 
communications equipment to two factors -  (1) communications equipment covers a more 
diverse set of products, and (2) large chunks of communications equipment are not sold on 
the retail level, and prices are not as widely published as for computer-related equipment.
182 The PPI series for electronic computers and computer equipment goes back to 1991 only, and has been 
extended through 1990 using the rate o f  change o f the deflator for investment in computers and peripheral 
equipment.
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To address these shortcomings, Doms (2005) collects the available evidence on changing 
prices of communications equipment, constructing improved indices “bottom-up,” i.e. by 
assembling evidence on changing prices of different types of communications equipment 
(accounting for quality changes), and aggregating. Figure 6 illustrates the differences 
between the U.S. producer price indices for communications equipment and the 
corresponding series constructed by Doms (2005) for 1994-2000, the years covered by his 
study. The adjusted series declines at a much faster rate than the series from the U.S. 
producer price indices, suggesting that the declines in producer price indices substantially 
understate technological gains embodied in communications equipment.
o . o
- 2.0
-4.0
-12.0 -I--------------------,--------------------,--------------------,--------------------,-------------------- .
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Sources: Author's calculations, based on Doms (2005), and data from U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008) the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008).
Issues regarding price measurement in cross-country studies
For international comparisons of the contribution of ICTs to growth, differences in statistical 
methods applied in national accounts to the measurement of prices of ICT equipment can 
blur the picture. The margin of error introduced by discrepancies in statistical methods has 
been illustrated by Schreyer (2002), and in a more extensive working paper version (2000). 
For example, he points at differences in the national price indices between the United States, 
where the price index for investment in office, accounting, and photocopying equipment 
declined by 22 percent annually in 1995-99, and Germany, where the rate of decline for the 
corresponding index was only 7 percent over this period. Gust and Marquez (2000) also
Communications Equipment Index (Doms, 
2005), "conservative" assumptions
Note: Price indices are 
show n relative to CPI.
Figure 6. Price Indices for Communications Equipment 
(Annual rate of change, in percent)
PR: Communications and 
related equipment
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provide a overview of statistical methods applied to computer prices in national accounts 
with a larger coverage of countries, although a less explicit analysis.
Adopting national price indices (resulting in the noted inconsistencies, but consistent with 
other national data) could make sense in some circumstances. However, for measuring the 
economic impacts of ICTs across countries, this seems hardly adequate. Therefore, cross­
country studies normally use either of two approaches -  constructing “harmonized indices,” 
or applying U.S. indices adjusted for exchange rates.183 Reflecting a consensus that U.S. 
price indices for ICT equipment represent the state of the art in measuring price 
developments for ICT equipment (in spite of noted problems in some areas, some of which 
are discussed above), the “harmonized index” is based on the smoothed difference between 
prices of respective categories of ICT equipment and of non-ICT investment goods for the 
United States. Based on the observation that most ICT equipment is highly tradable, some 
studies generate price indices for cross-country studies by applying an exchange-rate 
adjustment to the U.S. price indices (e.g., Daveri, 2002, also Bayoumi and Haacker (2002), 
although in a somewhat different context). While this measure may approximate price 
developments in a country of interest fairly well (depending on the extend and speed of pass­
through), the drawback is that it could be dominated by exchange rate developments, rather 
than providing a measure of technical progress.
Construction o f price series used in this study
Given the focus of our study on developing countries, applying “harmonized indices” is not 
feasible as meaningful price indices for investment (especially those differentiating between 
equipment and residential investment) are not available for many developing countries. As 
we mainly want to use price indices for ICT equipment for an assessment of the contribution 
of advances in ICTs to economic growth, using U.S. indices adjusted for exchange rates is 
also problematic, as these may be dominated by exchange rate changes for some countries in 
our wide sample, whereas we are primarily interested in the portion of ICT prices that can be 
attributed to technological progress in ICTs.
183 For examples o f the first approach, see, among others, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002), Colecchia and 
Schreyer (2002), Jorgenson (2005), or Schreyer (2002).
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The measure of productivity gains embodied in ICT equipment that we are using in this 
study are therefore based on the respective U.S. indices relative to the U.S. consumer price 
index. We choose not to use the price index for non-ICT equipment as a benchmark, as the 
investment data for developing countries we use do not differentiate between equipment and 
residential investment, removing one advantage for using harmonized indices as described 
above. Also, the price index for non-ICT equipment investment may also reflect productivity 
gains in certain manufacturing sectors.
That said, using the CPI as a benchmark also carries some problems. First, the CPI 
includes some ICT-related components. In light of the low weight of ICT spending in 
consumer spending, we estimate that the impact of declining prices of ICTs on the consumer 
price index amounts to about 0.1 percentage points in 2006. We do not correct for the impact 
of declining prices o f ICTs, this factor alone may result in a very small over-estimation of the 
impact of technological progress in ICTs.184
Second, the CPI itself is affected by changes in MFP (beyond the impacts of ICTs. This 
could result in an underestimation of the impact of technological progress in ICTs, if this 
estimate is based on a comparison with the CPI. The size of the bias could be of an order of 
magnitude of around 1 percentage point -  possibly somewhat higher after 2000 -  judging 
from estimates of MFP growth available for the United States (see, for example, Jorgenson, 
2005, and our discussion in chapter [4.1]).
Overall, our measure of technological progress in ICTs, i.e. declining relative prices of 
ICTs, therefore suffers from a small downward bias (i.e., it is underestimating the rate of 
technological progress). As the size of the bias appears moderate, we do not correct for it.
The benefit of this approach is that our price series are directly derived from published data.
Table 6 summarizes the relative price series used elsewhere in this study.
184 With prices o f  IT equipment declining at more than 10 percent per year (see our discussion o f  Figure [x]), an 
adjustment o f  0.1 percentage points would account for less than 1 percent o f the annual price change.
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Table 6. Relative Prices of ICT Equipment, 1990-2006 (1990=100)
Year
NIPA: Investm en t: 
C om puters and 
peripheral 
equipm ent
PPI: Communication 
and related 
equipm ent
Com m unication and 
related  equ ipm ent 
(based  on Dorns, 
2005)
PPI: In teg ra ted  
microcircuits
1990 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1991 86.7 97.7 91.8 85.3
1992 71.9 95.4 84.3 73.4
1993 59.7 94.3 78.3 70.1
1994 51.4 93.8 73.2 69.7
1995 42.1 92.9 68.4 61.1
1996 31.5 91.6 64.6 46.4
1997 23.9 90.9 59.8 34.4
1998 17.6 90.2 54.7 25.0
1999 13.4 87.6 49.5 22.7
2000 11.4 83.9 44 .2 20.3
2001 9.2 81.4 40.2 16.1
2002 7.8 78.8 36.6 14.3
2003 6.8 75.8 33.0 13.6
2004 6.2 72.3 29.5 12.5
2005 5.3 69.7 26.6 11.5
2006 4.5 67.7 24.3 10.4
Source: Author’s calculations, as described In tex t, based  on da ta  from U.S. D epartm ent of Com m erce, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (2008), U.S. D epartm ent of Labor, Bureau of Labor S tatistics (2008), and 
Dorns (2005). Underlying indices have been divided by the  CPI and scaled so  th a t  1990 values = 100. 
E stim ates from  Dorns (2005) w ere available for 1 994-2000  only. For 1 9 9 0 -9 3  and 2 0 0 1 -0 6  (num bers 
show n in italics), th e  se ries  w ere ex trapo lated , assum ing th a t th e  price index for com m unication equ ipm ent 
declines a t  a ra te  th a t is 6 percen t faste r than  in the  PPI sta tistics.
F. O ther Data
Data on GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars) and GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars) were 
obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database (IMF, 2008).
Data on the sectoral composition of GDP (specifically the shares of agricultural value 
added and industrial value added in GDP) were obtained from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 2007 (2007). For numerous countries, estimates on the shares of the 
respective sectors in GDP were not available for 2006 (to a lesser extent, this also applies to 
2005 and 2004, and, for a few countries, earlier years). In these cases, the latest available 
estimates were used for the missing years. Similarly, some missing values for early years 
were approximated by the earliest available estimate, and in few cases, missing values were 
approximated by linear intrapolation.
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Data on tariff rates were obtained from the IMF’s Trade Policy Information Database 
(IMF, 2008), and are defined as the simple average of import tariffs for most-favored nations. 
The database covers the years 1997-2007.
Data on the volume of oil production (in thousands of barrels per day), were obtained 
from the December 2007 International Petroleum Monthly, published by the Energy 
Information Administration of the United States Department of Energy (2008).
Data series on the value of oil production were constructed based on production data 
and data on oil prices from the “Global Assumptions” database maintained at the IMF, 
defined as the simple average of three crude oil spot prices (Dated Brent, West Texas 
Intermediate, and Dubai Fateh), in US$ per barrel.
The definition of country groupings into low-, lower-middle-, upper-middle-, and high- 
income countries adopted in this study is based on the World Bank’s country classification 
for 2007 (World Bank, 2007). In our discussion of availability of trade data, we refer to a 
group of high-income countries excluding six countries for which trade data are included in 
the trade statistics of another country (Isle of Man, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Puerto Rico, San 
Marino, and U.S. Virgin Islands). While our dataset on trade in and spending on ICT 
products includes all 49 countries currently classified as low-income countries and all 54 
countries classified as low-middle-income countries, the analysis is largely confined to a 
group of 95 countries for which a minimum set of data are available from IMF (2008), and 
excludes Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Liberia, Somalia, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Iraq, Marshall Islands, West Bank and Gaza, and Timor-Leste.
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IV.3. ICT E q u ip m e n t  I n v e s t m e n t  a n d  G r o w t h  in  L o w -  a n d  L o w e r -M id d l e -
In c o m e  C o u n t r ie s
A. Introduction
The primary objective of the present chapter is an assessment of the macroeconomic impacts 
of advances in ICTs. In this regard, it builds on the fact that the the use of ICTs is tied to the 
availability of certain types of equipment, such as computers for information technology, or 
certain communication devices (phones, or computers, depending on the type of 
communication) as well as the existence of a telecommunications infrastructure for 
communication technologies.
In the present chapter, we develop and apply a framework that draws on the existing 
literature on growth impacts of ICTs (see our discussion in Chapter 4.1), which is adapted to 
take into account the lack of availability of national accounts or industry data on a level of 
detail that the most common approaches to assessing the macroeconomic impact of ICTs -  
focusing on high-income countries -  draw from (compare our discussion in Chapter IV.2).
Specifically, our study focuses on the macroeconomic impacts of ICT-related capital 
deepening. In the absence of disaggregated investment data, this involves drawing inferences 
from the observed patterns of trade and -  where available -  production data regarding the 
levels of ICT-related investment. Using a set of commonly available macroeconomic 
variables (e.g., investment rates, underlying growth rates), international data on relative 
prices of ICT equipment, and a growth-accounting framework inspired by the literature on 
sources of growth in high-income countries, we estimate the implications of technological 
advances in ICTs (i.e., falling prices of ICT equipment)185 for the accumulation of capital and 
economic growth.
While the production of ICT equipment plays no role or a minor role only in most low- 
and lower-middle-income countries, it is a significant contributor to economic growth in a
185 For a discussion o f  the “price or ‘dual’ approach to productivity measurement” (as Jorgenson, 2005, 
describes it), also see Chapter 4.5).
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few countries. While the focus of the chapter is on ICT-related capital deepening, our 
analytical framework can also easily be applied to the study of the growth contribution of the 
production of ICT equipment. The main challenge here is the weakness of the data, as our 
production data do not identify the role of ICT-related inputs.
A third channel, which we will not attempt to quantify in this study, owing to data 
constraints, are generalized productivity gains associated with structural changes in the 
economy enabled by the usage of ICTs. Even for the U.S., the empirical evidence for such 
broad-based productivity gains is weak.186 As we are dealing with countries with generally 
weaker statistical systems, and a less prominent role of ICT equipment, we are in no position 
to estimate such generalized productivity effects.
Our discussion is broadly structured in 4 parts. Section II relates our study to the existing 
literature on sources of growth, especially to those studies analyzing the impacts of advances 
in ICTs across countries. Against this background, it motivates the approach taken in the 
present study, which aims for (near) complete coverage of low- and lower-middle-income 
countries. Section III describes the analytical framework, adopting a simple growth- 
accounting framework with two types of capital (non-ICT-related and ICT-related) in which 
technological advances in ICTs are identified as falling relative prices of ICT capital.
Section IV applies the framework to assessing the growth impacts of ICT-related capital- 
deepening, offering an analysis for a cross-section of low- and lower-middle-income 
countries (using 2001-06 averages of key variables), drawing on steady-state properties of 
the model, and an analysis covering the years 1990-2006, which distinguishes the immediate 
impacts of falling relative prices of ICT equipment on growth and the “multiplier effects” 
that arise if a shock to growth results result in changes in the rate of accumulation of capital 
in subsequent periods. Section V complements our analysis of the growth effects of ICT- 
related capital deepening with an assessment of the contribution of the ICT-producing sector 
to economic growth, for the limited number of developing countries where this is relevant. 
Section VI concludes.
186 See, for example, discussions included in Gordon (2000) and Oliner and Sichel (2000).
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B. Background
The analysis of the impact of advances in ICTs in low- and lower-middle-income countries 
can draw on a longstanding economic literature analyzing the sources of economic growth in 
advanced economies (summarized in Chapter IV. 1), notably the work in the tradition 
established by Griliches and Jorgenson (1966, 1967). In recent years, particularly in the 
context of the acceleration in economic growth experienced by the U.S. economy in the latter 
half of the 1990s, a number of studies addressed the role of ICTs in the “growth resurgence,” 
and identified technological advances in the production of ICTs, as well as capital deepening 
associated with falling prices of ICT-related equipment, as key factors behind the
1 R7acceleration in economic growth.
Relatedly, numerous studies have addressed the impacts of ICTs across countries, for 
example for the G7 economies (Jorgenson, (2003, 2005b), the OECD (see Ahmad, Schreyer, 
and Wolfl (2004), Colecchia and Schreyer (2002), or Pilat and Wolfl (2004)), or the 
European Union (see Daveri (2002) or van Ark, O’Mahoney, and Timmer, (2008)). A few 
studies have analyzed the impacts of ICTs across a larger number of countries, notably 
Bayoumi and Haacker (2002), for a group of 49 countries, and Jorgenson and Vu (2005a, 
2005b, and 2007), who cover 110 countries.188
The key challenges regarding the study of the economic impact of ICTs across countries 
are inconsistencies in national accounts data across countries, and -  especially for a study 
focusing on low- and lower-middle-income countries -  lack of any disaggregated national 
accounts data that would identify the production of or investment in ICT equipment in the 
countries of interest.
187 See, for example, Gordon (2000), Jorgenson (2001, 2005a), Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005), Oliner and 
Sichel (2000), Oliner, Sichel, and Stiroh (2007)
188 See Chapter 4.1 for a more comprehensive discussion o f the literature, which also covers studies focusing on 
the evidence on impacts o f ICTs on the industry level. Owing to the absence o f  industry-level data for the vast 
majority o f countries we focus on in the present chapter, the sample from the economic literature referred to 
here focuses on the aggregate impacts o f advances in ICTs.
261
Regarding price indices for ICT equipment (crucial as the rate of price decline of a 
commodity can be interpreted as a measure of the pace of productivity gains in the 
production of that commodity), most studies referred to above resolve the issue of 
consistency across countries by constructing “harmonized” price indices, following Schreyer 
(2000, 2002), based on the difference between prices of ICT equipment and non-ICT 
equipment in U.S. national accounts.
The more significant constraint for our purposes is the absence of production and 
spending data from national accounts. Some studies aiming for a wider country coverage 
have adopted data on ICT-related spending from industry sources (Daveri (2002), Bayoumi 
and Haacker (2002), and Jorgenson and Vu (2005a, 2005b, and 2007)). The most significant 
effort so far in developing a global perspective on the macroeconomic impacts of ICTs are 
the studies by Jorgenson and Vu, using sales data published by the “World Information 
Technology and Services Alliance,”189 which are available for 70 countries, and 
extrapolating spending data based on several secondary data sources for another 40 countries 
for which complete national accounts data are available from the Penn World Table Version
6.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002) for their period of interest (1989-2003).
As a key objective of the present study is a comprehensive assessment of the growth 
impact of ICTs in low- and low-middle income countries, the coverage of which is limited 
even in the Jorgenson and Vu dataset (although it is the study with the largest coverage of 
countries so far, it covers only 50 of 103 countries classified as low- or low-middle-income 
countries by World Bank, 2007), we follow a different track.
First, we construct a database of spending on ICT equipment based on trade data (with 
some modifications for countries producing ICT equipment), using data reported by countries 
of interest where available, augmented by data from trade partners where necessary (see our 
discussions in Chapters 4.2 and 4.5). This yields a dataset of spending on ICT equipment 
with a complete coverage of all 103 low- and low-middle-income countries, going back to
189 Version o f  the same database have also been used by Daveri (2002) and Bayoumi and Haacker (2002). In 
recent years, the WITSA database has been produced by Global Insight, and presents a subset o f  Global 
Insight’s Global IT Navigator database used in the present study (see Global Insight, 2006).
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1980 (as some countries became independent only after 1980, the number of countries 
covered is lower for the earlier years).
Second, rather than attempting a complete growth accounting exercise (attributing growth 
to inputs of labor, different types of capital, and multifactor productivity), we focus on the 
contributions of the production of ICT equipment and of ICT-related capital deepening to 
economic growth. As our accounting for the impacts of ICTs relies on the availability of data 
on investment and, in its crudest form, GDP, our analysis captures between 89 and 97 
countries towards the end of the sample period (our analysis of the growth impacts of ICTs 
covers the years 1990-2006), and 80 countries at the beginning.190 Notably, our approach 
does not require an estimation of the contribution to growth of changes in the supply of labor, 
which is a problematic area for low-income countries as frequently estimates are based on 
crude demographic models, and findings are difficult to interpret for the purposes of growth 
accounting if the economy features a large informal sector.
C. Analytical Framework
The purpose of the present section is two-fold: developing a model that will be used to assess 
the growth impacts of advances in ICTs, and making use of the model to calibrate some key 
parameters of interest regarding the impacts of ICTs, in addition to those that can be directly 
obtained from available data or be adapted from other studies. After introducing the key 
components of the model, we first derive the links between advances in ICTs and growth in 
the steady state.
However, as some of the impacts of falling prices of ICTs on economic growth unfold 
only over time, and the rates of technological advances in ICTs fluctuates, an analysis 
focusing on the steady-state properties of the model may yield exaggerated estimates of the 
(immediate) impact of ICTs on growth. We therefore adapt the model in order to track the 
growth impacts of advances in ICTs over time, interpreting fluctuations in the rate of change 
of relative prices of ICT equipment as perturbations along the steady-state growth path.
190 The lower coverage at the beginning o f  the period under consideration primarily reflects the fact that some 
countries became independent only after 1980, rather than data constraints.
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In light of the previous discussion (in the introduction to the present chapter, and in 
Chapter 4.1), we focus on
the growth impacts of rising productivity in the production of ICT equipment, and
• the contribution of ICT-related capital deepening, fueled by declining relative prices 
of ICT equipment.
Many of the issues regarding the contribution of ICTs to growth can be captured in a 
straightforward growth accounting framework, differentiating between ICT products 
(indicated by subscript 2) and any other products (subscript 1). We assume that ICT 
equipment is used as an investment good only,191 while the other good is used both as 
consumption goods and as investment good. Without loss of generality, we will choose good 
1 as the numeraire, so that pi  is identically equal to 1 (and will be suppressed below), and p 2 
represents the relative price of ICT products. Specifically, we assume that the world is 
populated by economies characterized by an equation that describes output (in terms of the 
numeraire) as the sum of production of good 1 and 2, with
Y = Y +Y = p A F ( K  ,K  , L )  + p A F ( K  ,K  ,L ), (1)
1 2  * 1  1 1 V 1.1 ’  1 , 2 ’  V  *  2  2  2 V 2 , 1  ’  2 , 2 ’  V '
where p t stands for the price of good i, A( represents total factor productivity in sector /, K.j  
stands for capital of type j  used in the production of good /, and Lt is the amount of labor 
occupied in sector i. We assume that F  (•) and F^ (■) are exhibiting constant returns to scale.
Both good 1 and good 2 are traded, so that the use of any commodity does not need to equal 
production in any economy. We do not impose a global market-clearing condition on either
191 Our approach, attributing all spending on ICT equipment to investment, differs somewhat from approaches 
adopted in key contributions to the literature. It is closest to the framework adopted by Jorgenson and 
collaborators, who also incorporate all spending on ICT equipment in the analysis. However, they use data that 
differentiates between investment and spending on durable consumption goods (which include ICT equipment), 
and adjust GDP figures for the services obtained from durable consumption goods. Other studies, including 
several studies by Oliner and Sichel, focus on non-farm agricultural output, and correspondingly consider ICT- 
related investment in those sectors only.
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commodity, as we focus on a subset of countries only, and market-clearing is implicit in our 
dataset (as trade flows -  aside from measurement errors -  would have to balance out).
Concretely, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas production function, with
Y = A K  a"K a* t a"~a" + A  p  K  a»K a» t a»~a* 
] 1,1 1,2 2 2 2,1 2,2 (2)
In this framework, the direct growth contribution of productivity gains in the ICT sector 
(an increase in Ai) can simply be obtained as the rate of growth of A2, weighted by the share 
of the ICT-producing sector 2 in output, i.e.
dgy =d
Ai
(3)
However, for the large majority of countries considered in the present study, the primary 
impacts of advances in ICTs arise from ICT-related capital deepening. To capture those in 
the present framework, we first make two related (in fact, one can argue, equivalent) 
assumptions:
(1) We assume that the any productivity gains in the production of ICT equipment (an 
increase in A 2) beyond the productivity gains in the production of non-ICT products result in 
a equiproportionate decline in the price of ICT equipment, i.e.,
* = A . _ A  = _ £ l . '”  (4)
2 A A p
2 , 1  2
(2) We assume that the factor shares of capital of type 1 and 2 are the same across 
sectors.
The first assumption is consistent with established praxis in the literature on growth 
impacts of ICTs, and discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.5.193 (To simplify notation, we
192 Where we use a more general notation, referring to x , is defined by Eq. (4), and x equal to 1.
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use x to denote the growth rate of A 2, as introduced in Eq. (4).) The second assumption is, 
strictly speaking, implied by the first -  if factor shares differ across sector, then productivity 
gains in the production of ICT equipment would also result in a change in relative prices 
owing to ICT-related capital deepening. On a more pragmatic level, in light of the small 
weight of the ICT producing sector in the few ICT-producing countries in our sample, and of 
the lack of availability of industry-level data for our countries of interest, there are no 
obvious gains from differentiating between factor shares across sectors. On the other hand, 
the assumption of equal factor shares allows for a considerably simplified presentation of the 
value of output (in terms of the numeraire), with
Y = A K a' K a>l!~a'~a\  (5)1 2  V y
with a  = a  - a  , a  - a  = a  , K - K  +K  , K  = K  +K  , L = L +L , and
1 I I  12 2 21 2 2  1 1.1 1.2 2 2,1 2 , 2  1 2
A = A^  + A2P2, the latter growing at the same rate as A \ by virtue of Eq. (4). 194
Using the constant-retums property of the production function, and transforming it into 
per-capita terms, gives
y  = A k ^ ' k “ ' , (6)
where y  = Y / L ,  and k. = K J  L .  The accumulation of capital of type j  ( j  e {l, 2}) is 
governed by
k j = —— (S +n)k , (7)
Pj '  '
193 See, for example, the brief discussion o f the “dual approach to productivity measurement” in Jorgenson 
(2005a), or Schreyer (2002) and Triplett (2004) for a more substantial treatment o f the issue.
194 Note that this representation o f the value o f output formalizes the point made elsewhere (Chapters 4.1, 4.2), 
that productivity gains in ICT-producing sectors, for producer countries, dissipate owing to falling relative 
prices o f  these products.
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where a dot above a variable indicates a rate of change, Sj is the share of national output 
invested in capital goods of type j ,  and Sj is the physical rate of depreciation of good j ,  and n 
the rate of population growth.
From Eq. (2), the rate of growth of output per capita is given by
v  A k k
g = — = — Ya — + a  — . (8)
y  A 1 k 2 k'  1 2
To estimate the contribution of ICT-related capital deepening to growth, it is thus 
necessary to determine the growth rates of the stocks of non-ICT and ICT capital, and to 
establish values for the respective elasticities a  and a  . By integrating Eq. (7), we obtain an
estimate of the stock of capital, as
M 0  = J ■ •Er- r —(£ +n )k d r .  (9)
J p  J J>
-o o
For ICT equipment, this can be calculated (in a corresponding discrete-time presentation) 
based on the available data on spending on ICT equipment and the relevant prices, in 
addition to data on GDP per capita, population growth, and the rate of depreciation of ICT 
equipment. The rate of growth of the respective capital stocks is then defined as
M O  p
s . y
J,t ‘ - ( S  + n ) k .j t jj
( 10)
M O  ' r s , yj f T - ( S  + n )k  dr
J n j t j,r
A key aspect of Eq. (10), for the purposes of estimating the growth impacts of ICT- 
related capital deepening, is the role of the relative price o f ICT equipment, p  ,195 Eq. (10)
shows that the faster this price declines, the larger is the growth rate of the stock of ICT-
195 Recall that we set p  - 1  by choice o f numeraire.
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related equipment. The same rate of ICT-related investment in period t as in earlier periods, 
owing to a lower relative prices at time t relative to earlier periods, translates into larger real 
increments to the capital stock of ICT equipment. (Vice versa, as ICT equipment was 
relatively more expensive in the past, the same rate of investment in the past bought little 
ICT equipment.
Steady-State Properties o f Model
While the general framework just describes allows for a calibration of the economic impacts 
of advances in ICTs over time, analyzing the steady-state properties of the model is 
interesting because it conveys information about the long-term impacts of advances in ICTs, 
and as it allows for an analytically tractable description of the impacts of ICTs on economic 
growth. To this end, a key challenge in estimating the growth contribution of ICT-related 
capital deepening regards the elasticities a  and , which cannot be measured directly. To
this end, we use the steady-state version of the model spelled out above, in order to obtain a 
mapping from parameters that can be observed or estimated more directly to a  and .
Provided that a steady-state with constant Sj, and constant growth rates of kj, y, and /?, 
exists, Eq. (9) can be rearranged as
t v pSir-t)
r i^t y (T~0*.(*)=  f - i J —  - ( g . + n ) k . e J dr,  (11)yw  J -xXr-t) y j  ' j,t v '
-o o  p  . e J
where y  represents the steady-state growth rate of k (assumed constant), which simplifies 
to yield
s .y i S .k .
k . = 1 ‘  (12)
J1 p  . g  + x . y. .
y Jt 6  J ' i , j
Rearranging, taking logs, and differentiating through Eq. (12) yields
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k j  K  a  k 2r  .=-rL = g  + x i.e., ~r = g  and - ±  = g  + x .  (13)
J k . J k , £_
J 1 2
Substituting back into Eq. (12), and solving the capital-output ratios k j y  and pk2 / y , 
gives
k s; p k
-*- = ------1-----  and ^_2. = -------- 2-------  (14), (15)
y g + y g + x + <?2+H
Returning to our objective of estimating the elasticities a  and , we first note that in a
world characterized by constant returns, the elasticities a i and ot2 are associated with the 
factor shares for the respective capital goods. While the factor shares for ICT- and non-ICT- 
related equipment are not generally available, estimates for the overall factor share of capital 
(denoted a ) are available, and a i and CL2 need to satisfy
+ « 2 = a . (16)
A second relationship between a\ and a.2 can be derived from a no-arbitrage condition -  
the condition that the rate of returns should be equal across different types of assets, after 
controlling for changes in relative prices of different assets and depreciation. In our context, 
this means that
0 — 8  = - 0 — x - S  ,196 (17)
dk 1 p  dk 2 
1 2 2
Differentiating the aggregate production function (Eq. (6) with respect to kx and k2, this 
implies that
196 This no-arbitrage condition is related to the concept o f  rental costs o f  capital used in the tradition o f Griliches 
and Jorgenson (1966, 1967) to calibrate the rates o f return on different types o f  assets, and the notion o f the 
quality o f  capital (i.e., the services obtained from a unit o f capital) used by Jorgenson in more recent 
publications (see, for example, Jorgenson, 2005a).
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(18)
Using Eqs. (14) and (15) to substitute for the (inverse of) the capital-output ratios in 
Eq. (18) yields
As the variables and parameters, other than a\ and a2, can be observed or estimated, it is 
possible to use the relationship described by Eq. (17) to draw inferences regarding the 
underlying parameters a\ and a2. Using Eqs. (13) and (17) then yields a solution for a2, for 
given g,x,  Si, S2, n, s\, and s2, with
Using the estimate of a  obtained through Eq. (20), it is possible to establish the link
between falling prices of ICT-related equipment and growth. Using Eq. (8), and substituting 
for the growth rates of k  and k  from Eq. (13), we obtain
which implies that
In light of Eqs. (8) and (13), this overall impact of changes in the pace of technical 
advances in ICTs can be broken down into the direct impacts of a change in x  on the rate of 
accumulation of ICT capital Eq. (8)) and thus on growth (Eq. (13), represented by a  , and
(19)
a(g  + S + n )  + s ( x  + S - S )
a  = s ------------!--------- -------- -— ■—
2 2 s2(g + Sl +n) + sl(g + x + S2+n)
(20)
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the indirect effects that arise as higher growth in turn results in a faster rate of accumulation
ccof capital (see Eq. (8)), represented by a  -------.
2 1 - a
The latter effect, however, arise over time (compare Eqs. (7), (10)). If the economy does 
not strictly follow a steady-state growth path, equation (22) may therefore give a misleading 
picture regarding the impacts of advances in ICTs over time. Notably, as the rate of price 
declines of ICT equipment fluctuates (implying shocks that would move the economy away 
from the steady-state growth path), a steady-state assumption is implausible, and adopting 
Eq. (22) would result in exaggerated estimates of the impact of changes in the pace of 
technological advances in ICTs when they occur, while missing out on the lagged impacts 
that occur through the induced changes in the rate of capital accumulation.
To address these shortcomings of an analysis built on steady-state relationships between 
key variables, and to gain an improved understanding of the impacts of advances in ICTs 
over the last years, we will therefore adopt a different approach below, interpreting changes 
in the rate of technological advances in ICTs as (a series of) one-off shock(s) to an economy 
moving around the steady-state growth path, and explicitly analyzing the implications of 
those shocks over time.
Impact o f ICT-Related Innovations Over Time
To get a grip on the impacts on economic growth over time of falling prices of ICT 
equipment, we use perturbation techniques, treating the falling prices of ICT equipment as 
time-variant disturbances to growth around a steady-state growth path. As it considerably 
simplifies notation, we adopt a discrete-time version of the model discussed above (with 
identical properties regarding the steady-state links between advances in ICTs and economic 
growth).
We denote a shock to growth at time t as y  , with
y = - a  dp I p  , (23)' t 2 2,1 2,/ - I  V 7
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1 0*7 1 0 8where we use “ d  ” to denote a deviation from a steady-state growth path. ■ As we have 
already accounted for changes in relative prices of ICT equipment through the disturbance 
term y  , we can simplify the analysis considerably by focusing on the capital stock in terms
of the numeraire good, which allows us to focus on the evolution of the aggregate capital 
stock.199
We use dy / y  t to represent a perturbation to economic growth relative to the steady- 
state, which is equal to the sum of y  and the impacts of the induced perturbations to the 
accumulation of capital, i.e.
dy dk
—L = / + a ~rL • (24)
v ' k'  t-\ M
The accumulation of capital is determined by the difference equation
k( = + 0 -  ~ «)£,_, • (25)
197 The quality o f  some o f our assumptions rests on the extent to which price shocks are correlated over time. 
Some o f our assumptions implicitly assume that changes in (but not levels of) y  are uncorrelated. If this is not
the case, price shocks would result in shifts o f the steady-state growth path, whereas we analyze them as 
disturbances around a steady-state growth path.
198 In the discussion o f the steady-state o f the model, we derived an explicit solution for the impact o f falling 
prices o f  ICT capital on growth. For perturbations around a steady-state growth path, the link between a change 
in relative prices, the induced growth rate o f the stock o f ICT equipment in real terms, and output growth rests 
on the need to equate rates o f return across different types o f capital. A drop in the relative price o f  ICT 
equipment implies an equiproportionate increase in the gross rate o f return. Under the functional specification 
we adopt, this results in a reallocation o f capital (or a disproportionate share o f  investment going to ICT 
equipment) until the nominal weights o f  ICT capital and other forms o f  capital are restored to the level at which 
rates o f  return are equal across assets. The overall effect on growth o f  this reallocation o f capital is equal to the 
decline in prices o f ICT equipment, weighted by the factor share a .
199 As noted before in a more general context, our analysis assumes that changes in y  are uncorrelated over 
time.
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Importantly, this relationship incorporates the behavioral assumption that savings rates 
remain constant as the growth rates change. For an infinite time horizon, Eq. (25) implies that
1 = 1
(26)
Differentiating and dividing by k , the induced perturbation to the growth rate of capital
follows
dk «
(=it-1
(1 - 8 - n ) M t-i
t-1
(27)
dk «
which expands to — = s y
k/-i /■=i
dy y
(1 - s - n y - ]
y  yt-i-l J t- 1
y i-1 (28)
This is the point were the perturbation techniques come in, drawing on properties of the 
steady-state growth path to approximate the consequences of perturbations. Specifically, we 
approximate the capital-output ratio by its steady state value k !  y  = s!{5 + n + g) ,  and
substitute (1 + g )' for y j y  . , • Eq. (28) then becomes
dk■ _ (S + n + g)
t-1 1 + g i=i
l - S - n  
l + S  .
/ - i
t-i- 1 _
(29)
Using Eq. (24), Eq. (29) yields a difference equation describing the induced perturbation 
to the growth rate of the capital stock as a function of past disturbances to output growth ( y ) 
and past disturbances to the growth rate of the capital stock,
^  (S + n + g)t _
M 1 + g (=1
1 - 8  — n 
1 + g
/-i dk
y + a —
t-i- 1
, which implies that (30)
dk (S+ n  + g )t _
t-\ 1 + 2
dk
y + a — 
'-> k
t-i
I-2
+ ■1 - S - n 8k.t- 1
1 + «  k,-2
(31)
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Rearranging and expanding backwards towards an infinite horizon yields a presentation 
of dk Ik  as a distributed lag of past disturbances y , with
&  (S + n + g ) f
t-1 1 + g /=0
1 + a g  -  (1 -  a){d + n) 
1 + g
r .t-]-i (32)
For changes to the rate of output growth, Eq. (A9), together with Eq. (AI), yields
(S + n + g)  — — — y + a - ---------—
y /-i 1 + g i=0
1 + a g  -  (1 -  a){6 + ri) 
1 + g
r.t-\-i (33)
Eq. (33) represents changes to output growth as the sum of the immediate impact of a 
disturbance ( y  ), and the transitional impacts on growth of past disturbances playing out
through capital accumulation as the economy returns to its steady state.
Regarding the long-term impact of a one-off disturbance to growth at time t, y  , Eq. (32) 
implies that
« dk i
Z —m k 1 - a r.
(34)
t+i-l
and that the long-term impact of a disturbance y  on output is
oo dy ™ dk i
1L— ±L=y ,+ a T j - r iL= -,— y,U y . . . , ' m * . ,/+/-] / + / - ]
or, equivalently (using Eq. (23)),
* dy « dk a  dp
£ _ i ! i = ^ + a £ _ _ i ± L - ------ 2-------- 1
k 1 - a  p
t+i-\ 2j-\
(35)
(35)
which closely corresponds to the steady-state presentation in Eq. (22), with y  corresponding 
to the immediate impact of declining prices, weighted by the respective elasticity.
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D. The Contribution of ICT Equipment to Economic Growth
Building on the theoretical framework developed in the preceding section, we are now in a 
position to assess the growth impacts of technological advances in ICTs in low- and lower- 
middle-income countries. As most of these countries do not produce ICT equipment, the 
principal impacts of ICTs may arise through ICT-related capital deepening (in addition to 
more fundamental transformations in the structure of the global and national economies, 
which are beyond the scope of this study). The present section evaluates the growth impacts 
of ICT-related capital deepening, setting out by discussing some key variables and 
parameters. The middle part of the section provides an analysis of the contributions of ICT- 
related capital deepening to growth in 2001-06, using the steady-state framework outlined 
above. The concluding part discusses the contribution of ICT-related capital deepening to 
growth over the 1990-2006 period, based on the evolution of ICT-related capital stock, and 
also allowing the role of ICTs (i.e., the elasticity of output with respect to ICT-related 
capital) to evolve over time.
Key Variables and Parameters
For our analysis of the growth impacts of ICT-related capital deepening, we need to draw on 
some macroeconomic and national accounts data. Data on nominal GDP, real GDP growth, 
and aggregate investment were obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database 
(IMF, 2008). Data on population size and the rate of population growth are based on the 
estimates by the United Nations Population Division, which are included in and were also 
downloaded from the World Economic Outlook database.
ICT-related investment was estimated following the approach described in Chapter 4.5 
(Appendix Table 1 provides the average investment rates for the years 2001-05). For most 
countries, the estimates are based on the level of net imports of IT- and communications- 
related investment, respectively, applying a mark-up to account for various costs and taxes 
not included in the data on net imports. For some countries, the investment data are based on 
available data on spending; for a few countries, adjustment to the data had to be made to 
account for domestic production of ICT-related equipment.
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A crucial variable that affects the magnitude of the growth effects o f ICT-related capital 
deepening is the rate of decline of relative prices of ICT-related equipment. The price series 
we use (see Chapter 4.5, Table 6) are based on prices indices from the U.S. National Income 
and Product Accounts and Producer Price Indices.200 For communications equipment, we 
adopt a modified series based on Doms (2005), which introduces various improvements to 
the official series regarding the measurement of changes in the quality of communications 
equipment.201
There are three technological parameters that our analysis requires -  the overall factor 
share of capital a(=a\+a2) and the rates of depreciation of non-ICT- and ICT-equipment, 8\ 
and &i. Estimates of a  are available from numerous studies, including empirical studies 
estimating the elasticity of output with respect to capital directly, or (especially for countries 
with sophisticated national accounts) studies identifying the parameter a  as the factor share 
of capital in GDP, and in growth accounting exercises the parameter a  commonly is assumed 
to take a value of 0.35- 0.40. The study with the most comprehensive coverage of low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, which are the focus of the present study, is Senhadji (2000), 
providing estimates for a  for 24 of the countries covered in our study. Based on his study, we 
assume a value for the parameter a  of 0.5, which is between the median (0.47) and the mean 
(0.52) of the country level estimates presented by Senhadji (2000) for the 24 countries of 
interest here.202
Our choices for depreciation rates follow the estimates compiled by Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(2000, also included in Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh, 2005). For IT equipment (“computers and
200 See U.S. Department o f Commerce, Bureau o f  Economic Analysis (2008), and U.S. Department o f  Labor, 
Bureau o f  Labor Statistics, 2008.
201 The work by Doms has been endorsed by prominent researchers in the field, including Jorgenson (2005). 
The series developed by Doms (2005) do not cover the whole 1990-2005 period that our study focuses on, for 
the outer years, we adopt an extrapolation (see Chapter 4.5 for more explanations).
202 The numbers regard the model estimated in levels. Senhadji (2000) also provides alternative estimates for a 
model estimated with first differences, which are very similar.
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peripheral equipment”), they propose a depreciation rate of 31.5 percent, and for 
communications equipment, a depreciation rate of 11 percent (this excludes structures related 
to telecommunications). For non-ICT capital, we adopt a depreciation rate of 6 percent -  
while many types of equipment are characterized by depreciation rates in the vicinity of 
10-15 percent, our choice reflects that our investment data also include residential and other 
structures, for which Jorgenson and Stiroh propose depreciation rates mostly between 1 and 5 
percent.
Steady-State Analysis
A steady-state analysis based on averages of key variables over a period of time may be a 
good approximation regarding the stock of ICT capital, as high rates of price decline and 
physical depreciation imply that investments in previous years carry a low weight in the 
stock of ICT capital. However, the estimates could be misleading owing to cyclical factors 
(business cycles, post-conflict recovery) resulting in unusual levels of ICT investment over 
the period under consideration. Additionally, the role of ICTs in the economy may be 
evolving over time (with implications for the relation between ICT investment and growth), 
and a steady-state analysis would not capture these effects.
Setting aside these caveats for the time being, we conduct a steady-state analysis of the 
contributions of ICT-related capital deepening to growth, for 97 countries for which key 
macroeconomic data were available over the 2000-2006 period, using the analytical 
framework described in the preceding section (notably, Eqs. (20) and (22)). In addition to the 
parameters described above, which are assumed to apply across countries, our estimates of 
the elasticities of output (See Eq. (20)) with respect to IT equipment and communications 
equipment are based on country-level estimates of GDP growth and population growth based 
on IMF (2008).
203 For a few countries (see Appendix Table 1), overall investment rates were not available. For these countries, 
we substitute the sample average o f investment rates. For Afghanistan, our estimates relate to 2002-06.
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Table 1. Impact of ICT-Related Capital Deepening on Growth (Steady-State Analysis), 
__________________________ Selected Countries, 2001-06______ ___________________
IT Equip­
m ent
Com m uni­
cations
Equipment
.W. .w w ,
Elasticity of 
output 
w .r.t. IT 
Equipment
Elasticity of 
output w.r. t. 
Com m uni­
cations  
Equipm ent
Contribution to  Growth
IT
Equipm ent
Com m uni­
cations
Equipm ent
ICT
Equipm ent
(=IT +C )
(P ercent o f GDP) (P ercentage  Points)
B angladesh 0 .5 2 0 .9 1 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 1 0 .0 9 0 .2 0
China,P.R.: Mainland1 0 .4 6 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 0 . . .
Egypt 0 .2 3 0 .8 0 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .1 4
Ethiopia 0 .8 0 1 .52 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 4 0 .3 1
India 0 .8 8 1 .76 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 9 0 .1 9 0 .1 6 0 .3 5
Indonesia 0 .4 1 1 .48 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 5 0 .2 4
Nigeria 0 .3 6 1 .34 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 8
Pakistan 0 .5 8 1 .20 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .2 5
Philippines 0 .8 4 0 .9 6 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 8 0 .1 0 0 .2 8
Vietnam 0 .5 8 1 .6 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 5 0 .2 8
M em orandum  Item s
All countries2 0 .7 4 1 .39 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 4 0 .3 0
LIC 0 .6 1.3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 3 0 .1 3 0 .2 6
LMC 1.0 1 .5 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 9 0 .1 6 0 .3 5
Source: Author's calculations, a s described in te x t (s e e  discussion  of s te a d y -s ta te  a n a lysis), based on data  
from IMF (2 0 0 8 ) , Global Insight (2 0 0 6 ) , and UN Statistics Division (2 0 0 8 ) . The tab le  sh o w s country-level 
e st im a te s  for th e  10 m ost populous low- and low er-m iddle-incom e countries. For m ore details (a v era g e  
in v estm en t rates, growth rates o f GDP and population), and country-level e stim a te s  o f th e  87  other  
countries covered , s e e  Appendix Table 1. The totals under m em orandum  item s relate to  all countries 
covered  by our analysis, not only th e  o n es show n in th e  present table.
1 For China, data on investm ent in com m unications equipm ent w ere unavailable.
2 T otals exclud e China (a s e stim a tes  on investm ent in com m unications equ ip m ent w ere unavailable) and  
Paraguay (th e  latter owing to  se v e re  inconsistencies in published trade data).
Table 1 summarizes our findings for the 10 most populous low- and lower-middle- 
income countries (Appendix Table 1 provides more details and estimates for all 97 countries 
covered by our analysis). Overall, we estimate that ICT-related capital deepening contributed 
0,3 percentage points to economic growth in 2001-06, with just over one-half attributed to IT 
equipment. While the contribution of IT and communications equipment is about the same 
for low-income countries, IT equipment plays a larger role in lower-middle-income 
countries. For the 10 countries covered in Table 1, the contribution of ICT equipment to 
growth amounts to between 0.14 and 0.35 percentage points (for Egypt and India, 
respectively). It appears that variations in IT-related investment account for the bulk of cross­
country variations in the contribution of ICT equipment to growth, with a contribution from 
IT investment between 0.05 and 0.19 percentage points, and the contribution from 
communications equipment ranging from 0.08 to 0.16 percentage points. This reflects a 
pattern that also applies for the foil set of countries covered (Appendix Table 1), for which
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the variance in the contribution of IT equipment to growth is 60 percent higher than the 
variance in the growth contribution of communications equipment.
To place our estimates of the growth impacts of ICT-related capital deepening in a global 
context, it is desirable to compare our estimates for low- and lower-middle-income countries 
to the impacts of ICTs in the most advanced economies. To this end, we construct estimates 
or the role of ICTs based on Global Insight’s Global IT  Navigator (Global Insight, 2006), 
which has a high coverage of high- and upper-middle-income countries. The estimates 
provided in Global IT Navigator dataset we use extend through 2005 only, and do not 
identify spending on communications equipment. We therefore need to narrow the focus of 
analysis to the scale and thejmpacts of IT-related capital deepening, and change the period 
under consideration to 2001-05.
Table 2. Impact of U-Related Capital Deepening on Growth (Steady-State Analysis), 
_______________________ Global Insight Dataset, 2001-05______________________ __
Country Group
— — .. ...
GDP per 
capita (U .S. 
dollars)
IT -investm ent:
(P ercent of 
(Percent of total 
GDP) investm en t)
Contribution 
to  growth  
(P ercent)
28  h igh-incom e countries 2 6 ,9 2 9 1 .18 5 .6 0 .2 7
18 upper-m idd le-incom e countries 4 ,4 7 8 1 .1 4 5 .8 0 .2 5
18 low er-m idd le-incom e countries 1 ,5 0 2 0 .7 3 3 .3 0 .1 6
5 low -incom e countries 6 2 4 0 .7 2 4 .1 0 .1 6
M em orandum  item s:
50  low er-m idd le-incom e countries1 1 ,7 4 8 0 .8 8 3 .8 0 .2 0
4 7  low -incom e countries1 4 0 9 0 .5 9 3 .0 0 .1 3
Source: S e e  Appendix Table 2 , and author's calculations for OECD countries.
1 B ased on th e  analysis presented  in Table 1 for th e  full s e t  of low- and low er-m idd le-incom e countries. 
E stim ates w ere adjusted  to  take into account th e  shorter period covered  by Global In sigh t (2 0 0 6 ) .
Table 2 summarizes our findings based on the Global IT  Navigator dataset. It appears the 
impact of IT-related capital deepening on growth is similar between high- and upper-middle 
income countries (0.27 and 0.25 percentage points, respectively), whereas the growth 
impacts are about 0.1 percentage points lower for the lower-middle-income countries and the 
(few) low-income countries covered by the Global IT  Navigator dataset, reflecting that IT- 
related investment is 0.4 percent of GDP lower in these countries, compared to high- and 
upper-middle-income countries.
Our analysis for the full sample of low- and lower-middle-income countries, however, 
suggests that the Global IT  Navigator database may yield misleading results for these
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countries, owing to limited coverage. Adapting our estimates presented earlier to the shorter 
period (2001-05) covered by Table 2, we find that the growth impacts o f IT-related capital 
deepening in low-income countries are about half o f the impact in high- and upper-middle- 
income countries, and that the impacts in lower-middle-income countries are about half-way 
between the impacts in low-income countries and the impacts in high- and upper-middle- 
income countries.
Figure 1. Contribution o f ICT-Related Capital D eep en ing  to  Growth
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Figure 1 summarizes our findings on the country level.204 As in our discussion o f the 
pattern o f ICT-related spending across countries (Chapter 4.2), we see very substantial
204 To facilitate comparisons between countries, Figure 1.1 and 1.2 are truncated at 0.6 percentage points, and 
Figure 1.3 does not show estimates exceeding 1.0 percentage points. As a result, the figures do not show  
estimates o f  the growth impact o f  IT-related capital deepening for Kiribati and Paraguay (the latter is also 
excluded from any averages or aggregates report in the present study, owing to severe inconsistencies in 
published trade data). Appendix Table 1 provides more detailed data, and also covers the 2 countries not shown 
in Figure 1.
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variation in the growth impacts of ICT-related capital deepening across low- and lower- 
middle-income countries with similar levels of GDP per capita. For IT-related capital 
deepening, the growth impact appears to be correlated with GDP per capita, reflecting the 
clustering of low-income countries at a growth impact of less than 0.2 percentage points. For 
communications equipment, the pattern across countries is less clear. Figure 1.4 shows the 
growth impacts of IT-related capital deepening for the Global IT  Navigator dataset. While 
Figure 1.4 suggests a positive link between the growth impact of IT-related capital deepening 
and GDP per capita, this largely reflects the differences between high- and upper-middle 
income countries on one hand, and low- and low-middle income countries on the other hand. 
However, our discussion of growth impacts of IT-related capital deepening across countries 
(as well as Figure 1.1), suggest that any relations suggested by Figure 1.4 could be 
misleading, owing to limited coverage of low- and lower-middle-income countries in the 
Global IT  Navigator dataset.
Contribution o f ICT-Related Capital Deepening to Growth, 1990-2006
While a steady-state analysis as presented in the previous section can yield important insights 
regarding the magnitude of the impacts of advances in ICTs on growth through ICT-related 
capital deepening, it is not well suited to identify the evolving impacts of ICTs over time, for 
two main reasons.
• First, the role of ICT equipment in the economy may change over time. Our analytical 
framework spells out a link between investment rates in ICT equipment and the 
elasticity of output with respect to ICT equipment. As investment in ICT equipment 
has generally accelerated over the period 1990, this also points to an increase in the 
elasticity of output with respect to ICT equipment.
• Second, the pace of innovation in ICTs, as measured by the rates of price decline of 
ICT equipment, is not constant. Our analysis interpreting innovations in ICTs as 
perturbations around a steady-state growth path suggests that the full impact of such 
perturbations evolve over time, and may involve long time lags. Applying a steady- 
state framework, in this context, results in exaggerations of the immediate impacts of 
an innovation, while missing out on the lagged impacts of previous innovations.
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Data issues
At the outset, we drop several countries from the analysis, owing to data limitations. 
Afghanistan, Liberia, and Timor-Leste were dropped as GDP data were available only from 
2000 (Liberia, Timor-Leste) or 2002. Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland were eliminated as 
the UN Comtrade database subsumes trade data for these countries under the Southern 
African Customs Union prior to 2000. For Kiribati, Paraguay, and Sao Tome & Principe, 
complete data were available, but the countries were dropped from cross-country analysis as 
the series for ICT-related equipment were characterized by large outliers.205
For some countries, investment rates were not available; in these cases, we substitute the 
unweighted sample averages for investment rates for the respective year.206 In some cases, 
macroeconomic data for the early 1990s were not available (largely former Yugoslav and 
Soviet republics). In these cases, we applied simple extrapolations for the missing data.
Elasticities o f Output With Respect to ICT Capital
Below, we capture the (potentially) evolving aspects of the impact of advances in ICTs over 
time by allowing the elasticity of output with respect to IT and communications equipment to 
differ not only across countries, but also over time. Figure 2 illustrates the importance of 
allowing for changes in the role of ICT equipment over time. Overall, investments both in 
IT-related equipment and communications equipment roughly doubled as a percentage of 
GDP between 1990 and 2006. Figure 2 also suggests some notable differences in the 
evolution of the role of ICT equipment between low-income countries and lower-middle-
205 For Paraguay, our estimates o f IT equipment (based on net imports) rise from 2.8 percent o f GDP to
17 percent o f  GDP by 2006. Interpretation o f these trends are complicated by the fact that published trade data 
for Paraguay (self-reported or reported by partners in UN ComTrade database, international data like IMF 
(2008) show very substantial inconsistencies. The series for Kiribati (in 1992) and Sao Tome & Principe (in 
1994) show investment in communications equipment o f around 30 percent in isolated years. While these may 
reflect very large communications investments (bearing in mind the small size o f  the economies), these outliers 
would have a dominant impact within the sample for the years indicated.
206 The sample averages exclude Haiti and Macedonia, where investment rates in the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook database (IMF, 2008) exceed 100 percent o f GDP for some years.
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income countries. Starting at about the same level, investments in IT-related equipment have 
accelerated markedly in lower-middle-income countries, as compared to low-income 
countries. At the same time, investment in communications equipment started out lower in 
low-income countries, but has accelerated markedly, notably since 2002, catching up with 
low-middle-income countries by 2006.207
Figure 2. ICT-Related Investment in Low-and Lower-Middle-Income Countries, 1990-2006
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In light of the apparently shifting role of ICT equipment in low- and lower-middle- 
income countries, we allow for variations in the elasticities of output with respect to IT 
equipment and communications equipment over time (in addition to cross-country 
differences). However, some of the variation in investments in ICT equipment appears 
spurious or related to business cycles, rather than reflecting short-term fluctuations in the role 
of ICTs in the economy. To capture the variations over time and across countries, we 
calibrate the elasticities of output with respect to IT and communications equipment as
a  = c '{k  +A -1) and a  - c  •(k  +A -t). (36)
ITJt IT,} v IT IT,t COMJt COM J v COM COM J
As a first step towards calibrating a ^   ^ and &C0M 7 (the elasticities of output with respect to 
IT equipment and communications equipment for country j  at time t), elasticities were
207 The increase in investment in communications equipment in low-income countries after 2002 cannot be 
attributed to specific outliers, but reflects substantial increases in a large number o f low-income countries. 
While investment in communications equipment accelerated by at least 1 percent o f GDP in 20 low-income 
countries between 2002 and 2006, it fell by at least 1 percent o f GDP in only one country.
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calculated for each country and each period, using the steady-state approximations discussed 
earlier (Eq. 20). Second, the linear trends k  +A -t and k  +X -t were obtained
v ^  ' IT IT J COM COM ,t
through regressions based on the sample averages for each period of the elasticities obtained 
in step 1. Third, the elasticities generated in step 1 were normalized and detrended by 
dividing them by the linear trends obtained in step 2. Fourth, the country-specific parameters 
c and c were obtained as the averages for each country of the detrended series
ITJ COM J
obtained in step 3.208 Concretely, we adopt the following specification:
a  — c (0.0025 + 0.00022-0 and a  = c  (0.006+ 0.00018-0,209 (37)ITJt ITJ v ' COM Ji COMJ v
which implies that the average elasticity of output with respects to IT capital has grown from 
0.0025 in 1990 to 0.006 in 2006. Meanwhile, our estimates suggest that the average elasticity 
of output with respect to communications equipment has increased from 0.006 in 1990 to
0.009 in 2006.
Fluctuations in Rate o f  Decline o f  Relative Prices o f  IC T  Equipment
Regarding the impact of changes in the prices of ICT equipment over time, our analytical 
framework -  interpreting innovations in ICTs as shocks to the prices of ICT equipment -  
allows us to distinguish the immediate effect of a price shock on the capital stock and the 
transitional effects as the economy (notably, the capital-output ratio) gradually reverts 
towards its steady-state growth path following a shock. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the 
relevance of this point. The annual rates of price decline for ICT equipment, notably for 
IT equipment, fluctuate considerably (Figure 3), ranging from 8.8 percent to 26.4 percent for 
IT equipment, and from 5.6 percent to 10.7 percent for communications equipment. 
Meanwhile, Figure 4 tracks the impact of a shock to relative prices of ICT equipment over
208 Taking logs and running a panel regression with a time trend would yield similar results. As most o f our data 
are based on net imports, this would have required a reduction in the sample or other adjustments to take 
account o f occasional negative values.
209 The R2 o f the regressions estimating the linear trend in step 2 o f our approach was 0.85 for the elasticity with 
respect to IT equipment and 0.47 for the elasticity with respect to communications equipment.
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time. The immediate impact accounts for only 50 percent of the long-run effects, and the 
subsequent adjustment is sluggish, with half o f the adjustment taking about 13 years. The 
persistence o f  the impacts o f shocks to relative prices, as well as the fluctuations in the rate o f  
price declines over time, thus validate our point that an analysis o f the impacts o f ICTs based 
on steady-state properties o f the model may yield misleading results.
Figure 3. Rates of Price Dedine of ICT Equipment, 1991-2006
(Annual rate of dedine, in percent)
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Figure 4. Impact of Shock to Relative Price of ICT Equipment Over Time 
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Estimating the Impacts o f  Advances in ICTs over Time
Our analysis o f the impacts o f advances in ICTs is based on the perturbation analysis 
developed above, in particular Eq. (33) and Eq. (23) which is repeated here for convenience.
\  = r + J S + n + 8'>
y /-i i +g
z
(=0
1 + ag  -  (1 -  a)(S + n)
r+ g7 " f-W
, with
y =  - a  dp Ip  
1 1 2 2,1 2 . / - 1
(33)
(23)
The validity o f this approach rests on the extent to which shocks to relative prices o f ICT 
equipment affect the steady-state growth path. Such changes to the steady-state growth path 
can occur if  agents perceive a decline in the rate o f price declines o f ICT equipment. This 
would reduce the user cost o f ICT capital, and agents would allocate a larger share o f  the 
capital stock to ICT capital. While our perturbation analysis is based on the capital stock in 
terms o f  the numeraire good (we account for the change in relative prices separately), such a 
reallocation would affect the rate o f depreciation o f the overall capital stock (a weighted 
average o f the depreciation rates o f ICT-related capital and non-ICT-related capital). 
However, the small share o f ICT equipment in the capital stock suggests that any changes to
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the average rate of depreciation and thus the steady-state capital-output ratio (assumed 
constant in our perturbation analysis) would be very limited.
One issue that we need to address is the fact that our approach requires very long time 
series for prices of ICT equipment (see Eq. (33), Fig. (4), beyond the beginning of the period 
of consideration. For IT equipment, we adopt the price index for “computers and peripheral 
equipment,” a component of private nonresidential investment, from the U.S. National 
Income and Product accounts, which is available from 1960. For communications equipment, 
we do not have earlier price series, and apply a rate of price decline of 8 percent for earlier 
years, roughly in line with our estimates for the early 1990s. Regarding the elasticity of 
output with respect to ICT equipment (required to translate the original price shock into an 
output shock, see Eq. 23), extending our estimation backwards to cover years before 1990 
increasingly results in problems regarding the availability of data. For this reason, we use our 
estimates of the respective elasticities for 1990 for the earlier periods.
Figure 5 and Table 3 summarize our estimates for the impacts of declining prices of ICT 
equipment on economic growth. (Appendix Table 2 provides the estimates for each of the 88 
countries covered by our estimates.) The magnitude of the contributions of IT equipment and 
communications equipment to growth, respectively, are similar, rising from about 0.09 
percent at the beginning of the period covered to 0.13 towards the end. While rates of 
investment in communications equipment are normally considerably higher than investment 
rates for IT equipment (according to Figure 2, by a factor of about 2 on average), the rates of 
price declines for IT equipment are higher (on average, exceeding the rates of price decline 
for communications equipment by a factor of about 2.2 over the 1990-2006 period), so that 
the magnitude of the growth effects are similar.
One interesting exception to this broad picture regards the years 1996-2000, in which the 
contribution of capital deepening arising from declining prices of IT equipment to growth 
peaks (and exceeds the contribution from communications equipment). This is the period 
which has motivated much of the early work on the economic impacts of advances in ICTs in 
the United States (e.g., Gordon (2000), Jorgenson (2001), or Oliner and Sichel (2000)). Our 
estimates are in line with this earlier literature (unsurprisingly, as our international price data
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are based on U.S. price indices). However, our distinction between the direct effects of 
shocks to prices of IT equipment and the indirect (and longer-term) effects through capital 
accumulation, which arise as the economy moves towards the steady-state growth path 
following a shock, provides a more differentiated picture, as the dampening impact on 
growth of the slowdown in the rate of decline of relative prices is partly offset by a gradual 
increase in the induced effects through capital accumulation.
Regarding the role of the impacts of the direct impacts of declining relative prices of 
equipment and the indirect effects through an induced acceleration in capital accumulation, 
we find that the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects is similar, in line with the steady- 
state properties of the model.210 Almost all of the variations in the growth impacts of falling 
prices of ICT equipment on a year-to-year basis reflect the direct effects of changing prices, 
this is a mathematical necessity as the indirect effects can be represented as a distributed lag 
of past price shocks with a long memory (for typical parameters, we obtain a half-time of 
about 13 years). However, changes in the indirect impacts play some role over longer time 
horizons, and contribute about one-sixth to the acceleration of the growth impacts of 
advances in ICTs between 1990 and 2006.
The lower part of Figure 5 (Figs. 5.5 and 5.6) summarize the overall growth effects of 
falling relative prices of ICT equipment for low- and lower-middle-income countries.
Overall, the impacts are about one-third smaller in low-income countries, compared to lower- 
middle-income countries. Apart from the scale of the impact, the pattern of the impacts over 
time is similar between low- and lower- middle-income countries, owing to the fact that the 
weights of investment in IT equipment are similar across these income groups, and our 
assumptions regarding the evolving role of ICT equipment, reflected in the modeling of the 
parameter a2.
210 See our discussion o f Eq. (22). Our choice o f a value o f  0.5 for the parameter a  implies that the size o f the 
direct and indirect effects is equal in steady state.
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Table 3. Impact of ICT-Related Capital Deepening on Growth, Selected Countries, 1990-2006
IT Equipm ent Com m unications Equipm ent Total ICT Equipm ent
Country 1 9 9 1 -1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 00 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
20 0 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 6
B angladesh 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .05 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 0
China,P.R .: Mainland1 0 .1 4 0 .2 2 0 .2 1 n.a. n .a . n.a. n.a. n.a. n .a .
Egypt 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 3
Ethiopia 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .1 6
India 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 8 0 .2 3 0 .2 5
Indonesia 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .1 4 0 .1 6 0 .1 9 0 .1 9 0 .2 4 0 .2 7
Nigeria 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 5
Pakistan 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 7 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 3 0 .1 4
Philippines 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .2 1 0 .2 4 0 .2 9 0 .3 0 0 .3 9 0 .4 3
V ietnam  0 .0 9  0 .1 4  
Country groups (unw eighted  a v era g es)
0 .1 3 0 .1 4 0 .1 6 0 .2 0 0 .2 3 0 .3 0 0 .3 3
All countries covered 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .2 5 0 .2 6
Low -incom e countries 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 5 0 .2 0 0 .2 1
Lower m iddle-incom e- 
countries 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 5 0 .2 2 0 .3 0 0 .3 1
Source: Author's calculations. S e e  Appendix Table 2 for country-level e stim a tes  o f all 88  countries covered  by 
our analysis.
Finally, a few more words are in order about differences in the pattern of investment in 
IT and communications equipment over time, the estimates of the growth impacts of falling 
prices of ICT equipment obtained from the steady-state analysis, and the estimates from our 
analysis treating changes in relative prices of ICT equipment as perturbations to an economy 
moving along (or close to) a steady-state growth path. Conceptually, the key differences are 
that (1) while the steady-state analysis simply adds up the direct and the indirect impacts 
(through accelerated capital accumulation) of falling prices of ICTs, the indirect effects occur 
very slowly in the perturbation analysis, and (2) that the assumptions regarding the elasticity 
of output with respect to ICT capital differ.
We have already discussed the first of these points at some length. The second point also 
does have some consequences for our estimates, as a comparison of the results of the steady- 
state and the perturbation analysis shows. Low-income countries experienced a strong 
acceleration in investment in communications equipment after 2000 (see Chapter 4.2 and 
4.5). The calibrated elasticity of output with respect to communications equipment in the 
steady-state analysis, which is based on the behavior of key variables for that period only, 
reflects this acceleration. In our perturbation analysis, we allow the elasticities of output with 
respect to ICT equipment to change only slowly over time, allowing for a linear time trend. A 
temporary acceleration in the rates of investment in ICT equipment (the key determinant of
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our estimates of the respective elasticities) therefore has a modest impact on the calibrated 
elasticities in the perturbation analysis. For these reasons, the gap between the growth 
impacts of falling prices of communications equipment between low- and lower-middle- 
income countries is closer in the steady-state analysis than it is in the perturbation analysis.
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E. ICT Production and Growth
Regarding the production of ICT equipment, the situation in low- and lower-middle-income 
countries is very different from the situation in OECD countries which has motivated most of 
the literature on the growth effects of advances in ICTs. While most OECD countries feature 
at least a small ICT-producing sector,211 this applies to only a handful of low- and lower- 
middle-income countries. Partly for this reason, the few studies with a substantial coverage 
o f non-OECD countries (notably, Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) and Jorgenson and Vu 
(2005a, 2005b, 2007)) have focused on the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening.212 
However, as production of ICT equipment does play an important role in some low- and 
lower-middle-income countries, an assessment of the growth effects of advances in ICTs in 
these countries would be incomplete without capturing the productivity gains on the 
production side.
Conceptually, estimating the (direct) contribution of productivity gains in the production 
of ICT equipment to growth is relatively straightforward. In terms of the framework 
developed above, the contribution of productivity gains in the ICT producing sector to 
growth can be calculated as
1 4
7  V
211 See, for example, Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) for production volumes across a large number o f countries, 
including developing economies, Pilat and Wolfl (2004) for the OECD, and Jorgenson (2005a, 2005b) or 
Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2005) for the G7.
212 Additionally, Bayoumi and Haacker (2002) (and Pilat and Wolfl (2004), drawing on the former study), point 
out that the gains to producers largely dissipate owing to declining prices. This is particularly relevant if  the 
bulk o f  ICT production is exported, as is the case in low- and lower-middle-income countries with an ICT- 
producing sector that is large relative to GDP.
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i.e., the rate of productivity gains in the ICT-producing sector (indexed “2”) AJ A2, weighted 
by the sector’s share in the economy Y J Y .
One factor that is complicating the assessment of the contributions of productivity gains 
in the production of ICT equipment to growth is the fact that we know little about the inputs 
to the production of ICT equipment, notably inputs of certain ICT-related components which 
embody most of the technological advances and productivity gains in ICTs. Some of our 
production data are available on a gross basis only, while others identify value added and the 
costs of inputs, but not in a form that allows us to identify inputs of interest. In other words, 
we are not in a good position to distinguish a low-tech manufacturing plant which simply 
assembles imported components, and a high-tech plant that produces electronic components 
embodying technological advances in ICTs.
To mitigate the problem, we include net exports of electronic microcircuits (SITC 2 
category 7764) in our estimates of the production of ICT equipment. The advantages of 
doing so arise in two areas. First, as microcircuits are an integral part of ICT equipment, and 
arguably the commodity in which technological progress in ICT is most pronounced and 
clearly defined, including them in production statistics to measure the contribution of 
advances in the production of ICT equipment to growth makes sense. Second, as much of the 
technological advances in ICT equipment are embodied in microprocessors, controlling for 
net exports allows us to distinguish, to some extent, countries which largely assemble 
imported components from countries producing the commodities embodying the 
technological advances. At the same time, focusing on net exports rather than production of 
electronic microcircuits avoids double-counting of domestically produced electronic 
microcircuits which are used in the production of ICT equipment.
As explained in some detail elsewhere (see Chapter 4.5), and reflecting established 
practice in the literature, we are using the rate of decline of prices of ICT equipment as a 
measure of productivity gains in the production of ICT equipment, using data from the U.S. 
Producer Price Indices and the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts. For
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communications equipment, the deflators were modified, drawing on the work of Dorns 
(2005).
Table 2 summarizes our findings on the contributions of the production of ICT equipment 
to growth. In most countries covered by Table 2 the growth impacts are miniscule, reflecting 
that we placed the bar for inclusion in the Table very low. The growth impact of the 
production of IT equipment exceeds 0.1 percentage points in only one low-income country 
(Vietnam), and 4 lower-middle-income countries. In three countries (China, Philippines, and 
Thailand), the impact of production of IT equipment on growth exceeds V2 percentage point 
at least in 2001-05.
The role of production of communications equipment is less pronounced, with a growth 
impact that exceeds 0.1 percentage points in only two countries (India, Iran) in 2001-05, 
although it had a larger impact in the Philippines and Thailand in the 1991-05 period. 
However, it is important to note that owing to data constraints the estimates on the role of 
communications equipment exclude China, a country for which informal calculations suggest 
that the growth impact of the production of communications equipment could also be around 
0.2 percent in 2001-05.213
213 China has been a net exporter o f communications equipment since 2000, with net exports rising to about 1.5 
percent o f GDP by 2005. Including plausible values for domestic sales o f communications equipment, this 
points to a level o f domestic production o f communications equipment that could exceed 2 percent, consistent 
with a growth contribution o f 0.2 percentage points or more.
Table 4. Contribution of ICT Production to Growth, Selected Countries, 1990-2005 
___________(Contribution to Annual GDP Growth, in Percentage Points)___________
IT Equipment
Com m unications
Equipment
Electronic Microcircuits 
(N et Exports) Total
Country 1 9 9 1 -1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 5
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
20 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
20 0 5
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
20 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 5
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 5
L ow -incom e Countries
Kyrgyz Republic 0 .0 3 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
Vietnam 0 .0 0 0 .2 3 0 .1 5 0 .0 0 0 .1 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 4 -0 .0 9 0 .0 0 0 .2 9 0 .0 6
Zim babwe
Lower-M iddle-Incom e
Countries
0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Albania 0 .0 0 0 .0 3 0 .0 5 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 3 0 .0 4
China,P.R.: Mainland 0 .0 7 0 .2 7 0 .5 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0 .0 2 -0 .0 9 -0 .2 1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Egypt 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 3
India 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .0 0 -0 .0 1 -0 .0 1 0 .1 2 0 .1 5 0 .1 4
Indonesia 0 .0 4 0 .2 3 0 .2 0 0 .0 7 0 .2 2 0 .2 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 .1 1 0 .4 7 0 .4 1
Iran, I.R. of 0 .0 1 0 .0 3 0 .0 1 0 .0 3 0 .1 0 0 .0 6 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 3 0 .1 3 0 .0 7
Moldova 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 1 o.-oo 0 .0 3 0 .0 1
Morocco 0 .0 0 0 .0 4 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 6 0 .0 2
Peru 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 2 0.00 0 .0 0
Philippines 0 .0 7 0 .8 4 0 .6 8 0 .3 3 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .1 4 2 .7 0 1 .51 0 .5 3 3 .5 4 2 .1 9
Sri Lanka 0 .0 3 0 .1 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 -0 .0 1 0 .0 3 0 .1 6 0 .0 6
Thailand 0 .0 7 0 .6 6 0 .6 0 0 .3 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .4 6 0 .8 0 0 .6 6
Ukraine 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 0 0 .0 1 0 .0 6 0 .0 0 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 8
M emorandum Item s
Rate o f decline in 
relative prices -1 5 .8 7 -2 2 .9 9 -1 4 .3 5 -7 .3 0 -8 .3 6 -9 .6 5 -9 .3 8 -1 9 .7 7 -1 0 .6 9
Source: Author's calculations, based  on data from UNIDO (2 0 0 7 ) , Global Insight (2 0 0 6 ) , and United Nations S tatistics Division (2 0 0 8 )  for 
data on production, trade, or spending; IMF (2 0 0 8 ) for data o f GDP; U.S. D epartm ent o f C om m erce, Bureau of Econom ic A nalysis (2 0 0 8 ) ,  
U.S. D epartm ent o f Labor, Bureau o f Labor Statistics (2 0 0 8 ) , and Dorns (2 0 0 5 ) for data on prices o f ICT products.
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Incorporating data on net exports of electronic microcircuits in the analysis refines the 
findings regarding the growth impact of ICT-related production in two areas. First, for some 
countries (notably Vietnam and China), net imports of electronic microcircuits account for a 
substantial proportion of the value of production of ICT equipment, which suggests that these 
countries largely assemble ICT equipment from imported components.214 Second, including 
net export of electronic microcircuits, Philippines -  by some margin -  emerges as the country 
where the role of production of ICT equipment is largest. In 2001-05, the total contribution 
of the production of ICT equipment to growth in Philippines amounted to 2.2 percentage 
points, of which net exports of electronic microcircuits accounted for 1.5 percentage points.
Finally, some notes on interpreting these findings. First, our estimates are based on price 
indices for the respective commodity categories from the United States. If the composition of 
production in our countries of interest differs substantially from the commodity bundles 
underlying the U.S. price indices, this would introduce some margin of error to our estimates. 
Second, to relate our estimates of the growth contribution of the production of ICT 
equipment to official data on GDP growth, it is necessary to know which deflators have been 
applied to the production of ICT equipment in the national accounts data. Only if national 
price indices fully reflect changes in the quality of ICT equipment is it possible to attribute a 
share of the growth rate of GDP to our estimated contributions from ICT-related production. 
If, at the other extreme, the national price indices do not capture changes in the quality of 
ICT products at all, then it would be necessary to correct the national estimates of GDP 
growth by adding our estimates of the growth contribution from productivity gains in the 
ICT-producing sector. Third, as pointed out earlier, it is important to bear in mind that a high 
contribution of ICT-related production to GDP -  literally -  does not buy much, as the 
productivity gains, regarding national income, dissipate owing to the terms-of-trade effect of 
falling prices of ICT products.
2,4 This also applies to Albania, India, Moldova, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, although the low levels o f  production 
there make it more difficult to assess the extent to which ICT production reflects the assembly o f imported 
components.
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F. Conclusions and Outlook
The first lesson from our analysis is that capital deepening related to technological advances 
in ICTs (i.e., falling relative prices of ICT equipment) matters in low- and low-middle- 
income countries. Overall, we estimate that between 1996 and 2006 the direct and indirect 
effects of falling prices of ICT equipment added about 0.2 percentage points to economic 
growth for low-income countries, and 0.3 percentage points for lower-middle-income 
countries. Relative to high-income countries, a preliminary analysis suggests that the growth 
impacts of falling prices of IT equipment in low-income countries are about one-half of the 
level attained in high-income countries, and about three-quarters in lower-middle-income 
countries. Regarding the relative roles of IT and communications equipment, we find that the 
magnitudes of the contributions to growth are similar -  while investment in communications 
equipment is about double the level of investment in IT equipment, both in low- and in 
lower-middle-income countries, the relative prices of IT equipment decline at a faster rate, so 
that the overall impact comes out about the same.
A key obstacle to a comprehensive assessment of the economic role of ICTs in low- and 
lower-middle-income countries is the lack of sufficiently detailed national accounts data for 
most countries. To address this problem, we construct estimates of investment in ICT 
equipment based on trade data (and, where necessary, production data), addressing some 
shortcomings of existing databases (see Chapter 4.5 for details), and compiling a database 
covering essentially all low- and lower-middle-income countries. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that trade data are a noisy indicator for ICT-related spending, especially for 
small countries. Additionally, to account for costs which would be included in investment 
data, but are not captured in trade data, we estimate an mark-up to “translate” trade data into 
spending figures in a national accounts framework. While a necessary adjustment, this is also 
an additional source of noise, as we miss out on the variation in these mark-ups across 
countries.
The most important determinant of the link between falling prices of ICT equipment and 
the impact on economic growth is the elasticity of output with respect to ICT equipment. We 
estimate these elasticities based on a steady-state version of our analytical framework, 
imposing the condition that rates of return to capital be equal between different types of
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assets, and estimated investment data. A key challenge, to which we do not have a sound 
answer, is the interpretation of changes in investment rates, which may be spurious, reflect 
business cycles, or changes in the structure of the economy (i.e., in the elasticity of output 
with respect to capital). An explicit model deriving appropriate weights is beyond the scope 
of the present study -  we use country fixed effects combined with a linear trend, as this is 
easily tractable and as we are not primarily interested in idiosyncrasies on the country level; 
other specifications that are built on an explicit model, giving more weight to year-to-year 
variations or difference across countries could yield improved estimates of the elasticities.
Finally, it is important to recall the limitations of our analysis. While it is true that 
benefiting from advances in ICTs does require the use of ICT equipment, and therefore the 
scale of the absorption of ICT equipment is an important indicator of the scale of the 
economic role of ICTs in an economy, the economic impacts are much broader, and differ 
systematically between countries. For example, in high-income countries, spending on IT- 
related services plays a much higher role than in low-income countries. On the other hand, 
ICTs have expanded the class of labor-intensive services that is tradable, and it is 
questionable whether investment in ICT equipment adequately captures the benefits from 
advances in ICTs in the economies exporting such services. Last, one specific feature of 
communication technologies (and of some aspects of information technologies) is that 
utilization of such technologies requires the existence of a related infrastructure (which is 
partly captured in our investment data), but also subscription to communication services, 
which means that the structure of the market for telecommunications services, which is 
characterized by imperfect competition, may affect the way in which advances in ICTs and 
falling international prices of ICT equipment affect national economies.
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Low-Incom e Countries 
A fghanistan, I.R. of 3 9 .4 0 .6 2 2 .6 7 4 .1 11 .7 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 1 0 0 .1 2 0 .2 0 0 .3 1
Bangladesh 2 3 .9 0 .5 2 0 .9 1 1.9 5 .7 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 1 0 .0 9 0 .2 0
Benin 18 .1 0 .4 3 0 .6 9 3 .3 4 .1 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 9 0 .0 7 0 .1 6
Burkina Faso 17 .8 0 .4 2 0 .5 6 3 .2 6 .1 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 9 0 .0 5 0 .1 4
Burundi 10 .5 0 .7 9 1.01 3 .5 2 .7 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 7 0 .1 0 0 .2 8
Cambodia 18 .5 0 .3 4 1 .36 1.8 9 .6 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 2 0 .1 9
Central African Rep. 8 .0 0 .2 1 0 .2 9 1 .7 -0 .2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 5 0 .0 4 0 .0 9
Chad 3 5 .4 0 .2 8 0 .4 8 3 .6 12.3 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 5 0 .0 4 0 .0 9
Com oros 1 0 .0 0 .3 1 1.31 2 .7 2 .5 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 7 0 .1 4 0 .2 1
Congo, Dem . Rep. of 11 .1 0 .6 7 1.23 3 .0 4 .5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 2 0 .2 7
Cote d'Ivoire 9 .9 0 .3 9 0 .7 7 1.7 0 .0 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 9
Eritrea 2 4 .3 1 .1 2 1 .75 4 .1 2 .0 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 9 0 .2 5 0 .1 8 0 .4 3
Ethiopia 2 2 .7 0 .8 0 1 .52 2 .6 6 .4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 4 0 .3 1
Gambia, The 2 4 .7 0 .6 2 2 .05 3 .1 4 .6 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 1 0 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .3 3
Ghana 2 6 .1 0 .8 4 1.95 2 .2 5 .3 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 1 0 0 .1 8 0 .1 9 0 .3 7
Guinea 12 .8 0 .2 5 0 .5 4 1.9 2 .9 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .1 2
G uinea-Bissau 12 .8 0 .8 4 0 .6 9 3.1 -0 .1 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .2 0 0 .0 8 0 .2 8
Haiti 2 7 .5 0 .2 4 1 .50 1.6 -0 .1 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 6 0 .1 9 0 .2 4
Kenya 17 .3 0 .6 4 1 .32 2 .6 4 .0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .2 7
Kyrgyz Republic 19 .8 0 .6 1 1 .92 1.0 3 .7 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 1 1 0 .1 4 0 .2 1 0 .3 4
Lao People's Dem . Rep. 2 9 .8 0 .3 9 2 .41 1.6 6 .6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 8 0 .2 3 0 .3 1
Liberia 1 .0 6 3 .1 5 2 .6 -2 .6 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 2 2 0 .2 7 0 .4 1 0 .6 8
M adagascar 2 0 .2 0 .4 6 0 .7 3 2 .8 2 .9 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 4 0 .1 0 0 .0 8 0 .1 8
Malawi 18 .6 1 .0 8 1 .41 2 .6 2 .8 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 8 0 .2 4 0 .1 5 0 .3 9
Mali 18 .6 0 .3 5 0 .9 0 3 .0 6 .2 0 .0 0 3 . 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 6
Mauritania 3 7 .5 0 .6 5 1 .23 2 .9 5 .2 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 4 0 .1 2 0 .2 6
M ozambique 2 1 .6 0 .8 2 1 .35 2 .4 8 .7 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 7 0 .1 2 0 .2 8
Myanmar 1 1 .9 0 .4 4 1 .12 0 .9 12 .8 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .1 8
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Nepal 19.1 0 .7 3 0 .9 9 2 .1 3 .4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 1 0 .2 7
Niger 1 6 .7 0 .2 9 0 .9 4 3 .6 5.3 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .1 5
Nigeria 2 5 .0 0 .3 6 1 .34 2 .5 10 .2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 8
Pakistan 1 6 .4 0 .5 8 1 .20 1.8 5 .3 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .2 5
Papua New Guinea 1 8 .8 1 .07 0 .8 0 2 .4 1.7 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 5 0 .2 5 0 .0 9 0 .3 4
Rwanda 1 7 .5 0 .7 3 0 .9 4 2 .5 5 .4 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 6 0 .0 9 0 .2 5
Sao Tom e & Principe1 1 .09 3 .0 4 1.7 6 .5 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 1 5 0 .2 3 0 .2 8 0 .5 1
Senegal 2 6 .1 1 .2 4 0 .9 5 2 .6 4 .2 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 0 5 0 .2 7 0 .1 0 0 .3 7
Sierra Leone 12 .3 0 .5 0 2 .0 3 4 .1 12 .6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 5 0 .2 4
Solom on Islands 2 9 .8 0 .9 1 0 .6 4 2 .6 2.3 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .2 1 0 .0 7 0 .2 8
Tajikistan 1 4 .6 0 .1 1 2 .2 2 1.2 9 .0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 2 0 .1 9 0 .2 2
Tanzania 2 1 .1 0 .6 7 1 .24 2 .6 7 .0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 4 0 .1 1 0 .2 5
Togo 12 .5 0 .3 1 1 .11 2 .9 1.7 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 2 0 .1 9
Uganda 2 0 .5 0 .7 1 1 .27 3 .2 5 .5 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 2 0 .2 7
Uzbekistan 2 5 .1 0 .7 3 1 .25 1.5 5 .7 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 2 0 .2 8
Vietnam 3 2 .1 0 .5 8 1 .6 7 1.4 7 .6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 5 0 .2 8
Yem en, Republic o f 1 9 .0 0 .0 9 0 .6 6 3 .0 4 .0 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 7 0 .0 9
Zambia 2 2 .0 0 .6 5 1 .22 1.9 5.0 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 4 0 .1 2 0 .2 6
Zim babwe 6 .5 0 .4 9 0 .6 8 0 .7 -5 .1 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 4 0 .1 2 0 .2 5
Lower-M iddle-Incom e Countries
Albania 2 5 .3 0 .8 2 1 .33 0 .5 5.5 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 8 0 .1 4 0 .3 2
Algeria 2 3 .5 0 .5 1 1 .07 1.5 4 .4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 1 0 .1 1 0 .2 2
Angola 11 .2 0 .5 0 0 .8 8 2 .9 11 .7 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 4 0 .1 0 0 .0 7 0 .1 7
Armenia 2 4 .2 0 .8 2 1 .14 -0 .4 12 .4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 6 0 .1 0 0 .2 6
Azerbaijan, Rep. of 3 9 .8 0 .4 6 1 .52 0 .5 14 .7 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .2 0
Bhutan 5 8 .8 0 .3 6 0 .5 3 2 .5 8 .2 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 7 0 .0 5 0 .1 2
Bolivia 13 .6 0 .8 7 0 .7 6 2 .0 3 .3 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 4 0 .2 0 0 .0 8 0 .2 8
Bosnia & H erzegovina 2 6 .4 1 .5 4 1 .26 0 .6 4 .8 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 0 7 0 .3 4 0 .1 3 0 .4 8
Cam eroon 18 .5 0 .5 2 0 .5 0 2 .3 3 .6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 2 0 .0 5 0 .1 7
Cape Verde 3 5 .2 1 .1 4 1 .07 2 .4 6 .1 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 5 0 .2 4 0 .1 0 0 .3 4
(Continued)
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China,P.R.: Mainland3'4 3 9 .3 0 .4 6 0 .7 9 .8 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 0
Colombia 17 .2 0 .9 1 1 .60 1.5 3 .9 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 9 0 .2 0 0 .1 7 0 .3 7
Congo, Republic of 2 3 .3 0 .6 0 1 .56 2 .4 4 .4 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 3 0 .1 6 0 .2 9
Djibouti 1 7 .8 1 .68 3 .5 9 1 .9 .3.1 0 .0 1 3 0 .0 1 9 0 .3 8 0 .3 6 0 .7 4
Dominican Republic 2 2 .3 0 .3 5 0 .8 3 1.6 4 .6 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 6
Ecuador 2 1 .9 0 .7 4 1 .86 1.2 5 .2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 1 0 0 .1 6 0 .1 9 0 .3 5
Egypt 1 7 .4 0 .2 3 0 .8 0 1.8 4 .2 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .1 4
El Salvador 16 .1 1 .03 1 .40 1.5 2 .6 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 8 0 .2 4 0 .1 6 0 .3 9
Georgia 2 6 .3 0 .6 4 1 .54 -1 .0 7 .7 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 4 0 .1 5 0 .2 9
G uatem ala 18 .8 0 .9 0 1 .8 7 2 .5 3 .4 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 1 0 0 .2 0 0 .1 9 0 .3 9
Guyana 2 5 .2 1 .39 2 .0 8 0 .1 1.2 0 .0 1 2 0 .0 1 4 0 .3 4 0 .2 6 0 .6 0
Honduras 2 4 .7 0 .8 6 1 .4 2 2 .0 4 .9 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 9 0 .1 4 0 .3 3
India 2 7 .1 0 .8 8 1 .7 6 1.6 7 .0 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 9 0 .1 9 0 .1 6 0 .3 5
Indonesia 2 1 .5 0 .4 1 1 .4 8 1.3 4 .9 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 5 0 .2 4
Iran, I.R. of 2 8 .2 0 .2 1 1 .1 2 1.0 5 .6 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 5 0 .1 1 0 .1 6
Jordan 2 3 .9 0 .6 8 3 .5 8 3 .0 6 .2 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 1 7 0 .1 4 0 .3 2 0 .4 6
Kiribati1 . . . 3 .3 6 2 .7 2 1.8 2 .1 0 .0 2 6 0 .0 1 6 0 .7 6 0 .3 0 1 .06
Lesotho 3 4 .0 0 .6 4 1 .0 8 0 .9 3 .6 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 2 0 .2 6
M acedonia, FYR 1 6 .9 1 .3 7 1 .88 0 .2 1.8 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 2 0 .3 3 0 .2 2 0 .5 5
Maldives 3 2 .3 2 .2 8 5 .7 0 1.6 6 .9 0 .0 1 7 0 .0 2 7 0 .4 8 0 .5 1 0 .9 8
Moldova 2 0 .9 1 .1 4 2 .1 9 -1 .3 6 .6 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 1 2 0 .2 6 0 .2 3 0 .4 8
Mongolia 2 4 .9 1 .36 2 .8 0 0 .9 6 .4 0 .0 1 0 0 .0 1 4 0 .2 9 0 .2 7 0 .5 6
Morocco 2 6 .5 0 .5 7 . 1 .59 1.1 5 .4 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 8 0 .1 3 0 .1 6 0 .2 9
Namibia 2 4 .9 1 .08 1 .30 1 .4 4 .7 0 .0 0 8 0 .0 0 7 0 .2 4 0 .1 3 0 .3 7
Nicaragua 2 6 .8 1 .19 2 .3 2 1.3 3 .3 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 1 3 0 .2 7 0 .2 5 0 .5 2
Paraguay4 18 .6 5 .6 2 1 .98 2 .0 2 .9 0 .0 4 2 0 .0 1 1 1 .21 0 .2 1 1 .4 2
Peru 18 .2 0 .9 3 0 .8 5 1.2 4 .8 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 5 0 .2 1 0 .0 9 0 .2 9
Philippines 16 .5 0 .8 4 0 .9 6 2 .1 4 .6 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 5 0 .1 8 0 .1 0 0 .2 8
S am oa1 1 .42 2 .2 3 0 .7 4 .3 0 .0 1 1 0 .0 1 2 0 .3 2 0 .2 4 0 .5 5
(Continued)
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Sri Lanka 2 4 .2 0 .7 6 1 .11 0 .4 4 .5 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 6 0 .1 7 0 .1 2 0 .2 9
Sudan 1 5 .8 0 .3 2 1 .13 2 .1 6 .9 0 .0 0 2 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 7
Swaziland 18.3 0 .7 8 1 .17 1.2 2 .4 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 8 0 .1 3 0 .3 2
Syrian Arab Republic 2 1 .7 0 .1 6 0 .5 7 2 .7 3 .5 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 9
Thailand 2 5 .5 0 .7 3 0 .2 5 0 .7 5 .1 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 1 0 .1 6 0 .0 3 0 .1 9
Tim or-Leste1 0 .5 5 0 .5 2 5 .3 0 .2 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 3 0 .1 2 0 .0 6 ' 0 .1 8
T onga1 1 .15 3 .0 7 0 .3 2 .3 0 .0 0 9 0 .0 1 9 0 .2 7 0 .3 5 0 .6 3
Tunisia 2 3 .9 0 .5 3 1 .23 1.1 4 .6 0 .0 0 4 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 2 0 .1 3 0 .2 5
Turkm enistan1 ... 0 .1 1 0 .2 1 1.4 15.3 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 4
Ukraine 2 1 .4 0 .9 4 1 .4 4 -0 .8 7 .6 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .2 0 0 .1 4 0 .3 5
Vanuatu1 0 .7 9 0 .7 5 2 .6 1.9 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 4 0 .1 8 0 .0 8 0 .2 6
M emorandum Item s
All countries4 2 2 .1 0 .7 4 1 .39 1.9 5.1 0 .0 0 6 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 6 2 0 .1 3 9 0 .3 0 1
LIC 2 0 .2 0 .6 1 .3 2 .5  ' 4 .8 0 .0 0 5 0 .0 0 7 0 .1 3 1 0 .1 2 8 0 .2 5 9
LMC4 2 3 .8 1 .0 1 .5 1 .4 5 .3 0 .0 0 7 0 .0 0 8 0 .2 1 3 0 .1 5 1 0 .3 6 4
Source: Authors calculations, a s  described in tex t, based on data from IMF (2 0 0 8 ) , Global Insight (2 0 0 6 ) , and UN Statistics Division (2 0 0 8 ).
1 In vestm en t rates w ere unavailable. Elasticities and contributions o f ICT equipm ent to  growth w ere estim ated  based on th e  sam p le average  for
investm ent rates (2 2 .0  percent).
2 For Afghanistan, data relate to  2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 6
3 For China, data on investm ent in com m unications equipm ent w ere unavailable.
4 Totals exclude China (a s  e stim a te s  on investm ent in com m unications equipm ent w ere unavailable) and Paraguay (th e  latter owing to  se v e re  
inconsistencies in published trade data).
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Appendix Table 2. Contribution of ICT-Related Capital Deepening to Growth, 88 Countries, 1990-2006
IT Equipment
W W V K W . I M I* ) WV W I W I I W I  • / V W ^
C om m unications Equipm ent Total ICT Equipm ent
Country 1 9 9 1 -1995
1 9 9 6 -
200 0
2 0 0 1 -
20 0 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
20 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
20 0 6
Albania 0 .1 4 0 .2 2 0 .2 0 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .1 7 0 .2 5 0 .2 4
Algeria 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 3 0 .1 8 0 .1 8
Angola 0 .0 9 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 7 0 .2 3 0 .2 4
Armenia 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 7 0 .2 2 0 .2 4
Azerbaijan, Rep. of 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .2 7 0 .31 0 .3 7 0 .3 3 0 .4 0 0 .4 6
B angladesh 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 0
Benin 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 7 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 3 0 .1 4
Bhutan 0 .1 2 0 .1 9 0 .1 7 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 7 0 .2 4 0 .3 3 0 .3 5
Bolivia 0 .0 9 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 5 0 .2 0 0 .2 6 0 .2 8
Bosnia & H erzegovina 0 .1 4 0 .2 1 0 .2 0 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .2 2 0 .3 1 0 .3 2
Burkina Faso 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .1 1 0 .1 6 0 .1 6
Burundi 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 8 0 .2 5 0 .2 5
Cambodia 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 5
Cam eroon 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 2
Cape Verde 0 .1 7 0 .2 6 0 .2 4 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 7 0 .2 9 0 .4 0 0 .4 1
Central African Rep. 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 2
Chad 0 .0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 6 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .1 1 0 .1 2
China,P.R.: Mainland 0 .1 4 0 .2 2 0 .2 1 n.a. n.a. n .a . n .a . n.a. n .a .
Colombia 0 .1 2 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .2 2 0 .3 0 0 .3 1
Com oros 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 3 0 .1 6 0 .1 9 0 .2 5 0 .3 3 0 .3 5
C ongo, D em . Rep. of 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .1 7
Congo, Republic o f 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 6 0 .2 2 0 .2 3
Cote d'Ivoire 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 2 0 .1 7 0 .1 7
Djibouti 0 .1 5 0 .2 3 0 .2 1 0 .2 0 0 .2 3 0 .2 7 0 .3 5 0 .4 6 0 .4 8
Dom inican Republic 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 4 0 .1 9 0 .2 0
Ecuador 0 .1 0 0 .1 5 0 .1 4 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .2 6 0 .2 7
Egypt 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 3
El Salvador 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .1 9 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .2 1 0 .2 9 0 .3 0
Eritrea 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 7 0 .2 2 0 .2 4
Ethiopia 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .1 6
Gam bia, The 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 7 0 .2 1 0 .2 6 0 .3 4 0 .3 7
Georgia 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 5 0 .2 0 0 .2 1
Ghana 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .2 5 0 .2 6
G uatem ala 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .2 1 0 .2 8 0 .3 0
Guinea 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 2
G uinea-Bissau 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .1 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .2 2 0 .3 0 0 .3 0
Guyana 0 .2 1 0 .3 1 0 .2 9 0 .1 9 0 .2 2 0 .2 7 0 .4 0 0 .5 4 0 .5 6
Haiti 0 .0 3 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 3
Honduras 0 .1 4 0 .2 2 0 .2 0 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .2 3 0 .3 2 0 .3 3
India 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 8 0 .2 3 0 .2 5
Indonesia 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .1 4 0 .1 6 0 .1 9 0 .1 9 0 .2 4 0 .2 7
Iran, I.R. of 0 .0 3 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 4 0 .1 7 0 .1 9
Jordan 0 .1 0 0 .1 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 4 0 .1 6 0 .1 9 0 .2 4 0 .3 2 0 .3 4
Kenya 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .2 2 0 .2 3
Kyrgyz Republic 0 .1 0 0 .1 6 0 .1 4 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 6 0 .2 2 0 .2 9 0 .3 0
Lao People's D em .R ep 0 .0 4 0 .0 7 0 .0 6 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 9 0 .2 1
M acedonia, FYR 0 .2 1 0 .3 1 0 .2 9 0 .1 3 0 .1 5 0 .1 8 0 .3 4 0 .4 6 0 .4 7
M adagascar 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 5
Malawi 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .1 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .2 3 0 .3 1 0 .3 2
Maldives 0 .2 2 0 .3 3 0 .3 1 0 .2 9 0 .3 3 0 .4 1 0 .5 1 0 .6 6 0 .7 2
(C ontinued)
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IT Equipment Com m unications Equipm ent Total ICT Equipment
Country 1 9 9 1 -1995
1 9 9 6 -
20 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
200 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 6
1 9 9 1 -
1995
1 9 9 6 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 6
Mali 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .1 1 0 .1 1
Mauritania 0 .0 7 0 .11 0 .1 0 0 .07 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 4 0 .1 9 0 .1 9
Moldova 0 .1 8 0 .2 7 0 .2 4 0 .09 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .2 8 0 .3 8 0 .3 7
Mongolia 0 .1 2 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .16 0 .1 9 0 .2 2 0 .2 8 0 .3 7 0 .3 9
M orocco 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .2 5 0 .2 6
M ozam bique 0 .1 0 0 .1 5 0 .1 4 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .2 4 0 .2 5
M yanmar 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .1 8
Nepal 0 .0 8 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .05 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 4 0 .1 9 0 .1 9
Nicaragua 0 .1 7 0 .2 6 0 .2 4 0 .13 0 .1 5 0 .1 8 0 .3 0 0 .4 1 0 .4 2
Niger 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 3
Nigeria 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 5
Pakistan 0 .0 5 0 .0 8 0 .0 7 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 0 0 .1 3 0 .1 4
Papua New G uinea 0 .1 6 0 .2 4 0 .2 2 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .2 2 0 .3 1 0 .3 0
Peru 0 .1 2 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 9 0 .2 6 0 .2 7
Philippines 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .21 0 .2 4 0 .2 9 0 .3 0 0 .3 9 0 .4 3
Rwanda 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 6 0 .1 7
Sam oa 0 .2 1 0 .3 2 0 .3 0 0 .15 0 .1 7 0 .2 0 0 .3 6 0 .4 9 0 .5 0
S en ega l 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .1 7 0 .2 4 0 .2 4
Sierra Leone 0 .1 4 0 .2 1 0 .1 9 0 .1 2 0 .1 4 0 .1 7 0 .2 6 0 .3 5 0 .3 6
Solom on Islands 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .1 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .2 1 0 .2 9 0 .2 9
Sri Lanka 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 8 0 .2 5 0 .2 6
Sudan 0 .0 4 0 .0 6 0 .0 6 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 2
Syrian Arab Republic 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .0 8
Tajikistan 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .1 2 0 .1 3
Tanzania 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 5 0 .2 0 0 .2 1
Thailand 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .1 7 0 .2 0 0 .2 4 0 .2 7 0 .3 4 0 .3 8
Togo 0 .0 6 0 .1 0 0 .0 9 0 .08 0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 4 0 .1 8 0 .1 9
Tonga 0 .1 7 0 .2 6 0 .2 5 0 .15 0 .1 7 0 .2 0 0 .3 2 0 .4 3 0 .4 5
Tunisia 0 .1 1 0 .1 6 0 .1 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 7 0 .2 4 0 .2 5
Turkm enistan 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 6 0 .0 8 0 .0 9
Uganda 0 .0 7 0 .1 1 0 .1 1 0 .0 5 0 .0 6 0 .0 7 0 .1 3 0 .1 7 0 .1 8
Ukraine 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .1 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .2 3 0 .3 1 0 .3 1
Uzbekistan 0 .0 6 0 .0 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 4 0 .1 8 0 .1 9
Vanuatu 0 .1 7 0 .2 6 0 .2 4 0 .11 0 .1 3 0 .1 6 0 .2 8 0 .3 9 0 .4 0
Vietnam 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .1 4 0 .1 6 0 .2 0 0 .2 3 0 .3 0 0 .3 3
Y em en, Republic of 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 4 0 .0 4 0 .0 5 0 .0 5 0 .0 7 0 .0 8
Zambia 0 .1 3 0 .2 0 0 .1 9 0 .0 8 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .2 1 0 .2 9 0 .3 0
Zim babwe 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .1 7 0 .11 0 .1 3 0 .1 5 0 .2 4 0 .3 2 0 .3 3
Country groups (un w eigh ted  a v era g es)
All countries covered 0 .0 9 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .0 9 0 .1 1 0 .1 3 0 .1 9 0 .2 5 0 .2 6
LIC 0 .0 8 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .1 0 0 .1 5 0 .2 0 0 .2 1
LMC 0 .1 1 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .11 0 .1 3 0 .1 5 0 .2 2 0 .3 0 0 .3 1
Source: Author's calculations.
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V . C o n c l u s io n s
A. Introduction
The different chapters in this volume represent contributions to the literature on economic 
growth in the context of economic development, focusing on long-run changes in incomes 
(and health standards, as in parts of Chapter III), addressing issues that are particular relevant 
in developing countries (as our discussion of the impacts of HIV/AIDS, in Chapter II and 
parts of Chapter III), or extending the analysis of issues that have primarily been addressed in 
the context of the most advanced industrialized countries (notably the United States or other 
OECD countries) to a developing-country context (as in our analysis of the macroeconomic 
consequences of ICT-related capital deepening). Before discussing and summarizing the 
contributions from our studies in more detail, we present some of the key findings.
B. Key Findings
Macroeconomic impact o f  HIV/AIDS:
•  Allowing for capital mobility, our analysis returns a stronger impact of HIV/AIDS on 
output and income per capita than the corresponding closed-economy models.
• The estimated impact on the informal sector is more pronounced than for the formal 
sector, reflecting a stronger impact of HIV/AIDS on savings rates.
• GDP per capita is lower in the scenario with comprehensive scaling-up of 
antiretroviral treatment, as rising costs of care and treatment affect savings rates.
Contributions o f health (and income) to living standards:
• For leading industrialized countries, the contribution of health over long periods of 
time has been of similar magnitude as rising incomes, but the contribution of health 
has slowed down since about 1950.
• For developing countries, a similar slowdown occurred somewhat later.
• HIV/AIDS has resulted in steep declines in living standards in a number of countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
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ICT-related capital deepening and growth:
• The estimated impact of ICT-related capital deepening on growth in developing 
countries is substantial (about 0.3 percentage points), although lower than comparable 
estimates for leading industrialized countries.
• Unlike in some industrialized countries, the impact of ICT-related capital deepening 
has not slowed down after 2000, owing to increased absorption of communications 
equipment.
C. Health, HIV/AIDS, and Economic Growth
The objectives of our analysis are two-fold. (1) On the methodological side, our study aims 
to assess certain properties of models commonly applied to the study of the economic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS. (2) Based on a review of the evidence on the impacts of HIV/AIDS 
on certain relevant variables, we provide an updated assessment of the economic impacts of 
HIV/AIDS, including -  for the first time in an academic study -  an assessment of the 
macroeconomic impacts of increased access to antiretroviral treatment.
In terms of the methodological aspects of our analysis, our study was motivated by an 
apparent incongruence between the closed-economy assumption adopted by most studies of 
the macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS and the fact that many of the highly-affected 
countries are characterized by a high degree of capital mobility and a prominent role of 
foreign direct investment. We find that allowing for capital mobility invalidates an important 
channel that reverses much of the adverse macroeconomic impacts of HIV/AIDS in the 
literature -  the link between a reduced population growth rate, the capital-labor ratio, and 
output per capita. Instead, in an open-economy setting, a decline in population growth results 
in a decline in the rate of return to capital, and a capital outflow (or fall in inward investment) 
until the equilibrium in the capital market is restored. In this open-economy setting, however, 
it is important to distinguish between output per capita and income per capita (as capital 
flows have implications for net income from abroad). Our analysis of the macroeconomic 
impacts of HIV/AIDS therefore also covers income per capita, with similar findings.
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Our calibrated model returns an impact of HIV/AIDS on output per capita that is rather 
small -  a decline of about 1 percent in a closed-economy setting,, rising to about 4 percent in 
the open-economy setting (the adverse impact is stronger in the open-economy setting for the 
reasons just discussed). In the dual-economy model, our findings point towards some 
distributional impacts of HIV/AIDS, as the adverse impacts of HIV/AIDS are more 
pronounced for the informal sector. This has also some implications for the impacts of 
HIV/AIDS on poverty, as the level of incomes is lower in the informal sector.
Regarding the economic consequences of increased access to antiretroviral treatment, our 
findings may seem counterintuitive at first sight -  we find that scaling-up of treatment results 
has a negative impact on GDP per capita. While antiretroviral treatment reduces HIV/AIDS- 
related mortality and restores people living with HIV/AIDS to full productivity for many 
years, there are two effects offsetting these “gains.” First, scaling-up of treatment most likely 
is associated with an expansion in government expenditures, as well as increased private 
expenditures on accessing treatment (even if external grants cover the costs of drugs and 
other costs). This results in a decline in national savings, eroding the capital stock. Second, 
increased access to treatment reverses some of the negative impact o f HIV/AIDS on 
population growth, as well as any increases in the capital-labor ration associated with lower 
population growth. One notable property of our estimates is that the negative impacts of 
antiretroviral treatment on output per capita were more pronounced for the informal sector, as 
the costs of access to treatment (and the decline in savings rates) were higher relative to 
income in this sector.
One notable shortcoming of the different strands of analysis presented in this chapter 
regards the distribution of income. Some of our findings point to a disproportionate impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the informal sector, suggesting that the impact on poverty may be higher than 
what is suggested by estimated changes in income per capita. More generally, an important 
dimension of the economic impacts of HIV/AIDS are the uneven impacts across households, 
most importantly regarding the distinction between households affected by HIV/AIDS and 
those not affected. The use of aggregate models does not capture such distributional effects 
on the microeconomic level, even though these distributional effects may have important
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implications for the macroeconomic impacts (and especially for poverty-related 
indicators).215
A second area that our analysis touched only in passing are the differences between the 
economic impacts predicted by models synthesizing the immediate effects of HIV/AIDS on 
macroeconomic variables such as the savings rate, labor productivity, and the rate of 
population growth, and deriving the implications of such changes for economic growth, and 
models taking a longer-run approach, with forward-looking agents, allowing, for example, 
for impacts of HIV/AIDS on the accumulation of human capital or fertility rates. While the 
models discussed in our study predict a moderate negative impact of HIV/AIDS on GDP per 
capita, the models exhibiting more complex frameworks regarding agents forward-looking 
decision can return large impacts of HIV/AIDS on GDP per capita, range from severe 
contractions (see, for example, Bell, Devarajan, and Gersbach (2006)) to the more cheerful 
scenarios proposed by Young (2005). A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of 
the different modeling strategies is beyond the scope of this review. However, we note that 
our findings regarding the consequences of allowing for some capital mobility also apply to 
the models featuring a richer microeconomic structure, in particular models in which declines 
in the rate of population growth and an associated increase in the capital-labor ration play an 
important role (as in Young (2005)).
D. Contribution of Health (and Income) to Living Standards
Our analysis on the role of health in changing living standards draws primarily on two 
strands of the literature -  accounts of the economic history of countries through long periods 
of development, noting that improvements in income over this time have been accompanied 
by increases in life expectancy (see, for example, Crafts (1997), and the literature on the 
economic impacts of HIV/AIDS, where observers are sometimes puzzled by the large 
magnitude of the impact of HIV/AIDS on demographic and health indicators, whereas the
2,5 For a discussion o f  the impacts o f  HIV/AIDS on poverty and inequality, in a setting where GDP per capita 
changes only very little, see Salinas and Haacker
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impacts on indicators like GDP per capita are of a much smaller magnitude (see. For 
example, Young (2005).216
While the microeconomic foundations of our analysis are straightforward and well- 
researched, our analysis is demanding as it covers not only long periods (up 136 years) in 
which incomes and the state of health have improved very significantly, but also episodes 
characterized by large declines in life expectancy in some countries. For these reasons, we 
have developed the analytical tools in order to adapt them to the analysis of large discrete 
changes in incomes and, in particular, life expectancy.
The choice of suitable parameters represents another challenge. Most of the valuations of 
health improvements relative to incomes are based on data from high- or higher-middle- 
income countries, with a disproportionate share of studies coming from the United States. In 
light of the very large differences in incomes per capita between advanced industrialized 
countries and low-income countries, adopting specifications which work for the high-income 
countries they were designed for in low-income countries may not make sense.217 Based on 
the available evidence, we adopt a specification in which valuations of changes in life 
expectancy are proportional to the level of GDP per capita, motivated by the existing 
literature. However, it is important to note that this represents a second-best approach to a 
study that would more directly draw on evidence from developing countries.
Our study -  in line with earlier studies -  finds that increasing life expectancy has played 
an important role in improving living standards over long periods of development, roughly 
on par with improving income per capita (for a group of 17 (of today’s) leading 
industrialized countries since 1970, and in a global dataset from 1950. However, our study 
finds that the contribution of improved health to living standards has declined -  from about
2,6 A third branch o f the literature, which we are not directly concerned with but which was influential in 
developing the analytical tools we are using is the literature on the value o f  health improvements in specific 
country settings, for example to assess the value o f medical research (see Murphy and Topel (2005) for an 
influential study) or to conduct cost-effectiveness analyses o f some planned law or policy intervention.
217 See our discussion o f  the work by Philipson and Soares (2005).
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1950 for the leading industrialized countries, and somewhat later for the other countries 
included in the post-1950 sample. The analysis of global trends also points to the special 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa, which stands out as improvements in life expectancy (and 
the associated increases in living standards) have turned negative since 1990, which takes us 
to the second area of interest in our study, as the drop in the contribution of increasing life 
expectancy to living standards in sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to the impact of the 
evolving HIV epidemic. The modest decline in life expectancy since 1990 is even more 
troublesome when considering that other health determinants have improved, so that the 
actual decline in life expectancy provides a gross underestimate of the impact of HIV/AIDS.
Using data from the United Nations Population Division (2007), which provides 
estimates of key demographic indicators, as well as a counterfactual no-AIDS scenario, we 
find that HIV/AIDS has resulted in a decline in life expectancy of almost 7 years, translating 
into a deterioration in living standards of 38 percent. In some countries, with losses in life 
expectancy of over 15 years, we estimate that the deterioration in living standards may well 
amount to around 70 percent. In terms of economic growth, the adverse impact of HIV/AIDS 
reversed some of the modest contribution of growth of GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa 
(0.6 percent annually), so that living standards improved by only 0.4 percent annually (and 
would have improved by more than 2.5 percent annually without the impact of HIV/AIDS).
As in our discussion of the impacts of HIV/AIDS on growth, our study introduces an 
analysis of the economic impacts of increased access to antiretroviral treatment. Based on 
estimates from United Nations Population Division (2007), we find that comprehensive 
access to antiretroviral treatment would reduce the adverse impact of HIV/AIDS on life 
expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa from 6.8 years to 5.6 years, and reduce the deterioration in 
living standards from 38 percent to 32 percent.
E. ICT Equipment Investment and Growth in Development
One of the challenges regarding the analysis of the impacts of ICT-related capital deepening 
is the lack of sufficiently detailed national accounts data. For this reason, a sub-chapter 
(IV.2) is devoted to the construction of a dataset of spending on ICT equipment across 
countries. As most developing countries (here, we focus on low- and low-middle income
313
countries, as defined by the World Bank) do not produce ICT equipment (so that it is not 
necessary to take into account domestic production),218 our estimates of ICT-related spending 
are based on trade data. As a number of other researchers (see, for example, Feenstra and 
others, 2005) we use partner country data to obtain estimates of trade flows for countries not 
reporting trade data themselves. The “value added” from the dataset that we construct arises 
from a correction in these indirectly observed trade data to account for trade between non­
reporting countries, which would otherwise in a bias in our data that is correlated with key 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP per capita.
The theoretical framework we use is based on the work originating from Griliches and 
Jorgenson (1966, 1967) and adapted to the study of the economic impacts of ICTs by 
Jorgenson and his collaborators (see Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), or Jorgenson, Ho, and 
Stiroh (2000)), adapted to account for the limited availability of data in developing countries. 
Notably, owing to labor market developments, we estimate the contribution of ICT-related 
capital deepening to growth, but do not attempt to break down the remainder into 
contributions of labor inputs and other factors. In addition to the steady-state properties of the 
model, we also provide estimates of the contributions of ICT-related capital deepening over 
time, interpreting shocks to the relative prices of ICT equipment as perturbations around the 
steady-state growth path.
We find that ICT-related capital deepening contribute about 0.3 percentage points to 
economic growth for 97 low- and low-middle-income countries in 2001-06, with a 
somewhat lower contribution for low-income countries (0.26 percentage points) than for low- 
middle-income countries (0.35 percentage points). For low-income countries, the 
contributions of declining prices of IT equipment and of communications equipment, 
respectively, are about even (0.13 percentage points each), the differences between low- and 
low-middle-income countries are explained by higher levels of absorption of IT equipment 
(relative to GDP) in the latter countries.
218 For the few ICT producers in this country group, we adopt a somewhat different approach.
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In summary, our estimates suggest that ICT-related capital deepening does have a 
substantial impact on growth in low- and low-middle-income countries. However, our 
estimates of the growth impacts of ICT-related capital deepening are lower than available 
estimates for the United States or other OECD countries.219 As these differences may reflect 
methodological, as well as underlying economic differences, we also estimate the 
contributions of IT-related capital deepening, using Global Insight’s (2006) “Global IT 
Navigator” database on IT spending, which is geared towards high- and higher-middle- 
income countries. (Note that this exercise, unless the previous one, does not include 
communications equipment.) Based on these data, we estimate a contribution of ICT-related 
capital deepening for the 2001-2005 period of 0.27 percentage points for 28 high-income 
countries, 0.25 percentage points for 18 higher-middle income countries, and 0.16 percentage 
points both for 18 low-middle-income countries and only 5 low-income countries included in 
the Global Insight sample. Overall, our estimates of the growth impacts IT-related capital 
deepening thus suggest that the impacts in low-income countries are about half of the impacts 
observed in high-income countries., and that the impacts in low-middle incomes are 
somewhat higher than those in low-income countries.
Finally, we provide an analysis of the growth impacts of ICT-related capital deepening in 
low- and low-middle-income countries over time, interpreting shocks to the relative prices of 
ICT equipment as successive perturbations to a steady-state equilibrium, followed by a 
gradual adjustment. Overall, we find that the contribution of ICT-related capital deepening 
has been increasing between 1991 and 2006, both in low-income countries and in low- 
middle-income countries. Early on (notably between 1994 and 1998), the acceleration was 
driven by an acceleration in the rate of technological progress embodied in IT equipment. In 
this regard, the pattern of growth attributed to ICT-related capital deepening (on a lower 
overall level) mirrors the findings from studies focusing on the United States or other OECD
2,9 For example, for the 1995-2004 period, van Ark, O’Mahoney, and Timmer estimate a contribution to growth 
from ICT-related capital deepening o f  0.5 percentage points for the European Union, and 0.8 percentage points 
for the United States. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2008) estimate contributions to growth from ICT-related 
capital deepening for the United States o f 1.0 percentage points in 1995-2000, and 0.6 percentage points in 
2000-2006.
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countries. For the latter part of the period under consideration, the contribution of ICT- 
related capital deepening in low- and low-middle-income countries remains stable, as a 
declining role of IT-related capital deepening is compensated by an increasing role of 
communications equipment. These trends are in contrast with findings suggesting that the 
growth contribution of ICT-related capital deepening has peaked in the late 1990s in the 
United States and other OECD countries.
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